FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252602. July 28, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ALBERTO SERRANO, III A.K.A. "FEILONG", ERNANI ANDRES A.K.A. "NANO", AND SALVADOR TELIG y ERA A.K.A. "ANDY TELIG", accused-appellants.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 28, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 252602 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO SERRANO, III a.k.a. "Feilong", ERNANI ANDRES a.k.a. "Nano", and SALVADOR TELIG y ERA a.k.a. "Andy Telig"
The appeal is DISMISSED.
Appellants are guilty of
The elements of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 2
There is no question here pertaining to the presence of the first and fourth elements.
On the second element, Imelda Sayo (Sayo) positively identified appellants Alberto Serrano III (Serrano), Ernani Andres (Andres), and Salvador Telig (Telig) as the persons who killed the victim, thus:
Q: Now you said that they offered alias Nognog [Camilon] a shot, what did alias Nognog do?
A: He refused, sir.
Q: Thereafter, what transpired next after that?
A: Feilong [Serrano] put his arm around the shoulder of Nognog, sir.
Q: After that, what else did he do?
A: Feilong and his companions insisted that Nognog take the shot but Nognog refused so they pushed Nognog and even punched and hit him, sir.
Q: Hit him with what?
A: With a tube, sir.
Q: What kind of pipe was it?
A: I cannot identify very well but I really saw that it was a lead pipe, sir.
Q: Who was using that?
A: Telig and Feilong, sir.
Q: And after that, what happened to alias Nognog?
A: Because they already hit Nognog with a pipe, he fell on the ground, sir.
Q: After he had fallen on the ground, what else transpired after that?
A: Nano [Andres] held the head of Nognog and then shot him, sir.
Q: Thereafter, what happened next after that?
A: Tenok called a barangay official and then Feilong uttered, "Patay na si Nognog" so they scampered away, sir." 3
She testified in detail how appellants Telig and Serrano punched the victim and one of them hit the victim with a lead pipe. When the victim was already sprawled on the ground, appellant Andres held up the victim's head and shot him right in the head at close range.
The trial court found the testimony of Sayo to be clear, categorical, and direct. Sayo could not have been mistaken in her identification of appellants since she had been residing in the area near the situs criminis since 1976, thus, she was familiar with the residents of the place, including appellants. In fact, the mother of appellant Andres is her neighbor. Also, appellants admitted they had no prior altercations with Sayo which reinforced the latter's credibility. Indeed, the testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even for murder. 4
As it was though, the credible testimony of Sayo is not the only inculpatory evidence against appellants. It finds full corroboration in the medical findings of Dr. Emmanuel Aranas who confirmed that he did an autopsy on the body of the victim and found that the latter sustained hematoma on the right side of the neck which could have been caused by a hard, blunt object; abrasion on the right side of the forehead; gunshot wound in the left side of the head; hematoma on the left eye; abrasion on the right side of the forehead; and abrasions near the right eye. 5 He died due to the gunshot wound. To paraphrase People v. Aguilos, 6 the physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Sayo's testimony. CAIHTE
As for the third element, the killing of Jackson Camilon (Camilon) was attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, as alleged and proved by evidence. To support a finding of abuse of superior strength, it must be proved that there was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that was plainly and obviously advantageous to the latter who purposely selected or took advantage of such inequality in order to facilitate the commission of the crime. The assailant must be shown to have consciously sought the advantage, or to have the deliberate intent to use his or her superior advantage. In this context, to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this qualifying or aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. 7
Here, Camilon was completely unarmed while facing off against three (3) assailants who were armed with a lead pipe and a gun. Appellants Serrano and Telig ganged up on Camilon, punched him, struck him with a lead pipe, and even when he was already sprawled on the ground, appellant Andres further took advantage of Camilon's helplessness by lifting Camilon's head and shooting him in the head at close range. Clearly, abuse of superior strength attended the killing of Camilon.
Too, there is no doubt that appellants acted in conspiracy with each other. Appellants acted in concert with one another — to hurt, disable, and eventually kill Camilon. As stated, appellants Telig and Serrano punched Camilon and one of them hit Camilon with a lead pipe. Taking his cue, appellant Andres shot Camilon right in the head. Thereafter, appellants fled together. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 8
Appellants, nonetheless, seek to discredit the credibility of Sayo on the following grounds: 1) she did not say how far she was when the killing took place; 2) she did not assist or shout for help, and; 3) she had ill motive because Serrano allegedly threatened her son.
We are not persuaded.
First. Sayo's failure to testify on how far she was when the incident took place does not automatically cast doubt on her credibility. She was unflinching, even during the cross-examination, in her assertion that she saw appellants beat up Camilon after he refused the shot of liquor, how appellants Serrano and Telig hit Camilon with a lead pipe, and when Camilon was already sprawled on the ground, appellant Andres held up Camilon's head and shot him right in the head. In People v. Casabuena, 9 a witness was deemed credible because her account of the incident was simple, clear, and credible, especially because of her actual presence at the locuscriminis. Her testimony was replete with details and consistent even on cross-examination, as in this case.
Second. Sayo's failure to render assistance to Camilon or ask for help cannot be taken against her and does not depart from the fact that she witnessed the killing from beginning to end. Suffice it to state that not everyone reacts in the same manner when confronted with strange, startling or violent situations. 10
Third. Appellants' accusation that Sayo was impelled to falsely testify against them because Serrano threatened her son some time ago must fail. Mere allegation is not evidence. It is settled that where the defense fails to prove that witnesses are moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimonies are therefore entitled to full weight and credit. 11
In any event, against the positive testimony of Sayo and the medical findings of Dr. Aranas, appellants' denial and alibi easily crumble. Denial is the weakest of all defenses and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. More, for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed as he must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 12
Here, Serrano claimed that he was bringing food from his house back to his wedding anniversary party, when he saw Camilon and his companion going towards the highway. While drinking at the party, he and his guests heard gunshots. Meanwhile, Andres asserted that on his way home from the party, he dropped by a store to buy cigarettes and got punched by Camilon, right before the latter got shot by an unidentified man right in front of him. For his part, Telig simply stated that he went straight home from the party. Yet, none of them were able to clearly demonstrate that it was completely physically impossible for them to be at the situs criminis when the crime took place. In fact, moments before Camilon got shot, Serrano admitted seeing Camilon on the street while Andres admitted to having witnessed Camilon getting shot. Telig was out and about in the immediate vicinity around the time Camilon was shot. Clearly, the defense of alibi cannot be appreciated in appellants' favor. On this score, we adopt the trial court's findings, viz.:
Compared with the account of Manguera, the testimony of Sayo is more reliable since it is recorded via a Sworn Statement (Exh. "B") which she executed at the police station a few weeks after the incident. Whereas, the testimony of Manguera was only heard in Court on October 29, 2012 — more than four (4) years after the victim was killed. Human mind is frail and it can be affected [by] several factors. One of the factors affecting human recollection is the passage of time or subsequent events. The Supreme Court held that because the act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to puzzle pieces together, human memory can change in dramatic and unexpected ways because of the passage of time or subsequent events, such as exposure to "post event" information like conversations with other witnesses or media reports (Elizabeth F. Loftus, et al., Beyond the Ken — Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS 177 [2005] as cited in People v. Crisente Nuñez, G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017).
The Court notes that witness Manguera testified in Court only after he had been re-acquainted with accused(s) Serrano and Andres at the San Mateo Municipal Jail (pages 11-12, TSN dated October 29, 2012). The passage of four (4) years combined with the re-acquaintance of Manguera with the two (2) of the accused(s) (sic), who obviously view the incident in their favor, affected how the Court appreciated testimony of the witness. 13
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All the accused(s) (sic) foisted denial and alibi to belie the charge of Murder. Manguera, accused Serrano III and Guiriba invariably said that Serrano III was called by Manguera to help the victim. Barangay Tanod Pulido, however, rebutted that none of the accused(s) (sic) were at the place of incident when they arrived (page 5, TSN dated March 8, 2018). The Court gives premium to the testimony of Pulido since it is more in touch with reality. No person guilty of killing a person would be near the place of the incident after doing the deed. Anent the alibi of Telig and Andres that they have left before the incident occurred, the same cannot be given credence. This is because they have gone in hiding after they learned that they were being implicated. Their flight is certainly a sign of guilt for what they have done. No less than in their words, they said they were afraid. They were afraid of the consequences for killing a person. 14
Suffice it to state that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from these factual findings are accorded the highest respect by the appellate court, whose review power is limited to the records of the case. This explains why this Court, which is not a trial court, is loathe to re-examine and re-evaluate the evidence that had been analyzed and dissected by the trial court, and sustained and affirmed by the appellate court. 15
Imposable Penalty
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, states:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances.
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Applying Article 63 (2) 16 of the Revised Penal Code here, the lesser of the two (2) indivisible penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua shall be imposed provided there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended the killing, as in this case. Hence, both courts below correctly sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua.
On the award of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly granted P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages to the Heirs of Jackson Camilon.
As for the grant of P50,000.00 as temperate damages, the same is in accord with People v. Angeles, 17viz.: DETACa
But, as pronounced in Gervero and People v. Jugueta, "when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded." Considering that the receipts presented by Abelardo's heirs did not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), they shall, in lieu of actual damages, be granted Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) temperate damages in order to avoid the situation where those who did not present any receipt at all would get more that those who claimed for more than Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) but failed to present receipts for the excess of that amount. Verily, the heirs of Abelardo Evangelista are entitled to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages.
These monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated December 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 12454 is AFFIRMED. Appellants Alberto Serrano III, Ernani Andres, and Salvador Telig are each found GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
They are further required TO PAY the Heirs of Jackson Camilon P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages. All monetary awards are subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
2.People v. Maron, G.R. No. 232339, November 20, 2019.
3. CA Rollo, pp. 70-71.
4.People v. Avila, 787 Phil. 346, 358 (2016).
5. CA rollo, p. 41.
6. 453 Phil. 1, 16 (2003).
7. See People v. Evasco, G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018, 881 SCRA 79, 82.
8.Arroyo v. People, 790 Phil. 367, 420 (2016).
9. G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020.
10.People v. Asto, 343 Phil. 495, 507-508 (1997).
11.People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529, 562 (2012).
12.People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 224584, September 04, 2019.
13. CA rollo, pp. 49-50.
14.Id. at 51.
15.People v. Soriano, 810 Phil. 239, 251 (2017).
16. Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
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2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
17. G.R. No. 224289, August 14, 2019.