FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249487. September 14, 2021.]
DIANA M. HENSON, petitioner, vs.CITIGROUP BUSINESS PROCESS SOLUTIONS PTE. LTD., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 14, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 249487 — Diana M. Henson v. Citigroup Business Process Solutions Pte. Ltd.
We deny the petition.
Generally, this Court reviews only questions of law raised via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized to rule on matters falling within their jurisdiction. The Court, however, permits the relaxation of this rule when the factual findings below are not uniform, as here. 1 Indeed, the variance between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, 2 on the one hand, and the National Labor Relations Commission 3 (NLRC) and the Court of Appeals, 4 on the other, allows us to resolve the factual issues anew.
Here, the core issue is whether respondent Citigroup Business Process Solutions Pte. Ltd. validly dismissed petitioner Diana M. Henson from employment on ground of willful breach of trust and confidence. Article 297 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code pertinently ordains:
Art. 297. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: ADCIca
(1) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(2) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(3) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(4) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(5) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (Emphasis supplied)
Loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. This class of employees includes managerial personnel entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. 5
A dismissal based on willful breach of trust and confidence requires the concurrence of two (2) conditions. First, the employee whose services are to be terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence. Second, the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence. 6
Both requisites are present here.
For one, petitioner never denied that she was a managerial employee and, thus, held a position of trust and confidence. 7 To be sure, Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Reyes8 defined "managerial employees," viz.:
Managerial employees are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. They refer to those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff. Officers and members of the managerial staff perform work directly related to management policies of their employer and customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment.
Here, petitioner's position as Team Leader/Unit Manager meant that she was in charge of her own team. Her tasks involved coaching her agents and monitoring whether they are logged in on their accounts. She also had authority to organize their team building activities and, more importantly, had access to budgets therefor via the Voice of the Employee (VOE) funds. Certainly, the first requisite is satisfied.
For another, there exists a reasonable basis for respondent's loss of trust and confidence. To be clear, the loss of trust and confidence is hinged on her act of dishonesty in overstating the amount to be reimbursed for their team building activity at Anvaya Cove Beach and Nature Club (Anvaya Cove) in Bataan. It speaks volumes of her integrity as an employee. The size of the amount involved (i.e., P600.00 for her husband's entrance fee and P893.23 for the beverages that her team personally paid for) is inconsequential.
Petitioner nevertheless counters that she simply could not separate the expenses for her husband's entrance fee and her team's beverages from the rest of the expenses incurred during the team building activity as Anvaya Cove only issued a singular receipt. At any rate, she instructed Bert Aguilar, the person in charge of processing the reimbursement, to exclude these personal expenses from the amount to be reimbursed. In another vein, she did not pocket the reimbursed amount of P10,812.94; she turned over the amount to her subordinate who agreed to advance their budget subject to reimbursement. Finally, respondent erred in not considering her years of service in her penalty, especially that this is her first offense.
We are not convinced.
It bears stress that nothing prevented petitioner from returning the excess amount reimbursed upon receipt thereof. But records do not show that petitioner ever repaid the P600.00 which covered her husband's entrance fee at Anvaya Cove. Consequently, whether petitioner turned over the reimbursed amount of P10,812.94 to another employee becomes immaterial. For the fact remains that petitioner's actions caused respondent to spend funds for her husband who was not even its employee.
Petitioner, too, offered no proof at all that her subordinates got their refund for the P893.23 they paid for beverages. On the contrary, all the team members who shared in the expense submitted complaints against petitioner precisely because they were not able to recover the amount they had paid. 9 Verily, respondent was not the only victim of petitioner's deception but her teammates as well. TIEHDC
Petitioner's approximately ten (10) years in service for respondent should have made her more conscious of and compliant with the company's regulations. Indeed, an employee's length of service should not be regarded as a justification for modifying the penalty of dismissal here. Otherwise, such circumstance would be treated as a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables. 10
All told, there clearly was valid ground for petitioner's dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code.
Yet we also affirm the rulings below that petitioner was deprived of her right to due process as she was dismissed for charges not indicated in her Employee Citation and Show Cause Form. 11 To reiterate, the basis for petitioner's dismissal was her dishonest act of including her husband's entrance fee and team's beverage expense in her request for reimbursement. But there was no reference to these acts in the Employee Citation and Show Cause Form she had received. At best, said form merely alleged that petitioner misrepresented to her team that the beverage expense would not be covered by the VOE funds; it did not specifically charge her with pocketing the excess amounts reimbursed.
Without sufficiently informing petitioner of the charges for which she was dismissed, it became impossible for her to adequately prepare and defend herself. This violation of petitioner's right to due process entitles her to indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The award would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. It likewise provides a vindication or recognition of the fundamental right to due process accorded to employees under the Labor Code and its Omnibus Implementing Rules. 12
With respect to the proper amount of nominal damages, the Court finds that the award of P30,000.00 below is consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. 13 This award, however, must earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of the Decision dated June 29, 2018 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 06-002197-18 until fully paid. 14 HCSAIa
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2019 and Resolution dated September 20, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 159216 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Diana M. Henson was NOT ILLEGALLY DISMISSED from employment. Respondent Citigroup Business Process Solutions Pte. Ltd. is nevertheless directed to pay nominal damages of P30,000.00 in favor of petitioner for violating her right to due process. This monetary award shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of the Decision dated June 29, 2018 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 06-002197-18 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. See Reyes v. Global Beer Below Zero, Inc., 819 Phil. 483, 493-494 (2017).
2.Rollo, pp. 284-302.
3.Id. at 88-103.
4.Id. at 42-57.
5. See Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Reyes, 740 Phil. 297, 312-313 (2014), citing Lima Land, Inc. v. Cuevas, 635 Phil. 36 (2010).
6. See Bravo v. Urious College, et al., 810 Phil. 603, 620-621 (2017).
7. See PJ Lhuillier, Inc. v. Camacho, 806 Phil. 413, 427 (2017).
8.Supra note 5 at 311, citing M+W Zander Philippines, Inc. v. Enriquez, 606 Phil. 591 (2009).
9.Rollo, p. 288.
10. See Immaculate Concepcion Academy, et al. v. Camilon, 738 Phil. 220, 232-233 (2014), citing Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 555 Phil. 134, 139-140 (2007).
11.Rollo, p. 175.
12. See Moral v. Momentum Properties Management Corp., G.R. No. 226240, March 6, 2019, citing Agabon v. NLRC, 485 Phil. 248 (2004).
13.Id.
14. See Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 280-283 (2013).