FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 217613. July 2, 2018.]
WILMA L. ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. BERNARD R. TWITCHETT AND ROSALIE CANLOM FARLEY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 2, 2018which reads as follows: CAacTH
"G.R. No. 217613 (Wilma L. Zamora vs. Bernard R. Twitchett and Rosalie Canlom Farley).
Petitioner Wilma Zamora (petitioner) appeals through a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 30, 2014 2 and the Resolution dated March 26, 2015 3 in CA G.R. SP No. 07923. The September 30, 2014 Decision nullified petitioner's appointment as co-special administrator of the estate of Peter John Holden (Holden), while the March 26, 2015 Resolution denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENTS
The instant controversy originated from a Petition for the Probate of the Will of Holden, a British National who died on January 30, 2012. The petition was filed by respondent Bernard Twitchett (Twitchett), Holden's alleged brother-in-law, and under his alleged capacity as the designated executor of Holden's Last Will and Testament. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 23. 4
Petitioner, Holden's purported common-law wife and business partner, opposed the petition. 5
Twitchett filed a Reply, opposing petitioner's allegations. He also filed a Motion to Appoint Special Administrator. 6
Meanwhile, Rosalie Canlom Farley (Farley) intervened, in her purported capacity as co-executor, appointed by Holden. She prayed that Twitchett be appointed as special administrator of Holden's estate because he is the named executor in Holden's purported last will and testament. Farley also alleged that majority of the stockholders and investors of PJH group of corporations have absolute trust and confidence on Twitchett. 7
In response, petitioner filed a Consolidated Comment/Opposition to Twitchett's Motion to Appoint Special Administrator and Farley's Petition in Intervention. 8 She also filed a Motion for Appointment as Special Administrator. 9
Order of the RTC
Since there was delay in granting the letters testamentary or administration, the probate court first resolved the prayers for the appointment of special administrator. In its July 16, 2013 Order, the RTC appointed petitioner and Twitchett as co-special Administrators, as follows:
Accordingly, the Court RESOLVES to:
1. APPOINT petitioner Bernard Twitchett and Oppositor Wilma Zamora as co-Special Administrators. As such, each of them are ordered to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the Executor/s or Administrator/s is/are appointed, or their appointment is revoked by the Court;
2. REQUIRE each of them to post a Bond in the amount of One Million Pesos (Php1,000,000.00) cash, Philippine Currency, within a period of Ten (10) days from notice hereof;
3. REQUIRE each one of them to start discharging the duties of the trust only upon submission to the Court of proof of their posting of the requisite bond. It is understood that only after both the petitioner and oppositor shall have filed their respective bonds that they may start doing so. The oath of Office shall be administered by the Branch Clerk of Court; and
4. REQUIRE them to jointly make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to their possession or knowledge, and that they will truly account for such as are received by them when required by the court, and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them. They are given Ninety (90) days from the time they started discharging the duties of their trust, within which to make such return under oath.
Furnish copies hereof to the petitioner, the oppositor, the intrevenor, and their counsels.
SO ORDERED. 10
Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration of the July 16, 2013 Order, Twitchett and Farley assailed the same before the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Twitchett and Farley claimed that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it appointed petitioner as a co-special administrator of Holden's estate despite the fact that she is indebted to Holden and has a claim against the estate of the deceased. IAETDc
Decision of the CA
The CA, in its assailed September 30, 2014 Decision, granted the Petition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Order of the trial court dated 16 July 2013, in SP Case No. 19024-CEB is partially MODIFIED. The appointment of Wilma L. Zamora as co-special administrator is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 11
The CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it appointed petitioner as co-special administrator, a debtor of the estate, and one who claims half of the estate as Holden's common-law wife and a trustee. The CA noted that petitioner possesses interests which are incongruent with the functions and duties of a special administrator, who is supposed to safeguard the interests of the estate.
Proceedings before this Court
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner assailed the CA's September 30, 2014 Decision before this Court, raising the following grounds:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that Wilma Zamora is disqualified from being appointed as Special Co-Administrator;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the promissory notes which the assailed Decision relied upon were never presented in evidence in the trial court, never identified by a witness, never offered in evidence;
3. Whether or not Wilma Zamora is qualified to be appointed as Special Co-administrator. 12
Meanwhile, respondents comment to the petition, submitting that:
1. No reversible error was committed by the Honorable Court of Appeals when it disqualified Wilma L. Zamora as a special co-administrator.
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in making petitioner's three (3) promissory notes as among the basis of its finding of conflict of interest on the part of the petitioner with the estate.
3. The subject decision and order of the Court of Appeals, by provision of law is submitted to be also not appealable it being a decision concerning a special administrator. 13
Meanwhile, on October 28, 2016, Petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that respondent Twitchett passed away on August 23, 2016. 14
Respondent Farley filed a Manifestation with Motion to Consider the Petition as Moot and Academic15 citing the probate court's Order 16 dated November 26, 2014, which purportedly adopted the CA's Decision.
Petitioner disputed respondent's claim that the probate court adopted the CA decision and opposed the motion to declare the instant petition moot and academic. 17 Respondent Farley filed her reply to petitioner's comment insisting on her earlier allegations in her manifestation.
In a Manifestation 18 dated June 23, 2017, respondent Farley stated that the probate court, in its Order 19 dated January 23, 2017, appointed respondent Farley and one Canuto T. Barte, Jr. (Barte) as co-special administrators of Holden's estate, in replacement of respondent Twitchett. It was also manifested that Farley and Barte already took oath as co-special administrators of Holden's estate. However, respondent Farley represented that the probate court also issued an Order dated March 29, 2017, recalling the earlier appointment of Farley and Barte, considering the pendency of the instant petition.
On July 3, 2017, petitioner filed a Counter-Manifestation with Motion to Cite Respondents and Respondent's Counsel in Direct Contempt of Court.20 Petitioner alleged that despite the revocation of Farley and Barte's appointment as special co-administrators, they are still acting as such.
We noted respondent Farley's manifestation in Our Resolution dated July 19, 2017. 21 DcHSEa
On July 5, 2017, respondents filed their comment to petitioner's motion to declare them in contempt. 22 They alleged that they did not conceal the probate court's revocation of respondent Farley and Barte's appointment as special co-administrators. They alleged that it is petitioner who should be declared in contempt since she allegedly misrepresented that Twitchett's appointment as special co-administrator, as one of the issues in the instant petition. By virtue of such misrepresentation, the probate court was purportedly misled to issue the revocation of Farley and Barte's appointment.
THE ISSUE
Stripped of the intervening complexities put forth by the parties herein, the fundamental issue for Our resolution is the petitioner's fitness and qualifications to act as a co-special administrator of Holden's estate.
OUR RULING
It is well-settled that the appointment of an administrator in estate proceedings primarily rests on the probate court's jurisdiction. Such discretion is generally respected unless there is clear showing of error. 23
The law is silent as to who should automatically be appointed as administrator of an estate of a decedent. However, the Rules of Court provide for the guidelines in the selection and disqualifications of the administrator of an estate of a deceased person.
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court enumerates persons who are disqualified to act as administrator:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. — No person in (sic) competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Meanwhile, Section 6 of the same rule provides for an order of preference for the appointment of an administrator:
SECTION 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
In this case, the RTC appointed both petitioner and respondents as co-special administrators of Holden's estate. Petitioner was specifically appointed because of her relationship with Holden, as common-law-wife, and her substantial interests in the corporations of Holden. 24
On the other hand, the CA reversed the RTC's order and nullified petitioner's appointment, concluding that there is a conflict of interest. The CA noted that petitioner is a debtor of Holden's estate and claimed half of the estate as common-law partner and trustee of all of Holden's estate. SCaITA
We agree with the appellate court's findings.
The designation of a person as a special administrator should be considered within the context of his/her duties. Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court is clear that:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. — Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court. (Emphasis ours)
In Diosdado S. Manungas vs. Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreño, 25 this Court explained that it is prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. 26 In that case, We ruled that an illegitimate son of the decedent's husband cannot be appointed as a special administrator of the estate because the illegitimate son is not an heir of the deceased, and therefore a stranger. Furthermore, We considered the obligation of the illegitimate son to the decedent as an interest incongruent with the duties of a special administrator.
The circumstances of the Manungas case runs parallel to the case at bar. Petitioner is a debtor of Holden's estate, as evidenced by the three promissory notes which she executed.
Petitioner's allegations denying the existence of the aforesaid loans do not deserve consideration. Verily, petitioner never addressed the existence of such loans in the proceedings a quo. Petitioner only deemed it relevant to deny such loans after the appellate court revoked her appointment as co-special administrator. This Court views her silence indicative of her inability to assail the existence of the said loans.
In her petition, she alleges that the promissory notes were executed merely to assure Holden that she will not run away with her shares in the PJH Lending Corp. in the event that they will separate. Petitioner, however, alleges that Holden waived his claims on the promissory notes because of the bond they forged as common-law spouses. This Court cannot accord merit to such allegations for the simple reason that they are unsupported by any other evidence.
In the case of Henry Dela Rama Co vs. Admiral United Savings Bank, 27 this Court explained:
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in civil cases, the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to prove the truth of his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. 28
In this case, other than her bare allegations, petitioner failed to present corroborating evidence that Holden intended to forego his right to collect the amounts stated in the three promissory notes.
Neither can We consider petitioner's alternative defense of prescription meritorious. First, the matter of prescription was not squarely raised in the appellate court. Matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. 29
In any case, We find that the loans evidenced by the promissory notes have not yet prescribed, as to detract from petitioner's ineligibility to act as administrator of the Holden's estate.
Actions based upon a written contract should be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. This accrual refers to the cause of action, which is defined as the act or the omission by which a party violates the right of another. A cause of action in a contract arises upon its breach or violation. Therefore, the period of prescription commences, not from the date of the execution of the contract, but from the occurrence of the breach.
Petitioner is correct that a negotiable instrument in which no time for payment is expressed is payable on demand. 30 However, the nature of the instrument does not automatically support petitioner's claim that she is not a debtor of Holden's estate. In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. John Bordinan Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc., 31 prescription starts to run not on the date of maturity, but on the date of the breach, or on the date of the demand. In this case, there is nothing in the records, which would establish that there has been demand and petitioner defaulted in the payment of the obligation. Hence, prescription cannot be deemed to have accrued, since there was no point in time when petitioner could have refused to pay, or committed a breach of her obligations. aTHCSE
Being a debtor of Holden's estate, We agree with the CA that petitioner cannot be expected to preserve and protect the interests of the estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 2014 and the Resolution dated March 26, 2015 in CA G.R. SP No. 07923 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."Leonardo-De Castro, J., on official leave; Del Castillo, J.,designated Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2562 dated June 20, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 21-40.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, concurring. Id. at 56-67.
3.Id. at 46-52.
4. Presided by Judge Lauro A.P. Castillo, Jr. Id. at 113-117.
5.Id. at 89-91.
6.Id. at 57.
7.Id. at 93-104.
8.Id. at 57.
9.Id. at 106-111.
10.Id. at 116-117.
11.Id. at 66.
12.Id. at 25.
13.Id. at 152-162.
14.Id. at 236-238.
15.Id. at 217-220.
16.Id. at 249-251.
17.Id. at 244-246.
18.Id. at 329-330.
19.Id. at 331-334.
20.Id. at 259-262.
21.Id. at 340.
22.Id. at 423-429.
23. See Marcelo Investment and Mgt. Corp, et al. v. Marcelo, Jr., 748 Phil. 882 (2014).
24.Rollo, p. 115.
25. 671 Phil. 495 (2011).
26.Id. at 507-508.
27. 574 Phil. 609 (2008).
28.Id. at 616.
29. Bognot vs. RRI Lending Corporation, 744 Phil. 59, 75 (2014).
30. See Section 7, Act No. 2031 or the Negotiable Instruments Law.
31. 509 Phil. 728 (2005) citing Elido, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 290-A Phil. 429 (1992).