FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232328. February 15, 2022.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.NESTOR LOREN y TATING and ARNOLD JUCO y SALAZAR, accused-appellants.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedFebruary 15, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232328 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versus NESTOR LOREN y TATING and ARNOLD JUCO y SALAZAR, accused-appellants.
After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the parties, the Court REVERSES the Decision 1 dated November 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07927, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated November 11, 2015 of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) convicting: (1) accused-appellants Nestor Loren y Tating (Loren) and Arnold Juco y Salazar (Juco) for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 3 in Criminal Case No. 13-300208; and (2) accused-appellant Juco for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, in Criminal Case No. 13-300209. The Court acquits Loren and Juco for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the burden of the prosecution weighs heavily on the proof of the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, which is the dangerous drug itself. 4 To discharge this burden, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized items and prove compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. 5 HSCATc
Specifically, Section 21 requires the members of the buy-bust team to comply with the following prescriptions: 1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In a plethora of cases, 6 the Court has repeatedly stressed that the presence of all the third-party witnesses at the time of the inventory and photography is mandatory and the law imposes said requirement because their presence will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame-up." 7 The presence of these disinterested witnesses will insulate "the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity." 8
While jurisprudence provides that strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 is not always possible given the wide range of varying field conditions, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9165 nonetheless state that "noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." Thus, for this saving clause to apply, the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 9
In this case, however, two of the three mandatory witnesses — an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ — were not present during the conduct of the inventory and photographing of the seized items. It is important to emphasize that "[e]arnest effort[s] to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven" 10 in order to reach a conviction in cases involving dangerous drugs.
As the Court En Banc unanimously held in the case of People v. Lim, 11
[i]t must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 12
In People v. Umipang, 13 the Court dealt with the same issue where the police officers involved did not show any genuine effort to secure the attendance of the required witnesses before the buy-bust operation was executed. In the said case, the Court held:
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for failing to do so — especially considering that it had sufficient time from the moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest. IDTSEH
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable — without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances — is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so. 14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Here, the explanation of the arresting police officers in excusing the presence of two of the three necessary witnesses is insufficient. Although the buy-bust operation was conducted at around 11:00 p.m. of October 2, 2013, it is worth noting that the police officers had authority to operate starting 6:30 p.m. in the evening of even date. Therefore, they had several hours prior to the buy-bust to get in touch with all the mandatory witnesses and ensure their presence during the inventory and photographing of the seized items. As well, based on the prosecution's own evidence, there was only testimony as regards the efforts to secure the presence of the elected public official and the representative from the DOJ. Unfortunately, mere statement that the police officers also tried to secure the presence of the two other mandatory witnesses is also insufficient, absent proof that they exerted earnest efforts and that securing the witnesses is not a mere afterthought. This unjustified deviation from the requirements of Section 21 cast reasonable doubt on the veracity of the contents of the inventory receipt as well as the legitimacy of the supposed buy-bust operations conducted against Loren and Juco.
The Court emphasizes that while it is laudable that police officers exert earnest efforts in catching drug pushers, they must always do so within the bounds of the law. 15 Without the insulating presence of the representative from the DOJ and any elected public official during the inventory of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence would again rear their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti. Thus, this failure adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of Loren and Juco. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
Because of the foregoing noncompliance with Section 21, RA 9165, the Court concludes that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving the corpus delicti of the offenses. Consequently, Loren and Juco should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated November 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07927 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Nestor Loren y Tating is hereby ACQUITTED from the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Arnold Juco y Salazar is likewise ACQUITTED from the charges of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless they are being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Director of New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-18. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, and Socorro B. Inting concurring.
2. CA rollo, pp. 52-60. Penned by Judge Sarah Alma M. Lim.
3. Titled AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved June 7, 2002.
4.People v. Labsan, G.R. No. 227184, February 6, 2019, 892 SCRA 112, 128.
5.People v. Supat, G.R. No. 217027, June 6, 2018, 865 SCRA 45, 82.
6. See People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749 (2014); People v. Reyes, 797 Phil. 671 (2016); People v. Sagana, 815 Phil. 356 (2017); People v. Calibod, 820 Phil. 1225 (2017); People v. Tomawis, 830 Phil. 385 (2018); Hedreyda v. People, G.R. No. 243313, November 27, 2019, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66031>; People v. Sta. Cruz, G.R. No. 244256, November 25, 2019, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65946>; People v. Arellaga, G.R. No. 231796, August 24, 2020, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66340>; and People v. Casilang, G.R. No. 42159, February 5, 2020, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66075>.
7.People v. Sagana, id. at 373.
8.Id.
9.People v. Ceralde, 815 Phil. 711, 721 (2017).
10.People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400>.
11.Id.
12.Id., citing People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018, 866 SCRA 73.
13. 686 Phil. 1024 (2012).
14.Id. at 1052-1053.
15.People v. Ramos, 791 Phil. 162, 175 (2016).