THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 239276. September 15, 2021.]
TITO HANDIG, TEODORO CABADDU, RIZALDY REYES, ILUMINADA GALAURAN, ROSALINA CAÑERO, ANIE BARTOLO, ARMANDO GALLAMET, ELENITA FLORES, WILLIAM GALAURAN, ENRIQUITA GONZALES, DOMINGO TADEO and ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, petitioners, vs.SPOUSES RAMONCHITO RAMOS and JOY CATHERINE OCAMPO RAMOS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTYS. RANDY G. SERRANO and RAYMON Y. ALIS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 15, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 239276(Tito Handig, Teodoro Cabaddu, Rizaldy Reyes, Iluminada Galauran, Rosalina Cañero, Anie Bartolo, Armando Gallamet, Elenita Flores, William Galauran, Enriquita Gonzales, Domingo Tadeo and all other persons claiming rights under them, Petitioners, v. Spouses Ramonchito Ramos and Joy Catherine Ocampo Ramos, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Attys. Randy G. Serrano and Raymon Y. Alis, Respondents.) — This Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition) 1 seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated 21 December 2017 and the Resolution 3 dated 23 April 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 146536. The CA Decision affirmed the Order 4 dated 08 June 2016 of Branch 80, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-01261-CV, reversing the Decision 5 dated 12 December 2014 of Branch 41, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC) in Civil Case No. M-QZN-13-06163-CV.
Antecedents
The present case emanated from an ejectment suit instituted by respondent Spouses Ramonchito and Joy Catherine Ramos (Spouses Ramos) against petitioners Tito Handig, Teodoro Cabaddu, Rizaldy Reyes, Iluminada Galauran, Rosalina Cañero, Anie Bartolo, Armando Gallamet, Elenita Flores, William Galauran, Enriquita Gonzales, Domingo Tadeo and all other persons claiming rights under them (petitioners) over a property located at Marco Polo Compound, Barangay Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 342341, which they purchased from Lydia Marco-Escudero (Lydia). 6
Prior to the sale, petitioners were the occupants of the property as they leased the premises from the late Johnny Marco (Johnny). Upon Johnny's demise, ownership of the said property was transferred to his only sibling, Lydia. Thereafter, she lodged an ejectment case against petitioners, among others, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 30574. 7 In a Decision dated 01 April 2004, Branch 36 of the Quezon City MeTC ordered the eviction of Rosita Gonzales, Roberto Navasa, Pablo La Torre, Merlyn Bordeos, Macela Canana Caccam, Rodolfo Caccam and Cecilio Aratas and all persons claiming rights under them from the premises and directed them to pay Php3,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use of the same. 8 The complaint against the rest of the defendants, herein petitioners, was dismissed without prejudice for Lydia's failure to notify them of the demand to vacate. 9
Meanwhile, when the title was already registered under the names of Spouses Ramos on 13 January 2010, 10 they verbally demanded petitioners to vacate the premises but to no avail. They also sent demand letters on 10 October 2013 to petitioners but they did not comply with the same. Hence, Spouses Ramos filed the instant case with the MeTC on 29 November 2013. 11
Rulings of the MeTC and RTC
In its Decision dated 12 December 2014, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It explained that petitioners are already occupying the property even before Spouses Ramos bought the same. Spouses Ramos' prayer to evict them therefrom was based on acquired ownership, and not on mere tolerance or on a contract. To wit:
WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for ejectment against defendants TITO HANDIG, TEODOR CABADDU, RIZALINO REYES, RODOLFOGONZALES (sic), ELUMINADA CALAURAN, ROSALINA CANERO, ANIE BAROTOLO, ARMANDO GALLEMET, ELENITA FLORES, WILLIAM GALAURAN, MARITES FLORES, ENRIQUITA GONZALES, DOMINGO TADEO, and all persons or entities claiming rights under them, for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
SO ORDERED. 12
On review, the RTC initially denied Spouses Ramos' appeal in its Decision dated 02 March 2016. However, the RTC granted Spouses Ramos' motion for reconsideration in its Order dated 08 June 2016, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 2, 2016 affirming the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City is hereby reconsidered and set aside and in lieu thereof the Court hereby orders the Defendants-Appellees and all persons claiming rights under them as follows:
1. To vacate the property located at Marco Polo Compound, barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 342341 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and turn over its full possession to the Plaintiff-Appellants;
2. To pay Plaintiffs-Appellants the amount of Three Thousand ([Php]3,000.00) pesos per month for each defendant as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises commencing from October 10, 2013 until possession finally reverts to the plaintiffs-appellants;
3. To pay plaintiff-appellants attorney's fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand ([Php]20,000.00) pesos; and
4. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 13
The RTC explained that Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is clear that the vendee against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, may at any time within 1 year after such unlawful withholding of possession bring an action in the proper MTC for the restitution of the possession, as in this case. 14
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. 15
Ruling of the CA
On 21 December 2017, 16 the CA dismissed the petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court dated June 8, 2016 STANDS. The extant appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 17
In affirming the RTC, the CA held that the complaint of Spouses Ramos sufficiently built a case for unlawful detainer, specifically: (1) Spouses Ramos' claim over the property is anchored on their acquisition thereof; (2) they averred that upon the issuance of the certificate of title, they demanded, verbally and through counsel, petitioners to vacate the premises; and (3) notwithstanding such demand, petitioners failed to comply. 18
The CA underlined that petitioners were previously leasing the property from Johnny. They stopped paying rentals after his death in 1991. Lydia demanded them to vacate the premises but to no avail. Thus, the ejectment suit in 2002. By virtue of said lease agreement, they were initially the legal possessors of the subject land. When Johnny died, however, their continued stay in the property without paying rent to Lydia, Johnny's successor, is by mere tolerance of Lydia until she demanded the property to be vacated in 2002. Hence, when the subject lot was sold in 2010, Spouses Ramos stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest. They are subrogated to whatever rights Lydia had with respect to the property including the right to evict the illegal occupants thereof. It is, therefore, apparent that the nature of the present complaint is one of unlawful detainer and within the MeTC's jurisdiction. 19
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated 13 April 2018. 20 Hence, this Petition.
Issue
Aggrieved by the CA's Decision, petitioners are now before this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order as regards the jurisdiction of the MeTC. 21
Ruling of the Court
Petitioners insist that Spouses Ramos failed to allege their: (1) prior physical possession of the property, and (2) tolerance of petitioners' occupancy of the property. Without which, the complaint for Unlawful Detainer must be dismissed as the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the same. 22
On the other hand, Spouses Ramos maintain that their complaint sufficiently alleged the elements for Unlawful Detainer. Moreover, a vendee against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful withholding of possession bring an action in the proper MTC for the restitution of the possession, as they did in this case. 23 They claim that petitioners occupied the premises by mere tolerance upon expiration of the lease agreement with Johnny. 24
We rule for Spouses Ramos. The findings of this Court shall be discussed in seriatim.
The MeTC has jurisdiction over
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. The complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 25
In this regard, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) the defendant's initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon the plaintiff's notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the property. 26
In this case, the Complaint 27 dated 19 November 2013 sufficiently alleged the elements for Unlawful Detainer. The Complaint states:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Plaintiffs are now the absolute owners of a certain real property located at Marco Polo Compound, Barangay Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 342341 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (Annex "B") having bought the same from its previous owner Lydia Marco Escudero;
4. Defendants were occupants of that property even before plaintiff became the absolute owners thereof. They have been sued for ejectment by the former owner of the property, Lydia Marco Escudero, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Eduardo Romeo G. Abol before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, Quezon City. However, for reasons that the defendants herein were not served with the demand letters as mandated by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, the case against them were ordered dismissed without prejudice on April 1, 2004. Copy of the said Decision is hereto attached and marked as Annex "C";
5. On January 13, 2010 at the time the certificate of title was issued in their names, plaintiffs verbally demanded from the defendants to vacate the premises as attribute of their ownership. However, those demands all fell on deaf ears. Defendants just ignored their demands and remained occupying in the premises;
6. Notwithstanding several oral demands were made for the defendants to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for their continued stay in the subject premises, defendants adamantly failed to comply. Because of the continuous disregard of the defendant of valid and lawful demands to pay reasonable compensation and to vacate the premises, plaintiff brought the matter to the attention of their lawyers, who sent demand letters to them upon plaintiff's instance. Copy of the said demand letters are hereto attached and marked as Annex "D" to "P". The same were received by the Defendants as shown by the Registry Receipts and Return Cards, which are hereto attached and marked as Annexes "D-1" to "P-1" and "D-2" to "P-2";
7. As a consequence thereof, plaintiffs have been deprived of the earnings on the subject property at the rate of P3,000.00 per month for each defendant from October 10, 2012 to present date.
xxx xxx xxx 28
Further, it is undisputed that petitioners had a lease agreement with Johnny. 29 This agreement was not renewed when the ownership of the property was transferred to Lydia upon Johnny's death. As such, petitioners possessed the subject property by mere tolerance. 30 Upon transfer of the property to Spouses Ramos, they demanded orally and through letters that petitioners vacate the premises. Petitioners, however, failed to heed the demand. 31
It is worthy to note that petitioners acknowledged the existence of the lease agreement with Johnny. 32 Thus, they had full knowledge of the nature of their possession of the subject property. 33
From the time that the lease agreement expired, petitioners no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the lease agreement or any separate lease contract, they illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owner — Lydia and eventually, Spouses Ramos. Hence, petitioners' possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 10 October 2013.
As unlawful occupants of the land of Spouses Ramos, and without any contract between them, petitioners are "necessarily bound by an implied promise" that they "will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them." Upon service of the final notice of demand, petitioners should have vacated the property and, consequently, Spouses Ramos had one year or until 09 October 2014 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the present case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 29 November 2013, which was well within the one-year period. 34
Considering the above, the MeTC, without a doubt, has jurisdiction over the instant case.
Prior physical possession of the
Neither are We persuaded by petitioners' argument that without Spouses Ramos' prior physical possession of the subject property, the unlawful ejectment case will not prosper against them.
To reiterate, in a case for Unlawful Detainer, the possession is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. 35
In Barba v. Court of Appeals, this Court categorically ruled that:
Where the cause of action is unlawful detainer, prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non. A complaint for unlawful detainer should be distinguished from that of forcible entry. In forcible entry, the plaintiff has prior possession of the property and he is deprived thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In an unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession of the property after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied; hence, prior physical possession is not required. . . . In ejectment cases, therefore, possession of land does not only mean actual or physical possession or occupation but also includes the subjection of the thing to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right, such as the execution of a deed of sale over a property. 36
As vendee of the subject property, Spouses Ramos are legally considered as being in possession thereof. Hence, the fact of actual possession becomes a non-issue. 37
Spouses Ramos are entitled to legal
We modify, however, the ruling of the CA by imposing legal interest by way of damages for their failure to pay the rentals due for the use of the subject premises. We reiterate that Spouses Ramos' extrajudicial demand on petitioners was last made on 10 October 2013. Thus, from this date, the rentals due from the petitioner shall earn interest at 6% per annum, until the judgment in this case becomes final and executory. 38
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 21 December 2017 and the Resolution dated 23 April 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146536 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the unpaid rentals shall earn a corresponding interest of six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from 10 October 2013 until the finality of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED." (Lopez, J. J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 2839 dated 15 July 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 12-31.
2. Id. at 33-39; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (who was a Member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy of the Special Seventeenth (17th) Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3. Id. at 42-43.
4. Id. at 158-160; penned by Judge Charito B. Gonzales.
5. Id. at 133-136; penned by Presiding Judge Analie B. Oga-Brual.
6. Id. at 34.
7. Id. at 34, 158.
8. Id. at 76.
9. Id. at 34, 76.
10. Id. at 66.
11. Id. at 34.
12. Id. at 34-35, 135-136.
13. Id. at 35, 158.
14. Id. at 157.
15. Id. at 33-34.
16. Id. at 33-39.
17. Id. at 39.
18. Id. at 37.
19. Id. at 38.
20. Id. at 42-43.
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id. at 20-24.
23. Id. at 228-231.
24. Id. at 232-233.
25. Diaz v. Spouses Punzalan, 783 Phil. 456 (2016), G.R. No. 203075, 16 March 2016 [Per J. Peralta].
26. Id.
27. Rollo, pp. 65-69.
28. Id.
29. Rollo, p. 98.
30. Id. at 72.
31. Id. at 34, 90.
32. Id.
33. See Spouses Loren v. Rigor (Notice), G.R. No. 221970, 21 November 2018.
34. See Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corp., 688 Phil. 616 (2012), G.R. No. 194880, 20 June 2012 [Per J. Sereno].
35. See Estrella v. Robles, 563 Phil. 384 (2007), G.R. No. 171029, 22 November 2007 [Per J. Chico-Nazario].
36. Estrella v. Robles, 563 Phil. 384 (2007), G.R. No. 171029, 22 November 2007 [Per J. Chico-Nazario], citing Barba v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 598-610 (2002), G.R. No. 126638, 06 February 2002 [Per J. Kapunan].
37. Id.
38. SeeCruz v. Spouses Chirstensen, 819 Phil. 379 (2017), G.R. No. 205539, 04 October 2017 [Per J. Leonen]; Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., 689 Phil. 411 (2012), G.R. No. 170509, 27 June 2012 [Per J. Brion].