Request for Special Allowances for the Chief Justice's Staff Head, Fiscal Management and Budget Office Chief and the Program Management Office Director
On March 29, 2005, the Philippine Supreme Court addressed a request from certain court officials for special allowances, citing the principle of "equal pay for equal work." The request was based on Republic Act No. 9227, which grants additional compensation to justices and judges, but the Court found that the requesting officials lacked the judicial rank necessary to qualify for these allowances. Although the officials argued that their roles were comparable to those receiving special allowances, the Court concluded that their positions did not warrant the same compensation under existing laws. Ultimately, the Court recommended granting adjusted allowances equivalent to what their counterparts received, effective from November 11, 2003, and emphasized the need for equitable treatment in compensation across the judiciary.
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- What is Request for Special Allowances for the Chief Justice's Staff Head, Fiscal Management and Budget Office Chief and the Program Management Office Director about?
- On March 29, 2005, the Philippine Supreme Court addressed a request from certain court officials for special allowances, citing the principle of "equal pay for equal work." The request was based on Republic Act No. 9227, which grants additional compensation to justices and judges, but the Court found that the requesting officials lacked the judicial rank necessary to qualify for these allowances. Although the officials argued that their roles were comparable to those receiving special allowances, the Court concluded that their positions did not warrant the same compensation under existing laws. Ultimately, the Court recommended granting adjusted allowances equivalent to what their counterparts received, effective from November 11, 2003, and emphasized the need for equitable treatment in compensation across the judiciary.
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- Request for Special Allowances for the Chief Justice's Staff Head, Fiscal Management and Budget Office Chief and the Program Management Office Director (<--!03292005-->A.M. No. 04-11-13-SC) was enacted on Mar 29, 2005.
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- <--!03292005-->A.M. No. 04-11-13-SC
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- Supreme Court Issuances
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- Notices
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Full Law Text
March 29, 2005
A.M. No. 04-11-13-SC
Sirs/Mesdames :
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 29, 2005
A.M. NO. 04-11-13-SC — RE: REQUEST FOR SPECIAL ALLOWANCES FOR THE POSITIONS OF CHIEF JUSTICE'S STAFF HEAD, CHIEF OF THE FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE AND DIRECTOR OF THE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE. AScTaD
Institutionalized in every civilized jurisdiction is the principle of "equal pay for equal work." This guarantees to every employee his right to fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value. 1 It will be an affront to this principle if this Court, the ultimate bulwark of human rights, will just close its eyes to the unequal and discriminatory rates of payment for work or positions of the same category within its own backyard. lawcd2005
On November 11, 2003, Republic Act No. 9227 2 took effect, granting additional compensation in the form of special allowances to justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court,the pertinent portions of which read:
"Sec. 2. Grant of Special Allowances.— All justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court,as authorized under existing laws, shall be granted special allowances equivalent to one hundred (100%) of the basic monthly salary specified for their respective salary grades under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, to be implemented for a period of four (4) years. EHSITc
The grant of special allowances shall be implemented uniformly in such sums or amounts equivalent to twenty-five (25%) of the basic salaries of the positions covered hereof. Subsequent implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by the funding source specified in Section 3 hereof."
In their memorandum dated November 8, 2004, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,Mr. Joseph Bryan Hilary P. Davide and Atty. Annaliza Ty-Capacite (Chief Justice's Staff Heads),Mrs. Corazon M. Ordoñez (Director V, Chief of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office),and Mrs. Evelyn T. Dumdum (Director V, Program Management Office) requested that "they be granted the special allowance equivalent to the amount received by the other Chiefs of Office chargeable against the savings of the Court effective November 11, 2003 when R.A. No. 9227 was implemented." They emphasized that their positions, with Salary Grade 29 under Republic Act No. 6758, 3 are similar to the positions of their counterparts (Chiefs of Offices) in the Office of Administrative Services, 4 Office of the Chief Attorney, 5 Office of the Reporter, 6 Judicial Records Office 7 and Management Information Systems Office. 8 With the implementation of R.A. No. 9227, only these Chiefs of Office are granted special allowances indicated below:
From Nov. 11, 2003 to Nov. 10, 2004
|
Name
|
Amount
|
|
| 1. | Campana, Ma. Piedad F. |
P6,816.34
|
| 2. | Candelaria, Eden T. |
6,653.75
|
| 3. | Dimaisip, Teresita G. |
7,524.04
|
| 4. | Diño, Edna E. |
7,161.26
|
| 5. | Uy, Ivan John E. |
7,340.55
|
From Nov. 11, 2004 to Nov. 10, 2005
|
Name
|
Amount
|
|
| 1. | Campana, Ma. Piedad F. |
P13,632.68
|
| 2. | Candelaria, Eden T. |
13,307.50
|
| 3. | Dimaisip, Teresita G. |
15,048.08
|
| 4. | Diño, Edna E. |
14,322.52
|
| 5. | Uy, Ivan John E. |
14,681.10
|
From Nov. 11, 2005 to Nov. 10, 2006
|
Name
|
Amount
|
|
| 1. | Campana, Ma. Piedad F. |
P20,449.02
|
| 2. | Candelaria, Eden T. |
19,961.25
|
| 3. | Dimaisip, Teresita G. |
22,572.12
|
| 4. | Diño, Edna E. |
21,483.78
|
| 5. | Uy, Ivan John E. |
22,021.65
|
From Nov. 11, 2006 to Nov. 10, 2007
|
Name
|
Amount
|
|
| 1. | Campana, Ma. Piedad F. |
P27,265.36
|
| 2. | Candelaria, Eden T. |
26,615.00
|
| 3. | Dimaisip, Teresita G. |
30,096.16
|
| 4. | Diño, Edna E. |
28,645.04
|
| 5. | Uy, Ivan John E. |
29,362.20
|
The Court En Banc referred the matter to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Administrative Officer, and Atty. Edna E. Diño, Chief Attorney, for their evaluation, report and recommendation.
In her report, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the request be denied for lack of legal basis. She is of the opinion that since the positions of the requesting officials have not been conferred judicial rank, they are not covered by R.A. No. 9227. To grant them special allowances would amount to stretching too far the coverage of R.A. No. 9227 tantamount to circumvention of the law.
Atty. Diño shared the same view. However, she pointed out that the Chief Justice has the authority to grant allowances to court personnel under the Special Provision Applicable to the Judiciary of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for FY 2003, 9 quoted as follows:
"1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of the appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel,and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the personal services itemization including, but not limited to the transfer of item or creation of new positions in the Judiciary: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices, PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws." CHcETA
Thus, Atty. Diño recommended that Mr. Davide, et al.be granted an "adjusted allowance" in the amount of P4,875.00, equivalent to the representation allowance that each receives. In allowing the adjusted allowance of only P4,875.00, she submitted that the authority of the Chief Justice to grant the adjusted allowance is limited by the above provision that "the implementation ...shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws."
While we agree with Atty. Diño, however, we are convinced that the proposed adjusted allowance should be equivalent to the amount being received by each of the other Chiefs of Office.
Let it be stressed that the positions of Mr. Davide, Atty. Capacite, Mrs. Ordoñez and Mrs. Dumdum carry the same responsibilities and burdens as those of the other Chiefs of Office. Their assigned tasks affect the entire judiciary and the course it is treading. Compared with their counterparts, their positions and functions cannot be said to be less important.The following job descriptions indicate their particular worth in the organizational structure of the judiciary:
"1. The Chief Justice Staff Head which is analogous to the Chiefs of Staff of the Vice-President and Senate President. Being the representative of the Chief Justice, he/she administers the affairs within the Office of the Chief Justice, acts on matters as may be authorized, and assumes duties and responsibilities delegated by the Chief Justice.
2. Director V
a. Chief Fiscal Management and Budget Office which is equivalent to Assistant Secretary of Finance and Management in the Executive Branch as provided under PD 1592; directs and supervises the fiscal affairs of the Judiciary nationwide; plans and prepares budget proposals, controls expenditures in accordance with the Appropriation Act, coordinates with Congress, Department of Budget and Management, Commission on Audit, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Treasury and other government offices relating to the Judiciary's financial operations;
b. Program Director assumes the responsibilities of carrying out the Judicial Reform Program as set forth and enunciated in the Action Program for Judicial Reform (APJR);directs and formulates the program management strategy of the Project Management Office; liaise with the funding agencies or donors and set up mechanisms for efficient mobilization of resources to finance specific project and activities of the APJR."
Clearly, the duties and responsibilities of Mr. Davide, et al. are not only confined within the Supreme Court but the entire Judiciary. Mrs. Ordoñez, for one, directs and supervises the fiscal affairs of the Judiciary nationwide. She coordinates with other national offices, particularly the Congress, Department of Budget, Commission on Audit, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Bureau of Treasury on matters affecting the Judiciary's financial operations. Mrs. Dumdum, for another, is responsible in implementing the Judicial Reform Program and works with the funding agencies or donors, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, and sets up mechanisms for efficient mobilization of resources to finance specific projects and activities of the APJR. CTIDcA
Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.
Section 6, Article XII of the 1973 Constitution contains a similar provision. Pursuant thereto, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his legislative powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 985. 10 With the advent of the new Constitution, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758, 11 otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law. Section 2 declares that it is the policy of the State "to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions."
To give life to this policy, Congress adopted the scheme provided by P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar salaries. This scheme is known as the "Grade," definedin P.D.No.985 as:
"Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibility and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation." 12
The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that they may be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation."
The fact that the positions of Mr. Davide, et al. and their counterparts are assigned Salary Grade 29 pursuant toR.A. No. 6758, only shows that their positions are"sufficiently equivalent." While it is true that they are not lawyers, except Atty. Capacite, however, such qualification is not demanded by the nature of their work.Certainly, one need not be a lawyer to be the Chief of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office. The best person suited for such kind of position is one who has a background in finance or accountancy. In grouping the positions of all the Chiefs of Office involved herein under Salary Grade 29, the Department of Budgetand Management saw "sufficient equality" among these positions, notwithstanding the dissimilarities in the qualification requirements.It bears emphasizing that "qualification" is not the sole criterion provided by law,the "level of difficulty and responsibility" is likewise taken into account. Section 9 of R.A. No. 6758 more specifically provides:
"SEC. 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions.— For positions below the Officials mentioned under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the National Government, local government units, government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions, the Department of Budget and Management is hereby directed to prepare the Index Occupational Services to be guided by the Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following factors: (1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position; (2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;(3) the kind of supervision received; (4) the mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of work;(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;(6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-makingresponsibility;(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment;and(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
Considering that the positions of the herein requesting parties are not within the coverage of R.A. No. 9277, with its implementation, they will receive less compensation than what their counterparts are actually receiving. This is a situation that necessitates corrective measures from the Court.
The Court is not without legal basis.
First, it is well within the power of the Chief Justice to grant allowances to court personnel pursuant to the General Appropriations Act (GAA), 13 thus:
"1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of the appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel,and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the personal services itemization including, but not limited to the transfer of item or creation of new positions in the Judiciary: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices, PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws."
Clearly, within the sphere of the judiciary, the Chief Justice has the full authority to control matters affecting its organizational structure. He may fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of the personnel or even make adjustments in the personal services itemization, including, but not limited to, the transfer of items or creation of new offices. This is in consonance with the concept of fiscal autonomy under the 1987 Constitution wherein the Judiciary has "full management and control of its financial affairs as well as flexibility to allocate, administer and utilize their resources with the wisdom is and dispatch that its officials need."
This Court invoked this similar authority in the past.On July 22, 2003, the Court En Banc,citing as premise the Court's constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy, the interest of the service, and the morale of lawyer employees, granted the request of the Supreme Court Assembly of Lawyer-Employees, Inc. (SCALE) for special representation allowance or RATA to SC Attorneys II and III, thus:
"A.M. No. 03-06-08-SC — Re: Request of SCALE to Grant Special Representation Allowance or RATA to SC Attorneys II and III — In the exercise of the Court's constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy, the interest of the service and the need to uplift the morale of lawyer-employees who are vital personnel in the administration of justice,the Court Resolved to GRANT the request of the Supreme Court Assembly of Lawyer-Employees, Inc. (SCALE) for the grant of Special Representation Allowance or RATA to SC Attorneys II and III in the amounts of P4,250.00 and P4,800.00 respectively, subject to availability of savings before the incorporation of the expense in the Court's budget."
In another instance, the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) authorized the Head of each Constitutional Agency to realign a portion of the savings it realized to augment "Other Personal Services" allotment, specifically for payment of employees' fringe benefits. 14 The CFAG cited as reason the need "to provide appropriate and reasonable awards and incentives to their officials and employees to compensate equitably their accomplishments, boost their morale and efficiency and to further their commitment and dedication to their jobs." AaDSEC
Corollarily, while the positions of the above-named-officials do not fall within the coverage of R.A. No. 9227, nothing therein prevents them from enjoying similar benefits. As a matter of fact, it is the intention of this law to grant benefits to the broadest number of employees. This is evident in Section 3 authorizing the Chief Justice "to grant additional allowances exclusively to other court personnelnot covered by the benefits granted under this Act." 15 This shows that the law is not exclusionary,and therefore, the feared circumvention of the law is without basis.
And second, the Chief Justice has also the power of augmentation under the GAA, 16 thus:
Special Provision(s)
"1. Augmentation of Any Item in the Court's Appropriation.Any savings in the appropriations of the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's appropriations for: ...(i) commutable representation and transportation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law;"
Initially, the adjusted allowances of the above-named officials may be taken from the Judiciary's savings. Under CFAG's Joint Resolution No. 10, 17 "the unexpended year-end balances of the approved appropriations already released to the Constitutional Offices shall remain valid appropriation and shall continue to be available for expenditures until fully spent; and that each head of the said offices is authorized to use savings for the incurrence of such obligations as may be approved by him to strengthen the office and enhance its operation and services, as well as any other expenditure or purpose authorized." Relative thereto, CFAG's Joint Resolution No. 1 dated April 3, 1992 provides:
"4.0 On Use of Savings for Certain Purposes
Subject to pertinent accounting and auditing rules and regulations, each head of the said offices is authorized to use savings for the incurrence of such obligations as may be approved by him to strengthen the office and enhance its operations and services, as well as any other expenditure or purpose authorized by law."
We, therefore, find no legal obstacle to the grant by the Chief Justice of adjusted allowances to the above-named officials.
Significantly, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Joseph Bryan Hilary P. Davide withdrew his request for special allowance "for personal reasons."
WHEREFORE, we recommend to the Chief Justice to GRANT the request of Atty. Annaliza Ty-Capacite, Mrs. Corazon M. Ordoñez and Mrs. Evelyn T. Dumdum for adjusted allowances equivalent to the amount being received by each of the other Chiefs of Office chargeable against the savings of the Judiciary. For equitable reason, the grant of such allowances shall take effect on November 11, 2003, the date the other Chiefs of Office received their respective special allowances.
We also recommend that a comprehensive study be conducted to determine who among the present officials of the entire Judiciary are entitled to similar allowances. We further recommend that a committee be created by the Chief Justice for the purpose.
Puno, J.,joins the dissent of Callejo, Sr.,J.
Callejo, Sr.,J.,dissents in a separate opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR.,J.,
In their Memorandum dated November 8, 2004 addressed to the Chief Justice, Joseph Bryan Hilary Davide 1 and Anna Liza Ty-Capacite (both the Chief Justice's Staff Heads), Corazon M. Ordoñez (Director V, Chief of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office) and Evelyn T. Dumdum (Director V, Program Management Office) request that "they be granted the special allowance equivalent to the amount received by the other chiefs of offices chargeable against the savings of the Court effective November 11, 2003 when Republic Act No. 9227 was implemented." 2
3 which took effect on November 11, 2003, 4 granted additional compensation in the form of special allowances to justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court. Section 2 thereof reads:
Sec. 2. Grant of Special Allowances. — All justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws shall be granted special allowances equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the basic monthly salary specified for their respective salary grades under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, to be implemented for a period of four (4) years.
The grant of special allowances shall be implemented uniformly in such sums or amounts equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the basic salaries of the positions covered hereof. Subsequent implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by the funding source specified in Section 3 hereof.
Aside from the incumbent justices and judges, court officials who have been conferred judicial ranks of justices and judges have been, likewise, declared to be entitled to the said special allowances. Among these officials are the chiefs of offices who have likewise been designated as Deputy Clerks of Court (DCC),e.g.,DCC and Chief, Judicial Records Office, DCC and Chief Administrative Officer, DCC and Chief Attorney, DCC and Reporter, DCC and Executive Officer, and DCC and Bar Confidant. These chiefs of offices (DCCs) have been conferred the judicial rank of an RTC judge. 5
The requesting Court officials invoke the principle of "equal pay for substantially equal work" as they claim that their positions are being "discriminated against" and "are now receiving less than their counterpart Chiefs of Offices (Deputy Clerks of Court) in the Administrative Services, Office of the Chief Attorney, Office of the Reporter, Judicial Records Office and Management Information Systems Office." 6 They describe their respective positions, thus:
1. The Chief Justice Staff Head which is analogous to the Chiefs of Staff of the Vice-President and Senate President. Being the representative of the Chief Justice, he/she administers the affairs within the Office of the Chief Justice, acts on matters as may be authorized, and assumes duties and responsibilities delegated by the Chief Justice;
2. Director V
a. Chief, Fiscal Management and Budget Office which is equivalent to Assistant Secretary of Finance and Management in the Executive Branch as provided for under PD 1592; directs and supervises the fiscal affairs of the Judiciary nationwide; plans and prepares budget proposals, controls expenditures in accordance with the Appropriation Act, coordinates with Congress, Department of Budget and Management, Commission on Audit, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Treasury and other government offices relating to the Judiciary's financial operations; HAISEa
b. Program Director assumes the responsibilities of carrying out the Judicial Reform Program as set forth and enunciated in the Action Program for Judicial Reform (APJR);directs and formulates the program management strategy of the Project Management Office; liaise with the funding agencies or donors and set up mechanisms for efficient mobilization of resources to finance specific project and activities of the APJR. 7
In the Resolution dated December 1, 2004, the Court referred the matter to Attys. Eden T. Candelaria and Edna E. Diño, Chief Administrative Officer and Chief Attorney, respectively, for their evaluation, report and recommendation.
In compliance therewith, Attys. Candelaria and Diño submitted their respective reports. In her Memorandum dated December 23, 2004, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the request be DENIED for lack of legal basis. She cited our Resolution dated October 1, 2004 in A.M.No. 03-10-05-SC and A.M.No.03-11-25-SC 8 where we explained that granting a "distortion allowance" to those who are not included in the coverage of Rep. Act No. 9227 would be tantamount to a circumvention of the said law. Atty. Candelaria averred that:
The special allowance being requested by the Chief Justice's Staff Heads, et al.,actually represents a distortion allowance to equalize the compensation being received by them vis-Ã -vis the compensation of the DCC and Chiefs of Offices. HIDCTA
Thus, the granting of the requested special allowance would be stretching too far the coverage of RA 9227 which is tantamount to a circumvention of the said law.
While it may be true that the works of the requesting officials may even be greater but not lesser than those of the DCC and Chiefs of Offices, that supposition has no bearing to the issue at hand. The grant of special allowance to the DCC and Chiefs of Offices is not based on their works but on their having been conferred the judicial rank of RTC Judge. The requesting officials do not have the judicial rank; hence, they cannot derive any benefit from RA 9227. Neither can they claim that they have been discriminated against.
Parenthetically, the salary grade and the judicial rank of the DCC and Chiefs of Offices have been upgraded by this Honorable Court from SG 29 to SG 30 and from rank of RTC Judge to rank of CA Associate Justice, per Resolution dated 3 August 2004 in A.M. No. 04-6-08-SC. However, the implementation of the said Resolution has been deferred in the meantime.
Atty. Diño is of the same legal opinion as Atty. Candelaria. In her Report dated January 5, 2005, Atty. Diño, likewise, recommended that the request be DENIED for lack of legal basis. Relying on Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9227, as well as our Resolution in A.MNo. 03-10-05-SC and A.M.No. 03-11-25-SC, Atty. Diño opined that the underlying basis for the grant of the special allowances under Rep. Act No. 9227 is judicial ranking. Since the positions of the requesting Court officials have not been conferred any judicial rank, they do not fall within the coverage of Rep. Act No. 9227; hence, not entitled to the special allowances granted therein. Atty. Diño cautioned that:
Indeed, if the request were to be granted, the Court would "ingraft into the law that which the Legislature never intended and interpret the law in a manner that defeats or negates its purpose." To grant the request would result in experimentation in judicial legislation. 9
Interestingly, the majority opinion concedes that the positions of the requesting Court officials, not having been conferred any judicial rank, are not within the coverage of Rep. Act No. 9227, therefore, they are not entitled to the special allowances. However, in lieu of the special allowances, the majority opinion would now grant them "adjusted allowances" equivalent to the special allowances of the other chiefs of offices (DCCs) and retroactively to when they received the same.
As basis therefor, the majority opinion invokes the authority granted to the Chief Justice under the Special Provision of the General Appropriations Act for FY 2003, or Rep. Act No. 9206, which provides in part that "the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized . . . to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel, . . . PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws." cSIHCA
The grant of "adjusted allowances" to the requesting Court officials was actually originally proposed by Atty. Diño, likewise, citing the authority of the Chief Justice under the GAA. She stressed that the same was based on equitable, not legal, considerations and precisely so as not to result in the circumvention of Rep. Act No. 9227, Atty. Diño proposed that the grant of "adjusted or adjustment allowances" should be limited to P4,875.00, which is equivalent to their representation allowances, and subject to following conditions:
1. The amount of the "adjustment allowance" shall remain constant until an increase thereof is authorized by the Chief Justice because it is distinct from the Special Allowance which increases by 25% within a 4-year implementation period. To peg the "adjustment allowance" at the amount of Special Allowance as requested would result in circumvention of Rep. Act No.9227.
2. In the event of an amendment to the Salary Standardization Law to increase the salary of all government employees, the amount of "adjustment allowance" already received shall be considered as part thereof. To allow the same to remain an allowance would result in undue advantage to the petitioner-officials for purposes of computation of retirement benefits, as a component thereof which is not granted to the other officials should be factored in. Under Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 9227 quoted above, the Special Allowance received is actually part of whatever salary increases Congress would prescribe in amending Rep. Act No. 6758.
3. The fund source shall be savings deposited under the fiscal autonomy account for the initial year of implementation. The expended amount for the allowance shall be incorporated in the next budget of the Court.
4. The "adjustment allowance" shall be given only upon approval of the instant request. There is no legal basis for making receipt thereof retroactive to 11 November 2003, as it is not the equivalent of the Special Allowance.10
In marked departure from the proposal of Atty. Diño, the majority opinion now grants to the requesting Court officials, who are indisputably not entitled to the special allowances under Rep. Act No. 9227, "adjusted allowances" equivalent to the special allowances being received by the other chiefs of offices which shall be initially chargeable against the savings of the Judiciary.Further, the "adjusted allowances" are to "be retroactive to the time the other chiefs of offices received their special allowances." In other words, except for the appellation, the adjusted allowances are, to all intents and purposes, the same as the special allowances.
To my mind, and as succinctly put by Justice Dante O. Tinga in A.M.Nos. 03-10-05-SC and 03-11-25-SC, "this tack is a mere circumvention of Rep. Act No. 9227." As it was further stated therein:
...The nature of the proposed distortion allowance is to compensate for the resulting disparity in benefits between those covered by the law and those who are not. Granting a distortion allowance to those outside the coverage of the law would amount to giving them the same special allowance that the law has denied them by exclusion. 11
Indeed, the time-honored legal maxim that "nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum" (no one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly) applies with equal force to this Court.
In justifying the grant of such "adjusted allowances" to the requesting Court officials, the majority opinion likens the situation to that of a wage distortion as defined in Article 124 of the Labor Code. Under this provision, there is wage distortion when, as a result of an increase in the prescribed wage rates, an elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates would occur between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation. SEHACI
The analogy is not quite appropriate. Wage distortion contemplates a situation where a wage order engenders wage parity between employees in different rungs of the organization ladder of the same establishment. Wage distortion involves a parity in the salary rates of different pay classes which, as a result, eliminates the distinction between different ranks in the same region. 12 Strictly speaking then, there can be no wage or salary distortion to speak of in the case of these requesting officials vis-a-vis their counterparts because their case does not involve employees belonging to different rungs in the Judiciary. On the contrary, they are of "practically equal rank." In any case, Rep. Act No. 9227 did not increase the salaries of those officials within its coverage, it merely granted them "special allowances." Thus, no "salary distortion" is occasioned by its implementation.
Echoing the line of reasoning taken by the requesting Court officials, the majority opinion invokes the "declared policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work" and the equal protection clause which guarantees that "persons similarly situated must be similarly treated."
As correctly averred by Atty. Diño, the policy of "equal pay for equal work" is embodied in Rep. Act No. 6758, 13 known as the Salary Standardization Law, in this wise:
SEC. 2. Statement of Policy.— It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. ... TIaCcD
The law does not provide for absolute equality of pay for substantially equal work. Differences in pay are allowed based on substantive differences in duties and responsibilities and qualification requirements of the positions.The positions occupied by the requesting Court officials have the following qualification standards: 14
Chief Justice's Staff Heads
— Bachelor's Degree relevant to the job
— 5 years relevant experience
— 32 hours relevant training
— Career service (Professional) second level eligibility
Chief or the FMBO (Director V)
— Certified Public Accountant
— 3 years supervisory experience
Chief of the PMO
— Bachelor's Degree
— 3 years supervisory experience
— Career service (Professional) second level eligibility
Significantly, these positions do not require membership in the Bar as one of the qualifications therefor. On the other hand, the other chiefs of offices who are, at the same time, designated as deputy clerks of courts have the following qualification standards: 15
Chiefs of Offices (Deputy Clerks of Court)
— Bachelor of Laws
— 10 years or more relevant supervisory work experience acquired under career service positions in the Supreme Court, 3 years of which rendered under position/s requiring the qualifications of a lawyer
— 32 hours of relevant training in management and supervision
— RA 1080 (Bar)
Clearly then, the requesting Court officials are not similarly situated as the other chiefs of offices (DCCs) in respect of qualifications for their respective positions. And while they may occupy the same salary grade (SG 29) as the other chiefs of offices (DCCS),they may not necessarily enjoy the same privileges. 16 Hence, the grant to the latter of the special allowances does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution. This clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. 17 With respect to Rep. Act No. 9227, the difference in the treatment accorded to non-members of the Bar, on one hand, and members thereof, on the other, lies in the fact that it was enacted for the purpose of attracting lawyers to the Judiciary. This can be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of then Senator Renato Cayetano of Senate Bill No. 2018: 18
Mr. President, it is indeed ironic that those who dispense justice and the government lawyers who actively participate in the system receive compensation that could be characterized as indecently low, but likewise not commensurate to their qualifications and responsibilities and very much below the prevailing rates of compensation and benefits with their counterparts in other government offices and in the private sector. THDIaC
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. President, we must formulate ways of improving the processes and procedures within our judicial system. But we should not overlook the fact that judges and lawyers in government service have families to support and bills to pay.
It is also in keeping with the declared policy of the State to provide equal pay for equal work that this Senate Bill No. 2018 has been crafted. It is also with the intention to keep the good men and women as well as to attract the best and the brightest in the bench. It is, therefore, imperative that we upgrade their present compensation to make it more responsive to our present economic conditions, to provide adequate incentive for these public servants to stay and to attract also qualified men and women to enhance the delivery and quality of the justice system in our country. 19
The authority of the Chief Justice under the General Appropriations Act "to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits" of the personnel in the Judiciary is not disputed. However, like in all discretionary powers, the exercise of this authority must rest upon a reasonable basis. 20 At the very least, the grant of benefits to a certain group of employees, to the exclusion of the other personnel in the Judiciary, must be based on ascertainable standards or guidelines of reasonable classification. Especially in this case where only a handful of officials, in fact, just three to four, are being singled out to enjoy the benefit of receiving the adjusted allowances. Absent reasonable classification grounded on ascertainable standards and guidelines therefor, the exercise of this authority would result in giving undue favor and preference to certain individuals.
The requesting Court officials rely on the fact that they occupy the same salary grade (SG 29) as the other chiefs of offices (DCCs) who are receiving the special allowances under Rep. Act No. 9227. Their situation, however, is not unique. There are other employees of this Court who belong to the same salary grade as those who are receiving special allowances under Rep. Act No. 9227. For example, Court Attorneys V are classified as SG 26, the same salary grade as that of Municipal Trial Court judges, Court Attorneys VI as SG 27, the same salary grade as that of MTC judges in cities, Judicial Staff Heads as SG 28, the same salary grade as that of Metropolitan Trial Court judges. 21 Hence, the grant of "adjusted allowances" to the requesting Court officials should have a reasonable basis other than the flimsy justification that their counterparts are receiving special allowances under Rep. Act No. 9227.
Only late last year, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the pronouncement that:
. . . The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of the law. There is recognition, however, that in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may, under such circumstances, invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the government act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason." Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient . . . that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 22
To grant "adjusted allowances" to the requesting Court officials without granting the same to the other employees in the Judiciary who are similarly situated would result in giving the former undue favor and preference and, in the process, run afoul of the equal protection guarantee.
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 9227 has also been cited to justify the grant of the "adjusted allowances." Said provision reads in full:
SEC. 3. The amount necessary to implement the additional compensation in the form of special allowances granted under this Act shall be sourced from, and charged against, the legal fees of Court originally prescribed, imposed and collected under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court prior to the promulgation of the amendments under Presidential Decree No. 1949, dated July 18, 1984, and from the increases in current and new fees which may be imposed by the Supreme Court of the Philippines after the effectivity of this Act. SHEIDC
In the event that the said amounts are insufficient to cover the grant of allowances on the last year of implementation of this Act, the National Government shall subsidize the special allowance granted for justices, judges and all other positions in the judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws in an amount not exceeding One hundred sixty-five million pesos (Php165,000,000.00) per annum.
If the collections from any increase in current fees and any new fees imposed after the effectivity of this Act exceed the amount needed to fund the special allowances granted to justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws, the surplus may be used by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to grant additional allowances exclusively to other court personnel not covered by the benefits under this Act.
A plain reading of the above provision shows that the other court personnel not covered by the benefits under Rep. Act No. 9227 may be granted additional allowances under the said law only when there is a surplus in the collections from any increase in current fees and any new fees imposed by the Court. It has not been shown that there is such an excess or surplus. Even if there is such a surplus, the additional allowances should be granted to all or at least a majority of the other personnel in the Judiciary, not to a handful of employees only. SCaIcA
Finally, the tasks assigned to the requesting officials have been characterized as affecting "the entire judiciary and the course it is treading. Compared with their counterparts, they cannot be said to be less important." The importance of their positions is not questioned. However, it is our oft-repeated phrase that every person connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. Hence, all the employees of the Judiciary, from the lowest clerk to the Justices of this Court, are cogs and spokes in the wheels of justice. Each is tasked with distinct functions necessary for the administration of justice. No particular position or function should be considered more, or even less, important than the others.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to:
1. DENY for lack of legal basis the request of the above-named Court officials for "special allowances equivalent to the amount received by the other Chiefs of Offices chargeable against the savings of the court effective November 11, 2003 when Rep. Act No. 9227 was effective" and;
2. DIRECT the Chief, Office of the Administrative Services and Chief Attorney of this Court, to conduct a comprehensive study on the feasibility of granting "adjusted allowances" to all the employees of the Judiciary belonging to the same salary grades as those already receiving the special allowances under Rep. Act No. 9227.
(SGD.) ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate Justice
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNOClerk of CourtSupreme Court of the Philippines
Footnotes
1. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
2. An Act Granting Additional Compensation in the Form of Special Allowances for Justices, Judges and All Other Positions in the Judiciary with the Equivalent Rank of Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the Regional Trial Court and for other Purposes.
3. Otherwise known as Salary Standardization Law.
4. Atty. Eden T. Candelaria.
5. Atty. Edna E. Diño.
6. Atty. Ma. Piedad F. Campana.
7. Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip
.
8. Atty. Ivan John E. Uy.
9. Republic Act No. 9206, at 646.
10. A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Compensation Systems in the National Government, and Integrating the Same.
11. An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes.
12. Section 3h, P.D. No. 985.
13. R.A. No. 9206.
14. Joint Resolution No. 8.
15. "If the collections from any increase in current fees and any new fees imposed after the effectivity of this Act exceed the amount needed to fund the special allowances granted to justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws, the surplus may be used by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to grant additional allowances exclusively to other court personnel not covered by the benefit granted under this Act."
16. R.A. No. 9206, supra,at 636.
17. December 28, 1994.
Callejo, J.,dissenting opinion:
1. In his Letter dated March 17, 2005, addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Davide has manifested that he withdraws, "in the meantime, [his] request as stated in the said Memorandum."
2. Memorandum dated November 8, 2004, p. 2.
3. An Act Granting Additional Compensation in the Form of Special Allowances for Justices, Judges and all Other Positions in the Judiciary with the Equivalent Rank of Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the Regional Trial Court and For Other Purposes.
4. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 9227 provides that it "shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation." It was published in Today on October 25, 2003 and the Times on October 27, 2003.
5. In A.M. No. 04-6-08 dated August 3, 2004, the Court has upgraded the salary grade and the judicial rank of the DCC and Chiefs of Offices from SG 29 to SG 30 and from rank of RTC Judge to rank of CA Associate Justice. The implementation of the same, however, has been deferred in the meantime.
6. Memorandum, supra.
7. Ibid.
8. A.M. No. 03-10-05-SC, Re: (a) Request of Assistant Court Administrators for Upgrading of their Rank, Salary and Privileges Upon the Effectivity of Republic Act No. 9282 Elevating the Court of Tax Appeals to the Level of the Court of Appeals and (b) Grant of Special Distortion Allowance to Positions in the Judiciary with Rank of Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Assistant Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals and Division Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals and A.M. No. 03-11-25-SC, Re: Request for the Grant of Special Distortion Allowance to Positions in Judiciary with the Rank of Metropolitan Trial Court Judges Particularly the Five (5) Executive Clerks of Court III of the Sandiganbayan.
9. Report of the Chief Attorney dated January 5, 2005, p. 7.
10. Id.at 12. (Emphasis supplied).
11. Resolution dated October 1, 2004, supra at 14.
12. Prubankers Association v. Prudential Trust Bank & Trust Company, 302 SCRA 74 (1999).
13. The Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
14. Qualification Standards of the Civil Service Commission (Revised 1997),and as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions with respect to the pertinent positions.
15. Qualification Standards of Unique Positions in the Supreme Court.
16. See Resolution, A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, November 25, 2003.
17. Villareña v. Commission on Audit,408 SCRA 455 (2003).
18. Senate Bill No. 2018 and House Bill No. 5178 were consolidated and became RA 9227.
19. RECORDS OF THE SENATE, February 26, 2002, Vol. I, No. 61, pp. 17-18.
20. For example in Ichong, etc,v. Hernandez, etc.,101 Phil. 1155 (1957),the Court recognized that "the legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis." The Court therein further held that "the equal protection clause ...does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary."
21. See SYSTEM OF RANKING POSITIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT, prepared by the Office of Administrative Services pursuant to Administrative Order No. 16-2003 dated January 28, 2003 and INDEX OF OCCUPATIONAL SERVICES, POSITION TITLES AND SALARY GRADES OF 1997, prepared by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) pursuant to Rep. Act No. 6758.
22. Resolution, A.M. Nos. 03-10-05-SC and 03-11-25-SC, supra at 14-15, citing Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982).
Cite This Law
Request for Special Allowances for the Chief Justice's Staff Head, Fiscal Management and Budget Office Chief and the Program Management Office Director, <--!03292005-->A.M. No. 04-11-13-SC, Mar 29, 2005 (Philippines)
Request for Special Allowances for the Chief Justice's Staff Head, Fiscal Management and Budget Office Chief and the Program Management Office Director, <--!03292005-->A.M. No. 04-11-13-SC (Phil. 2005)
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