THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 11669. October 13, 2021.]
SPS. TEODORICO & MAGDALENA ROMERO, complainant,vs. ATTY. ARNOLD P. CASTRO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021, which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 11669 (SPS. TEODORICO & MAGDALENA ROMERO, complainant v. Atty. ARNOLD P. CASTRO, respondent.) — A lawyer has the duty to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly-constituted authorities therein." 1 Any violation to this effect is a breach of the Lawyer's Oath. Lawyers do not have the power to determine the validity of court orders, nor do they have the right to disobey them just because they believe them to be contrary to law. "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." 2
This Court resolves the Complaint 3 for disbarment filed by the Spouses Teodorico and Magdalena Romero (the Romero Spouses) against Atty. Arnold P. Castro (Atty. Castro). The Romero Spouses alleged that Atty. Castro illegally proceeded with an auction sale in "grave disregard, open disobedience and serious defiance" 4 of the Regional Trial Court's Order to refrain from instituting the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the Romero Spouses. 5
The case originated from Civil Case No. 2196 for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage with Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and Damages filed by the Romero Spouses against one Eden C. Josef (Josef) and Atty. Castro. The case was pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34 of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Castro served as counsel for Josef. 6
The Romero Spouses filed the case to question the legality of the foreclosure of a parcel of land they owned, praying that the trial court enjoin Josef and Atty. Castro from proceeding with the foreclosure sale scheduled at about 1:00 p.m. on November 26, 1999, at the Main Entrance lobby of the Municipal Hall of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. 7
Ruling in favor of the Romero Spouses, the Regional Trial Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the conduct of the auction sales. 8 Thereafter, Atty. Castro requested the Romero Spouses' counsel to drop him as party-defendant on the assurance that they will not conduct any similar extra-judicial foreclosure during the pendency of the civil case. Heeding Atty. Castro's request, the Romero Spouses, through counsel, filed a formal Manifestation and Motion 9 to drop Atty. Castro as party-defendant, with the understanding that he will not institute any foreclosure during the pendency of Civil Case No. 2196.
Despite his request, however, Atty. Castro still scheduled a public auction sale on February 26, 2001 at 2:00 p.m., in front of the Municipal Hall of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. Upon learning of this, the Romero Spouses filed an Omnibus Motion 10 for the reinstatement of Atty. Castro as party-defendant in Civil Case No. 2196, with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order to enjoin the February 26, 2001 foreclosure sale.
In its February 26, 2001 Order, 11 the trial court granted the Motion to implead and reinstate Atty. Castro as party-defendant in Civil Case No. 2196. It reiterated its order for Josef and Atty. Castro to refrain from having the Romero Spouses' property foreclosed and pushing through with the scheduled auction sale. Still, Josef and Atty. Castro proceeded with the auction sale as evidenced by the Sheriff's Return 12 issued by Sheriff Renante Y. Palor. 13
In its January 27, 2009 Order, 14 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Castro to submit his verified answer within 15 days from his receipt of the Order.
In his February 20, 2009 Answer, 15 Atty. Castro admitted to proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure 16 despite the February 26, 2001 Order of the trial court enjoining the conduct of the auction sale. 17 He argued the following: (1) that the Order was "infirm, and void, and of no legal effect" 18 for it was issued without a hearing by a Presiding Judge who was not an Executive Judge; (2) that it was already a second Temporary Restraining Order or a de facto extension of the first Temporary Restraining Order already issued by the Regional Trial Court; and (3) that it was issued on mere motion, not through an application in a verified pleading. Further, he alleged that he is not bound by said Order for he was already dropped as a party-defendant. 19
During the mandatory conference, the parties narrowed down the issue to "whether or not Atty. Castro violated the Code of Profession Responsibility when he implemented the extra-judicial foreclosure sale despite the existence of a temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court." 20 The Commission on Bar Discipline then terminated the mandatory conference and directed the parties to submit their respective verified position papers within 30 days from receipt of the Order. 21 The parties have submitted their respective Position Papers. 22
In its February 8, 2012 Report and Recommendation, 23 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline found that Atty. Castro completely disregarded the restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court. 24 That he was arrogant in "taking upon himself the onus of declaring a duly-issued restraining order to be without legal effect," 25 thereby "arrogating upon himself the role that should have exclusively belonged to the court." 26 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year from notice. 27
In its February 12, 2013 Notice of Resolution, 28 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but reduced the period of suspension from one year to six months.
Atty. Castro then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 29 He asserted that the February 26, 2001 Order did not bind him, for he was still not reinstated as a defendant in Civil Case No. 2196. Therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to restrain him from proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure sale. 30 He maintained that the Order was null and void, and that he was bound to observe his duty to protect his client's interests. He was of the belief that he committed no disobedience to any legal order because he was already dropped as a defendant. 31 He filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, essentially raising the same arguments. 32
In its August 27, 2016 Resolution, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors denied Atty. Castro's Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed his suspension from the practice of law for six months.
After a careful examination of the records, this Court adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Respondent Atty. Arnold P. Castro violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.02, the Code of Professional Responsibility in deliberately disregarding the lawful order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, in Civil Case No. 2196.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes." Rule 1.02 of the same Code further provides that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system."
In Manalang v. Buendia, 33 this Court held that:
The duty of a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes demands that he or she shall "not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Saladaga v. Astorga explains:
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. 34 (citations omitted)
As a lawyer, respondent had the duty to "uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law of and legal processes." 35 In defying, disobeying, and disregarding the February 26, 2001 Order of the trial court, respondent violated this duty.
In unilaterally declaring that the February 26, 2001 Order was null and void, respondent took on the mantle of a judge which he had no authority to do. It is a basic legal principle that judicial orders of courts remain valid unless declared null and void by higher courts. 36 In Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.: 37
. . . We have ruled time and again that the constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally. There is a legal presumption of validity of these laws and rules. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands[.] 38 (Citations omitted)
More importantly, in Bantolo v. Castillon Jr., 39 this Court held that "lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well." 40
Here, respondent only stubbornly claims that the February 26, 2001 Order is null and void, submitting that his judgment is enough to justify his willful disobedience. The records are bereft of any proof that neither respondent nor his client, Josef, commenced any valid attack on the Order. If indeed he sees merit in his claim, respondent, as a lawyer, should have questioned the validity of the February 26, 2001 Order in accordance with the appropriate process under the law. Only then could he and his client have validly proceeded with the auction sale that they illegally conducted.
Respondent claims that he was bound by his duty to protect the interests of his client in proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property as scheduled. 41 However, he must have known that a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 42
Finally, respondent insists that the February 26, 2001 Order, even if valid, does not bind him considering that he was already dropped as a party-defendant. 43 However, the circumstances involved in his removal as a party in the case does not escape this Court's attention. The petitioner only agreed to remove him as a defendant on the assurance that he will no longer conduct any form of extrajudicial sale until the case is pending. 44 Yet, respondent pursued the auction sale, in contravention of their settled understanding. This is tantamount to using his legal knowledge to engage in deceitful conduct which this Court cannot overlook. As "vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." 45 Respondent's conduct falls short of this standard.
Under Rule 138, Section 27 46 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by this Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court.
Admittedly, the power of this Court to impose the penalty of disbarment is exercised with great caution. 47 In Advincula v. Macabata: 48
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 49 (Citations omitted)
Here, the disbarment of respondent is not warranted. However, this Court notes that until his final motion for reconsideration, respondent remains firm on his erroneous interpretation and application of the law and proffered neither an assurance that he will not commit the same wrongdoings again nor showed any remorse for his transgressions. This is a dangerous behavior of errant lawyers that this Court has the duty to correct lest we encourage deviance from the members of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnold P. Castro is found GUILTY of deliberately disregarding Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, this Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., on official leave, Dimaampao, J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 2839 dated September 16, 2021)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. The Lawyer's Oath provides:
"I, _________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."
2. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.02.
3. Rollo, pp. 3-9.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 12-14.
10. Id. at 19-28.
11. Id. at 29.
12. Id. at 30.
13. Id. at 5-6.
14. Id. at 35.
15. Id. at 36-47.
16. Id. at 42.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 133.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 135-142.
23. Id. at 173-177. The February 8, 2012 Report and Recommendation in CDB Case No. 09-2374 was penned by Commissioner Hector A. Almeyda of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline, Pasig.
24. Id. at 176.
25. Id. at 177.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 172.
29. Id. at 178-181.
30. Id. at 179.
31. Id. at 179-180.
32. Id. at 185-191.
33. A.C. No. 12079, November 10, 2020 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66729> [Per Curiam, En Banc].
34. Id.
35. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1.
36. Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 514 Phil. 307 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
37. Id. at 316.
38. Id.
39. 514 Phil. 628 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
40. Id. at 632.
41. Rollo, p. 179.
42. In re: Laureta, 232 Phil. 353-390 (1987) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
43. Rollo, p. 179.
44. Id. at 213-214.
45. Yu v. Dela Cruz, 778 Phil. 557, 565 (2016) [Per Curiam, En Banc] citingResurreccion v. Sayson, 360 Phil. 313-322 (1998) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
46. Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 27 provides:
SECTION 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
47. Advincula v. Macabata, 546 Phil. 431 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
48. Id.
49. Id. at 447-448.