FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 241849. December 3, 2018.]
ALLAN GODINEZ YBAÑEZ, petitioner, vs.CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC./COLUMBIAN SHIPMANAGEMENT AND/OR CAPT. VERLOUS CARMELINO, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 3, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 241849 — Allan Godinez Ybañez, Petitioner, v. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc./Columbian Shipmanagement and/or Capt. Verlous Carmelino, Respondents.
The Court resolves to GRANT petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file his Petition for Review on Certiorari.
This Court has carefully reviewed the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari and accordingly further resolves to DENY the same for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 139276, committed any reversible error in affirming the National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC) October 20, 2014 Decision and December 29, 2014 Resolution, and reversing the Labor Arbiter's (LA) April 29, 2014 Decision.
The instant petition calls for an exception to the general rule that factual issues may not be reviewed in a petition for review on certiorari, i.e., when the appellate court's findings are contrary to those of the LA's findings. 1 Nevertheless, a review of the instant petition shows that the same must be dismissed for failure to prove that petitioner was entitled to disability benefits.
In Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, 2 this Court has ruled that a seafarer's employment is terminated once a contract has already expired. This principle is likewise embodied in Section 18 (A) 3 of the 2010 POEA-Standard Employment Contract (SEC). Thus, petitioner's claim of disability benefits is unwarranted because of his return to the Philippines without any medical issue. In this case, Section 20 (B) of the 2010 POEA-SEC applies wherein "the liabilities of the employer [arise] only when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment." 4 caITAC
Here, the fact that petitioner was repatriated due to a finished contract, and not because of any medical reason, is undisputed. A comparison of the LA's Decision, on one hand, with those of the NLRC's and CA's Decisions, on the other, show that the evidence presented by the parties prove that petitioner was scheduled for disembarkation on June 21, 2013 due to a finished contract. 5 The NLRC and the CA both observed that petitioner was not able to present any evidence of an accident on board respondents' vessel in February 2013. 6 In fact, a photocopy of respondents' Logbook of Sickness/EC/Accident/Death 7 shows that petitioner only complained of "lower back pain with numbness of lower extremities" 8 on June 20, 2013.
It is also worthy to note that the LA's Decision finding petitioner totally and permanently disabled is without any factual basis. A reading of the said decision shows that the LA never cited any documentary evidence to justify his finding. The LA merely relied on HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar, 9 where this Court said that "[t]he law looks tenderly on the laborer. Where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor consistent with the principle of social justice," 10 without disclosing the supposed divergent evidence.
Given the dearth of evidence allegedly considered by the LA, this Court is more inclined to subscribe to the NLRC's and CA's factual findings in the instant case. As such, this Court subscribes to the appellate court's finding, viz.:
Petitioner failed to show the steps undertaken by him to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement. Despite petitioner's complaint of alleged back pain, he did not immediately report to the company-designated physician for post-employment medical examination. It was only on August 1, 2013 that petitioner showed himself to the said physician. This lapse on petitioner's part only demonstrates that he did not comply with what was incumbent upon him. Moreover, while the rule on mandatory reporting requirement is not absolute as a seafarer may show that he was physically incapable to comply with the same by submitting a written notice to the agency within the same three-day period, records do not show that petitioner submitted any such notice. Thus, petitioner is deemed to have forfeited his right to claim disability benefits and sickness allowance.
While it is true that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and that the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract must be construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. 11 (citations omitted)
Given the above-mentioned findings, it may be well to remind petitioner that "[b]asic is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts it, not upon him who denies, since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof of it." 12 ICHDca
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to AFFIRM the Decision dated May 18, 2018 and Resolution dated August 30, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 139276.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank and Privatization and Management Office, 642 Phil. 547, 556 (2010).
2. 434 Phil. 524 (2002).
3. Section 18. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT. —
A. The employment of the seafarer shall cease when the seafarer completes his period of contractual service aboard the ship, signs-off from the ship and arrives at the point of hire.
4.Musnit v. Sea Star Shipping Corporation, 622 Phil. 772, 779 (2009). (Emphasis in the original. Italics supplied.)
5.See id. at 15 and 392.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 406.
8.Id.
9. 603 Phil. 309 (2009).
10.Id. at 320.
11.Rollo, pp. 17-18.
12.MOF Company, Inc. v. Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation, 623 Phil. 424, 436 (2009).