THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200292. September 30, 2013.]
TOPMARK STEEL CORPORATIONvs. JOSE RIZAL J. SOLANOY, ROSIE P. LABRAMONTE, JANUS A. GALLARDO, AND AMELITO LEQUIGAN.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated September 30, 2013, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 200292 (Topmark Steel Corporation vs. Jose Rizal J. Solanoy, Rosie P. Labramonte, Janus A. Gallardo, and Amelito Lequigan).— Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated March 5, 2012, a Very Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Leave of Court 2 dated November 19, 2012, and an Urgent Motion Reiterating Petitioner's Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Leave of Court 3 dated September 12, 2013.
The controversy of the present Petition arose after Jaime Trespecios, an employee of the petitioner, failed to deliver a piece of construction material to petitioner's client, Albert Metalcraft. Due to the incident, petitioner investigated all its warehouses. Jaime Trespecios admitted his guilt and alleged that almost all of the petitioner's employees were guilty of pilferage. Petitioner then issued a Memorandum to all its employees calling for a general assembly and requiring them to submit a written explanation on the alleged pilferage.
Four other employees admitted to committing the theft. These four employees identified other employees they had allegedly conspired with. Among them were respondents Jose Rizal J. Solanoy, Rosie P. Labramonte, Janus A. Gallardo, and Amelito Lequigan, together with Arnulfo N. Bueza, Arturo A. Jayan, Jr., Alfred Calawod, Randy T. Lukin, Rocel M. Bulawan, Felipe Tanilon, and Salvador Clores, Jr. Because of this, petitioner issued a Notice of Termination to each of them on June 22, 2004. EAcIST
Aggrieved, the dismissed employees filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages against the petitioner on July 23, 2004.
On March 10, 2006, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment 4 finding the dismissal of the employees to be with valid cause. However, it ordered the petitioner to pay P5,000.00 as indemnity to each employee for failure to observe procedural due process. The judgment caused the employees to appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission.
On September 23, 2008, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a Decision, 5 docketed as NLRC-NCR-CASE No. 00-06-0770-2004 & NLRC-NCR-0007-08661-200, modifying the Labor Arbiter's judgment. It found that the Labor Arbiter relied on the affidavits of their co-workers Julius Chavez, Jonathan Mendoza and Jessie Bedia, specifically naming Arnulfo N. Bueza, Arturo A. Jayan, Jr., Alfred Calawod, Randy T. Lukin, Rocel M. Bulawan, Felipe Tanilon, and Salvador Clores as among the employees who committed the pilferage. However, there was no showing that respondents Jose Rizal J. Solanoy, Rosie P. Labramonte, Janus A. Gallardo, and Amelito Lequigan were among the employees named in the affidavits. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (1) Respondent Topmark Steel Corporation is hereby ordered to pay the following complainants separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, and full backwages from June 23, 2004 up to the date of the finality of this decision: Jose Rizal Solanoy, Rosie Labramonte, Janus Gallardo, Amelito Laquigan, Valentin Almeroda, Charito Talon and Ruben Lucinemcio; (2) the award of the above-mentioned seven complainants of nominal damages is hereby SET ASIDE; and (3) the award to complainant Augustine Estaris is likewise SET ASIDE and in addition, his complaint is hereby DISMISSED for failure to prosecute. The award of nominal damages to complainants Arturo Jayan, Randy Lukina, Arnulfo Bueza, Rolito Gulbe, Raul Bulawan, Salvador Clores, Jr., Alfred Calawod, and Felipe Tanilon is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 6
Afterwards, the Court of Appeals received two separate Petitions stemming from the National Labor Relations Commission's Decision.
The first was a Petition for Certiorari 7 dated May 4, 2009 filed by the respondents, together with Arnulfo N. Bueza, Arturo A. Jayan, Jr., Alfred Calawod, Randy T. Lukin, Rocel M. Bulawan, Felipe Tanilon, and Salvador Clores, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 108580. In it, they argued, among others, the issue on whether the National Labor Relations Commission should have ordered reinstatement instead of separation pay upon finding their dismissals illegal.
On March 30, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 which partially granted the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 108580. It affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission that Arnulfo N. Bueza, Arturo A. Jayan, Jr., Alfred Calawod, Randy T. Lukin, Rocel M. Bulawan, Felipe Tanilon, and Salvador Clores were legally dismissed for loss of trust and confidence when they were implicated in the pilferage case. However, it modified the award of separation pay and instead ordered the reinstatement of the respondents with the payment of the full backwages since there was no showing that the principle of strained relations applies. The dispositive portion reads: ITcCaS
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed dispositions are MODIFIED in that the portion of the disposition ordering the payment to Arturo Jayan, Randy Lukina, Arnulfo Bueza, Rolito Gulbe, Raul Bulawan, Salvador Clores, Jr., Alfred Calawod, and Felipe Tanilon of "separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, and full backwages from June 23, 2004 up to the date of the finality of this decision" is DELETED. In lieu thereof, Topmark Steel Corporation is ORDERED to:
1) REINSTATE Petitioners Jose Rizal J. Solanoy, Rosie P. Labramonte, Janus A. Gallardo, and Amelito Lequigan to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and,
2) PAY the above-enumerated Petitioners their respective full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and the monetary equivalent of other benefits, computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of their actual reinstatement.
Accordingly, the portions of the NLRC's order awarding nominal damages to complainants Arturo Jayan, Randy Lukina, Arnulfo Bueza, Rolito Gulbe, Raul Bulawan, Salvador Clores, Jr., Alfred Calawod, and Felipe Tanilon; setting aside the award of nominal damages to Jose Rizal Solanoy, Rosie Labramonte, Janus Gallardo, Amelito Laquigan, Valentin Almeroda, Charito Talon and Ruben Lucinemcio; and, dismissing the complaint of Augustine Estaris is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.9
This Decision is the subject of the present Petition.
The second Petition was a Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari also dated May 4, 2009, filed by the petitioner. The Court of Appeals docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 108575. This Motion and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were both denied by the court. 10 The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 11 with this Court on August 10, 2009. This Court docketed the case as G.R. No. 188987. In the Petition for Review, the petitioner argued that there should be liberal application of the technical rules where the Petition is on its face meritorious.
This Petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution 12 dated September 9, 2009 for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality 13 by this Court on February 24, 2010. Judgment was entered 14 on April 15, 2010. As a result, the respondents filed a Motion for Execution 15 on March 22, 2012 to execute the judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission, using as basis the Entry of Judgment by this Court dated April 15, 2010. The Labor Arbiter granted the Motion for Execution in an Order 16 dated August 29, 2012.
This Order is now the subject of the present application for injunctive relief.
It should be pointed out that the Court of Appeals should have consolidated these cases when the parties filed their respective Petitions on May 4, 2009. Generally, "when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved." 17 IaEASH
The Court of Appeals' failure to consolidate the cases inevitably resulted in the confusion before this Court today. Further adding to the complications in this case is the finding that the petitioner failed to disclose, in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping 18 attached to its Petition for Review dated August 10, 2009 in G.R. No. 188987, that there was a pending Petition for Certiorari filed by the respondents in the Court of Appeals.
As a result, this Court is faced with the unfortunate situation where a single Decision by a lower court became final and executory in one case, but is still pending and under appeal in another.
The denial in G.R. No. 188987 was premised on the petitioner's failure to file in a timely manner its Petition for Certiorari. While admittedly procedural in nature, this judgment is still considered as one made on the merits, thus:
. . . There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to keep track of their applications. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is a decision on the merits.19 (Emphasis provided; citations omitted.)
In other words, when this Court issued its Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 188987 on April 15, 2010, it made the Decision dated September 28, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission final and executory. The respondents, therefore, would have had every right to move for the execution of the Decision. As this Court ruled in Abalos v. Philex Mining Corporation: 20
A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is final and executory cannot be amended or modified anymore. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. However, this rule is subject to exceptions as stated in the case of David vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710 (1999), cited by respondent:
One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision no longer enforceable. Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory. 21
Accordingly, the Decision by the Court of Appeals cannot be considered a supervening event contemplated by the law that would rendered the execution of the National Labor Relations Commission's Decision unjust and inequitable. It should be pointed out that both G.R. No. 188987 and CA-G.R. SP No. 108580 were decided in favor of the respondents. The only effect of the Court of Appeals' Decision would have been to modify the award in favor of respondents from separation pay to reinstatement. In any case, their act of moving for the execution of the National Labor Relations Commission's Decision already estops them from seeking for the execution of the Court of Appeals' Decision. The application for injunctive relief, therefore, cannot prosper. AEHCDa
However, in the interest of substantial justice and to settle the issue once and for all, this Court resolves to take up the merits of the Petition pending before this Court.
Petitioner takes issue with the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals that the respondents were illegally dismissed. It argues that "had the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission considered and evaluated all the evidences submitted by the petitioner, it would have definitely affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter that respondents were validly dismissed." 22
The respondents in this case were dismissed by the petitioner on the basis of loss of trust and confidence. Under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. 23 This situation holds where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of employer's property. 24 As this Court previously ruled in the recent case of Mendoza v. HMS Credit Corporation: 25
It must be noted, however, that recent decisions of this Court have distinguished the treatment of managerial employees from that of rank-and-file personnel, insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned. Thus, with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. . . . . 26 (Emphasis and underscoring provided.)
In this case, the respondents were employed as crane operators, checkers, warehouse helpers, truck helpers, and/or drivers. They should be classified as rank-and-file employees entrusted with the custody and handling of the petitioner's property. When the National Labor Relations Commission examined the evidence to assess the legality of the respondent's dismissals, it stated that:
In the challenged decision, the Labor Arbiter found the complainants' dismissal to be justified by willful breach of trust which, under Article 262 of the Labor Code, is a valid ground for dismissal. Apparently, the evidentiary basis for the above-mentioned finding consists of the affidavits executed by Julius Chavez, Jonathan Mendoza and Jessie Bedia, who were the complainants' co-workers, and the handwritten statement of complainant Alfred Calawod. In his affidavit (records, pp. 253-254), Julius Chavez specifically named complainants Arturo Jayan, Randy Lukina, Arnulfo Bueza, Rolito Gulbe, Raul Bulawan, Salvador Clores, Jr. and Felipe Tanilon as among the employees who surreptitiously loaded extra metal goods inside the delivery trucks without the knowledge of management. His allegation regarding the modus operandi of stealing metal goods was corroborated by Jonathan Mendoza and Jessie Bedia in their own affidavits (records, pp. 254-256; 258) and by complainant Alfred Calawod in his written statement (records, p. 181). 27
No other evidence was presented by the petitioner to the Labor Arbiter to prove that the respondents were participants in the alleged pilferage. Using this evidence, the National Labor Relations Commission correctly ruled that the respondents were dismissed without valid cause. EADSIa
However, a perusal of the affidavit of Julius Chavez yielded the finding that respondent Amelito Lequigan 28 was also implicated. This would have been enough ground for the petitioner to validly dismiss him on the basis of loss of trust and confidence. Be that as it may, this finding cannot have the effect of overturning the finality of the National Labor Relations Commission's Decision. The Decision of the Court of Appeals being assailed in the present Petition did not impugn the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission. It did not even touch on the issue of the illegality of the respondents' dismissals. This finding was, therefore, already binding on the petitioner when the National Labor Relations Commission's Decision became final and executory in G.R. No. 188987. Even if the petitioner's cause of action against respondent Amelito Lequigan is meritorious, it would still not persuade this Court to decide the case in the petitioner's favor.
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict." 29 If this Court were to allow the procedural complications of this case to further delay what would have been a bittersweet vindication of the laborer's rights, a grave injustice would result.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 5, 2012 is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the petitioner's Very Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Leave of Court dated November 19, 2012 and Urgent Motion Reiterating Petitioner's Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Leave of Court dated September 12, 2013 are DENIED for being moot and academic. (Mendoza, J., on official leave; Reyes, J., designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1557 dated September 19, 2013.)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo (G.R. No. 200292), pp. 12-53.
2.Id. at 682-692.
3.Id. at 994-1000.
4.Id. at 97-111.
5.Id. at 169-181. This Decision was docketed as NLRC-NCR-CASE No. 00-06-0770-2004 & NLRC-NCR-0007-08661-200.
6.Id. at 180.
7.Id. at 417-460.
8.Id. at 54-68.
9.Id. at 67-68.
10.Rollo (G.R. No. 188987), pp. 47-53.
11.Id. at 3-46.
12.Id. at 467.
13.Id. at 497.
14.Id. at 500.
15.Rollo (G.R. No. 200292), pp. 693-700.
16.Id. at 715.
17.Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. Nos. 190462 & 190538, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 403, 415 citingZulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001, 354 SCRA 100, 111. So said this Court in Steel Corporation:
The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.
18.Rollo (G.R. No. 188987), pp. 43-44.
19.Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 820, 828-829 (1996) citing Sta. Rita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119891, August 21, 1995, 247 SCRA 484, 489; Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., G.R. No. 73210, February 10, 1994, 230 SCRA 9, 15; Ceniza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95296, February 3, 1993, 218 SCRA 390; Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 101527, January 19, 1993, 217 SCRA 237.
20.441 Phil. 386 (2002).
21.Id. at 392-393 citing Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001, 350 SCRA 568, 578 and Aboitiz Shipping Employees Association v. Trajano, G.R. No. 112955, September 1, 1997, 278 SCRA 387, 391.
22.Rollo (G.R. No. 200292), p. 39.
23.Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 115491, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 76, 82 citingQuezon Electric Cooperative v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 79718-22, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 88, 94.
24.Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, citingPanday v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 67664, May 20, 1992, 209 SCRA 122, 125.
25.G.R. No. 187232, April 17, 2013.
26.Mendoza v. HMS Credit Corporation, supra, citing Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 148410, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 516, 529.
27.Rollo (G.R. No. 200292), p. 178.
28.Id. at 103. The name is erroneously listed as "Amelio A. Lequigan."
29.Li Kim Tho v. Conrado S. Sanchez and Go Siu Kao, G.R. No. L-2676, January 31, 1949, 82 Phil. 776, 778.