THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 227255. October 7, 2020.]
AMADO B. PANALIGAN III, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 7, 2020, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 227255 — (Amado B. Panaligan III, Petitioner, v. People of the Philippines and The Honorable Court of Appeals, Respondents). — This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142587 which reversed the Resolution 3 and Joint Resolution 4 issued by Branch 143, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal Case No. 10-100.
Antecedents
On 25 January 2010, petitioner Amado B. Panaligan III (petitioner) was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati City in Criminal Case No. 10-100. The case was raffled to Branch 143 thereof. 5
During trial, respondent People of the Philippines (People) filed the Judicial Affidavit of its last witness, Mariano A. David (David), who was scheduled to testify on 27 November 2013. Unfortunately, David was unable to attend the said hearing due to an illness. In its Order of even date, the RTC reset the hearing to 03 March 2014 and also directed David to submit a notarized medical certificate, which Order the People complied with. 6
Ruling of the RTC
In its 03 March 2014 Order, 7 the RTC declared the People to have waived David's testimony and ordered the prosecution to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence within fifteen (15) days therefrom or until 18 March 2014, after David again failed to attend the hearing. The RTC set the initial presentation of defense evidence on 05 May 2014. 8
The People did not file its formal offer and instead moved for reconsideration of the 03 March 2014 Order, explaining that David failed to appear at the hearing because he was currently recuperating from an operation. It also stated, that on the date of the hearing itself, David suffered uncontrolled hypertension which rendered him temporarily incapacitated to testify. The People submitted David's medical certificate and assured that he would be ready to testify if given the opportunity to do so on 19 March 2014, the hearing set for the People's motion. 9 CAIHTE
On 19 March 2014, David appeared but petitioner and his counsel were absent this time. Hence, the RTC reset the hearing on the People's motion to 07 May 2014. 10
The RTC, on 07 May 2014, declared that petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss and gave the People ten (10) days within which to file its comment thereon or opposition thereto. 11 After the People filed its Opposition, the RTC issued its 13 August 2014 Resolution 12 dismissing 13 the criminal case against petitioner for violation of his right to speedy trial under R.A. No. 8493. The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 14
According to the RTC, the People's failure to complete the presentation of its evidence and its failure to submit its formal offer manifested their lack of interest to pursue the case against petitioner. 15
The People filed its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition, respectively, but the RTC denied both motions in its 18 May 2015 Joint Resolution. 16 Feeling aggrieved, the People filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, asserting that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in rendering its assailed issuances. 17
Ruling of the CA
In its 13 May 2016 Decision, 18 the CA granted the petition, 19 reversed the RTC's 13 August 2014 Resolution and 18 May 2015 Joint Resolution, and directed the RTC to revive Criminal Case No. 10-100, and to try and decide the same on the merits with deliberate dispatch. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision stated:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed August 13, 2014 Resolution and May 18, 2015 Joint Resolution of the Makati City Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, in Criminal Case No. 10-100 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered in that the trial court is DIRECTED to:
1. REVIVE the Criminal Case No. 10-100 (For: Estafa) and REINSTATE the same into its docket of active Criminal Cases; and,
2. TRY and DECIDE the present case on the merits with due and deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED. 20
The CA held that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case. While postponements attended the proceedings below, they were neither intentional nor executed in bad faith by the prosecutor and the latter's actuations indicate that the People was not unwilling to pursue the present case. The CA also noted that petitioner failed to prove his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated because petitioner suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which resulted from the ordinary and inevitable delay. 21
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to no avail. 22 Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether or not the CA correctly found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case below for violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial.
Ruling of the Court
We sustain the CA's Decision.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. 23 The right to speedy trial and the speedy disposition of cases is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. 24
We find no violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial in this case.
In justifying its dismissal of the case, the RTC held in its 13 August 2014 Resolution that despite its leniency, the People failed to present further evidence and to submit its formal offer, which omission demonstrated the prosecution's lack of interest to pursue the case against petitioner. 25
Contrary to the RTC's ruling, the People had shown intent to complete the presentation of its evidence. Notably, it had already filed David's Judicial Affidavit on 18 November 2013 before he was originally scheduled to testify on 27 November 2013. Moreover, David was present and ready to testify during the scheduled hearing on 19 March 2014 regarding the People's Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's 03 March 2014 Order. Unfortunately, David was prevented from taking the stand when the RTC rescheduled that hearing to 07 May 2014 due to the absence of petitioner and his counsel. DETACa
David's intended testimony, however, was subsequently shelved when, during the hearing on 07 May 2014, the RTC no longer took up the People's Motion for Reconsideration and instead directed the prosecution to comment on petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Further, the People cannot be faulted for not submitting its formal offer as to have done so would be premature because it precisely sought reconsideration of the RTC's 03 March 2014 Order to enable it to present David, its third and last witness.
As correctly observed by the CA, petitioner himself thwarted the People's attempt to complete the presentation of its evidence on the scheduled hearing on 19 March 2014, 26 due to petitioner's absence during the trial date, and thus, delaying the proceedings. Where the accused, as in this case, himself contributed to the delay in his trial, the very evil sought to be prevented by the right, he cannot be heard to complain of any infringement thereof.
It is settled that the right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution of its day in court. 27 Like any other litigant, the State is entitled to its day in court and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the litigation. It must be noted that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons. Courts are tasked to give meaning to that intent. 28 By hastily dismissing the case, the RTC deprived the People of reasonable opportunity to complete the presentation of its evidence despite its willingness to do so. The right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same, as in this case, would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. This right should not operate to deprive the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases. 29
Also, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What offends the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. 30
Petitioner never disputed that prosecution witness David was a sickly senior citizen. We note that the People was able to explain that David's absences on 27 November 2013 and 03 March 2014 occurred due to his physical incapacity to testify on those dates as evidenced by said witnesses' medical certificates. As such, the resulting postponements due to David's initial unavailability on the said dates were reasonable and not unjustified.
Lastly, apart from his bare claim that the delay will cause him prejudice — as allegedly, it would be burdensome for him to seek witnesses and evidence to prove his innocence, his anxiety will be prolonged, and his litigation expenses will increase — petitioner has not shown particular evidence of such actual prejudice.
Not every claim of prejudice shall conveniently work in favor of the accused. There must be conclusive factual basis behind the purported claim as the Court cannot rely on pure speculation or guesswork. The respondent, who asserts to have suffered prejudice, must show actual, specific, and real injury to his rights. A claim that the delay has caused an impairment to one's defense must be specific and not merely conjectural. Simply put, general claims shall not serve to deprive the State of its right to prosecute criminal offenses. 31 So should it be in the case at bench.
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 32 It exists when the lower court or tribunal exercises its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 33 In this case, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in hastily dismissing the case, which effectively deprived the People of its right its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 13 May 2016 and Resolution dated 30 August 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142587 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 32-44, dated 13 May 2016.
2.Id. at 46-47, dated 30 August 2016.
3.Id. at 49-50, dated 13 August 2014.
4.Id. at 115-118, dated 18 May 2015.
5.Id. at 48.
6.Id. at 56.
7.Id. at 143-144.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 63-68.
10.Id. at 69.
11.Id. at 155.
12. Penned by Judge Maximo M. De Leon.
13.Rollo, pp. 49-50, dated 13 August 2014.
14.Id. at 33.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 115-118.
17.Id. at 34.
18. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Carmelita Salandanan Manahan.
19.Id. at 32-44.
20.Id. at 43-44.
21.Id. at 38-40.
22.Id. at 46-47, dated 30 August 2016.
23.Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, 21 April 2009, citing Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004.
24.Id.
25.Rollo, pp. 49-50.
26.Id. at 39.
27.People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35-45 (1995); G.R. No. 102485, 22 May 1995.
28.Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, 21 April 2009.
29.People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 233557-67, 19 June 2019.
30.People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, 21 March 2018, citing People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35-45 (1995); G.R. No. 102485, 22 May 1995.
31.People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 233557-67, 19 June 2019.
32.Valencia (Bukidnon) Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Heirs of Cabotaje, G.R. No. 219984 (Resolution), 03 April 2019.
33.Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, 799 Phil. 47, 62 (2016), cited in Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 242860, 11 March 2019.