EN BANC
[G.R. No. 203563. November 19, 2013.]
RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [FIRST DIVISION] AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 203693-94. November 19, 2013.]
NILDA B. PLARAS, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [FIRST DIVISION], OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, JAIME REGALARIO, RISA HONTIVEROS, ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 203740-41. November 19, 2013.]
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN AND HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [FIRST DIVISION], respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 203955-56. November 19, 2013.]
JOSE R. TARUC, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [FIRST DIVISION], ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 203978-79. November 19, 2013.]
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [FIRST DIVISION], ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 204208-09. November 19, 2013.]
MANUEL L. MORATO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [FIRST DIVISION], ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated November 19, 2013, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 203563 (Raymundo T. Roquero v. Sandiganbayan [First Division] and People of the Philippines); G.R. Nos. 203693-94 (Nilda B. Plaras v. Honorable Sandiganbayan [First Division], Office of the Ombudsman, Jaime Regalario, Risa Hontiveros, et al.); G.R. Nos. 203740-41 (Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. Honorable Ombudsman and Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division]); G.R. Nos. 203955-56 (Jose R. Taruc v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], et al.); G.R. Nos. 203978-79 (Reynaldo A. Villar v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], et al.); and G.R. Nos. 204208-09 (Manuel L. Morato v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], et al.). — For resolution are: 1) the Motion for Leave to File Petition for Intervention dated December 20, 2012 filed by movant-intervenors Rico Manulid Ocampo, Eugene Paul E. Ponio, Marcelo Rivera Valencia, and Joaquin Manalac; and 2) the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition for Intervention dated December 27, 2012 filed by Atty. Percival B. Peralta, counsel for movant-intervenors Ricardo S. Rivera, Anthony Joseph S. Torres, Roy Andre Sunglao, Rodolfo Ocampo, Joel Pascual, Rey Cayanan, Ruben Manlutac, Hector David, Ernesto Enriquez, Ruperto Z. Tanjoco, Santos S. Serrano, Homer Garcia, Dante O. Gozo, Angelo C. Layug, Victor Gaviola, Antonio D. Ladao, Helen Tantengco, Ma. Victoria Soriano, Jesie Cardona, Alfonso P. Ocampo, Jesus Sunga, Maricel Sunglao, Fe Sunglao, Amylyn Sunglao, Bernadette Sunglao, Joel Pascua, Remy Ria S. Pascua, Gino Ocampo, Danilo Alfonso, Evelino Parico, Heriberto Alfonso, Dante Sarmiento, Florinda Dasig, Eneline Vitug, Paterno Ocampo, Russel Sahagun, Jingerly Calma, Orlando Navarro, Sharon Baldovino, and Mark Owen Guiao.
What are involved in the present consolidated Petitions for Certiorari are the Review Joint Resolution dated July 10, 2012 and Joint Order dated September 28, 2012 of the Office of the Ombudsman which found probable cause to indict petitioners Arroyo, Valencia, Uriarte, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero, Villar, and Plaras for the crime of Plunder; and the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated October 3, 2012 issuing the warrants of arrest of petitioners. The petitioners in the Petitions for Certiorari also ask for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the warrants of arrest issued by the respondent court. EaHDcS
The first batch of movant-intervenors 1 alleged that they are "bonafide residents and registered voters of the second district of Pampanga" 2 and "they had overwhelmingly voted for [the] petitioner," 3 former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as their representative to the House of Representatives. Petitioner Arroyo was the incumbent representative of the second district of Pampanga at the time of the filing of the Petition for Intervention.
According to the movant-intervenors, Arroyo "is the best person who could best serve them given her competence and experience in government." 4 Thus, the filing of non-bailable cases against Arroyo resulted in the petitioner-intervenors' deprivation of their lawful representation in the House of Representatives. 5
The second batch of movant-intervenors 6 re-pleaded the grounds for intervention relied upon by the first batch. 7 They likewise alleged that they are bonafide residents and registered voters of the second district of Pampanga and are entitled to the protection of their right to representation in Congress. 8
Both batches of movant-intervenors in their separate Motions claim that:
The movants clearly have a legal interest in the matter under litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, and that they are so situated as to be adversely affected by the decision of the Honorable Court in the instant action;
That this intervention will not, in the least, unduly delay the proceeding or prejudice the rights of the original parties;
That the intervenors' right can be fully protected in this proceeding rather than by filing a separate proceeding. 9
In a Resolution dated January 8, 2013, this Court required the Ombudsman and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the Motion for Leave to File Petition for Intervention filed by the first batch of movant-intervenors. 10 On January 15, 2013, this Court required the parties to comment on the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition for Intervention filed by the second batch of movant-intervenors. 11
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment on the Petition for Intervention dated February 27, 2013, argued that the movant-intervenors have no legal interest in the case, and thus, their intervention is not proper. 12 According to the Solicitor General: cHAaEC
The interest being alleged by intervenors in this case — that they are deprived of meaningful service and representation by Arroyo — is not the kind of legal interest sufficient to allow them to litigate a cause of action. The continuation of the plunder case against Arroyo will not cause any of petitioners any material loss or injury. . . . Their personal interest in the success of Arroyo in the main case is merely remote, indirect and generalized. 13
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in its Consolidated Comment dated February 4, 2013, argued that the movant-intervenors are not real parties in interest and are, therefore, strangers to the case. 14 The present case involves a criminal Information, and only the accused and the People of the Philippines are the real parties in interest. 15 The Office of the Ombudsman further argued that the movant-intervenors have no legal interest in the matter in litigation as required by the Rules. The interest claimed by the movant-intervenors — the right to be represented in the House of Representatives — is:
. . . too general, indirect and indistinguishable. They do not have, and they could not show, any personal and substantial interest in the case so much so that they will sustain direct and actual injury when the court eventually acts on the case.
As stated, involved in these cases is the crime of Plunder against Arroyo, among others. Needless to say, the criminal case is very personal to the accused. It is a crime committed against the People of the Philippines to which every electorate, including the would-be intervenors, is a part of. 16
Lastly, the Office of the Ombudsman argued that the intervention will only unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties. To allow the movant-intervenors to intervene would "open the floodgate for all the other political supporters of petitioner Arroyo." 17
The Motions filed by the movant-intervenors are DENIED.
The movant-intervenors failed to comply with the requirements for intervention as provided for in the Rules and jurisprudence. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the requirements to determine who may intervene in a proceeding: caADIC
A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. (2[a], [b]a, R12) (Emphasis provided)
In Garcia v. David, 18 intervention was defined as:
. . . a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. (33 C. J., 477.) Fundamentally, therefore, intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. 19
This Court in the Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison 20 said that:
[t]o warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. 21
On the first requisite, the movant-intervenors argued that their legal interest in the case is anchored on their right to representation in Congress, that is, as constituents of petitioner Arroyo in the second district of Pampanga. Such interest, however, is not the legal interest contemplated by the Rules. The legal interest required:
. . . must be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. 22
The movant-intervenors failed to establish that they are suffering a direct and immediate injury pending the resolution of the plunder case against petitioner Arroyo as required under Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. HCIaDT
This Court has already tackled and debunked the argument that representation of the sovereign people is primordial to the procedural restraints of a pending criminal investigation: 23
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects [sic] to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite [sic] of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
. . . . There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. . . . . 24
In this case, being a registered voter does not automatically entitle a third party to intervene in a proceeding involving his or her Congressional Representative.
On the second requisite for intervention, "[t]he trial court must not only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but also take into consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to the original parties that the intervention will cause." 25 We said before that the "allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court." 26 The movant-intervenors have not contributed anything substantial or new to aid this Court in the resolution of the main Petitions. They have failed to establish that the allowance of their intervention would not unduly prejudice the parties and burden this Court. As postulated by the Office of the Ombudsman:
Imagine if all the voters who voted for petitioner Arroyo in the last May 2010 congressional position will go to this Court and intend to be parties to the case, without doubt, the proceedings before this Honorable Court will definitely be delayed. And, allowing these would-be intervenors to intervene would only unnecessarily complicate and unduly delay and prolong the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, i.e., the People and accused petitioner Arroyo, among others. 27
In any case, movant-intervenors' alleged legal standing was rendered moot and academic by the end of the term of petitioner Arroyo on June 30, 2013. In Mendoza v. Villas, 28 we said that:
[w]ith the conduct of . . . elections, a supervening event has transpired that has rendered th[e] case moot and academic and subject to dismissal. . . . 'whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.' . . . [petitioner] no longer has any legal standing to further pursue the case, rendering the instant petition moot and academic. 29
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DENY the Motion for Leave to File Petition for Intervention dated December 20, 2012 and Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition dated December 27, 2012." Peralta, J., no part in G.R. No. 203563. (adv16) IEAacT
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDALClerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Motion for Leave to File Petition for Intervention dated December 20, 2012 filed by Ocampo, et al., G.R. Nos. 203740-41, rollo, p. 785.
2. Rollo, p. 779.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 780-781.
6. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition for Intervention dated December 27, 2012 filed by Rivera, et al., rollo, p. 830.
7. Rollo, p. 834.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 785-786 and 830-831.
10. Id. at 806.
11. Id. at 845-846.
12. Id. at 1368.
13. Id. at 1370.
14. Id. at 1341.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1344.
17. Id.
18. 67 Phil. 279 (1939).
19. Id. at 282.
20. Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, G.R. No. 185954, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 702.
21. Id. at 713.
22. Gibson v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 219, 230.
23. See People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000, 324 SCRA 689.
24. Id. at 694.
25. Ongco v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 190810, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 232, 239.
26. Big Country Ranch Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102927, October 12, 1993, October 12, 1993, 227 SCRA 161, 165.
27. Rollo, pp. 1344-1345.
28. G.R. No. 187256, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 347.
29. Id. at 357.