Tuliao v. Edra

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 246991. November 23, 2021.]

ANTONIO A. TULIAO, petitioner,vs. MARTIN EDRA, MERLY MARILYN EDRA CABACUNGAN, CECILIA ANDRES, AS REPRESENTED BY PABLITO CABACUNGAN, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 23, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 246991 (Antonio A. Tuliao v. Martin Edra, Merly Marilyn Edra Cabacungan, Cecilia Andres, as represented by Pablito Cabacungan). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 2 dated November 9, 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated April 15, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 140902. The CA reversed and set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Laoag City (RTC) dated March 11, 2015 4 and April 30, 2015, 5 thereby reinstating the Decision 6 dated January 29, 2014 of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Sarrat-Vintar, Ilocos Norte (MCTC).

The instant case stemmed from a Complaint 7 for "ownership, possession, and damages with prayer for issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction" filed on March 29, 2005 by Martin Edra, Merly Marilyn Edra Cabacungan, and Cecilia Andres, as represented by Pablito Cabacungan (respondents) against Antonio A. Tuliao (petitioner), together with Perigrino Edra, Sergio Edra, Melecia Edra, and Jovencio Edra as unwilling co-plaintiffs before the MCTC.

The complaint alleged that respondents, together with the unwilling co-plaintiffs, are the surviving legal heirs of Narciso Edra (Narciso), who is the declared owner of a parcel of residential land designated as Lot No. 1605-P situated in Barangay 05, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 009031 8 and 03-001-00423 9 (subject lot). The subject lot was purportedly acquired by Narciso sometime in 1928 from Eugenio Jamias (Eugenio). Upon the acquisition, the tax declaration in the name of Eugenio was cancelled and transferred in the name of Narciso. Since then, Narciso had been in possession of the subject lot, and had been religiously paying the taxes due thereon. It was also on the subject lot that respondents' residential house was erected. 10

Sometime in 1982, the subject lot was leased to petitioner where he will be setting up a "talyer," under the agreement that the rentals would be used to pay the subject lot's real property taxes. The agreement was allegedly affirmed and executed in the presence of certain barangay council members. 11

Notwithstanding the lease agreement, respondents were surprised that petitioner was making claims that he had acquired the subject lot from Amparo Jamias (Amparo), daughter of Eugenio. Upon verification from the Municipal Assessor's Office, they learned that petitioner had executed an affidavit claiming the subject lot as his own. Worse, the affidavit revealed that petitioner had begun constructing his residential house on the subject lot without the requisite building permit or the respondents' consent, to their damage and prejudice. 12

Petitioner's conflicting claims on the subject lot prompted respondents to refer the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Brgy. 5, San Vicente, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, for conciliation, which proved fruitless. Respondents also filed a protest before the Office of the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Engineer, to enjoin petitioner from constructing a house on the subject lot. Such protests were left unheeded, as petitioner did not halt the construction thereon. After another failed attempt to undergo conciliation, the respondents were constrained to file a complaint before the MCTC. 13

In his Answer, 14 petitioner maintained that he is the lawful owner of the subject lot, having acquired the same in good faith from Amparo in 1983, and became the sole and exclusive owner of the subject lot as her share in the oral partition of the properties left by Eugenio. The sale was embodied in a private document 15 executed between the parties. From the time of acquisition, petitioner claimed that he had been consistently paying the realty taxes due on the subject lot. More, petitioner questioned the lease agreement presented by respondents, as he had already been residing in Hawaii since 1997, and had only returned to the Philippines when the complaint was filed in 2005. Contrary to respondents' asseverations, he had, in fact, applied and was issued a building permit from the Office of the Provincial Engineer; after all, as the lawful owner thereof, there was no need for consent from respondents in order to construct on the subject lot. By way of special and affirmative defenses, petitioner raised that impleading Narciso's other legal heirs as co-plaintiffs, absent any duly-notarized documents proving such unwillingness, may cause them to institute the same case in the future, to the petitioner's prejudice. Moreover, petitioner also argued that there can be no complete and final determination of the case, as respondents had failed to implead the other heirs of Narciso, who begot other children in a subsequent marriage. 16

Upon the termination of the pre-trial proceedings on August 7, 2006, trial ensued. 17

On January 29, 2014, the MCTC rendered a Decision, 18 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above-discussions considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein Plaintiff by way of recognizing them as lawful owner (sic) of the land in suit and declaring the tax declarations under the name of defendant Antonio Tuliao as null and void.

The Municipal Assessor of Sarrat, ILocos (sic) Norte is hereby ordered to cause the cancellation of the tax declaration of defendant over the land in suit.

Finally, defendant Antonio Tuliao is ordered to pay to the Plaintiffs the amount of:

1. Php100,000.00 as moral damages;

2. Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

3. Php20,000.00 as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED. 19

The MCTC reasoned that the barangay council certification, affirming the intention of the parties to enter into a lease agreement over the subject lot, as well as the admission of petitioner himself that the tax declarations were in the name of "Edra" and not "Jamias," are sufficient pieces of evidence to conclude that the subject lot belongs to the respondents. 20 Likewise militating against petitioner is his admission that he never inquired or verified whether the subject lot was claimed by another; neither did he require Amparo to issue a public document or a deed of sale as proof of their agreement. While petitioner may have been issued a building permit, he did so by circumventing the procedure in applying directly to the provincial engineer, instead of the municipal engineer, who he knew was prohibiting him from constructing on the subject lot in light of the protest lodged by the respondents. 21

Dissatisfied, petitioner interposed an appeal to the RTC. On March 11, 2015, the RTC issued an Order 22 stating:

Without dwelling on the merit of the case, it appearing that the unwilling co-plaintiffs (co-defendants of Antonio Tuliao), though impleaded, were not properly Summoned (sic), and considering that they are indispensable parties in this case, this Court is constrained to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the lower court and REMAND this case to its court of origin, so that it could issue an order for the service of Summons which shall include all indispensable parties.

SO ORDERED. 23

Respondents moved for reconsideration, 24 which was denied in an Order 25 dated April 30, 2015 by the RTC.

Respondents sought recourse via a Petition for Review 26 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. In the main, respondents insisted that the MCTC was entirely correct in all its findings, being in accord with existing laws and jurisprudence. Contrary to the conclusion of the RTC, the unwilling co-plaintiffs are but necessary parties whose absence will not affect the proceedings or the judgment rendered by the lower court. 27

In its Decision 28 dated November 9, 2018, the CA granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the disquisition of the RTC. The decretal portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Orders dated March 11, 2015 and April 30, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Laoag City, in Civil Case No. 16321-15 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 29, 2014 of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Sarrat-Vintar, Ilocos Norte, in Civil Case No. 745, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. 29

The CA ruled that the unwilling co-plaintiffs, as heirs of Narciso, are co-owners of the subject lot and are not indispensable parties to the case. Thus, a co-owner, in this case the respondents, may bring a suit for the recovery of properties for the benefit of the other co-owners without the need to implead the other co-owners. With respect to the issue of ownership, the CA concurred with the findings of the MCTC that the preponderance of evidence supports the claim of ownership of respondents over the subject lot. 30

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, 31 which was denied by the CA in a Resolution 32 dated April 15, 2019.

Hence, the instant petition.

In seeking for the reversal of the CA Decision and Resolution, petitioner raised the following grounds:

I. The Court a quo sanctioned the unacceptable manner by which the MCTC decided the case in favor of Respondents as the trial court's decision was fraught with arguments anchored merely on assumptions or speculations, glaringly overlooked evidence or the lack of it that were supposed to have impacted the merits of the case and on the whole was not in accordance with law or jurisprudence.

II. By allowing non-service of summons on Respondents' "unwilling co-plaintiffs," the Court a quo departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings so as to require the exercise by this Honorable Court of its power of supervision. 33

In praying for the reversal of the CA Decision, petitioner claims to have proven his ownership over the subject lot, having offered in evidence a private instrument of sale where he bought the lot for P5,000.00. Despite being unnotarized, there was no proof of its falsity or forgery. 34 Likewise, petitioner points out that none of the respondents even bothered to appear in court to testify and establish their cause of action against petitioner; in fact, it was only their representative, Pablito Cabacungan, Narciso's son-in-law, who testified in their behalf. 35 Finally, petitioner reiterates his argument that that the unwilling co-plaintiffs were not properly impleaded as indispensable parties as no service of summons was effected to them. Moreover, he argues that respondents appear to claim sole ownership over the subject lot for asserting that the other heirs were unwilling to participate in the proceedings for relinquishing their rights to Martin Edra, without even presenting any sworn statement to prove such unwillingness. 36

On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment, 37 pray that the petition for review be denied outright considering that the MCTC and the CA are entirely correct in all its findings and conclusions. They reiterate that they have been the owner and possessor of the subject lot since 1930, the time when Narciso acquired the same from Eugenio. From that time, Narciso had regularly paid the realty taxes due thereon, and upon his death, was inherited by respondents as his successors-in-interest. 38 Respondents aver that the consistent tax declarations in the name of Narciso from 1930 up to its revision in 1973 and succeeding years thereto, coupled with the indisputable payment of annual realty taxes due on the said lot, leads to the inevitable conclusion that respondents have acquired the lot in the concept of an owner. 39

During the pendency of instant petition, respondent Martin Edra passed away on December 3, 2019. 40 Thus, a motion 41 was filed by his heirs for purposes of substitution.

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

Preliminarily, petitioner directly comes to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, which is limited only to reviewing questions of law, not of fact. A question of law arises in the face of doubt as to what the law, is given a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact arises when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 42 In Republic v. Malabanan, 43 this Court established that the test to determine whether the question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, "it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact." 44 As expounded in Pascual v. Burgos, 45 "there is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this court is the correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties."

An evaluation of the instant petition would reveal that petitioner merely reiterates the factual issues and arguments raised before the CA. Essentially, petitioner is asking this Court to conduct its own independent recalibration of the evidence to resolve the issue of ownership and whether respondents' other co-heirs were properly impleaded as unwilling co-plaintiffs, which have already been passed upon by the CA. This is exactly the situation expressly prohibited by Section 1, 46 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which requires that only questions of law be distinctly raised in such petitions. This Court is not a trier of facts and is not duty-bound to analyze the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. 47 Appropriately, it shall stay its hand from entertaining questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this court when supported by substantial evidence." 48

Nonetheless, the case likewise fails on the merits. This Court is unconvinced that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA suffers from reversible error.

To begin with, respondents have sufficiently established ownership over the subject lot. As found by both the MCTC and the CA, respondents inherited the property from their father, Narciso, who had been the owner thereof since 1928, having acquired the same from a certain Eugenio. As proof of their open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership, respondents presented the cancelled tax declaration 49 dated 1921 of Eugenio in favor of Narciso, which took effect in 1930. Respondents' witness, Nestor Domingo (Nestor), a local assessment officer from the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Ilocos Norte, confirmed such cancellation and that the same may only be effected by the presentation of a deed of conveyance. 50 It must be stressed that respondents were able to proffer tax declarations as well as tax payment receipts. 51 To bolster their claim of paying realty taxes religiously, respondents offered the uncontested testimony of Pablito Cabacungan, respondents' attorney-in-fact, who categorically testified that he had accompanied Narciso in paying the taxes of said subject lot, aside from the fact that they were also in charge of cultivating the same. 52

While tax declarations are not necessarily conclusive evidence of ownership, this Court, in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 53 recognized that "[t]he voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes x x x strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership." In fact, it is "good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner and, when coupled with continuous possession, constitutes strong evidence of title." 54 After all, "no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession." 55

For another, the tax declarations and payment receipts that date as far back as 1940 further fortify respondents' claim of ownership. In Kawayan Hills Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 56 citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 57 this Court has favorably considered the presentation of tax declarations which are "not of recent vintage" as indicative of possession under a bona fide claim of ownership:

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals concerned a cadastral proceeding in which this Court affirmed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals, "order[ing] the registration and confirmation of Lot 10704 in the name of the Spouses Monico Rivera and Estrella Nota." This Court found no error in the lower courts' findings that "assertion of possession under claim of ownership [was] tenable" and that "the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has 'satisfactorily possessed and occupied the land in the concept of owner openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1926, very much earlier to June 12, 1945.'" This was so even when the documentary evidence adduced by the claimant in support of a claim of ownership was limited to tax declarations dating back to 1927, and deeds of sale:

Considering the date of the earliest tax declaration, which shows it is not of recent vintage to support a pretended possession of property, it is believed that the respondent court did not commit reversible error in affirming the finding of the trial court that Monico Rivera's assertion of possession under claim of ownership is tenable.

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 58

Regrettably, the same cannot be said regarding petitioner's evidence. While he relies on a similar tax declaration to prove that he had acquired the subject lot in 1983 via a private document of sale, he himself admitted on cross-examination that the same tax declaration was made only in 1994. 59 Aside from presenting a declaration that was belatedly issued vis-à-vis those proffered by respondents, petitioner's failure to explain why the tax declaration from which he derived his own was found to be in the name of "Edra," instead of Amparo, also belies his claim of ownership and his version of how he came to own the lot. 60

In the same vein, this Court gives scant consideration to the private, unnotarized document presented by petitioner as proof of sale from Amparo. As correctly observed by the MCTC, Amparo was divested from any right to transfer the subject lot to petitioner, as Eugenio had already sold the property to Narciso when he was still alive in 1928. Effectively, the subject lot was not part of Eugenio's estate at the time of his death, thus, Amparo, notwithstanding her status as heir, was, in no way, entitled to even pass or transfer the same to petitioner. 61 This Court notes that the testimonies of Amparo, or the alleged signatory witnesses to affirm the document's veracity and credibility, were not even presented during the proceedings in the MCTC.

In any event, the private document cannot be granted any probative weight; in fact, it should not have been admitted into evidence. Glaringly, the document is written in Ilokano, an unofficial language. For petitioner's failure to attach the document's translation in either English or Filipino, the fact of sale cannot even be properly established. To be sure, Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. — Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial. (33)

The factual antecedents in St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LWV Construction Corporation62 apply squarely to the case at bench, as the Court concluded that a document written in an unofficial language absent any translation should not have been given probative weight. It reasoned in this wise:

A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains English words, the majority of it is in an unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino provided by respondent, the same should not have been admitted in evidence; thus their contents could not be given probative value, and deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein.63

Lastly, this Court is not persuaded that the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that Narciso's other heirs, who were impleaded herein as unwilling co-plaintiffs, were correctly made part of the present action.

Unwilling co-plaintiffs are those who are supposed to be plaintiffs, but whose consent to be included could not be obtained for reasons such as their mere refusal to be part of the action. 64 The rule on joining unwilling co-plaintiffs is enshrined under Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. — If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. (10).

A review of the instant complaint would bear that respondents complied with the above-mentioned provision. Aside from impleading Perigrino Edra, Sergio Edra, Melecia Edra, and Jovencio Edra as unwilling plaintiffs before the MCTC, they properly stated the reasons thereof. The complaint alleges:

2. Perigrino Edra and Sergio Edra who are residents of Brgy. Luzon, Cabatuan, Isabela, are impleaded as unwilling co-plaintiffs as they do not want to be involved in this case. Likewise, Jovencio Edra and Melecia Edra, both of legal age and residents of #1 Zamora St., Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City, are impleaded also as unwilling co-plaintiffs as they have shown lack of interests (sic) x x x. 65

Notably, nowhere in the Rules does it require unwilling co-plaintiffs to execute sworn statements to prove such unwillingness, as asserted by petitioner. To even mandate additional evidence from parties who are uninclined to be included in the proceedings would manifestly frustrate the intention of the provision.

It also bears reiterating that the unwilling co-plaintiffs are not indispensable parties requiring the service of summons and whose absence would render all subsequent actions of the courts null and void. In Wee v. De Castro, 66 this Court clarified that pursuant to Article 487 67 of the New Civil Code, any one of the co-owners may bring all kinds of actions, including the recovery of ownership, in behalf of all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs. Meanwhile, it was held in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, 68 that co-owners are not even necessary parties, as complete relief may be accorded sans their participation, as the suit has been presumably filed for the benefit of all. To quote civilist Arturo M. Tolentino:

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added) 69

As comprehensively explained in the assailed Decision of the CA, respondents, as heirs of Narciso, initiated the present action in behalf of the other co-owners and heirs of Narciso. Nowhere in the complaint did respondents dispute the existence of a co-ownership nor claim to be the sole and exclusive owners of the subject lot. 70 Accordingly, such intention is evident in their inclusion of unwilling co-plaintiffs who share the same interests as respondents, but were unwilling to be included in the proceedings.

In fine, the CA did not demonstrate any departure from legal provisions in its assailed Decision and Resolution. Upon close analysis, given the nature of the present case as civil, respondents were able to prove their case by a preponderance of evidence, and that petitioner failed to disprove respondents' claim.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 9, 2018 and the Resolution dated April 15, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 140902 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 9-31.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (retired member of this Court) and Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin concurring; id. at 35-44.

3.Id. at 45-46.

4. Penned by Hon. Benjamin D. Turgano; id. at 58.

5.Rollo, p. 59.

6. Penned by Hon. Judge Designate Ramon Corazon P. Blanco; id. at 47-57.

7.Rollo, pp. 83-91.

8.Id. at 269.

9.Id. at 270.

10.Id. at 85.

11. Certification issued by the Office of the Barangay Council dated July 4, 1999, id. at 273.

12.Rollo, p. 86.

13.Id. at 83-90.

14.Id. at 92-98.

15. Agreement dated January 15, 1983, id. at 248.

16.Rollo, p. 96.

17. Pre-Trial Order dated August 7, 2006, id. at 241-242.

18.Rollo, pp. 47-57.

19.Id. at 57.

20.Id. at 54-55.

21.Id. at 55-56.

22.Id. at 58.

23.Id.

24. Motion for Reconsideration dated April 11, 2015, id. at 121-126.

25.Rollo, p. 59.

26.Id. at 60-82.

27.Id. at 28.

28.Id. at 35-44.

29.Id. at 43.

30.Id.

31.Id. at.

32.Id. at.

33.Id. at 16.

34.Id. at 19.

35.Id. at 27.

36.Id. at 28

37.Id. at 309-324.

38.Id. at 312.

39.Id. at 319.

40. Certificate of Death, id. at 307.

41. Manifestation and Motion for Substitution dated December 31, 2019; id. at 302-306.

42.Javelosa v. Tapus, 835 Phil. 576, 587 (2018).

43. 646 Phil. 631 (2010).

44.Id. at 638.

45. 776 Phil. 167, 183 (2016).

46. Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (1a, 2a) (Emphasis ours)

47.Miro v. Vda. de Erederos, 721 Phil. 772, 785 (2013).

48.Arrivas v. Bacotoc, G.R. No. 228704, December 2, 2020.

49.Rollo, pp. 290-dorsal side of 290.

50.Id. at 48.

51.Id. at 276-289.

52.Id. at 48.

53. 284-A Phil. 675, 691 (1992).

54.Republic v. Spouses Noval, 818 Phil. 298, 319 (2017).

55.Republic v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 238, 248 (1996).

56. G.R. No. 203090, September 5, 2018, 879 SCRA 289, 307.

57. 367 Phil. 597, 604 (1999).

58.Kawayan Hills Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 56, at 310-311. (Emphasis ours; citations omitted)

59. TSN, January 8, 2009, p. 25; rollo, p. 200.

60.Id. at 26; id. at 201.

61.Rollo, p. 55.

62. 822 Phil. 1, 19 (2017).

63.Id. at 19-20. (Emphasis ours)

64. Civil Procedure (The Bar Lectures Series), Volume I, Willard B. Riano, 2011, p. 243.

65.Rollo, p. 84. (Emphasis supplied)

66. 584 Phil. 669, 686 (2008).

67. Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

68. 538 Phil. 319, 338 (2009).

69.Wee v. De Castro, supra note 66. (Emphasis ours)

70.Rollo, p. 40.