FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 221970. November 21, 2018.]
SPOUSES TEDDY AND SALLY LOREN AND SPOUSES RUDY AND REGINA NAVARRA, petitioners, vs.GUENEVER V. RIGOR AND ZENIAFLOR V. CABALONA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 21, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 221970 (Spouses Teddy and Sally Loren and Spouses Rudy and Regina Navarra vs. Guenever V. Rigor and Zeniaflor V. Cabalona).
This is a Petition 1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Amended Decision 2 dated May 14, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04855-MIN and its Resolution 3 dated October 8, 2015.
Facts of the Case
Guenever V. Rigor and Zeniaflor V. Cabalona (respondents) filed an action for unlawful detainer, collection of unpaid rentals, damages against spouses Rudy and Regina Navarra (spouses Navarra) and spouses Teddy and Sally Loren (spouses Loren), herein collectively referred to as petitioners, averring that they are the owners of a parcel of land, described as Lot No. 4349-C located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, covered by Tax Declaration No. F-071425 in the name of their deceased father Eligio D. Valdehueza (Eligio), married to Priscilla Baang Valdehueza. 4
Records show that on March 1, 1980, spouses Navarra, as lessees, entered into a Contract of Rentals with Eligio as lessor, over a portion of the subject lot. On the other hand, on October 20, 2002, spouses Loren also entered into an agreement to occupy a portion of the subject lot, denominated as Kasulatan sa Kasabutan. In the said agreements, petitioners acknowledged Eligio's ownership of the land on which their houses are standing, and that Eligio and his successors-in-interest, herein respondents, leased a portion thereof to spouses Navarra per the Contract of Rentals, while spouses Loren were merely tolerated to occupy another portion until they could have an area to move to, per the Kasulatan sa Kasabutan. 5
In June 2007, respondents demanded from spouses Navarra to vacate the subject land for their failure to pay rentals. They also made a demand for spouses Loren to vacate the subject lot as the family will already use it. Petitioners, however, refused to heed to the demand. Settlement was not reached before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Hence, on May 28, 2008, the complaint for unlawful detainer, collection of rentals, and damages was filed. 6 CAIHTE
For their part, petitioners averred that the disputed lot is not owned by Eligio, hence, the latter has no better right of possession over the same. Petitioners alleged that the portion of the subject lot that they are occupying is owned by a certain Warlina Cabanducos, daughter of Eulalia de Mira (de Mira), invoking the Decision (1985 Decision) of the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) of Misamis Oriental in an action for partition between de Mira and the other claimants of the subject lot, including Eligio, docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 63593. 7
In the said case, only an area of 433 square meters was awarded to Eligio, which does not cover the portion occupied by the petitioners. Said Decision became final and executory on September 26, 1985. Petitioners further argued that Tax Declaration No. F-071425 in the name of Eligio, covering the subject lot with an area of 1,374 sq. m. is not applicable anymore as the ownership of the subject lot has been changed and defined by virtue of the said Decision. 8 Thus, petitioners contend that they were misled by Eligio and respondents to believe that the latter own the subject property and have the right to lease and tolerate the occupancy of the same to the former. 9
On October 21, 2010, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) rendered a Judgment 10 dismissing the case for failure to clearly establish the identity of the portion of the litigated property. The MTCC ruled that considering that the 1985 Decision which segregated the shares of the co-owners of the property, covering the subject lot, there is a question as to the exact location of the property the respondents are claiming and that actually possessed by the petitioners.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a Decision 11 dated June 29, 2011, affirmed the MTCC's Decision in toto.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its Order 12 dated February 20, 2012.
On August 11, 2014, the CA promulgated a Decision, 13 likewise, affirming the RTC's Decision.
On respondents' motion for reconsideration, however, the CA reversed its prior ruling, thus, issuing an Amended Decision, 14 the dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Our Decision dated August 11, 2014 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby ENTERED finding for [respondents], to read as follows:
1. ORDERING [petitioner] spouses and all persons claiming under them to VACATE the subject properties subject of the Contract of Rentals dated March 1, 1980 and Kasulatan sa Kasabutan dated October 20, 2002 where their respective houses are erected and to surrender possession thereof to the [respondents];
2. ORDERING [petitioner] spouses Rudy and Regina Navarra to pay [respondents] the sum of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) per month as accrued rentals counted from June 2007 and which shall earn interest at 6% per annum, until the judgment in this case becomes final and executory; and
3. ORDERING [petitioner] spouses Teddy and Sally Loren to pay [respondents] the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) yearly counted from June 2007 until they vacate the subject property as payment for reasonable compensation for the use of the lot in question.
After the finality of judgment and until full payment of the rentals and reasonable compensation due, the legal rate of interest to be imposed shall be 12%.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioners, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision, which was denied by the CA in its October 8, 2015 Resolution. 16
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners pound on the fact that the ownership of the subject lot had already been adjudicated by the court as early as 1985, by virtue of which, it was determined with finality that the litigated portions of the subject lot do not belong to Eligio but to de Mira. Thus, petitioners posit that the CA committed a grave error in considering the lessor-lessee relationship between the parties as the issue on tenancy is no longer relevant because the ownership of the litigated portions of the subject lot had already been adjudicated against Eligio in favor of de Mira; and the only thing left to do is to actually implement the said judgment. DETACa
Further, petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in relying on the Contract of Rentals and Kasulatan sa Kasabutan as they timely contested the authenticity of the same. Also, petitioners point out that the said documents do not conclusively prove that the lot contemplated therein is the same lot that was awarded to Eligio in the 1985 Decision.
We find no merit in the petition.
As between petitioners and respondents, the latter has a better right of possession over the subject premises.
"An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." 17 There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Thus, issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. 18 "[W]hen the relationship of lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful detainer case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question of ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might throw light on the right of possession." 19
In this case, the CA correctly ruled that the Contract of Rentals and Kasulatan ng Kasabutan clearly established the lessor-lessee or tenant-landlord relationship between petitioners and respondents. Petitioners raising question on the authenticity of the said documents is of no moment. Foremost, the determination of the genuineness and authenticity of the said documents is a factual matter, which is not within the purview of a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and even if we exercise discretion to re-examine evidence, we will not be able to make judicious findings regarding the same considering that we are limited to evaluating mere copies of documents, if at all.
At any rate, petitioners clearly admitted in the instant petition, that a lessor-lessee or tenant-landlord relationship exists between the parties. Petitioners aver that they agreed to stay in Eligio's property albeit with a caveat that they were misled by the latter to believe that he owns the subject lot. 20 The CA thus correctly observed that petitioners had full knowledge of the nature of their possession of the subject premises.
Respondents' rights as lessors cannot, therefore, be denied. When Eligio and/or respondents, as lessors, made a demand against petitioners to vacate the premises, such demand constitutes as an express act on the part of the lessors that they no longer consent to the continued occupation by the lessees of their property. 21
That being established, we now proceed to petitioners' main argument. Petitioners' case is mainly anchored upon the alleged ownership of a third person (de Mira) over the litigated premises. The Rules of Court, however, protects the lessor/landlord from being questioned by the lessee/tenant regarding his or her title or better right of possession over the subject premises. The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
xxx xxx xxx
b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
In Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., 22 we ruled that once a lessor-lessee or tenant-landlord relationship is shown to exist between the parties, the lessee/tenant cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn said conclusive presumption. In the same case, the Court cited Tamio v. Ticson, 23 wherein we pronounced that:
[T]he relation of the lessor and lessee [or the tenant-landlord] does not depend on the former's title but on the agreement between the parties, followed by the possession of the premises by the lessee under such agreement. As long as the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it is immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title — or any title at all — at the time the relationship was entered into. 24 aDSIHc
To be sure, we are not unaware of the jurisprudential principle that the rule on estoppel does not apply if there was a change in the nature of the title of the lessor/landlord during the subsistence of the lease/tenancy. 25 For this exception to apply, the lessee/tenant must show that the subject property covered by the lessor/landlord's title has expired, conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a title. 26 The CA's findings gain relevance on this matter, thus:
[E]ven considering that [the 1985 Decision] has become final and executory whereby Eligio was adjudicated only a portion of Lot 4349-C-4 equivalent to only 433.7 sq. meters, this fact shall not affect [respondents'] case since it is well-settled that they are previous possessors of the subject lots and whatever possessory rights [petitioners have] over the subject properties clearly emanated from them through the contracts executed. Furthermore, contrary to the rulings of the [MTCC] and the RTC, there is no need to identify further the land claimed by [respondents] as the contracts executed between the parties are replete with admissions from [petitioners] that the lands where their houses are erected are owned by Eligio and their possession thereof are only by virtue of the Contract of Rentals and Kasulatan sa Kasabutan. Also worth noting is the fact that no final order approving the project of partition in [the civil case] has even been issued. Whether or not the subject properties are the same properties adjudicated to Eligio in [the said civil case] is beside the point for what is only being sought in the present action is for [respondents] to be restored of physical possession of their land which were [possessed by mere tolerance and leased by petitioners]. x x x. 27
Admittedly, the 1985 Decision invoked by the petitioners is yet to be enforced. Verily, while petitioners lessees/tenants are allowed by jurisprudence to assert ownership of the property by a third person not a party to the ejectment case, 28 they cannot legally assert enforcement of a 19-year-old unenforced Decision in this separate and distinct summary proceeding.
In any case, we find no necessity to belabor on the issue of ownership in this case. The defense of ownership, of a third person that is, does not change the summary nature of this action. 29 We have previously held that although a wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the court, this is merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order. Thus, contrary to petitioners' position, what is relevant in this case is the established tenancy relationship between the parties. We reiterate that the fact of the lease/tenancy and the expiration of its terms are the only elements in an action for unlawful detainer. 30
In all, we sustain the CA's findings and conclusion that respondents are entitled to the possession of the subject premises. If there is any issue between respondents and de Mira or other claimants of the subject lot, specifically in the enforcement of the trial court's decision as regards the partition thereof, the same should be resolved among the proper parties in a proper forum.
We, however, modify the interest imposed by the CA on the judgment awards. Accrued rentals due for the use of the subject premises, shall earn an interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of demand, i.e., from June 2007 up to June 30, 2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction, in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. 31 Also, such judgment obligation shall earn an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Amended Decision dated May 14, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04855-MIN and its Resolution dated October 8, 2015, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows: ETHIDa
1. ORDERING petitioners and all persons claiming under them to VACATE the subject properties subject of the Contract of Rentals dated March 1, 1980 and Kasulatan sa Kasabutan dated October 20, 2002 where their respective houses are erected and to surrender possession thereof to the respondents;
2. ORDERING petitioners spouses Rudy and Regina Navarra to pay respondents the sum of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) per month as accrued rentals counted from June 2007 and which shall earn interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum from June 2007 up to June 30, 2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until they vacate the subject property;
3. ORDERING petitioners spouses Teddy and Sally Loren to pay respondents the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) yearly counted from June 2007 and which shall earn interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum from June 2007 up to June 30, 2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until they vacate the subject property;
4. After the finality of this judgment, the above-enumerated judgment obligation shall earn an interest of six percent (6%) per annum until full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED." Bersamin, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2606 dated October 10, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Additional Member per Special Order No. 2607 dated October 10, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA
Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 34-68.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean-Paul B. Inting, concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Pablito A. Perez; id. at 16-24.
3.Id. at 12-15.
4.Id. at 161.
5.Id. at 175.
6.Id. at 175-176.
7.Id. at 176.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 40.
10.Id. at 161-164.
11.Id. at 165-170.
12.Id. at 171-172.
13.Id. at 174-182.
14.Id. at 16-24.
15.Id. at 23-24.
16.Id. at 12-15.
17.Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., 689 Phil. 411, 417 (2012), citing Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694, 707 (2006).
18.Mangaser v. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372, 381-382 (2014).
19.Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., 689 Phil. 411, 417 (2012), citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 544, 554 (2002).
20.Rollo, p. 40.
21.Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., supra at 419.
22. 689 Phil. 411 (2012).
23. 485 Phil. 434 (2004).
24. Id. at 444.
25. Santos v. National Statistics Office, 662 Phil. 708, 722 (2011), citing Borre v. CA, 242 Phil. 345, 352 (1988).
26. Id.
27. Rollo, p. 22.
28. Santos v. National Statistics Office, supra at 718.
29. Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., supra note 17, at 421.
30. Id.
31. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., 716 Phil. 267 (2013).