Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciary's Fiscal Autonomy

EN BANC

[A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC. June 14, 1993.]

RESOLUTION

Gentlemen :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 1993

"A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC (Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciary's Fiscal Autonomy)

The administrative matter, at bar treats of Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution reading as follows:

"SEC. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval shall be automatically and regularly released."

In a letter dated August 27, 1992, addressed to Hon. Salvador M. Enriquez, Jr.,Secretary of Budget and Management, the Chief Justice made the following statements as regards the budget of the Court and of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, and of the judiciary in general, viz.:

"The Court wishes me to express to you its deep disappointment upon its discovery that your Department revised the Court's budget for 1993 that it had asked you, through my letter to you of April 24, 1992, simply to submit to the Congress for consideration and approval. The Court has been informed that your Department made its own determination of the Court's needs and plans as regards personal services (including the creation of new court salas and new positions),capital outlay (including the acquisition of equipment),and maintenance and operating expenses.

It is to be regretted that this was done without prior consultation with, or even advance notice to, the Court, much less a statement of the reasons therefor, and despite the Court's having made known to you its desire that the fiscal autonomy provisions of the Constitution be strictly observed. You will recall that I had occasion to stress this in my letter to you of February 14, 1992, and again in the letter dated May 22, 1992 which in the Court's behalf I, together with the heads of the other independent constitutional offices, addressed to Her Excellency, then President Corazon C. Aquino — of which you were doubtless made aware, and to which was appended the "Joint Resolution" on Fiscal Autonomy of all said officers, dated April 3, 1992. I once more intimated this in my letter to you, of April 24, 1992 transmitting the Court's budget for 1993 to you 'for submission in due course to the Congress of the Philippines and eventual inclusion in the National Budget.' In any event, in its decision in G.R. No. 103524 (Cesar Bengzon, et al. v. Hon. Franklin N. Drilon, etc.,et al.) and Adm. No. 91-8-225-CA (Request of Retired Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, et al.),promulgated on April 15, 1992, the Court has made the meaning of fiscal autonomy quite clear. EHTISC

'What is fiscal autonomy?

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.'

In my letter to you of February 14, 1992 above adverted to, I pointed out that:

"...the constitutional provision ...is clear in what it commands and implies: that within the bounds of its allotted appropriations, the Judiciary, represented by the Supreme Court, is the sole judge of how they are to be spent, and where and when; and that the Court does not have to justify its programs of expenditures, or be answerable in the ordering of its priorities, to any person or agency. No lesser authority can be inferred from the cited provision, no other meaning given to the term "fiscal autonomy" and the unmistakable injunction that appropriations for the Judiciary "shall be automatically and regularly released," i.e.,even without request therefor, and most certainly without being compelled to justify or explain its requirements.

As one of the three great departments of Government, coordinate and co-equal vis a vis the Executive and the Legislative branches, the Court feels that, under the circumstances, it is entitled to know why and by what authority the unilateral revision of its budget has been done, and what steps you believe might now be taken to ensure that any change in the Court's 1993 budget be entrusted solely to the Congress to which, after all, this function rightfully and exclusively belongs.

I hardly need add that much the same things may be said about the action taken on the budget of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by your office which, regrettably, again appears to have substituted its own judgment for that of the Tribunal as to some of its own requirements."

The letter closed with the request that the Honorable Secretary give the matter "preferential attention" and a reply be submitted in five (5) days.

The Hon. Secretary of Budget and Management having duly responded, orally and in writing, with the assistance of the Solicitor General, the Chief Justice had occasion to address another letter on the same subject to the latter, under date of January 15, 1993, in which the following statements were made, viz.:

"Whatever past practice the Court might have put up with "in the interest of comity and cooperation," as Bengzon so aptly states, there was no agreement to subject budget proposals of the Judiciary to what is referred to as the 'the standard preparation, review and evaluation process of the DBM,' or to recognize in that department the capacity to raise issues on the proposals for submission to Congress 'for arbitration.' HDTISa

The Court recognizes that it is the duty of the DBM to obtain as accurate a picture of total resources as possible for any given year and suggest to Congress how essential services and other programs of Government might be funded. In other words, DBM studies priorities and proposes to the legislature how the expected revenues should be apportioned among the various agencies and instrumentalities of the Government. This function, however, in so far as the Judiciary is concerned, is purely advisory and should address nothing more specific than general fiscal policy. It may not be exercised in such a manner as, under the guise of budget preparation, to infringe the Judiciary's independence and fiscal autonomy.

To be very clear, the Court's position is that the fiscal autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution makes it the sole judge of the requirements of the Judiciary and how these are to be funded from the monies appropriated by law, and of the Judiciary's priorities and their ordering. This prerogative is subject only to the constitutional authority vested in Congress over the national budget.(Italics supplied)

I do appreciate ...your ...intent to reduce the areas of irritation and annoyance between the Court and the DBM on the question of how the Judiciary's budget is to be dealt with. On the other hand, in light of Bengzon,any accommodation that would to any extent dilute the Court's authority on the matter would be out of the question."

Again the Honorable Secretary of Budget and Management made due response. In none of their responses above-mentioned did either the Secretary or the Solicitor General manifest any serious objection to the Court's basic postulates; indeed, both expressed substantial agreement therewith.

After deliberating on the matter, THE COURT RESOLVED TO ESTABLISH THE FOLLOWING GUIDING PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE BUDGET OF THE JUDICIARY, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, HENCEFORTH TO BE OBSERVED AND IMPLEMENTED BY ALL CONCERNED, to wit:

1. The Court shall prepare the annual budget proposal for the judiciary and itself submit it to Congress for approval. A copy thereof shall be submitted to the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 22 of Article VII of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill a budget expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures."

2. The budget proposal for the Judiciary, as prepared by the Supreme Court, shall be incorporated in the draft national budget. The Department of Budget and Management make revisions thereon as it may deem appropriate provided that the latter clearly indicate that the revisions are its own and not the Court's, and provided further that each item as to which revision is sought by the Department shall be indicated in brackets on the draft national budget for consideration by the Congress.

3. The Department of Budget and Management shall consult with the Supreme Court concerning its comments on and suggested revisions of the proposed budget for the Judiciary.

4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released subject to availability of funds.

5. The Supreme Court may submit to the Department of Budget and Management reports of operation and income, current plantilla of personnel, work and financial plans and similar reports only for recording purposes. The submission thereof concerning funds previously released shall not be a condition precedent for subsequent fund releases".Bidin, J.,is on leave.

Very truly yours,

DANIEL T. MARTINEZClerk of CourtSupreme Court of the Philippines

By:

(SGD.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNOClerk of CourtSupreme Court of the Philippines