Clarifying Whether it is Still Necessary for Justices and Judges to Secure an Ombudsman Clearance for Purposes of Their Application for Retirement

November 27, 2006

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 162-06

 

For your information and guidance is the Court En Banc resolution issued on October 17, 2006 in A.M. No. 06-10-18-SC (Re: Request for Clarification Whether it is Still Necessary for Justices and Judges to Secure an Ombudsman Clearance for Purposes of Their Application for Retirement), to wit:

"A.M. No. 06-10-18-SC (Re: Request for Clarification Whether it is Still Necessary for Justices and Judges to Secure an Ombudsman Clearance for Purposes of Their Application for Retirement) — This refers to the Letter dated October 12, 2006 of Mr. Joseph Bryan Hilary P. Davide, Chief Justice's Staff Head, seeking clarification from the Court on whether it is still necessary for Justices and Judges to secure an Ombudsman Clearance for purposes of their application for retirement.

Memorandum Circular No. I Series of 1992 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman reads in full:

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. I

TO: ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, OFFICES, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS

RE: OMBUDSMAN CLEARANCE aCSDIc

Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act " provides that "(N)o public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery. "

In order that the foregoing prohibition may be strictly observed, all concerned are hereby enjoined not to allow the retirement, or accept the resignation of any "public officer " as defined under said Act without first securing/presenting a clearance to the effect that he has no pending criminal or administrative case with this Office.

Any person found to be not complying with this Circular may be punished for contempt pursuant to Section 15(9) of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).

This Circular takes effect immediately.

February 11, 1992.

(Sgd.) CONRADO M. VASQUEZ

On the basis thereof, Justices and Judges, as one of the requirements for their application for retirement, are required to secure the Ombudsman Clearance to the effect that he or she has no pending criminal or administrative case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Court finds, however, that such requirement has no legal justification.

Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office only by impeachment. This is clear from Section 2, 1 Article XI of the Constitution. Further, Section 3(1) thereof vests in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. On the other hand, Section 6, Article VIII provides that the "Supreme Court shall have the administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. "

In Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 2 the Court in no uncertain terms stressed that the Office of the Ombudsman may not encroach into the Supreme Court's exclusive administrative jurisdiction over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk in this wise: DaCEIc

. . . Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda v. Vasquez (221 SCRA 464 [1993]).

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. 3

The requirement imposed on the Justices and Judges to secure the Ombudsman Clearance for purposes of their retirement is, thus, without basis in law.

ACCORDINGLY, Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, and Judges are not required to secure the Ombudsman Clearance for purposes of their application for retirement. " DIHETS

(SGD.) CHRISTOPHER O. LOCKCourt Administrator

Footnotes

1. The provision reads, in part, thus:

  SEC. 2. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

2. 413 Phil. 717, 725 (2001).

3. Id. at 724-725.