THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 253219. July 13, 2022.]
PAPERTECH, INC., AND ALL ITS RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS, petitioners,vs. e-JOBLINK AND BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 13, 2022, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 253219 (Papertech, Inc., and all its responsible officers, Petitioners vs. e-Joblink and Business Solutions, Inc., Respondent). — Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 the Court resolves to DENY it for failure to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision 2 dated May 31, 2019 and Resolution 3 dated August 24, 2020 in CA-G.R. CV No. 111640. The CA correctly ruled that petitioner Papertech, Inc. (Papertech) is guilty of breach of contract and did not err when it ordered Branch 213 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City to recompute Papertech's unpaid billings to e-Joblink and Business Solutions, Inc. (respondent) in accordance with the terms of the parties' agreement. 4
As a rule, the Court, in the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, resolves only questions of law. There are, however, recognized exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (4) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (5) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (6) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (7) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (8) when the findings of fact are premised on the purported lack of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 5
A question of law, as distinguished from a question of fact, is explained as follows:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same should not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. [If] the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the [question] posed is one of fact. 6
Here, petitioners contend that the CA erred in its appreciation of facts and evidence when it held: that the parties agreed on an hourly rate of P60.90 for the payment of overtime and nightshift differential; 7 that Papertech failed to substantiate its claim of overbilling or overpayment; 8 that there was no evidence that the parties were debtors and creditors of each other; 9 and that respondent was able to prove its claim for actual or compensatory damages, 10 exemplary damages, 11 attorney's fees, and cost of suit. 12 These are clearly factual matters that are beyond the ambit of Rule 45. Although the rule admits of exceptions, none of which was proved here.
At any rate, it is undisputed that a contract of service existed between Papertech and respondent and that Papertech reneged on its obligations under the contract which caused injury to respondent. 13 In fact, during pre-trial, petitioners admitted liability in favor of respondent but only in the amount of P1,198,997.17. 14 This entitles respondent to actual or compensatory damages, defined under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code as follows:
Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
To be entitled to compensatory damages, the amount of loss must be capable of proof and must be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage suffered is imposed on the party claiming the same, who should adduce the best evidence available in support thereof. 15 As applied in the case, respondent is entitled to compensatory damages as duly proved during the trial corresponding to the amount of loss it sustained by reason of Papertech's breach of contract.
Notably, while the CA agreed that respondent was entitled to compensatory damages, it ordered the RTC to recompute the amount of award on the basis of the terms of agreement of the parties in the contract of services. The CA's ground and ratiocination for the recomputation is duly supported by evidence which the Court will not disturb absent cogent reason to do so.
On the question of whether respondent is entitled to the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees, the Court likewise finds no reason to depart from the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.
Exemplary damages may be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to compensatory damages. 16 In the case, the CA aptly agreed with the RTC that Papertech's unjust act of evading a legitimate obligation to respondent entitles the latter to exemplary damages. Indeed, as a business owner, Papertech should always be forthright in its dealings and it should not be allowed to renege on the obligations it freely entered into in the course of business. 17
Moreover, the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses was in order. Recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, may be allowed in cases where "the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff x x x to incur expenses to protect his [or her] interest." 18 Here, because of Papertech's unjust refusal to pay its obligations, respondent was constrained to engage the services of counsel to protect its interest. 19 At any rate, attorney's fees and litigation expenses may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, 20 as in the case.
All told, the CA was thus correct in affirming the RTC which found Papertech liable for breach of contract of services with respondent. In addition, the CA did not err, first, when it ordered the RTC to recompute Papertech's unpaid billings to respondent in accordance with the terms of the contract and as set forth in the assailed CA Decision dated May 31, 2019; and second, when it ruled that the recomputed amount of compensatory damages shall earn monetary interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of default, i.e., extrajudicial demand on November 18, 2011, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of the Decision.
Further, the Court imposes legal interest on the total monetary award in favor of respondent at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until full satisfaction, pursuant Nacar vs. Gallery Frames. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31, 2019 and the Resolution dated August 24, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 111640 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the total monetary award in favor of respondent e-Joblink and Business Solutions, Inc. shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-39.
2.Id. at 46-59. Penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Tita Marilyn B. Payoyo-Villordon.
3.Id. at 60-62. Penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben Reynaldo C. Roxas and Tita Marilyn B. Payoyo-Villordon.
4.Id. at 58.
5.Star Electric Corp. v. R & G Construction Dev't. and Trading, Inc., 774 Phil. 410, 419-420 (2015), citing Sps. Almendrala v. Sps. Ngo, 508 Phil. 305, 315-316 (2005).
6.FAJ Construction & Development Corp. v. Saulog, 757 Phil. 191, 209-210 (2015), citing Engr. Dueñas v. Guce-Africa, 618 Phil. 10, 18-19 (2009).
7.Rollo, p. 12.
8.Id. at 18.
9.Id. at 22.
10.Id. at 25.
11.Id. at 30.
12.Id. at 34.
13.Id. at 52.
14.Id. at 171.
15. See Pryce Properties Corp. v. Spouses Octobre, 802 Phil. 391-397 (2016).
16. See Civil Code, Art. 2229.
17.Rollo, p. 56.
18. See Civil Code, Art. 2208 (2).
19.Rollo, p. 193.
20. See Civil Code, Art. 2208 (1).
21. 716 Phil. 267, 281 (2013).