FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 235280. January 31, 2018.]
AMIL SULA, petitioner, vs.PROSECUTORS VIMAR M. BARCELLANO, GERARD E. GAERLAN and JAYVEE LAURENCE B. BANDON, ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 31, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 235280 — AMIL SULA, Petitioner, v. PROSECUTORS VIMAR M. BARCELLANO, GERARD E. GAERLAN and JAYVEE LAURENCE B. BANDON, ET AL., Respondents. — The petitioner's motion for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED, counted from the expiration of the reglementary period.
The Court further resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 26, 2017 and the Resolution dated October 18, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139185 for petitioner Amil Sula's (Sula) failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing the said Decision and Resolution.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Sula failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he directly elevated to it the resolution of the members of the panel of prosecutors from the Department of Justice (DOJ), herein public respondents, without appealing the same first to the DOJ Secretary via a petition for review.
The Court has repeatedly held that the thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to one's cause of action. 1 aScITE
Furthermore, it is settled in jurisprudence that:
The prosecutor has the discretionary authority to determine whether facts and circumstances exist meriting reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime. The question of whether or not to dismiss a criminal complaint is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary (or Undersecretary acting for the Secretary) of Justice. Who to charge with what crime or none at all is basically the prosecutor's call.
Accordingly, the Court has consistently adopted the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. x x x
In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in him by law. This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained. 2 x x x. HEITAD
Finally, we concur with the Court of Appeals that the public respondents did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as their finding of probable cause and subsequent denial of the motions for reconsideration were consistent with existing rules and applicable jurisprudence. Given that a plain, speedy and adequate remedy of appeal via a petition for review to the Secretary of the DOJ was available to Sula and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents, Sula cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Philippine Postal Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 722 Phil. 860, 872-873 (2013).
2.Elma v. Jacobi, 689 Phil. 307, 340-341 (2012).