SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 236162. September 27, 2021.]
FE P. BURCIO, petitioner, vs.SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, *respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated27 September 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 236162 (Fe P. Burcio v. Saint Louis University). — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fe P. Burcio (petitioner) assails (1) the August 10, 2017 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 137636, which upheld the judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC Case No. 04-000981-14; and (2) the November 24, 2017 Resolution 3 of the appellate court which denied the Motion for Reconsideration 4 thereof.
Antecedents:
Petitioner was hired by respondent Saint Louis University (SLU) as faculty member with an academic rank of Instructor I-1 in its College of Human Sciences. Her letter of appointment 5 dated July 19, 2005 stated that her appointment was on a contractual basis for the duration of the first semester of school year (SY) 2005-2006. 6
On June 27, 2008, SLU appointed petitioner as Instructor II-2 with a regular status effective on the first semester of SY 2008-2009, subject to the condition that petitioner obtain a master's degree within a period of four (4) years reckoned from the first semester of SY 2008-2009 or until May 31, 2012, otherwise, her employment would be terminated. 7
On July 9, 2009, SLU reminded Burcio to earn her master's degree by May 31, 2012 or she shall be considered as part-time or contractual faculty. 8
In a letter 9 dated July 22, 2009, the university again reminded petitioner that the grace period to obtain her masteral degree would lapse on June 1, 2012. She was also apprised that under the Manual of Regulations for Private Higher Education of 2008 (MORPHE), "[a] part-time employee cannot acquire permanent status, and hence, may be terminated when a qualified teacher becomes available." 10 This was followed by similar reminders on June 1, 2011 and March 9, 2012. 11
On March 31, 2012, petitioner sent a letter 12 to SLU requesting for an extension to finish her master's degree citing an illness as the main cause of her failure to obtain the required educational qualification. It appears that sometime in May 2010, petitioner was diagnosed with mild cervical osteophytosis and reversed cervical lordosis which required her to undergo therapy sessions.
However, in a letter 13 dated June 2, 2012, SLU informed petitioner that she shall be classified as part-time faculty effective June 1, 2012 due to her failure to secure her master's degree within the grace period given her. On October 25, 2012, the university extended petitioner's employment as part-time faculty for the second semester of SY 2012-2013 effective November 1, 2012 to March 31, 2013.
On March 8, 2013, petitioner filed a complaint for constructive dismissal but she later withdrew said complaint. 14
On April 30, 2013, petitioner was notified of·the expiration of her services as part-time faculty. In spite of the issuance of said notice, SLU subsequently offered petitioner a 15-unit teaching load for the first semester of SY 2013-2014 but petitioner declined.
Later, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal termination with claims for damages and attorney's fees against the university before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch-Cordillera Administrative Region which was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR 08-0296-13.
Ruling15 of the Labor Arbiter (LA):
On February 27, 2014, the LA dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of merit and denied her claims for lack of basis. The LA ruled that her dismissal was valid since she failed to obtain the required master's degree for her continued employment.
Displeased, petitioner appealed to the NLRC. 16
Ruling of the National Labor
In its June 16, 2014 Decision, 17 the NLRC sustained the LA's Decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal. It held that petitioner was not dismissed by the university as it was petitioner herself who refused to accept the school's offer to continue working as a faculty member. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 18 was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution 19 dated July 31, 2014.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari20 before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition. It declared that petitioner's allegation of constructive dismissal cannot be given credence and that the reversion of her employment status from regular to part-time faculty was a legal and logical consequence of her failure to satisfy SLU's minimum requirement to attain or retain full-time employment status.
Hence, this recourse hinged on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE COULD BE DIMINISHED BY A MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR ISSUED BY THE COMMISSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION? CAIHTE
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORPHE 2008 COULD AMEND AN EXISTING CBA AND THE LABOR CODE?
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORPHE 2008 COULD BE STRICTLY INTERPRETED AGAINST THE INTEREST OF LABOR IN VIOLATION OF THE LABOR CODE AND THE CIVIL CODE?
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORPHE 2008 VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE COMPLAINT (SIC) AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS?
V. WHETHER OR NOT, (SIC) THE MORPHE 2008 COULD RETROACT TO A REGULAR FACULTY WHO HAS EARLIER EARNED HER RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE?" 21
Petitioner maintains that she was illegally dismissed. She contends that she should not have been terminated from work for her failure to obtain her master's degree since she already acquired tenure pursuant to their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Petitioner points out that the CBA between SLU and the Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis University (UFESLU) provides that the period of probation for full-time teaching employees shall be two (2) years. The CBA also specified that the probationary employment of the university's employees who teach in its college department shall be for a period of "four (4) Consecutive Semesters." Petitioner argues that inasmuch as she had served as a faculty member for six consecutive semesters, it goes without saying that she already attained regular status pursuant to their CBA. Hence, she may no longer be removed except for a just or authorized cause under the Labor Code.
Petitioner further posits that the provision of MORPHE 2008 requiring a master's degree as the minimum qualification for faculty members in the tertiary level to maintain their employment is inapplicable to her since she already attained regular employment status on June 27, 2008, or prior to the effectivity of the said regulation in December 2008. She argues that applying MORPHE 2008 to her case would be violative of her right against non-impairment of contract. She insists that the provision on tenure under the CBA should be observed as it is the contract between respondent university and its employees.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
In a nutshell, the issue is whether petitioner should be required to obtain a master's degree to attain permanency status notwithstanding that she already completed the probationary period set under the CBA.
Probationary employment refers to the trial stage or period during which the employer examines the competency and qualifications of job applicants, and determines whether they are qualified to be extended permanent employment status. 22 Such an arrangement affords an employer the opportunity — before the full force of the guarantee of security of tenure comes into play — to fully scrutinize and observe the fitness and worth of probationers while on the job and to determine whether they would become proper and efficient employees. 23 It also gives the probationers the chance to prove to the employer that they possess the necessary qualities and qualifications to meet reasonable standards for permanent employment. 24 Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, governs probationary employment. It provides:
Art. 281. Probationary employment. — Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. (Emphases supplied)" 25
Here, the records disclose that petitioner was made fully aware by the university that possession of a master's degree was a criterion to attain permanency as a full-time faculty member. In fact, such necessary academic qualification to obtain the status of permanency was clearly written in the letter of appointment 26 given to petitioner.
It is settled jurisprudence 27 that a probationer can only qualify upon fulfillment of the reasonable standards set for permanent employment as a member of the teaching personnel. In line with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the discretion and prerogative to impose standards on its teachers and determine whether these have been met. Upon conclusion of the probation period, the college or university, being the employer, has the sole prerogative to make a decision on whether or not to re-hire the probationer. The probationer cannot automatically assert the acquisition of security of tenure and force the employer to renew the employment contract.
In petitioner's case, the university afforded her a reasonable period to acquire the postgraduate degree that was required of her. A master's degree can be fulfilled within a minimum period of two (2) years but petitioner was given four years from 2008 to finish the same notwithstanding that she commenced taking up her master's degree way back in the summer of 2002. 28 It is evident that petitioner did not take full advantage of the opportunity accorded to her. Justice, fairness, and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had little or no participation or control. 29
In University of the East v. Pepanio, 30 the Court held in no uncertain terms that the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves public interest. Hence, the government has all the right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in the field of education is indeed sensible for protecting not only the students but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. Hence, they may be required to take an examination 31 or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisites to employment.
We therefore reject petitioner's contention that she automatically acquired the permanent employment status when she completed the probationary period set under the CBA. aScITE
Relevantly, in Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, 32 the Court expressly clarified that a school CBA must be read in conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications. These regulations should be understood as forming part of a valid CBA without need for the parties to make express reference to it. Indeed, while the parties to a contract may establish such stipulations, clauses, and terms and conditions as they may see fit, the right to contract is still subject to the limitation that the agreement must not be contrary to law or public policy. A CBA cannot override matters involving public policy such as the State's right to regulate in the field of education.
Going further at the time of petitioner's engagement as probationary full-time faculty member, the applicable regulation was the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 Manual). 21 Sections 44 and 45 of the 1992 Manual set out the minimum requirements for the position of a permanent full-time instructor, viz.:
Section 44. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. — The minimum qualifications for faculty for the different grades and levels of instruction duly supported by appropriate credentials on file in the school shall be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Tertiary
(1) For undergraduate courses, other than vocational:
(a) Holder of a master's degree, to teach largely in his major field; or, for professional courses, holder of the appropriate professional license required for at least a bachelor's degree. Any deviation from this requirement will be subject to regulation by the Department.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 45. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. — As a general rule, all private schools shall employ full-time academic personnel consistent with the levels of instruction.
Full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following requirements:
a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the Department under this Manual for all academic personnel;
b. Who are paid monthly or hourly, based on the regular teaching loads as provided for in the policies, rules and standards of the Department and the school;
c. Whose total working day of not more than eight hours a day is devoted to the school;
d. Who have no other remunerative occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work that will conflict with the working hours in the school; and
e. Who are not teaching full-time in any other educational institution.
All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are considered part-time.
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to the 1992 Manual, private educational institutions in the tertiary level may extend "full-time faculty" status only to those who possess, inter alia, a master's degree in the field of study that will be taught. This minimum requirement is not subject to the prerogative of the school. Any agreement between the parties should not tamper with the Manual's provision on the matter. For all intents and purposes, the qualification required in the 1992 Manual must be deemed a part of the employment contracts between private educational institutions and potential teachers. Thus, whether a probationer has been informed of this academic requirement before his or her employment as a probationary employee is beside the point as the employee is presumed to know such qualifications. Thus, notwithstanding completion of three years of satisfactory service, a probationer who fails to meet the criteria under the 1992 Manual cannot legally attain the status of a permanent full-time faculty member. 33
In light of the above disquisitions, this Court holds that as between the requirements set in the 1992 Manual and the CBA relevant to the standards for permanent employment, the former should prevail. Private educational institutions must still supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the Commission on Higher Education, and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority). This limitation on the right of private schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the employment status of their academic personnel has been imposed by the State in view of the public interest nature of educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools and educators. 34
Verily, while our Constitution fully recognizes the State's policy to afford full protection to labor and its right to security of tenure, this, however, must be balanced against the policy of the State to protect and promote the right to quality education at all levels as embodied in our laws and regulations prescribing qualifications for the teaching profession. Although this Court is mindful of the plight of teachers whose security of tenure is necessarily affected by the said laws, We can only afford reliefs that are within the confines of the law. Neither estoppel nor equity can contravene a clear provision of law. 35
Aside from the foregoing, this Court sees merit in the conclusion of the NLRC that petitioner was not illegally dismissed but instead voluntarily resigned as evidenced by her letter dated June 8, 2013 addressed to the university's President, Rev. Fr. Jesse M. Hechanova, viz.:
Dear Fr. President:
I would like to thank you for the teaching load you are offering me this first semester.
After receiving the notice on April 30, 2013 informing me of the expiration of my services as part-time faculty and having no assurance if I will be given a teaching load this semester. I have already set another important plan. Taking back such plan now will be inappropriate and unfair to the person who, too, had already fixed a significant intent relative to the decision that I made.
In as much as I want to teach this semester, I decided not to take the offer because of the reason mentioned above.
Thank you for the opportunity I was given in the past years to teach in Saint Louis University.
Respectfully yours,
(Sgd.)36
While there was no direct mention of the word "resignation" in said letter, the clear intent of petitioner to sever her employment was evident in the wordings therein. As we find no reversible error on the part of the CA for affirming the decision of the labor tribunals, the instant petition should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the August 10, 2017 Decision and November 24, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 137636 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost. DETACa
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MA. CONSOLACION GAMINDE-CRUZADADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* The National Labor Relations Commission was dropped as respondent pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
1.Rollo, pp. 10-33.
2.Id. at 38-48; penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a retired Member of this Court) and Jane Aurora C. Lantion.
3.Id. at 50-51.
4. CA rollo, pp. 356-371.
5.Id. at 84.
6.Rollo, p. 39.
7. See also CA rollo, p. 34.
8. See June 1, 2011 Letter, CA rollo, p. 37.
9. See NLRC Decision, CA rollo, p. 191.
10.Id. at 232.
11. CA rollo, pp. 87-88.
12.Id. at 89.
13.Id. at 90.
14. See Position Paper for the Respondent, CA rollo, pp. 72-73.
15. CA rollo, pp. 118-126; penned by Executive Labor Arbiter Vito C. Bose.
16.Id. at 128-148.
17.Id. at 226-239; penned by Presiding Commissioner Herminio V. Suelo and concurred in by Commissioners Angelo Ang Palana and Numeriano D. Villena.
18.Id. at 203-207.
19.Id. at 240-242.
20.Id. at 3-33.
21.Rollo, pp. 17-18.
22.Colegio del Santisimo Rosario v. Rojo, 717 Phil. 265, 275-276 (2013); Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., 632 Phil. 228, 250 (2010); Magis Young Achievers' Learning Center v. Manalo, 598 Phil. 886, 901 (2009).
23.Id.
24.Id.
25.Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica's College, 723 Phil. 495, 505 (2013).
26. CA rollo, p. 84.
27.Colegio del Santisimo Rosario v. Rojo, supra note 22; Lacuesta v. Ateneo de Manila University, 513 Phil. 329 (2005); La Salette of Santiago, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 272-A Phil. 33 (1991); Cagayan Capitol College v. National Labor Relations Commission, 267 Phil. 696 (1990).
28. Records, p. 124.
29.Son v. University of Sto. Tomas, 830 Phil. 243, 265 (2018).
30. 702 Phil. 191, 201 (2013).
31.Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, 476 Phil. 596, 618 (2004).
32. 366 Phil. 166 (1999).
33.Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica's College, supra note 25 at 513.
34.Id.
35.Brazil v. STI Education Ser. Group, Inc., G.R. No. 233314, November 21, 2018.
36. CA rollo, p. 98.