THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 239631. July 29, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.NOE BALSIMO III, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 29, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 239631 (People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee v. Noe Balsimo III, accused-appellant). — After a thorough review of the records and issues submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR HC No. 02275 properly affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, which convicted appellant for the crime of murder for the treacherous killing of Rosario Raya Paypa (victim).
In finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder, both the trial court and the appellate court gave full weight and credence to the testimony and positive identification of the lone eyewitness, Ruby Paypa Ravina (Ruby). This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the unanimous findings and legal conclusions reached by the trial court and the appellate court with respect to the guilt of the appellant as charged. More specifically, the Court puts great weight on the factual findings of the trial judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and observed their demeanor while they testified. Time and again, the Court has stressed that factual findings of the trial court, including its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, must be accorded respect and shall not be disturbed on appeal, except when the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and significance, which, if considered, would have affected the result of the case. 1 This is especially true where, as in the case herein, the trial court's findings were affirmed by the appellate court. 2
Furthermore, the behavior of Ruby in not being on guard upon the mere sight of appellant near the victim's house, her reaction to the stabbing, and in allegedly failing to immediately report the crime cannot taint her credibility as a witness. Ruby testified that she did not react upon seeing appellant, who was sitting in the gutter near the victim's house, because, at that moment, she was still unaware of what really transpired between the latter and the victim. She cannot likewise be faulted for not defending the victim or pleading for mercy from appellant because witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. 3 Further, it is settled that delay or vacillation in reporting a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness and render her testimony unworthy. 4
The Court equally holds that treachery attended the killing of the victim. To establish treachery, the following elements must concur: (1) that the victim was in no position to defend himself or herself when attacked; and (2) the offender deliberately adopted the specific manner of attack. 5 In the case at hand, the victim was attacked by appellant from behind while she was in no position to defend herself as both her arms were firmly positioned on Ruby's shoulders to enable her to alight from the motorcycle. Aside from her defenseless state, the attack was sudden, without any provocation on the part of the victim, and consciously adopted by appellant to avoid any form of retaliation.
With respect to appellant's alibi, the fact that it can only be confirmed by his sister who may not be an impartial witness, his denial of culpability of affirmative testimony merits scant consideration, especially in the face of affirmative testimony of an eyewitness as to the appellant's presence in the crime scene. 6 Alibi and denial are worthless and cannot prevail over positive identification that is categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness. 7 It was also not physically impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission since appellant himself admitted that the house of the victim can be reached within three (3) minutes by running.
As regards the penalty imposed upon appellant, the prescribed penalty for Murder, as provided in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Other than the circumstance of treachery which already qualified the crime to murder, no other modifying circumstance is present. Hence, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the need to append the phrase "without eligibility for parole" to qualify appellant's prison term in line with A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC dated August 4, 2015. 8
However, this Court deems it proper to modify the award of damages. In the absence of an ordinary aggravating circumstance in the commission of murder, the prevailing rule is that when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, as in the case at bench, the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present. 9 Thus, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should be pegged at P75,000.00 each. The award of P50,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, is sustained.
The imposition of six percent (6%) interest per annum on all damages awarded from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid is likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2018 in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02275 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is reduced to P75,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED." (Reyes, A., Jr., J., on wellness leave)
Very truly yours,
WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.People v. Ambatang, 808 Phil. 236, 242 (2017).
2.Bastian v. Court of Appeals, 575 Phil. 42, 55 (2008).
3.People v. Halili, 315 Phil. 351, 364 (1995).
4.Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 207, 218 (2000).
5.People v. Pulgo, G.R. No. 218205, July 5, 2017, 830 SCRA 220, 232-233.
6.People v. Macaliag, 392 Phil. 284, 298 (2000).
7.Id.
8.People v. Ampo, G.R. No. 229938, February 27, 2019.
9.People v. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 citing People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331, 381-382.