FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 245512-13. September 29, 2021.]
CHARTER PING AN INSURANCE CORPORATION, ASIA INSURANCE [PHILS.] CORP., NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO., LTD. AND MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioners, vs.STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 245512-13 (Charter Ping An Insurance Corporation, Asia Insurance [Phils.] Corp., New India Assurance Co., Ltd. and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Steel Corporation of the Philippines, Inc.). — Steel Corporation of the Philippines, Inc. (Steel Corp.) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of cold-rolled galvanized steel sheets and coil. On October 5 and 30, 2009, Steel Corp. insured with Charter Ping An Insurance Corporation, and New India Insurance, Co., Ltd., and Mapfre Insular Insurance Corporation (Charter Ping, et al.), as co-insurer, its facilities against material damage and business interruption from August 19, 2009 to August 19, 2010. On December 7, 2009, a fire broke out at Steel Corp.'s plant, totally burning the cold rolling mill, central housing, and auxiliary equipment. On December 1, 2010, Steel Corp. demanded from Charter Ping, et al., US$20,000,000.00 as property damage and US$8,000,000.00 as business interruption losses. On December 17, 2010, Steel Corp., which was under rehabilitation, also filed with the rehabilitation court a motion to direct insurers to pay the insurance proceeds.
In a letter dated March 22, 2011, Charter Ping, et al., rejected Steel Corp.'s insurance claim on the ground, among others, that fire is an excepted risk. Meanwhile, the rehabilitation court granted Steel Corp.'s motion to direct the insurers to pay the insurance proceeds. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the order because the rehabilitation court has no jurisdiction over an insurance claim. 1 Aggrieved, Steel Corp. appealed to the Court docketed as G.R. No. 201199. On October 16, 2013, the Court affirmed the CA's findings that the rehabilitation court has no jurisdiction over the insurance claim, and that Steel Corp. has to file a separate action to recover its claim against Charter Ping, et al.
On March 27, 2015, Steel Corp. filed a complaint for sum of money against Charter Ping, et al., before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Yet, Charter Ping, et al., moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. 2 Charter Ping, et al., averred that pursuant to the Suit Against Insurers Clause of the policy, Steel Corp. should have commenced an action in the Insurance Commission, or in any court of competent jurisdiction within 12 months upon receipt of the notice of rejection of the claim. Otherwise, the claim shall be deemed abandoned and shall not be recoverable. Charter Ping, et al., explained that Steel Corp. received the notice of rejection on March 24, 2011, 3 while its counsel, Atty. Xyrha Javier-Salazar, received the same on March 25, 2011, as shown by his signature on the received copy of the notice. Hence, Steel Corp. had until March 24, 2012 to file its claim. Nevertheless, the complaint was filed only on March 27, 2015 or more than three years after the deadline. cTDaEH
On January 18, 2016, the RTC denied Charter Ping, et al.'s motion to dismiss given that the defense of prescription is evidentiary in nature. The RTC noted that Steel Corp.'s complaint did not indicate that it received a notice of rejection. Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, Charter Ping, et al., elevated the case to the CA through consolidated petitions for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 148185 and CA-G.R. SP No. 148594. On May 28, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings that prescription is a matter of evidence best threshed out in a full-blown trial, 4 thus:
As to whether the cause of action of SCP had already prescribed, this issue is not as simple as all the petitioners would have Us believe. Note that nowhere in SCP's complaint was it admitted that it duly received a notice of rejection from any of the petitioners. This issue was the basis of the trial courts' denial of petitioners' Motion to Dismiss citing that the fact of prescription is a matter of evidence best threshed out in a full blown trial. Prescription as a ground for a motion to dismiss is adequate when the facts establishing prescription are apparent in the complaint or from the records. x x x:
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There is also no merit to the claim of all of the petitioners that the fact of receipt by SCP of the notice of rejection had been established by the admission of the latter's counsel during the hearing before the rehabilitation court on the motion to direct insurers to pay, absent any opportunity given to both parties to substantiate this claim. Concomitant therewith, petitioners' argument that SCP duly received the rejection notice can be deduced by judicial notice, on account of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119760 promulgated on February 8, 2012 and the Supreme Court's Decision dated October 16, 2013 in G.R. No. 201199 x x x. While judicial notice may be taken of the aforementioned decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, it is important to stress that in both Decisions, although both courts noted that a letter of rejection dated March 22, 2011 was made by the panel of insurers to SCP, there was no statement which would affirm that the insured SCP had duly received the notice.
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With regard to petitioners' asseveration that SCP's failure to deny due receipt of the notice in its pleading is tantamount to an admission, We see no applicability of the rule on specific denials to motions, such as a motion to dismiss. There is no rule that requires an adverse party to a motion to specifically deny the allegations made therein and that the failure to do so would imply an admission. Appurtenant thereto, it should be reiterated that the burden of proof to show receipt of the notice of rejection is still with herein petitioners and that mere allegation without competent proof would not suffice.
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The issue on the prescription of SCP's cause of action as a ground to dismiss the complaint then hinges on the determination as to when the notice of rejection was duly received by SCP, an issue that is best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the trial court where both parties can substantiate their claims. The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the credibility of both parties. Indeed, a determination of evidentiary matters such as the receipt of the notice of rejection is necessary for a determination of the applicability of prescription to warrant the dismissal of the action.
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Considering the foregoing, the trial courts correctly denied petitioners' motion to dismiss. The summary or outright dismissal of an action is not proper where there are factual matters in dispute which need presentation and appreciation of evidence.
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WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. 5
Charter Ping, et al., sought partial reconsideration but was denied. 6 Hence, this recourse. 7 Charter Ping, et al., argue that the parties' pleadings showed Steel Corp.'s receipt of the notice of rejection on March 24, 2011. 8 Specifically, Charter Ping, et al., submitted: (a) the November 10, 2017 judicial affidavit of Mr. Uy, the Chief Executive Officer of Steel Corp. which was submitted to the Insurance Commission and attached to petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration of the assailed May 28, 2018 Decision; (b) the receiving copy of the notice of rejection personally served upon Steel Corp. bearing the date March 24, 2011; (c) the judicial affidavit of Steel Corp.'s then Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Mr. Espiritu, and the Executive Summary which were submitted by Steel Corp. to the rehabilitation court; (d) Atty. Javier-Salazar's admission during the rehabilitation proceedings that he received the notice on March 25, 2011. Moreover, the CA erred in finding that, while Charter Ping, et al., rejected the claim on March 11, 2011, there is no proof that Steel Corp. received the notice. In ruling so, the CA amended this Court's decision in G.R. No. 201199 that there is a notice of rejection of the claim, and that Steel Corp. received it. Contrary to the CA's reason, in determining prescription, it is not only the allegations in the complaint which should be considered, but the entire records of the case. Lastly, Steel Corp. failed to deny the receipt of the notice of rejection, despite numerous opportunities. On the other hand, Steel Corp. maintains that it did not receive a notice of rejection and that the matter of prescription should be ventilated in a full-blown trial. cSaATC
The petition is unmeritorious.
"Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint without going to trial on the merits. Under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is raised in a motion to dismiss which is filed before the answer." The matter of prescription "may also be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. At the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense may be conducted as if a motion to dismiss was filed. Nevertheless, this is only a general rule. When the issue of prescription requires the determination of evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an outright dismissal without hearing." 9 Thus, "[a]n allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed; otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss." 10
Here, the CA affirmed the trial court's finding that based on the complaint, the issue of prescription was not clearly established. The CA noted that "nowhere in SCP's complaint was it admitted that it duly received a notice of rejection from any of the petitioners." On this point, we stress that when the CA confirmed the factual findings of the trial court, said facts are final and conclusive on this Court. Accordingly, this Court will not endeavor to re-examine this fact all over again. In any case, we note that the parties' pleadings denied each other's allegations as to the fact of Steel Corp.'s alleged receipt of the notice of rejection on March 24, 2011. "On this score alone, it is apparent that the complaint on its face does not readily show that the action has already prescribed." The Court emphasizes once more that a summary or outright dismissal of an action is not proper where there are factual matters in dispute, which require presentation and appreciation of evidence. 11
Also, the pleadings that Charter Ping, et al., submitted to show Steel Corp.'s alleged admissions of the receipt of the notice of rejection constitute new evidence as they were presented for the first time to the CA in their motion for partial reconsideration or after the assailed May 28, 2018 was rendered. It is implicit from Rule 37 of the Rules Court, that a motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence. Thus, if Charter Ping, et al., wanted to present further evidence, they should have filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
However, for newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, (a) it must have been discovered after trial, (b) it could not have been discovered or produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence, (c) it must be material and not merely collateral, cumulative, corroborative or purely for impeaching a witness, merely important evidence being not enough, and (d) if presented, would probably alter the result of the action. 12
Charter Ping, et al., nonetheless, did not resort to this action. Charter Ping, et al., contend that, though these documents were not examined by the trial court as they were not offered as evidence, they remained part of the records of the case which the CA should have examined. We do not agree.
As a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in the record of the case before it, yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or applicable to the case under review. In some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases "may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke" a rule of judicial notice.
Notably, the pleadings supposedly showing Steel Corp.'s admissions on the receipt of the notice of rejection were submitted to the rehabilitation court. Although the subject matter in the proceedings before the rehabilitation court and the RTC both pertain to the adjudication of Steel Corp.'s insurance claim against Charter Ping, et al., the CA, in resolving a disputed fact, may not rely on those evidence presented in the rehabilitation court, without violating Steel Corp.'s right to due process. Fundamentally, Steel Corp. should be given the opportunity to refute the alleged admissions. Charter Ping, et al., cannot take refuge in the expedience of a judicial notice. Similarly, with respect to the receiving copy of the notice of rejection sent to Steel Corp. that bears the stamp RECEIVED on March 24, 2011, we note that the same was not identified, marked, nor offered as evidence by Charter Ping, et al., in the proceedings before the trial court. Charter Ping, et al., likewise refused that their messenger be cross-examined on her judicial affidavit for the reason that Steel Corp. will only controvert the statement of their messenger.
Contrary to Charter Ping, et al.'s allegation, the CA did not amend the finding of this Court in G.R. No. 201199 on the denial of Steel Corp.'s claim and that it received the notice of rejection. To be sure, the Court's decision in G.R. No. 201199 did not conclude that Steel Corp. received the notice of rejection. In that case, the issue pertains to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitation court to determine and adjudicate insurance claims. The fact of receipt of the notice of rejection was not an issue, and the Court did not make a categorical ruling on the matter.
Corollarily, the CA did not rule that Steel Corp. received the notice of rejection, precisely because it is an issue that should be resolved during trial on the merits. What the CA elucidated is its observation that "nowhere in SCP's complaint was it admitted that it duly received a notice of rejection from any of the petitioners"13 and that "it is not apparent from the complaint that the action had already prescribed as there was neither an allegation nor an admission thereof as to the date when SCP's insurance claims were indeed rejected by petitioners."14 These statements do not imply that Steel Corp. received the notice of rejection. On the contrary, they punctuate the necessity of a full-blown trial in order to establish the fact of receipt by Steel Corp. and the date thereof. cHDAIS
Lastly, Steel Corp.'s failure to deny the receipt of the notice of rejection on March 24, 2011 does not amount to an admission. Section 11 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that "[m]aterial averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath." Based on Section 11, what is required to be specifically denied are the allegations, or material averments in the complaint. Failure to deny will amount to admission of that allegation, or material averment. Interestingly, the Rules of Court does not provide for a similar consequence when a party fails to specifically deny a material averment in a motion to dismiss. Here, the allegation with respect to Steel Corp.'s receipt of the notice of rejection is contained in Charter Ping, et al.'s motion to dismiss. Consequently, no admission may be concluded from Steel Corp.'s alleged failure to deny.
All told, considering that Steel Corp.'s receipt of the notice of rejection is disputed, the CA rightly affirmed the RTC which acted judiciously in denying the motion to dismiss in order for the parties to present their respective evidence in a full-blown trial.
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 377-396. Decision dated February 8, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 119760, penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Agnes Reyes-Carpio.
2.Id. at 413-426.
3.Id. at 427.
4.Rollo, pp. 9-35. The Consolidated Decision was penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a member of the Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Danton Q. Bueser.
5.Id. at 24-33.
6.Id. at 37-44.
7.Id. at 72-73.
8. These pleadings and submissions include: (a) the November 10, 2017 judicial affidavit of Mr. Uy, the chief executive officer of Steel Corp., which was submitted to the Insurance Commission and attached to petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration of the assailed May 28, 2018 Decision; (b) the receiving copy of the notice of rejection personally served upon Steel Corp. bearing the date March 24, 2011; (c) the judicial affidavit of Steel Corp's then Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Mr. Espiritu, and the Executive Summary which were submitted by Steel Corp. to the rehabilitation court; (d) Atty. Javier-Salazar's admission during the rehabilitation proceedings that he received the notice on March 25, 2011.
9.G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corp., 820 Phil. 235, 254 (2017).
10.Balo v. Court of Appeals, 508 Phil. 224, 235 (2005).
11.Sanchez v. Sanchez, 722 Phil. 763, 771 (2013).
12.Cansino v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 686, 693 (2003).
13.Rollo, p. 24.
14.Id. at 25.