THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 12057. June 6, 2018.]
ROBERT G. TE SIONG, complainant,vs. ATTY. MARTIN JOHNSON J. HEJE, JR., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 6, 2018, which reads as follows: ITAaHc
"A.C. No. 12057, (Robert G. Te Siong vs. Atty. Martin Johnson J. Heje, Jr.). — For resolution by the Court is a complaint filed by Robert G. Te Siong (Te Siong) against Atty. Martin Johnson J. Heje, Jr. (Atty. Heje) for violation of the latter's oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his "Affidavit-Complaint" filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Te Siong alleged that Atty. Heje borrowed money from him in the amount of Php300,000.00. He alleged that this amount was borrowed by Heje for his election campaign as candidate for vice-mayor of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. Upon receipt of said amount from the complainant, respondent issued a postdated check (UCPB Check No. MAG 7178613), dated February 10, 2013, in the amount of PhP300,000.00. When he encashed the said check on April 10, 2013, it was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. Te Siong alleged that he tried to collect the amount from Atty. Heje and that the latter promised to redeem the check and asked for time to raise the amount. However, Atty. Heje allegedly failed to make good his worthless check and to pay his debt despite repeated demands, as he would not answer Te Siong's calls nor contact the latter for months. 1 The complaint was docketed as CBD Case No. 14-4111.
In his Answer, Atty. Heje admitted that he borrowed money from Te Siong, whom he alleged was his kumpare and was engaged in the business of lending money. As for the issuance of the check, he alleged that it was meant for security and not to be encashed by Te Siong. Contrary to Te Siong's allegation, Atty. Heje stated that the money was borrowed for family expenses and school fees and not for his election campaign, as the expenses for the said campaign were shouldered by his political party. He alleged that his failure to pay his debt was not willful but was rather brought about by financial constraints. In particular, he stated that this dire financial condition was brought by their family's agri-farm business being adversely affected by Typhoon Pablo, and that he did not earn definite income during that time from his practice as most of his services as a lawyer were pro bono. It was because of these circumstances that he allegedly allowed his wife to borrow money from Te Siong in the amount of PhP100,000.00, which was later increased to PhP200,000.00, as the family was having hard time recovering from the typhoon's onslaught and expenses were falling past due. Even when he started accepting cases from paying clients and managing their family business after his failed electoral bid, his income was barely enough so he was not able to deposit the monthly interest, prompting complainant to demand payment of the entire obligation. Furthermore, he averred that before his financial condition turned sour, he was prompt in paying his other financial obligations to Te Siong. 2
In his Reply-Affidavit, Te Siong denied all the allegations in the respondent's Answer. He also denied being engaged in the business of lending money, claiming that the real reason he lent the money was because he knew and he trusted Atty. Heje. He also stated the debt subject of the complaint is still an outstanding debt. 3
During the mandatory conference on June 5, 2014, the parties made the following stipulations of facts: (1) it was Heje's wife who initially approached Te Siong to borrow one hundred thousand (PhP100,000.00) pesos; and (2) Atty. Heje had been faithful in paying his previous obligations with Te Siong. 4
Commissioner Numeriano F. Rodriguez, Jr. of the IBP-CBD then ordered the parties to submit their position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of Order. After the submission of position papers and a clarificatory hearing on October 3, 2014, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
The Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Rodriguez dated November 25, 2014 recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Atty. Heje. In support of his recommendation, he explained as follows:
Against the foregoing legal backdrop, and after considering the evidence on record, the undersigned is unable to conclude that respondent's failure to pay his loan to Complainant and the consequent dishonor of his check amount to a gross misconduct of such gravity equal to the Co and Lao cases, making respondent unworthy and unfit to remain as a lawyer. Respondent had never denied the fact of the loan or his legal obligation. From the beginning, he professed his willingness to pay the same. The undersigned finds his reason for not being able to do so credible and sincere, that he is in dire financial straits, which upon examination, may not be attributable to his fault or negligence. One cannot be blamed for falling victim to the ill-effects of an unfavorable business climate or being in the path of a natural calamity. Notwithstanding the admitted failure to pay now and the consequent dishonor of his check, there is nothing in the record, nor has Complainant, presented evidence of deceit, dishonesty, wrongdoing or misrepresentation that would make Respondent substantially wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to become unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. Respondent asks for time within which he could pay.
But, there is nothing in this Report that may be interpreted as relieving Respondent of his continuing duty as a lawyer to maintain a high standard of morality honesty, integrity, and fair dealing; or, in particular, diminishing his obligation to Complainant to settle his debt. The Respondent may well be warned that new evidence of any conduct indicating any attempt to unreasonably delay or subterfuge to effect payment may tip the balance against him.
Based on the forgoing [sic], the instant complaint is respectfully recommended for dismissal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 5
The Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-590 dated June 20, 2015, reversing and setting aside the Report and Recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to REVERSE, as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering respondent's persistent refusal to make good of the checks he issued in spite of repeated demands. Thus, Atty. Martin Johnson J. Heje, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. 6 HEITAD
In its Extended Resolution dated August 11, 2016, the Board of Governors explained its basis for reversing the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Rodriguez in the following manner:
In the Robiso and Medel cases, it is clear that the issuance of a worthless check cannot be countenanced nor condoned under any circumstances [sic]. This is because the act of a lawyer in issuing a check which is drawn against insufficient funds constitutes deceitful conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. It indicates a lawyers [sic] unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. Consistent with the penalty imposed in Medel, herein respondent must likewise be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board RESOLVED to REVERSE the Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014 and respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
SO ORDERED. 7
Atty. Heje filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution of the Board of Governors. He argued that contrary to Resolution No. XXI-2015-590 stating that he persistently refused to make good of the checks he issued in spite of repeated demands, the Investigating Commissioner found that he never denied the loan to Te Siong and has professed his willingness to pay the same. 8 As regards the issuance of the check, he reiterated that the check was merely issued for security and as evidence of indebtedness. To support this contention, he cited the following circumstances: (1) Te Siong only deposited the check after he failed to pay the monthly interest and two months after the check was due; (2) Te Siong did not send the required notice of dishonor for a bouncing check, and instead sent a letter requesting arrangement for payments; (3) Te Siong did not file a criminal case for violation for B.P. Blg. 22 and instead filed the present complaint and a civil case for collection for sum of money against him and his wife. 9
As regards the payment of the obligation, he stated that he has already fully settled his obligation to Te Siong under an amicable settlement in the civil case. To prove this, Atty. Heje attached a copy of the Order dated September 10, 2015 of Branch 7 of Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MCTC) of Davao City in Civil Case No. 23,493-G-14, entitled Robert Te Siong v. Atty. Martin Johnson Heje, Jr. and Ma Christina Heje, 10 and Certificate of Finality of the said Order. 11 Finally, he stated that unlike the respondent lawyer in Lao v. Medel, 12 he averred that he is mindful of the deleterious consequences of issuing a worthless check to the public interest and public order, as he did not offer to pay his debt by issuing another post-dated check which he knows he cannot yet fund, if only to appease Te Siong. 13
Atty. Heje's MR was denied in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1314 dated April 20, 2017, stating that there was no new reason and/or new argument adduced to reverse the previous finding and decision of the Board of Governors. 14 In a Manifestation with Prayer to the Board dated January 17, 2018, Atty. Heje prayed that the Board revisit his MR. 15 To support his plea, he attached a document entitled Clarification and Explanation (Comments to the Motion for Reconsideration) dated December 19, 2017, executed by Te Siong. Here, Te Siong stated, among others, that the reason he filed the present case was for Atty. Heje to make arrangements for the payment of the obligation and that the latter had fully fulfilled his obligation to him under an amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 23,493-G-14. 16 Pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter (B.M.) No. 1645, 17 the records of CBD Case No. 14-4111 were transmitted to this Court. The records also show that Atty. Heje filed with this Court a Petition for Review reiterating his arguments in his MR and attached thereto a copy of the same Clarification and Explanation (Comments to the Motion for Reconsideration) executed by Te Siong. 18
Issue
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Heje should be administratively sanctioned for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling of the Court
After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that Resolution No. XXI-2015-590 is in accord with the pertinent rules and jurisprudence on bar discipline.
Preliminary, it must be mentioned that although Atty. Heje filed before this Court a Petition for Review, such is no longer necessary under Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended by B.M. No. 1645. As amended, the rule states that the Resolution of the Board of Governors recommending the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary sanction against the respondent lawyer, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution. 19 A petition for review therefore is no longer necessary for purposes of elevating the case from the IBP Board to the Supreme Court.
Proceeding to the merits of the present case, Atty. Heje argues that UCPB Check No. MAG 7178613 was merely issued for security and as evidence of indebtedness and was not intended to be encashed. The argument fails to persuade.
For whatever reason the check was issued, the fact remains that it was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds and such act of issuing a bouncing check would have constituted a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 20 In People v. Nitafan, 21 where the Court was tasked to resolve whether a memorandum check falls within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22, it was held:
A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued as partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions for its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum. 22 (Citations omitted)
Furthermore, in De Jesus v. Collado, 23 the Court stated that the issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar. 24 In People v. Tuanda, 25 the Court denied a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension filed by a lawyer suspended from the practice of law after she was convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The Court held therein that a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order, and that it imports deceit and violation of an attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which a lawyer is bound to "obey the laws of the land." 26
Although the records of this case do not indicate that a criminal action for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has been filed against Atty. Heje, this Court, in a long line of cases, 27 had imposed penalties ranging from suspension to disbarment upon lawyers who issued checks which were subsequently dishonored, regardless of whether the lawyer has been convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In fact, in De Jesus v. Collado, 28 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension upon a lawyer who issued bouncing checks even without a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, as the Court held that such conviction is not essential in the disbarment case against the lawyer. 29 In Barrios v. Martinez, 30 citing Co v. Bernardino31 and Lao v. Medel, 32 this Court stated that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. 33 Finally, in Ong v. Delos Santos, 34 it was held that the issuance of a worthless check constitutes violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: ATICcS
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for granted the express commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, viz.:
CANON 1. — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7. — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. 35 (Citations omitted)
However, even as this Court finds Atty. Heje to have violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility, we deem it necessary to modify the penalty recommended by the Board.
Commissioner Rodriguez as well as the Board both cited Lao v. Medel36 in arriving at their respective recommendations. The former, in recommending the dismissal of the complaint, held that the present case was different from Lao, while the latter invoked the Lao ruling which imposed a penalty of one-year suspension upon a lawyer who issued bouncing checks.
However, a reading of Lao reveals that respondent lawyer therein issued a total of four (4) checks which were dishonored and which he did not make good despite his several promises to pay promptly and the sufficient time afforded him. The Court also found that he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and cast the blame onto the complainant, saying that his failure to pay was because the latter had refused to accept his plan of payment. Furthermore, he disrespected the Investigating Commissioner assigned to his case when he raised his voice, left before the scheduled hearing could start, and did not comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness before leaving. 37 No such similar circumstances obtain in the present case to warrant a mechanical application of the penalty imposed in Lao.
A survey of decisions where this Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for issuing checks which were later dishonored shows that the Court takes into account the factual circumstances of each case in order to arrive at the appropriate sanction upon the respondent lawyer. In Sanchez v. Somoso, 38 the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months upon a lawyer who issued two checks amounting to PhP44,347.00 for payment of medical bills but were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Similarly, in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Carandang, 39 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension for six (6) months upon a lawyer who signed 24 checks on behalf of the corporation of which he was president for payment of rental arrears to PAGCOR. The checks were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.
Like in Lao, the Court also imposed a penalty of suspension from practice of law for one year upon the respondent lawyers in De Jesus v. Collado, 41 Castillo v. Taguines, 41Co v. Bernardino, 42Rangwani v. Diño, 43Arroyo-Posidio v. Vitan, 44Enriquez v. De Vera45 and Sosa v. Mendoza. 46 In De Jesus, 47 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension for one year from the practice of law upon the respondent lawyer who issued nine (9) checks with a total amount of PhP243,063.75 and was about to evade her obligation by fleeing to the United States, had it not been for the hold departure order issued by the Supreme Court. 48 In Castillo, 49 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension for one year upon respondent lawyer who issued a cheek to the complainant in the amount of PhP500.00 constituting monetary settlement in a civil suit between the complainant and the respondent's client. The check was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. The Court held that the respondent "piled one offense after another" when he issued the said check after he has repeatedly refused to give the money to the complainant despite the latter's various and repeated demands, the resort to the filing of criminal and administrative charges, and notwithstanding the numerous opportunities he had. 50
In Co, 51 the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year was imposed upon respondent lawyer therein who issued several checks with a total amount of PhP109,200.00 which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closure of account. The Court concluded that respondent lawyer committed a gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his act of procurement of personal loans through insinuations of his power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad checks and the taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid government office. 52
In Rangwani, 53 the respondent lawyer was able to get the complainant's title to the latter's parcel of land. When he failed to return the title, he instead offered to buy the property and thus issued a series of checks which were dishonored for having been drawn against closed accounts. The Court imposed a penalty of suspension for one year and did not impose a lighter penalty as in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, 54 since there was no restitution made and the Court took note of the fraudulent manner by which he was able to entice complainant to entrust to him the title to her land. 55
In Sosa, 56 the Court imposed the penalty of one-year suspension upon respondent lawyer, not only because he issued a check which was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds, but also for his deliberate failure to pay an admittedly just and valid obligation. The Court noted that by respondent's manifestation during the hearing before the IBP Investigating Officer, he already had the amount to pay the complainant but still failed to pay because he arrived late during the hearing — an excuse which this Court found flimsy. 57 The Court also stated that "he was either lying he had the money, or had no intention of paying in the first place" because of his unclear reason for ignoring the complainant's request for settlement if he indeed had the money in the first place. 58
On the other hand, the Court imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for more than one year upon lawyers in the cases of Grande v. De Silva, 59Wong v. Moya II, 60A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio, 61Heenan v. Espejo, 62Dizon v. De Taza, 63 and Yu v. Dela Cruz. 64 In Grande, 65 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension of two years upon the respondent lawyer who issued a check to the complainant as settlement for the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent's client. The respondent gave the assurance that the check will be honored upon presentment and this convinced the complainant to desist as a complaining witness in the criminal case resulting in its dismissal. However, the check was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. The Court further noted that respondent deliberately refused to accept the notices served upon her. 66 TIADCc
In Wong, 67 the Court imposed the penalty of two years of suspension since the respondent lawyer not only issued worthless checks and failed to pay his debts, but had also seriously breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings, when he submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several extensions of time to file his answer and for his failure to attend the hearings and belated plea to dismiss the case despite orders to the contrary. 68 Also, in A-1 Financial Services, Inc., 69 the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for two years upon the respondent lawyer not only for issuing checks which bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds but also for failure to obey the orders of the IBP directing them to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the scheduled hearings, despite having made partial payments on the loan and interest before the filing of the complaint. 70 The same penalty was also imposed in Heenan71 for the same reason that the respondent lawyer failed to file an answer and attend the hearings despite orders to do so.
In Dizon, 72 the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for two years upon respondent lawyer not only for issuing checks which were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account but also for making it appear to the complainants that the proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. 73 In Yu, 74 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension for three years upon respondent who borrowed pieces of jewelry from his client, pledged them and appropriated the proceeds for his personal use, and issued a check to his client to facilitate the redemption of the pledged jewelry but was dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, in People v. Tuanda, 75 the Court denied the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension filed by the accused, a lawyer who has been suspended from the practice of law until further orders from the Supreme Court as a consequence of her conviction by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, which the Court characterized as an offense involving moral turpitude. 76 In Nuñez v. Ricafort, 77 the Court imposed the penalty of indefinite suspension upon respondent lawyer. Here, the respondent was authorized by the complainant to sell the latter's parcels of land, which the respondent was able to do, but he failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale which caused the complainants to file an action for collection of sum of money. Judgment was rendered against the respondent lawyer in the civil case which became final and executory. To satisfy the judgment, respondent issued a check to the complainant which was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. He failed to make good the checks forcing the complainant to file criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Furthermore, respondent, for unexplained reasons, did not file any comment on the administrative case filed against him despite the orders and the three extensions granted by the Court.
On the other hand, the Court imposed the extreme penalty of disbarment in the cases of Cuizon v. Macalino, 78Barrios v. Martinez, 79Moreno v. Araneta, 80 and Huyssen v. Gutierrez. 81 In Cuizon, 82 the respondent lawyer was disbarred after he failed to carry out his duties as counsel for the complainant's husband after he agreed to represent the latter and persuaded her to sell her car to the respondent, forcing the complainant to avail the services of another lawyer. Worse, the respondent lawyer also issued a check which was dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account, went into hiding to evade arrest, and did not comply with the order to file a comment in the complaint against him. In Barrios, 83 the respondent lawyer was also disbarred after he has been convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, a crime involving moral turpitude. Similarly, in Moreno, 84 the respondent lawyer was also disbarred because aside from issuing checks which were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account, the respondent has also apparently been convicted by final judgment for the crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document, for which he was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Finally, in Huyssen, 85 the respondent lawyer failed to return to the money of the complainant which he claimed was needed for a favorable action on the complainant's visa application with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). When complainant demanded the return of the money, he issued several postdated checks which were later dishonored for insufficiency of funds or because the respondent lawyer ordered to stop payment thereon.
However, the Court has also meted a lighter penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of less than one year in several cases. In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, 86 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension for six months upon a lawyer who issued bouncing checks but was already able to make partial payment in the amount of Php50,000.00. Similarly, in Yuson v. Vitan, 87 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension for six months upon respondent lawyer upon admission by the complainant that there has been partial payment, pursuant to the ruling in Barrientos.
In Wilkie v. Limos, 88 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension for three months upon the respondent lawyer who issued checks which were later dishonored, but was able to make full payment in the amount of PhP400,000.00. The Court also took into account the fact that the criminal cases against the respondent lawyer have been dismissed and it was the first time that a complaint of such nature was filed against the respondent. Payment and dismissal of the criminal cases were also taken as mitigating circumstances in the respondent lawyer's favor in Ong v. Delos Santos. 89
In Santos-Tan v. Robiso, 90 also cited by the IBP Board in their Extended Resolution, the respondent lawyer issued a check for Php85,000.00 to his client who was demanding refund of the Php100,000.00 acceptance fee. The check was later dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The Court, while ruling that the act of a lawyer in issuing a check drawn against insufficient funds constitutes deceitful conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one month, noting that acceptance fees of lawyers are generally non-refundable and the fact that respondent is willing to make good the amount of the check. 91 Finally, in Foronda v. Alvarez, Jr., 92 the Court, in imposing a lighter penalty of suspension for six months upon respondent lawyer, considered the dismissal of the criminal charges filed against the respondent upon an affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant. The Court also acknowledged his dutiful participation in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD and the complete settlement of his obligation to the complainant, as evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt signed by the complainant's counsel. Furthermore, the respondent was able to file, albeit belatedly, the complainant's petition, and he returned in full the money he received as attorney's fee in spite of having gone through all the trouble of preparing and filing the required petition and the cost he incurred for the purpose. 93
From the discussion above, it is apparent that payment, whether partial or full, and dismissal of criminal cases against the respondent lawyer may be considered to mitigate liability, while the disregard of orders of duly constituted authorities such as the IBP, and other acts tantamount to defrauding the complainant or deliberately failing to pay just debts, may be taken account in imposing a higher penalty. Moreover, a conviction by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be considered in imposing the penalty of indefinite suspension, or worst, disbarment.
We shall now proceed to apply the foregoing principles in determining the appropriate penalty upon Atty. Heje.
In the present case, the records show that Atty. Heje dutifully participated in the proceedings before the IBP. He appeared during the mandatory conference on June 5, 2014 and the clarificatory hearing on October 3, 2014 and in fact complied with the directives to file an Answer and his position paper. During the mandatory conference, it was stipulated that he had been faithful in paying his previous obligations to Te Siong. Thus, unlike in the other cases mentioned, this Court is not inclined to conclude that he has the propensity to defraud by incurring debts without the least intention of paying them. AIDSTE
Furthermore, in the Clarification and Explanation (Comments to the Motion for Reconsideration), Te Siong stated that the reason he filed the present case was for Atty. Heje to make arrangements for the payment of the obligation and that the latter had fully fulfilled his obligation to him under an amicable settlement in the civil case for collection for sum of money filed by him against Atty. Heje and the latter's wife. 94 If his real intention was really to just compel Atty. Heje to pay his debt, a civil case for collection of sum of money would have been the more appropriate action, as what he eventually did in this case. In this respect, the Court's pronouncement in Heenan v. Espejo95 is enlightening:
x x x In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant. 96 (Citations omitted)
Nevertheless, the fact that Atty. Heje has fully settled his obligation to Te Siong will not completely absolve the former from any administrative liability for it will only operate to lessen the penalty, at the most. This Court reiterates its pronouncements in Wong v. Moya II, 97Yuhico v. Gutierrez98 and Sosa v. Mendoza99 that being in dire financial condition is not a valid excuse for failure to settle one's financial obligations, as one should not incur debts which are beyond one's capacity to pay. Similarly, in this case, even if Atty. Heje is to be believed that his failure to pay was not deliberate and willful but due to financial constraints, then he should have been more careful in issuing the check because of the greater possibility that it may be dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Furthermore, as already discussed, even if the check was issued merely as security and as evidence of indebtedness, such purpose is immaterial for what remains undeniable is the fact that he issued a check which was later dishonored for insufficiency of funds. In light of the circumstances discussed herein, this Court deems that suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is already sufficient.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Martin Johnson J. Heje, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 3.
2.Id., at 17-22.
3.Id., at 20.
4.Id., at 39.
5.Id., at 122-123.
6.Id., at 113.
7.Id., at 127.
8.Id., at 73.
9.Id., at 74-75.
10. Attached as Annex "A" of the Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo, p. 78.
11. Attached as Annex "B" of the Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo, p. 79.
12. A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 227.
13.Rollo, p. 75.
14.Id., at 113.
15.Id., at 101.
16.Id., at 107.
17. Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors. —
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.
c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and Submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.
d) Notice of the resolution of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.
18. Attached as Annex "6" to the Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 162-163.
19. Supra.
20. AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Also popularly known as the "Bouncing Checks Law."
21. G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79.
22. Id., at 84.
23. A.C. No. 3806, December 16, 1992, 216 SCRA 619.
24. Id., at 624.
25. A.C. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 692, 697.
26. Id. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides in Canon 1 that "a lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 under the same Canon provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
27. Yu v. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 10912, January 19, 2016, 781 SCRA 188; Sosa v. Mendoza, A.C. No. 8776, March 23, 2015, 754 SCRA 61; Enriquez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015, 753 SCRA 235; Foronda v. Alvarez, Jr., A.C. No. 9976, June 25, 2014, 727 SCRA 155; Dizon v. De Taza, A.C. No. 7676, June 10, 2014, 726 SCRA 70; Ong v. Delos Santos, A.C. No. 10179, March 4, 2014, 717 SCRA 663; Heenan v. Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013, 711 SCRA 290; A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio, A.C. No. 8390, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 616; Santos-Tan v. Robiso, A.C. No. 6383, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 556; Wilkie v. Limos, A.C. No. 7505, October 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 1; Wong v. Moya II, A.C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 256; Arroyo-Posidio v. Vitan, A.C. No. 6051, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 1; Yuson v. Vitan, A.C. No. 6955, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 540; Huyssen v. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 244; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Carandang, A.C. No. 5700, January 30, 2006, 480 SCRA 512; Moreno v. Araneta, A.C. No. 1109, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 329; Rangwani v. Diño, A.C. No. 5454, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 408; Barriosv. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324; Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, A.C. No. 6408, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 209; Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 479; Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 569; Grande v. De Silva, A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 310; Lao v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 227; Nuñez v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 5054, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 381; Co v. Bernardino, A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 102; Castillo v. Taguines, A.C. No. 2024, March 11, 1996, 254 SCRA 554; De Jesus v. Collado, A.C. No. 3806, December 16, 1992, 216 SCRA 619; and People v. Tuanda, A.C. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 692.
28.Supra, at 624.
29. Id., at 623-624.
30. A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324.
31. A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 102.
32. Supra note 12.
33. Supra note 30, at 338.
34. A.C. No. 10179, March 4, 2014, 717 SCRA 663.
35. Id., at 669.
36. Supra note 12.
37. Id., at 230, 232, 234.
38. A.C. No. 6061, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 569.
39. A.C. No. 5700, January 30, 2006, 480 SCRA 512.
40. Supra note 23.
41. A.C. No. 2024, March 11, 1996, 254 SCRA 554.
42. Supra note 31.
43. A.C. No. 5454, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 408.
44. A.C. No. 6051, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 1.
45. A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015, 753 SCRA 235.
46. A.C. No. 8776, March 23, 2015, 754 SCRA 61.
47. Supra note 23.
48. Id., at 624.
49. Supra.
50. Id., at 563.
51. Supra note 31.
52. Id., at 108.
53. Supra.
54. A.C. No. 6408, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 209.
55. Supra, at 423.
56. Supra.
57. Id., at 69.
58. Id.
59. A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 310.
60. A.C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 256.
61. A.C. No. 8390, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 616.
62. A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013, 711 SCRA 290.
63. A.C. No. 7676, June 10, 2014, 726 SCRA 70.
64. A.C. No. 10912, January 19, 2016, 781 SCRA 188.
65. Supra.
66. A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 310, 313.
67. Supra.
68. Id., at 267.
69. Supra.
70. Id., at 621.
71. Supra.
72. Supra.
73. Id., at 80.
74. Supra.
75. Supra note 25.
76. Id., at 691.
77. A.C. No. 5054, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 381.
78. A.C. No. 4334, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 479.
79. A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324.
80. A.C. No. 1109, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 329.
81. A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 244.
82. Supra.
83. Supra.
84. Supra.
85. Supra.
86. Supra note 54.
87. A.C. No. 6955, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 540.
88. A.C. No. 7505, October 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 1.
89. Supra note 34.
90. A.C. No. 6383, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 556.
91. Id., at 565.
92. A.C. No. 9976, June 25, 2014, 727 SCRA 155.
93. Id., at 169-170.
94. Rollo, pp. 107-108. Also Attached as Annex "6" to the Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 162-163.
95. Supra note 62.
96. Id., at 301.
97. Supra note 60, at 267.
98. A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 684, 689.
99. Supra note 46, at 70.