De Lima v. Reyes, Jr.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 206616. September 21, 2016.]

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, CLARO A. ARELLANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE PANEL OF THE PROSECUTORS (PURSUANT TO DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 710 WITH ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTORS ALLAN A. MARIANO, VIMAR M. BARCELLANO AND GERARD E. GAERLAN (AS MEMBERS), ALL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, petitioners, vs. MARIO T. REYES, JR., respondent.

[G.R. No. 206840. September 21, 2016.]

MARIO T. REYES, JR., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, PROSECUTOR GENERAL CLARO A. ARELLANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTORS STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO, VIMAR M. BARCELLANO AND GERARD E. GAERLAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, PALAWAN, BRANCH 52, AND PATRIA GLORIA INOCENCIO ORTEGA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 21 September 2016 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 206616 (Secretary Leila M. de Lima, Claro A. Arellano, in his capacity as the Prosecutor General of the Philippines, and The Panel of the Prosecutors (pursuant to Department Order No. 710 with Assistant State Prosecutors Allan A. Mariano, Vimar M. Barcellano and Gerard E. Gaerlan (as members), all of the Department of Justice v. Mario T. Reyes, Jr.).

G.R. No. 206840 (Mario T. Reyes, Jr. v. Secretary Leila M. de Lima, Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano, Assistant State Prosecutors Stewart Allan A. Mariano, Vimar M. Barcellano and Gerard E. Gaerlan, Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, Branch 52, and Patria Gloria Inocencio Ortega).

In G.R. No. 206616, the petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the November 23, 2012 Decision 1 and April 4, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121918, which declared null and void Department Order (D.O.) No. 710 3 and the second panel of investigator's Resolution, 4 dated March 12, 2012. In G.R. No. 206840, on the other hand, the petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the April 4, 2013 Resolution 5 of the CA, which declared that the decision whether to dismiss the criminal case rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.

The Antecedents:

On January 24, 2011, Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega) was shot dead in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila de Lima (Secretary de Lima) issued D.O. No. 091 creating the first panel of investigators (first panel) to conduct preliminary investigation over his killing.

On June 8, 2011, the first panel issued a Resolution 6 indicting Rodolfo Edrad, Jr. (Edrad), Armando Noel, Dennis Aranas, and Arwin Arandia for the crime of murder. The criminal complaint against Mayor Mario T. Reyes, Jr. (Mayor Reyes) and Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (Governor Reyes), among others, however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

On June 28, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), wife of Dr. Ortega, filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad. Likewise, on July 7, 2011, Dr. Inocencia-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam against the first panel's resolution. In a Resolution, 7 dated September 2, 2011, the first panel denied both motions. aHECST

On September 7, 2011, Secretary de Lima issued D.O. No. 710 creating a second panel of investigators (second panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. It mandated the reinvestigation of the case in the interest of service and due process to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the first panel.

On October 3, 2011, Governor Reyes filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA assailing the legality of D.O. No. 710 and the authority of the second panel to conduct the reinvestigation. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 121553.

Meanwhile, on October 28, 2011, Mayor Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which is the subject matter of the present case, to enjoin momentarily the reinvestigation. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 121918.

On March 12, 2012, while the petitions were pending before the CA, the second panel issued a Resolution 8 finding probable cause against Governor Reyes and Mayor Reyes which the Prosecutor General approved.

On March 14, 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an Information 9 indicting Governor Reyes and Mayor Reyes for the crime of murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26839 and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Palawan, Branch 52 (RTC).

On March 27, 2012, the RTC issued the warrants of arrest against Governor Reyes and Mayor Reyes. The warrants were not immediately served as they had left the country.

CA and SC Rulings

In CA-G.R. SP No. 121918

On November 23, 2012, the CA ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 121918 that D.O. No. 710 was null and void and that the resolution of the second panel should be set aside. It held that Secretary de Lima gravely abused her discretion because she did not specify any compelling reason, as required under Section 11 of DOJ Circular No. 70, to justify the reinvestigation of the case.

Secretary de Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, Mayor Reyes filed a Motion for Clarification, 10 dated December 18, 2012, asking whether the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26839 before the RTC was also a nullity due to the void reinvestigation proceedings.

In its assailed April 4, 2013 Resolution, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Secretary de Lima. It, however, also stated that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26839 could not be nullified because the decision whether to dismiss the case rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 121553

On March 19, 2013, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 121553 granted the petition of Governor Reyes. It held that Secretary De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion when she improperly created the second panel through D.O. No. 710.

Aggrieved, Secretary De Lima, through the OSG, elevated an appeal to the Supreme Court and it was docketed as G.R. No. 209330. EHACcT

In G.R. No. 209330

In G.R. No. 209330, in its January 11, 2016 Decision, the Court reversed and set aside the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 121553 and held that D.O. No. 710 was valid and binding. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the resolution of the second panel and the proceedings before the RTC were likewise valid. The Court wrote:

The Secretary of Justice has the discretion upon motion or motu propio, to act on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the conduct of reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of a preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes the determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest.

Hence, these consolidated petitions.

ISSUES

I

WHETHER SECRETARY DE LIMA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING D.O. NO. 710 AND CREATING THE SECOND PANEL FOR THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE.

II

WHETHER THE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26839 BEFORE THE RTC SHOULD BE NULLIFIED AS THE REINVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS WAS DECLARED VOID.

On the first issue, Secretary de Lima, through the OSG, argues that D.O. No. 710 which created the second panel was meant to give all the parties the reasonable opportunity to present their evidence; that she acted within the confines of the Rules of Court, DOJ Circular No. 70 and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10071 because there was a probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor and subject to her review; and that the second panel did not exceed its authority when it recommended the filing of an information against Mayor Reyes because such recommendation was approved by the Prosecutor General and was not overturned by the Secretary of Justice.

On the second issue, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega argued that as the criminal information had already been filed with the RTC, then it had the sole discretion on the disposition of the case.

On the other hand, Mayor Reyes countered that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to issue D.O. No. 710, which created the second panel, because the parties were already given the opportunity to present their evidence, including the alleged newly-discovered evidence, before the first panel; and that as D.O. No. 710 and the resolution of the second panel had been declared void, then the information filed against him was likewise void and could not serve as a basis for Criminal Case No. 26839 before the RTC.

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are moot and academic. EacHCD

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. 11

In these cases, the petitions are moot and academic because the issues raised were already resolved. As aforestated, the Court in G.R. No. 209330 declared that D.O. No. 710 and the resolution of the second panel were valid and binding, to wit:

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on any "probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.

 

xxx xxx xxx

Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 because she had reason to believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may cause a probable miscarriage of justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to overturn the findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to make sure that all the evidence, including the evidence that the First Panel refused to admit, was investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not act in an "arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility." [Emphases supplied]

In addition, the petitions have been rendered moot and academic because of the filing of the information before the RTC and its issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused therein. In the landmark case of Crespo v. Mogul, 12 it was declared that:

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 13

In this case, the RTC already issued a warrant of arrest on March 27, 2012. In G.R. No. 209330, it was written:

The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over the case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" provided by law. 14 cIECaS

Consequently, as the present petitions are derived from a moot petition for certiorari before the CA, these must also be considered moot. At this stage, the proper course of action should be to continue with the trial.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.(Carpio, J., on official leave; Brion, J., designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2374 dated September 14, 2016)"

Very truly yours,

 

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia V. Real-Dimagiba with Associate Justices Ramon A. Cruz and Myrna V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 206840), pp. 129-164.

2. Id. at 37-56.

3. Id. at 89.

4. Id. at 92-120.

5. Id. at 37-56.

6. Id. at 61-81.

7. Id. at 83-88.

8. Id. at 92-120.

9. Id. at 121-123.

10. Id. at 176-186.

11. Pormento v. Estrada, 643 Phil. 735, 739 (2010).

12. 235 Phil. 465 (1987).

13. Id. at 474.

14. January 11, 2016 Decision.