FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226790. September 12, 2018.]
CECILIA QUE YABUT, petitioner,vs. CAROLINA QUE VILLONGCO; FRANCIS QUE VILLONGCO; CARLO GERONIMO QUE VILLONGCO; MICHAEL CLIMENT QUE VILLONGCO; MARCELIA QUE VILLONGCO; ANA MARIA QUE TAN; ELAINE VICTORIA QUE TAN; and ANGELICA QUE GONZALES, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 12, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 226790 (CECILIA QUE YABUT, Petitioner, v. CAROLINA QUE VILLONGCO; FRANCIS QUE VILLONGCO; CARLO GERONIMO QUE VILLONGCO; MICHAEL CLIMENT QUE VILLONGCO; MARCELIA QUE VILLONGCO; ANA MARIA QUE TAN; ELAINE VICTORIA QUE TAN; and ANGELICA QUE GONZALES, Respondents.) — By petition for review, the petitioner seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on May 17, 2016, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed her petition for certiorari to assail the declaration of her default for her failure to file her answer in Civil Case No. CV-940-MN of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, in Malabon City, as well as the denial of her motion to lift the order of default.
The salient factual antecedents are stated in the assailed decision of the CA, as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Que Yabut (Petitioner) and Private Respondents Carolina Que Villongco, Francis Que Villongco, Carlo Geronimo Que Villongco, Michael Clement Que Villongco, Marcelia Que Villongco, Ana Maria Que Tan, Elaine Victoria Que Tan, and Angelica Que Gonzalez (collectively referred to as Private Respondents) are stockholders in Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-Ville).
On 24 January 2013, Private Respondents filed against Petitioner and her co-defendants an Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Annulment of Sale (Complaint) before the court a quo. The Complaint sought to invalidate the 3,140 shares of stocks sold by the late Geronima Que Gallego (Geronima) to Petitioner and her co-defendants. Private Respondents alleged that they are the heirs of Geronima and argued that a portion of the shares of stocks sold to Petitioner and her co-defendants should have been distributed to them (Private Respondents) by way of settlement of Geronima's estate.
On 28 January 2013, Petitioner was served with summons requiring her within fifteen (15) days, or until 12 February 2013, to file an Answer. On 01 February 2013, Petitioner filed a Motion for an extension of twenty (20) days from 12 February 2013, or until 3 March 2011, to file her Answer. Finding her Motion to be meritorious, the court a quo granted the same.
Meanwhile, petitioner's co-Defendants, on 12 February 2013, filed a Motion to declare Private Respondents' Complaint as a nuisance and harassment suit.
On 20 February 2013, Petitioner again filed another Motion for extension of seven (7) days from 4 March 2011, or until 11 March 2011, to file an Answer. On 1 March 2013, the court a quo granted the extension, giving Petitioner until 11 March 2013 to file the responsive pleading. Instead of filing her Answer, Petitioner, on 04 March 2013, filed a Motion to adopt and join her co-Defendants' Motion which sought to declare Private Respondents' Complaint as a nuisance and harassment suit.
On 18 March 2013, Petitioner filed her Answer to Private Respondents' Complaint. The Answer being filed seven (7) days out of time, the court a quo issued the assailed Order dated 20 May 2013, declaring Petitioner in default.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order and a Motion to vacate the same, but the same was denied on 14 August 2014. 2
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul and set aside the RTC's order declaring her in default, 3 and denying her motion to lift the order of default. 4 aScITE
As stated, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, 5 and later denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on September 9, 2016. 6
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner, insisting that:
I
The Court of Appeals seriously erred in effectively affirming the May 20, 2013 Order of the Malabon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 74 considering the petitioner, as lead defendant, "is considered in default" as well as its Order dated August 14, 2013 denying her Motion to Vacate and Lift Order of Default.
II
The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it declared that Petitioner's Motion to Declare Private Respondents' Complaint as a Nuisance and/or Harassment Suit did not suspend the period to file her Answer. 7
The petitioner posits that the filing of her motion to declare the respondents' complaint as a nuisance and harassment suit had effectively tolled the running of the period to file her responsive pleading.
The appeal has no merit.
Section 4, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines an answer as a pleading in which a defending party sets forth her defenses. In relation thereto, Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court requires the defending party to file the "answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court." The failure to file the answer may render the defending party in default. The consequences can become dire for such party. In that regard, Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is clear, to wit:
Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (1a, R18)
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner who was presumed to know the consequences of her failure to file her responsive pleading within the reglementary period may, upon the plaintiff's motion, be declared in default by the court.
The RTC allowed the petitioner until March 11, 2013 to file her answer. She had been thereby granted a total of 27 days within which to file the answer. Yet, instead of filing the answer, she filed the motion to adopt her co-defendants' motion to declare the complaint as a nuisance and harassment suit. Such motion did not substitute for the answer because the defenses she might have had vis-a-vis the allegations of the complaint were not stated therein. Moreover, such motion did not stop the running of the period for her to file the answer because it was not one of the pleadings or motions the filing of which could have suspended the running of the period to file the answer, like a motion to dismiss or a motion for a bill of particulars.
The petitioner filed her answer only on March 18, 2013, which was seven days beyond the reglementary period. Undeniably, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in declaring her in default, and in denying her motion to lift the order of default. Consequently, the CA correctly dismissed her petition for certiorari.
We stress that procedural rules — being designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases as well as to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice — should be treated with utmost respect and due regard. There may be occasions, from time to time, when the Court recognizes exceptions to justify tempering the rigidity of procedural rules, but such occasions should be only upon the most compelling reasons, such as when a stubborn obedience to a rule defeats rather than serves the ends of justice. Otherwise, procedural rules would be rendered inutile, or be subject to the whims of every litigant or to the arbitrariness of any judge. Every plea for liberal construction of procedural rules must at least be accompanied by an explanation as to why the party-litigant has not complied with the rules and by a plausible justification for the liberal construction. Where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the plea for liberal construction, the strict application of procedural rules may be relaxed as a necessary exercise by the Court's legal jurisdiction. 8 Unfortunately, this case is wanting of such considerations. HEITAD
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 2016; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." Tijam, J., on official leave.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 34-40; penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with the concurrence of Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.
2.Rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 35-36.
3.Id. at 44-45; penned by Judge Celso R.L. Magsino, Jr.
4.Id. at 46.
5.Supra note 1.
6.Rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 42-43.
7.Id. at 17.
8.Torres v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211225 (Notice), January 10, 2017.