FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226689. December 7, 2021.]
ROMULO C. TABASA, petitioner,vs. SAINT FRANCIS INSTITUTE OF COMPUTER STUDIES/LUISITO R. AMANTE, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 7, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 226689 (Romulo C. Tabasa v. Saint Francis Institute of Computer Studies/Luisito R. Amante). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 2 dated February 24, 2016 and Resolution 3 dated August 1, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 134338, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated July 17, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 03-000969-13.
FACTS
On November 18, 2000, Romulo C. Tabasa (Romulo) started working as a maintenance crew for Saint Francis Institute of Computer Studies (the Institute) with a daily wage of P100.00. In 2007, his salary was increased to P215.00 per day. Romulo's employment continued until he left for Tarlac to visit his family on December 16, 2011, without permission from his employer. When he came back after two (2) days, he was allegedly instructed not to report for work and to rest for six (6) months. 5 Thus, on February 17, 2012, Romulo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries/wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium for holiday pay and rest day, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, and for illegal deductions with prayer for damages and attorney's fees against the Institute and its president, Luisito R. Amante (Luisito). 6
For their part, Luisito and the Institute maintained that Romulo was not dismissed from employment. Romulo was merely confronted about his absence without leave, but he got slighted and abandoned his work. 7
In a Decision 8 dated December 18, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Romulo was illegally dismissed. The LA held that the allegation of abandonment was untenable considering that Romulo filed a complaint to assert his tenurial security immediately after dismissal, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [Romulo] is hereby adjudged to have been illegally dismissed by [Luisito and the Institute,] who are hereby held liable for his backwages and separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement. He is likewise held entitled to the money claims, computed hereunder, and 10% of total amount of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 9
Luisito received a copy of the LA Decision on February 20, 2013 through a security guard. Under the rules, 10 they had ten (10) days from notice of the judgment or until March 2, 2013 to appeal to the National Labor Relation Commission (NLRC). The last day of the filing fell on a Saturday. The next business day was March 4, 2013, but the appeal was not filed until March 5, 2013. 11
In a Decision 12 dated July 17, 2013, the NLRC gave due course to the appeal for being meritorious despite being filed one (1) day late. The NLRC found no proof, aside from Romulo's bare allegation, that he was terminated from employment. However, there was likewise no proof of overt acts on Romulo's part to show a clear and unequivocal intention to abandon his job. Thus, the NLRC concluded that there was no dismissal nor abandonment to speak of, and disposed:
WHEREFORE, [Luisito and the Institute's] Appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Edgar B. Bisana dated December 18, 2012 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1) The [LA's] finding that [Romulo] was illegally dismissed is hereby REVERSED. Consequently, the action for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED;
2) The award of backwages, separation pay, overtime pay, and attorney's fees in favor of [Romulo] are hereby SET ASIDE;
3) The following awards in favor of [Romulo] are AFFIRMED:
3.1) the amount of [P]103,924[.00] representing salary differential for underpayment of wages;
3.2) the amount of [P]4,890.45[.00] representing service incentive leave pay;
3.3) the amount of [P]25,430.36[.00] representing 13th month pay; and
3.4) the amount of [P]11,608.00[.00] representing holiday pay.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphases in the original.)
Aggrieved, Romulo filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution 14 dated December 26, 2013. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari15 with the CA. In the assailed Decision 16 dated February 24, 2016, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in giving due course to the belatedly filed appeal as the merits of the case warranted the exercise of liberality in the application of procedural rules. Upon scrutiny of the records, the CA confirmed that no evidence was presented to substantiate Romulo's claim that he was dismissed from work other than his bare allegation. Luisito and/or the Institute's allegation of abandonment of work was also found unsubstantiated. The NLRC's dispositions on the monetary awards were likewise sustained, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated 17 July 2013 and Resolution dated 26 December 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 17 (Emphases in the original.)
Romulo sought reconsideration but was denied in the Resolution 18 dated August 1, 2016. Hence, this petition, wherein Romulo insists that Luisito and/or the Institute's appeal to the NLRC should have been dismissed outright for being filed out of time. He further contends that his categorical allegation that he was verbally dismissed from work was sufficient for the CA to conclude that he was illegally dismissed. In their Comment, 19 Luisito and/or the Institute counter that the NLRC properly relaxed the application of the procedural rules given their meritorious case. They also maintain that Romulo failed to discharge the initial burden of proving that he was dismissed from employment.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA erred in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the appeal, which was filed one day late; and
II. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that Romulo was not dismissed from employment nor did he abandon his job.
RULING
The petition lacks merit.
This Court's task in this review is limited to the determination of whether the CA correctly ruled on the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC 20 in giving due course to the belatedly filed appeal, and in ruling that there was no termination of employment or abandonment.
The CA did not err in sustaining
It is undisputed that the appeal to the NLRC was filed one (1) day beyond the 10-day reglementary period under Section 1, 21 Rule VI of "The 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure," as amended (NLRC Rules). Luisito received a copy of the LA Decision on February 20, 2013. Hence, the last day of the filing of the appeal was on March 2, 2013, which fell on a Saturday. As such, the appeal could have been filed until the next business day, which was March 4, 2013, but no appeal was filed until March 5, 2013. Nevertheless, the NLRC found it necessary to give due course to the meritorious appeal despite being filed late. We agree with the CA in affirming the NLRC ruling.
Section 10, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules explicitly provides that:
SEC. 10. TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING. — The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
This rule is in keeping with the general principle that administrative bodies are not strictly bound by the technical rules of procedure: 22
[A]dministrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 23
With these precepts, the Court has consistently sanctioned the relaxation of procedural rules in meritorious cases. 24 After all, they are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases. A strict and rigid application of technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must then be avoided. 25 As correctly found by the CA, there was no showing that the NLRC was motivated by caprice, whim, or personal hostility in considering the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing it outright for being filed late. The NLRC merely discharged its mandate to "ascertain the facts in [the] case x x x without regard to technicalities of law or procedure." As discussed below, records of the case show, the appeal was patently meritorious; dismissing it on technical grounds would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.
The CA did not err in affirming the
The NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found that Romulo failed to discharge the initial burden of sufficiently establishing that he was terminated from employment. Basic is the rule in illegal dismissal cases that before the employer bears the burden to prove the validity or legality of a dismissal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from employment. 26 Indeed, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to its legality or illegality. Romulo's claim that he was verbally dismissed from work, unsubstantiated by impartial and independent evidence, is insufficient to establish the fact of dismissal, 27 constructive or otherwise. The fact alone that Romulo was confronted about his absences without leave, as every employer would do, cannot be deemed as sufficient proof that he was terminated from work. No other allegation, much less proof, was on record to conclude that he was no longer allowed to report back to work. Time and again, we have emphasized that bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no probative value. We also stress that the evidence presented to show the employee's termination from employment must be clear, positive, and convincing. 28 Absent a showing of an overt or positive act proving that Luisito and/or the Institute had dismissed Romulo, the claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained as the same would be self-serving, conjectural, and of no probative value. 29
Neither was there any evidence to support a conclusion that Romulo abandoned his work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. 30 In Atienza v. Saluta, 31 we explained:
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the [employee] has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. 32
The burden of proving abandonment is upon the employer, 33 but Luisito and/or the Institute failed to do so. Apart from their assertion that Romulo no longer reported for work after he was confronted about his absences, no other circumstances appear on record to show Romulo's clear and unequivocal intention to end his employment with the Institute. Jurisprudence states that mere absence or failure to report for work is not tantamount to abandonment of work. 34 This is especially so when Romulo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. We have consistently held that an employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned his work. The filing of such complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus, negating any suggestion of abandonment. 35
Since there was neither dismissal nor abandonment, the NLRC and the CA correctly deleted the awards of backwages and separation pay. Backwages are awarded only to unjustly dismissed employees to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of wages as a result of such dismissal. 36 Likewise, separation pay is warranted only in favor of dismissed employees in the following instances:
1) in case of closure of establishment under Article 298 [formerly Article 283] of the Labor Code; 2) in case of termination due to disease or sickness under Article 299 [formerly Article 284] of the Labor Code; 3) as a measure of social justice in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character; 4) where the dismissed employee's position is no longer available; 5) when the continued relationship between the employer and the employee is no longer viable due to the strained relations between them[;] or 6) when the dismissed employee opted not to be reinstated, or the payment of separation benefits would be for the best interest of the parties involved. In all of these cases, the grant of separation pay presupposes that the employee to whom it was given was dismissed from employment, whether legally or illegally. 37 x x x
None of these circumstances obtains in this case. It was not proven that Romulo was terminated from work. Hence, the NLRC and the CA aptly ruled that the burden of economic loss cannot be rightfully shifted to the employer. 38
In cases wherein, the parties failed to prove the presence of either dismissal from employment or abandonment, the remedy is reinstatement without payment of backwages since the employer-employee relationship between the parties was never severed. 39 There is, however, a need to clarify the concept of "reinstatement" in this context. In Rodriguez v. Sintron Systems, Inc.40 we explained:
Indeed, in cases where the parties failed to prove the presence of either dismissal of the employee or abandonment of his work, the remedy is to reinstate such employee without payment of backwages. There is, however, a need to clarify the import of the term "reinstate" or "reinstatement" in the context of cases where neither dismissal nor abandonment exists. The Court has clarified that "reinstatement," as used in such cases, is merely an affirmation that the employee may return to work as he was not dismissed in the first place. It should not be confused with reinstatement as a relief proceeding from illegal dismissal as provided under Article 279 of the Labor Code, to wit:
[ART.] 294 [279]. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original.)
Reinstatement under the aforequoted provision restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was removed, that is, to his status quo ante dismissal. In the present case, considering that there has been no dismissal at all, there can be no reinstatement as one cannot be reinstated to a position he is still holding. Instead, the Court merely declares that the employee may go back to his work and the employer must then accept him because the employment relationship between them was never actually severed.
Moreover, as there can be no reinstatement in the technical sense of Article 279, the doctrine of strained relations likewise has no application. This doctrine only arises when there is an order for reinstatement that is no longer feasible. It cannot be invoked by the employer to prevent the employee's return to work nor by the employee to justify payment of separation pay. As discussed, there having [sic] been no abandonment nor dismissal, the employee-employer relationship between the parties subsists. 41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, Romulo may return to his employment, and Luisito and/or the Institute must restore him to his former position.
In all, we find no reversible on the part of the CA in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the appeal, and ruling that the parties failed to prove either dismissal from employment or abandonment. Romulo is deemed to have never lost his employment in the Institute, and as such, should be allowed to go back to his former position without backwages. We, however, find it proper to impose the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the total monetary awards from the finality of this Resolution until their full payment is consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence. 42
FOR THESE REASONS, this Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated February 24, 2016 and Resolution dated August 1, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134338 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed upon the total monetary awards from finality of this Resolution until full satisfaction. Petitioner Romulo C. Tabasa is reinstated to his former position without backwages.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 4-18.
2.Id. at 273-282. Penned by Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of the Court) with the concurrence of Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla (now a Retired Member of the Court).
3.Id. at 298-299.
4.Id. at 51-62.
5.Id.
6.Id. at 274.
7.Id. at 153.
8.Id. at 151-155.
9.Id. at 154.
10. THE 2011 RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE NLRC, approved on May 31, 2011, as amended by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, approved on November 16, 2012, RULE VI, SEC. 1. PERIODS OF APPEAL. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof;
xxx xxx xxx."
11.Rollo, pp. 228-229.
12.Id. at 51-62.
13.Id. at 61.
14.Id. at 46-49.
15.Id. at 25-42.
16.Id. at 273-282.
17.Id. at 282.
18.Id. at 298-299.
19.Id. at 310-313.
20. See Every Nation Language Institute v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 225100, February 19, 2020.
21.Supra note 10.
22. See Palao v. Florentino III International, Inc., 803 Phil. 393, 399 (2017).
23. See id. citing Samalio v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 456, 464 (2005).
24.Tolentino-Prieto v. Elvas, 799 Phil. 97, 112 (2016).
25.Jaro v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 532, 548 (2002).
26.Rodriguez v. Sintron Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 240254, July 24, 2019.
27.Atienza v. Saluta, G.R. No. 233413, June 17, 2019.
28.Id.
29. See id.
30.Id.
31.Id.
32.Id. citing Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes, 753 Phil. 482, 507 (2015).
33.Id. at 494.
34.Id. at 510.
35. See id. at 494.
36.Rodriguez v. Sintron Systems, Inc., supra note 25.
37.Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. v. Tanguin, 811 Phil. 784, 799 (2017).
38.Rodriguez v. Sintron Systems, Inc., supra note 25.
39.Id.
40.Id.
41.Id.
42.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 283, 278-279 (2013).