Republic v. Romero II

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 209180. September 11, 2019.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.REGHIS M. ROMERO II AND OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 209253. September 11, 2019.]

OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, petitioner, vs.REGHIS M. ROMERO II, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Special First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 11, 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 209180 — REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, versus REGHIS M. ROMERO II and OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, respondents.

G.R. No. 209253 — OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, petitioner, versusREGHIS M. ROMERO II, respondent.

This resolves the Second Motion for Reconsideration 1 (Second MR) of the Court's Resolution 2 dated September 27, 2017 denying the Motion for Reconsideration 3 (First MR) filed by Reghis M. Romero II (Reghis).

The First MR sought reconsideration of the Court's Decision 4 dated February 24, 2016 (February 2016 Decision), which, in turn, dismissed Reghis' petition for declaration of nullity filed under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The facts, as narrated in the Court's February 2016 Decision, are as follows:

Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972 at the Mary the Queen Parish in San Juan City and were blessed with two (2) children, namely, Michael and Nathaniel, born in 1973 and 1975, respectively. The couple first met in Baguio City in 1971 when Reghis helped Olivia and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Since then, Reghis developed a closeness with Olivia's family, especially with the latter's parents who tried to play matchmakers for Reghis and Olivia. In the desire to please Olivia's parents, Reghis courted Olivia and, eventually, they became sweethearts.

Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of his siblings and parents. Thus, less than a year into their relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals. Olivia, however, refused to end their relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latter's dormitory overnight. Reghis declined and, instead, made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female dormitory. The next day, Reghis brought Olivia home and while nothing happened between them the previous night, Olivia's parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get married. Reghis initially objected to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared. However, Olivia's parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they are financially able. As Olivia's parents had treated him with nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed.

The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis could not forgive Olivia for dragging him into marriage and resented her condescending attitude towards him. They became even more estranged when Reghis secured a job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career and focused on supporting his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little time with his family, causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to be a real husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways.

On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-34627, citing his psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. In support of his petition, Reghis testified that he married Olivia not out of love but out of the desire to please the latter's parents who were kind and accommodating to him. Reghis further maintained that he was not prepared to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time, as his mind was geared towards finishing his studies and finding employment to support his parents and siblings. He also added that Olivia is in a relationship with a certain Eddie Garcia (Mr. Garcia) but he (Reghis) has no ill-feelings towards Mr. Garcia, as he and Olivia have been separated for a long time.

Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio (Dr. Basilio), a clinical psychologist, who submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report dated April 28, 1998 and testified that Reghis suffered from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD). According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis' behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as those pertaining to his roles as father and husband. Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis' OCPD was the root of the couple's disagreements and that the same is incurable, explaining too that Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest from his mind at the time and, as such, felt cheated into marriage.

For her part, Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations before, at the time, and after the celebration of their marriage. She also averred that the petition is barred by resjudicata inasmuch as Reghis had previously filed petitions for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage on the ground [that] she is allegedly psychologically incapacitated, but said petitions were dismissed. Olivia, however, was unable to present evidence due to the absence of her counsel which was considered by the RTC as waiver of her right to present evidence.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the petition.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated November 5, 2008, the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Basilio, holding that Reghis suffered from a disorder that rendered him unable to perform the obligations of love, respect and fidelity towards Olivia as it gave him a strong obsession to succeed in his career, to the exclusion of his responsibilities as a father and husband. It also concurred with Dr. Basilio's observation that Reghis is still deeply attached to his parents and siblings such that he pursues his business ventures for their benefit. Likewise, it agreed that Reghis' behavioral disorder existed even before his marriage or even his adolescent years and that the same is incurable.

Anent the issue of res judicata, the RTC remarked that there is no identity of causes of action between the petitions previously filed, which ascribed psychological incapacity on Olivia's part, and the present case which is brought on the ground of Reghis' own psychological incapacity.

The Republic and Olivia moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated July 3, 2009. Undaunted, both appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated March 21, 2013, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC, holding that the OCPD from which Reghis suffered made him yearn for professional advancement and rendered him obligated to support his parents and siblings, at the expense of his marital and filial duties. It ruled that Reghis' condition amounts to psychological incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code as it is permanent in nature and incurable. It observed that Reghis' OCPD started early in his psychological development and is now so deeply ingrained in his structure and, thus, incurable because people who suffer from it are of the belief that nothing is wrong with them. It further concluded that Reghis' condition is severe considering that it interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning and rendered him unable to assume the essential marital obligations.

The Republic's and Olivia's respective motions for reconsideration were denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 12, 2013.

The Proceedings Before the Court

On November 19, 2013, the Republic filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 209180, where it maintained that Reghis has not established that his alleged psychological incapacity is grave, has juridical antecedence, and is incurable. It averred that the psychological report prepared and submitted by Dr. Basilio has no factual basis to support the conclusions found therein as she failed to describe in detail the "pattern of behavior" showing that Reghis indeed suffered from OCPD. The Republic also claimed that the methodology employed in evaluating Reghis' condition is not comprehensive enough and that based on Reghis' own testimony, he was able to perform his marital obligations as he lived together with Olivia for years and attended to his duties to their children. It pointed out that Reghis' condition was not shown to have existed before their marriage and that the same is incurable.

On November 13, 2013, a separate petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 209253 was filed by Olivia. Like the Republic, she pointed out that Reghis himself admitted knowing his marital obligations as husband to Olivia and father to their children. Olivia added that if Reghis indeed felt that he was being forced into the marriage, he could have simply abandoned her then or refused to take his vows on their wedding day.

In a Resolution dated February 17, 2014, the Court consolidated the present petitions. 5

Resolving the consolidated petitions, the Court issued the February 2016 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94337 are hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, as amended, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.6

Applying the requisites laid down in Santosv. Court of Appeals7(Santos), the Court held that the severance of Reghis and Olivia's marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is unwarranted, as Reghis neither established that his alleged psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations was grave and serious in nature, nor was the juridical antecedence of such alleged incapacity shown. 8

In particular, the Court ruled that Reghis' testimony confirmed that he had fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he even contributed money to purchase their family home. 9 Moreover, the Court found that while Dr. Basilio diagnosed Reghis to be suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder, such diagnosis was not supported by specific citations of adolescent behavior or habits tending to explain Reghis' disposition during his marriage with Olivia, thereby negating the claim that his alleged incapacity existed prior to the marriage. 10

Subsequently, Reghis filed the First MR, alleging, among others, that both the CA and the Court failed to appreciate that the separate notices of appeal filed by Olivia and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) should have been dismissed outright for being filed out of time. 11 In any case, Reghis further argued that the allegations raised by Olivia and the OSG were not supported by the evidence on record. 12 On such basis, the First MR prayed that the February 2016 Decision be vacated and a new one be entered affirming the RTC's Decision in toto. 13

Subsequently, Reghis filed a Manifestation and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration 14 dated November 14, 2016 (November 2016 Manifestation). Apart from asserting that the Court "gravely erred in finding that [Reghis] is not psychologically incapacitated and that he was able to comply with his marital obligations,"15the November 2016 Manifestation likewise asserted that the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal) had recently declared the canonical marriage of Reghis and Olivia null and void. 16

On September 27, 2017, the Court issued a Resolution 17 denying the First MR. Said Resolution, reads in part:

x x x Acting on respondent Reghis M. Romero II's motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated February 24, 2016 and manifestation and supplement thereto, praying that his motion for reconsideration and the supplement thereto be granted and a new decision be issued declaring respondent and petitioner Olivia R. Lagman-Romero's marriage null and void ab initio, and considering that there is no substantial argument to warrant a modification of this Court's decision, the Court resolves to DENY reconsideration with FINALITY. 18

Subsequently, Reghis filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration 19 and the Second MR 20 both dated December 27, 2017. Attached to the Second MR is a copy of the Judgment 21 of the Metropolitan Tribunal (Canonical Judgment) which had not been previously submitted to the Court due to the alleged prohibition imposed by the Archdiocese of Manila, which, according to Reghis, no longer stands. 22

In this Second MR, Reghis argues that contrary to the Court's assessment, the evidence on record, including the Psychiatric Evaluation Report issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Manalo-Arcena (Dr. Arcena) annexed to the First MR, sufficiently establish that Reghis suffers from psychological incapacity characterized by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence. 23

Further, Reghis prays that the Court consider the Canonical Judgment in the resolution of the present case. 24In this connection, Reghis later filed a Manifestation25dated October 8, 2018 (October 2018 Manifestation) informing the Court that a Decree of Finality26had been issued by the Metropolitan Tribunal on December 17, 2016, confirming that no appeal has been lodged in connection with the Canonical Judgment. 27

Subsequently, Reghis filed a Manifestation with Alternative Motion to Refer the Second MR to the Court En Banc 28 dated January 17, 2018 (January 2018 Manifestation) praying that the consolidated petitions be referred to the Court En Banc.

The Court resolves to remand the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for reception of evidence anent the authenticity of the Canonical Judgment furnished by Reghis.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Article 36 draws its roots from the New Code of Canon Law, 29 particularly, Canon 1095 thereof, which reads, in part:

Canon 1095.  The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

3º Those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Based on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, Article 36 should be understood to contemplate marriages involving parties who fail to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage, thus:

[Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa] explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations. 30 (Emphasis supplied)

In Santos, the Court expounded on the concept of the psychological causes contemplated in paragraph 3, Canon 1095:

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

"This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to renderwhat is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties."

Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 31 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

These parameters were later adopted in the oft-cited case of Republicv. CA and Molina, 32 which set forth the guidelines on the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code. These guidelines stressed the persuasive weight that should be accorded to the decisions of the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, thus:

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. 33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The spirit and intent of Article 36 thus behooves the Court to consider the Canonical Judgment in the resolution of the consolidated petitions. The Court notes, however, that the Court cannot take cognizance of the Canonical Judgment at this stage, as it has not been properly authenticated.

To recall, the Court was first informed of the Canonical Judgment through the November 2016 Manifestation Reghis filed pending resolution of the First MR. In said Manifestation, Reghis, through counsel, informed the Court of the issuance of the Canonical Judgment. However, the Court had not been furnished a copy, "considering that [the] Metropolitan Tribunal expressly [prohibited] the same." 34 Accordingly, the Court was constrained to resolve the First MR based on the evidence then existing on record, without regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal of which it had no notice.

It was only upon the filing of this Second MR and the subsequent January 2018 and October 2018 Manifestations that the Court was finally furnished a copy of the Canonical Judgment and the corresponding Decree of Finality, as it was only at such time when the Metropolitan Tribunal's prohibition had been lifted. 35

Thus, as a matter of fairness and in the interest of speedy disposition of cases, the Court deems it proper to remand the case to the CA for reception of evidence relating to the authenticity of the Canonical Judgment and the Decree of Finality submitted before this Court. 36

The propriety and rationale behind this course of action was explained by the Court in ManotokIV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque37(Manotok):

Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.

The [CA] generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.

In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the [CA]. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the [CA] to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces' and/or 'areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." The [CA] therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the [CA] is not a deviant procedure.

The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the [CA] to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein. 38 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, pursuant to Rules 32 and 46, and consistent with the Court's ruling in Manotok, this case is remanded to the CA in order to: (i) allow Reghis to present a duly authenticated copy of the Canonical Judgment of the Metropolitan Tribunal dated October 14, 2016; and (ii) allow the OSG and Olivia to present controverting evidence, if any. Thereafter, the CA is called upon to submit its corresponding resolution and forward the case to this Court for appropriate action.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with this Resolution. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to submit to the Court its resolution on the authenticity of the Canonical Judgment with proper dispatch.

The Court DEFERS ACTION on the following submissions filed by respondent Reghis M. Romero II, pending the Court of Appeals' resolution on the authenticity of the Canonical Judgment:

(i) Manifestation filed on December 28, 2017;

(ii) Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration dated December 27, 2017;

(iii) Second Motion for Reconsideration dated December 27, 2017;

(iv) Manifestation with Alternative Motion to Refer the Second Motion for Reconsideration to the Court En Banc dated January 17, 2018;

(v) Urgent Omnibus Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and for Early Resolution filed on February 26, 2018;

(vi) Manifestation filed on October 8, 2018; and

(vii) Urgent Manifestation dated June 17, 2019.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

Separate Opinions

 

LEONEN, J.,concurring:

I concur with my esteemed colleagues in remanding this case to the Court of Appeals for the determination of the authenticity of the Canonical Judgment voiding the marriage between Reghis M. Romero II (Reghis) and Olivia Lagman Romero (Olivia).

It is time to abandon the restrictive interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code on psychological incapacity, and the rigid guidelines set in Santos v. Court of Appeals1 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. 2

I

In its 2016 Decision, 3 this Court found the marriage between Reghis and Olivia valid. It set aside the previous findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Reghis suffered from psychological incapacity rooted in his obsessive compulsive personality disorder. According to this Court, that Reghis consistently prioritized his work over his duties as husband and father was not shown to be grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable, contrary to the guidelines set in Santos and, by extension, in Molina.

Reghis filed a Motion for Reconsideration 4 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, 5 maintaining that his marriage with Olivia was void due to his psychological incapacity. He, likewise, alleged that the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila had recently voided their canonical marriage in its Canonical Judgment. 6 Nevertheless, in its September 27, 2017 Resolution, 7 this Court denied his Motion with finality.

Thus, Reghis filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration 8 and the Second Motion for Reconsideration. 9 He appended a copy of the Canonical Judgment under which the marriage between him and Olivia was voided on the ground of lack of due discretion of judgment on the part of both parties. 10

This Court resolved to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence of the authenticity of the Canonical Judgment. 11 As justification, it cited "[t]he spirit and intent of Article 36" 12 of the Family Code, the provision being based on Canon 1095 of the New Canon Law of the Catholic Church.

I agree with remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for the reception of evidence on the authenticity of the Canonical Judgment.

II

Psychological incapacity as a ground for voiding marriages is found in Article 36 of the Family Code:

ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As discussed by Associate Justice Flerida Ruth Romero (Associate Justice Romero) in her Concurring Opinion in Santos, the Family Code Revision Committee considered including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of the Family Code. 13 However, foreseeing strong opposition from the Catholic sector to which the majority of Filipinos belong, the Committee instead opted for an action for declaration of nullity based on Canon Law. 14 Article 36 was, thus, "lifted" 15 from Canon 1095 of the New Canon Law with a view that Article 36 "be an acceptable alternative to divorce" 16 and "solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriage on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State." 17 Canon 1095 of the New Canon Law provides:

Canon 1095.  They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 18

Notwithstanding Article 36 being based on Canon Law, this Court was clear that decisions of church tribunals are not binding on civil courts in recognition of the separation of Church and State enshrined in the Constitution. 19 Instead, canonical decisions are given "persuasive effect" 20 and "great respect by our courts." 21 This meant that, "subject to the law on evidence[,] what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void." 22 The seventh guideline in Molina 23 states:

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to cause of psychological in nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. 24

In Antonio v. Reyes, 25 the trial court voided the marriage after finding that the wife's pathological lying had rendered her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. 26 While the appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila also annulled the parties' church marriage on the ground of lack of due discretion. This Decision was affirmed with modification by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal after finding that only the wife suffered from psychological impairment. The Roman Rota upheld the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal's Decision. 27

There, the husband manifested to the Court of Appeals the decisions of the church tribunals that voided his canonical marriage with his wife. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court Decision, finding that "the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish [the wife's] psychological incapacity." 28

In reversing the Court of Appeals Decision, this Court found that the husband's Petition sufficiently complied with all the requirements in Molina. 29 Particularly on canonical judgments, this Court reiterated in Antonio that they, "while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts": 30

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 31 (Citations omitted)

This Court, however, was quick to state that though Article 36 was based on Canon Law, its judicial interpretation progressed in a "wholly secular" 32 manner:

Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 33 (Citation omitted)

According to this Court in Antonio, the Court of Appeals "clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church[,]" 34 highlighting that the church rulings "[held] sway since they [were] drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of [the husband's] allegations." 35 However, had the trial court's decisions been in the wife's favor, with the Court of Appeals affirming these decisions, "the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value" 36 because "it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not [those] of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court." 37 In the end, the marriage in Antonio was voided.

Unlike in Antonio, however, this Court in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin38 did not consider the decisions of the church tribunals. In 2002, the trial court declared the marriage between the parties in Mallilin void. 39 A month after, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the First Instance voided the parties' church marriage on the ground of lack of due discretion, which decision the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal affirmed. 40 In 2009, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court Decision. 41

This Court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision, sustaining the validity of the marriage in Mallilin. In disregarding the canonical judgments, this Court noted that they were not offered in evidence. 42 Furthermore, even if they were offered and admitted, this Court pointed out that the canonical decrees of nullity were grounded on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 on lack of due discretion, not on the third ground on causes of a psychological in nature. 43 Thus, this Court held that reliance on the canonical judgments would be misplaced, explaining:

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the [National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal] under the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, interpretations given by the [National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal] of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive. 44 (Emphasis in the original)

I disagreed with the majority in Mallilin, and I reiterate my statements in my dissenting opinion 45 there.

Whether a canonical decree is granted on the ground of lack of due discretion, on one hand, or psychological causes, on the other, should be of little consequence in determining the canonical judgments' persuasive effect on psychological incapacity cases. Such persuasiveness lies in its pragmatic effect — the annulment of the canonical marriage — such that the anomalous situation of being unmarried under church laws but married under state laws is avoided. Thus, this Court said in Molina: "[i]deally — subject to our law of evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void." 46

In Mallilin, this Court expressed concern that other religious groups can invoke their own interpretation of psychological incapacity, and that admitting in evidence a canonical decree under the second paragraph of Canon 1095 would be tantamount to "[adding] grounds for annulment under Article 36[.]" 47 However, to have such concern is to lose sight of the merely persuasive, and not conclusive, effect of the canonical judgment. Ultimately, it is the totality of evidence that is considered, with each Article 36 case being decided on a case-to-case basis.

Thus, a canonical judgment, whether rendered under the second or third paragraph of Canon 1095, should still be considered persuasive evidence in a psychological incapacity case. This is especially true if the rest of the evidence presented show that one or both parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with their essential marital obligations.

Here, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the totality of evidence presented by Reghis showed that he suffers from psychological incapacity. 48 As for the Canonical Judgment, the evidence presented included a testimony from a "court-appointed expert in psychology on the personality assessment of both [Reghis and Olivia,]" 49 who found that the parties had "low [intelligence quotient] results . . . indicating a limited capacity for understanding of self and others." 50 This intellectual immaturity, coupled with "amazing naivete and optimistic blindness[,]" 51 allegedly showed that the parties "had never developed the capacity to assess reality objectively and critically." 52 The Canonical Judgment read in part:

III. THE FACTS

23. After considering all the evidence presented, we have reached moral certitude required by law that both the Husband-Petitioner and the Wife-Respondent were seriously lacking due discretion of judgment at the time they contracted marriage, because of their unstable personality constitution at the time they exchanged consent.

24. The Acts contain plenty of proofs concerning the lack of due discretion of judgment on the part of both parties. Their deposition and their case history were corroborated by the testimony (sic) of seven witnesses, namely, his brother, sister-in-law, two friends and his family driver, and her two sisters. A written report of the court-appointed expert in psychology on the personality assessment of both parties and the circumstances of the marriage was submitted to the Tribunal which formed part of the evidence in the adjudication of the case.

xxx xxx xxx

THAT the parties were lacking due discretion of judgment at the time they exchanged consent due to certain unstable personality constitution. This was what the court-appointed expert established in his personality assessment of both the Petitioner and the Respondent, which stated relevant and important information for the resolution of the petition for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. The expert established that "what actually happened to this marriage that it broke apart will probably never be known clearly and the data available do not permit to see clearly what actually happened. From this psychological assessment, three things stand out clearly. The first one is related to the low IQ results of each spouse, indicating a limited capacity for understanding of self and others. This certainly plays a role in the confusing picture that emerges from the case-histories. The second is the amazing naivete and optimistic blindness in the way they each speak about their family and themselves, as though they had never developed the capacity to assess reality objectively and critically. This is evidently a sign of significant immaturity and is also responsible for the discrepancies that appear in almost everything they report about their marriage. The third one is that the marriage was all along more problematic than what the witnesses (especially on her side) report. The respondent herself admits this in the way she mentions her doubts about his 'womanizing.' And given their personalities, as described above, it is evident that no true communication could ever come between them, both because of their intellectual limitations and of their blindness." . . .

Thus, the same expert concluded that "while there is no hope to disentangle truth from fiction in what they write and say about the marriage, it is possible to understand better some of the difficulties they encountered by looking at their personality profiles." . . . Moreover, "this is seen also in the interviews of the tribunal and reveals an amazing of (sic) degree of blindness in each of them. It is that blindness, and therefore immaturity and biased perception, that is also present in the way they look at the marriage, as though they could not accept any limitation or problem in their own behavior and personality." 53 (Citations omitted)

If proven authentic before the Court of Appeals, the Canonical Judgment is persuasive evidence of the invalidity of the civil marriage between Reghis and Olivia. The case was, therefore, properly remanded to the Court of Appeals.

III

To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Reghis was psychologically incapacitated, which voided his marriage with Olivia. This Court, however, reversed the lower courts' Decisions, finding that the parties' situation did not substantially comply with the guidelines in Santos and, by implication, in Molina.

Santos, decided in 1995, was the first case that outlined the history of Article 36. There, the wife, after three (3) years of marriage, left for the United States in 1988, never to return to her husband and son. Despite her abandonment, this Court refused to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity.

According to this Court, the Family Code Revision Committee deliberately refused to define psychological incapacity "to allow some resiliency in [the] application" 54 of Article 36. Apparent in the provision is that it does not specify what constitutes psychological incapacity so that its applicability would not be limited "under the principle of ejusdemgeneris." 55

Nevertheless, this Court went on to define psychological incapacity as "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 56 Furthermore, psychological incapacity, said the Court, must refer to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." 57

Referring to the religious roots of Article 36, it being derived from the New Canon Law, this Court cited the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila. He said that psychological incapacity "must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 58

This Court then built on these three (3) criteria in Molina. There, the wife filed a Petition for declaration of nullity five (5) years after their wedding in 1985. She said that her husband had preferred spending time with friends, choosing to squander his money on them instead of giving some to his family, and was allegedly dependent on his parents for aid. In 1987, the wife resigned from her job and, shortly after, the husband abandoned her and their child.

In deciding Molina, this Court invited two (2) amici curiae: (1) Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, the Judicial Vicar or Presiding Judge of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Philippine Catholic Church; and (2) Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. 59 From their submissions, this Court formulated the following guidelines in interpreting and applying Article 36:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. 60 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Applying the guidelines, this Court held in Molina that the incapacity alleged was not shown to be psychological, but a mere "difficulty," 61 and an "outright 'refusal' or 'neglect' in the performance of some marital obligations." 62 This Court, therefore, sustained the validity of the marriage between the Molina Spouses.

The Molina guidelines, as they have been called since, were subsequently applied in deciding psychological incapacity cases. 63 From 1997 to 2008, only Antonio was found to have satisfactorily complied with all the guidelines.

It was in Ngo-Te v. Yu Te64 where this Court first acknowledged that "jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed," 65 a view that is "totally inconsistent with the way [its] concept was formulated." 66 This Court compared the Molina guidelines to a "strait-jacket" 67 in which psychological incapacity cases are forced to fit:

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the [Office of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. 68

This was echoed in Kalaw v. Fernandez, 69 where this Court had initially sustained the validity of the marriage 70 but, on reconsideration, declared it void due to psychological incapacity. In its 2015 Resolution 71 granting the motion for reconsideration, this Court said:

The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." 72 (Citations omitted)

Nevertheless, aside from Antonio, Ngo-Te, and Kalaw, only the parties in Azcueta v. Republic, 73Halili v. Santos-Halili, 74Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 75Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, 76Republic v. Javier, 77 and Republic v. Mola Cruz78 were granted a decree of nullity due to psychological incapacity. Even if one counts Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 79 though it was decided before Molina, these are only a handful of cases, or 10 out of the 55 decisions and signed resolutions on psychological incapacity that this Court has issued since the Family Code was signed into law. 80 This reflects the State's policy of contesting all lower court decisions granting a decree of nullity, with this Court often reversing decisions where both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that one or both parties were suffering from psychological incapacity. 81

IV

It is time to abandon the restrictive judicial interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code and overturn the rigid guidelines set in Santos and Molina.

IV (A)

The first guideline in Molina provides for the presumption of validity of marriage, such that "[a]ny doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." 82Molina anchored this guideline on Article XV, Sections 1 83 and 2 84 of the Constitution on the inviolability of marriage, the premise being that marriage is the foundation of the family and, consequently, of the nation. Thus, marriage must be protected by the State.

That marriage is the foundation of the family and that its protection is a State duty are relatively novel ideas, appearing only in the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions never mentioned the word "marriage." Marriage laws in the Philippines have been statutory. 85 Still, the notion of marriage being the foundation of the family can only be found in the Family Code, an executive order issued in 1987 by then President Corazon Aquino (President Aquino) by virtue of her legislative powers. It took effect in 1988.

As for the word "family," not once did the 1935 Constitution mention it, although it was provided that parents had the "natural right and duty . . . in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency[.]" 86 This was later developed in Article II, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, which provides that "[t]he State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution. The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the government."

At present, the general State policy on the family is found in Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

In Antonio, this Court observed how "the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family[,]" 87 and that establishing the legal aspects of marriage remains "the province of the legislature[.]" 88 At present, the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are provided in the Family Code, notably not a statute enacted by the legislature, but an executive order issued under then President Aquino's law-making powers.

In any case, Article 36 "should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage" 89 in that, in protecting marriages, "there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life." 90 "Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage." 91

This Court has made a similar observation in Ngo Te:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage. 92 (Citations omitted)

In Kalaw, when this Court reversed its 2011 Decision and resolved to grant a decree of nullity in its 2015 Resolution, it said that "[i]n declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, . . . the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid." 93

Indeed, our laws characterize marriage as "inviolable" 94 and "permanent," 95 and this Court, in deciding psychological incapacity cases, appears to equate the two. Inviolability, however, is different from permanence as Antonio, Ngo Te, and Kalaw highlight. When parties found incapable of fulfilling their marital obligations are forced to stay together for the sake of the relationship's permanence, the foundation of the family is paradoxically eroded. In an earlier opinion, I said:

The notion of "permanent" is not a characteristic that inheres without a purpose. The Family Code clearly provides for the purpose of entering into marriage, that is, "for the establishment of conjugal and family life." Consequently, the state's interest in protecting the marriage must anchor on ensuring a sound conjugal union capable of maintaining a healthy environment for a family, resulting in a more permanent union. The state's interest cannot extend to forcing two individuals to stay within a destructive marriage. 96 (Citation omitted)

Besides, divorce is not unprecedented in this jurisdiction. Before the Spaniards arrived, it had been customary in the Philippines. Women divorced simply by returning double the amount of the dowry, if she wished to remarry, or only the original amount of the dowry, if she remained unattached. If it was the man who wished to divorce his wife, he forfeited half of the dowry. If the divorcing spouses had children, the grandparents held the entire dowry in trust for the children. 97

During the Spanish era, marriage law was deeply influenced by Catholic doctrine. Hence, only relative divorce or legal separation was allowed. 98

Absolute divorce laws in the Philippines began with the enactment of Act No. 2710 during the American regime, where a petition for divorce on the ground of adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband, may be filed by the aggrieved party. 99

With the arrival of the Japanese came the passage of Executive Order No. 141, repealing Act No. 2710. The Executive Order increased the grounds for divorce from two (2) to 11, namely: (1) adultery of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband; (2) a spouse's attempt against the other's life; (3) a second or subsequent marriage by either spouse before the former marriage has been legally dissolved; (4) loathsome contagious disease; (5) incurable insanity; (6) impotence; (7) either spouse's criminal conviction of a crime, the penalty of which is not less than six (6) years' imprisonment; (8) repeated bodily violence that endangers the life of either of them; (9) unjustified desertion for one (1) continuous year prior to filing the action; (10) unexplained absence for three (3) consecutive years prior to filing the action; and (11) slander by deed or gross insult so as to make further living together impracticable. 100

After the Japanese left, all laws enacted during their occupation were declared void. 101 Act No. 2710 returned into effect until Republic Act No. 386, or the Civil Code, was enacted in 1950. Since then, absolute divorce has been forbidden in this jurisdiction, so much so that we, together with the Vatican, remain the only country in the world without a law on absolute divorce applicable to all its citizens. 102

That we had divorce laws in the past did not make marriage any less inviolable. Neither is there any evidence on how prohibiting divorce strengthened the stability of our society. Instead, cases of neglect, abuse, and exploitation persisted — in which the women almost always suffer — by forcing partners to stay in destructive marriages. 103

History shows that divorce was primarily opposed on religious grounds. In his article, "The History of Marriage Legislation in the Philippines," 104 Professor Samuel R. Wiley, S.J. wrote:

One of the most disputed dispositions was the abolition of absolute divorce and the introduction in its place of mere legal separation. Needless to say this was not effected without much discussion and pressure. Fr. Juan Ylla, writing in the Boletin Ecclesiastico, gives us some of the background of this struggle. The Code Commission, presided over by Dr. Jorge Bocobo, opposed this change tenaciously. This is evident in the Commission's own report, which states: "The proposed Civil Code does not increase the grounds of absolute divorce. Relative divorce is revived, so that the petitioner may choose this less radical remedy if he or she does not desire the matrimonial bonds to be dissolved."

It was the influence of the Philippine Congress, moved by the outcry of Catholics which forced the expurgation of the provisions for absolute divorce from the proposed new code. Had this not been done, it is extremely doubtful whether the new code would have passed the legislature at all. Despite this fact, there was an intense campaign on the part of certain groups to restore the former divorce law. Public audiences were held in the halls of session of the legislature before a joint committee of the Senate and the Congress. The spokesman of the anti-divorce group was a Judge of the Court of Appeals, Pastor Endencia, and of the pro-divorce group, Juan Nabong. When the latter tried to confuse the issue by equivalating divorce and annulment proceedings, he was vigorously opposed by Dra. Josefa Gonzalez-Estrada, Dean of Women of the University of Santo Tomas. 105

The Catholic sector's influence is manifest in drafting Article 36 of the Family Code. Citing a letter from Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy to Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro, Associate Justice Romero wrote in her Concurring Opinion in Santos106 that Article 36 was intended as an alternative to absolute divorce to prevent strong opposition from the Catholic Church:

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. 107 (Emphasis in the original)

As has been repeatedly noted before, it is strange that the sensibilities of a particular religion are considered in the drafting of our laws. 108 This is contrary to the separation of Church and State enshrined in the Constitution. 109 In the landmark case of Republic v. Manalo: 110

To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate. 111 (Citations omitted)

I add that the Constitution protects the family regardless of its structure. What constitutes a family is not constitutionally defined; instead, the Constitution describes the family as the "basic autonomous social institution." 112 This means that all family arrangements, whether the parents are married or not, are entitled to protection by the State. As citizens, this is our right to autonomy, an inherent part of human dignity. As I have noted in a previous opinion:

The Family Code provides that the "nature, consequences, and incidents [of marriage] are governed by law and not subject to stipulation," but this does not go as far as reaching into the choices of intimacy inherent in human relations. These choices form part of autonomy, protected by the liberty and human dignity clauses. Human dignity includes our choices of association, and we are as free to associate and identify as we are free not to associate or identify.

Our choices of intimate partners define us — inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society. The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties. 113

IV (B)

The third, fourth, and fifth guidelines in Molina reflect the requirements in Santos, i.e., that the psychological incapacity of one or both spouses must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. A review of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity reveals that, more often than not, a decree of nullity is denied due to lack of one or more of these characteristics.

Furthermore, petitions for the declaration of nullity were denied when any of the grounds for annulment or legal separation are present. For instance, in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 114 the wife alleged that her husband never gave support and failed to contribute to the management of the household, choosing to spend all his time drinking with friends. Worse, the husband had several affairs, even cohabiting with another woman who eventually bore him a child. Not only this, but he also infected his wife with gonorrhea. When the wife finally confronted him, he beat her up so badly that she had a brain concussion.

Despite all of these, this Court refused to void the marriage between the parties because, said the Court, grossly abusive conduct, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, and abandonment for more than a year were mere grounds for legal separation. It even required expert evidence to show that the husband's behaviors were "manifestations of a disordered personality which [made him] completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state[.]" 115 However, at that time, the wife could not have presented such expert evidence. The trial in Hernandez was concluded in 1993, way before Molina had been decided in 1997.

Cases like Hernandez demonstrate how the guidelines in Santos and Molina are, indeed, comparable to a straitjacket, 116 in which the facts of psychological incapacity cases are forced to fit. The jurisprudential interpretation of Article 36 largely deviated from the intent behind the provision; that is, for the judge to mainly "interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis." 117

Instead of guidelines, judges should be given a wider latitude in deciding psychological incapacity cases. They should be allowed to consider other grounds that would convince them of the existence of psychological incapacity.

For example, abuse and violence against women and children were considered grounds for a declaration of nullity. In Tani-De La Fuente, the wife alleged that his then husband was too paranoid and jealous that he suspected his own 15-year-old cousin to be the wife's lover and poked a gun on his cousin's head. Worse, the husband treated the wife like a sex slave, forcing her to have sex with him four (4) to five (5) times a n day. He would even fetch her at work during lunch break just to have sex with him. The last straw was when, during a heated quarrel, he poked a gun on her head. The wife, with their children in tow, left their conjugal home, never to return. 118

The trial court granted the petition, 119 but the Court of Appeals reversed this Decision after finding that the husband's behavior was not shown to be rooted in a psychological illness that rendered him incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations. 120

In reversing the Court of Appeals Decision, this Court held that the wife proved that the husband suffered from paranoid personality disorder that made him sexually depraved and prone to jealousy. 121 Moreover, his need to intimidate and dominate his wife was found to be a classic case of coercive control, a form of psychological abuse recognized under Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence against Women and Children. 122 Had it affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals, this Court said that "[i]t would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that [the wife] should remain married to [the husband]." 123 In the words of this Court:

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only inflicted non-physical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.

Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic deprivation. Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence against Women and Children Act of 2004[.]

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable. 124

Further, a separation for more than five (5) years should be considered in granting nullity. Marriage is, fundamentally, a cooperative relationship obviously requiring the presence of the spouses. To force partners to remain married, when they no longer wish to do so, is to force a false status on them. It would be nothing but cruelty on the part of this Court to condemn them in a world they do not want to live in.

IV (C)

All things considered, I find Reghis psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to Olivia. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and supported by expert opinion, Reghis is suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder, impeding him from performing his essential marital obligations to Olivia. His psychological disorder led him to compulsively focus on work, at the expense of his obligations as husband and father.

Furthermore, Reghis and Olivia have been separated since 1986, nearly 33 years ago. 125 I see no reason for this Court to compel Reghis to remain in a marriage that, in reality, no longer exists. To force him to remain with a false status is pure and simple cruelty.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to REMAND these consolidated cases to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence on the authenticity of the Canonical Judgment voiding the canonical marriage between Reghis M. Romero II and Olivia Lagman Romero. These consolidated cases should be ELEVATEDEn Banc in view of the proposed reversal of the guidelines for deciding psychological incapacity cases laid down in Santos v. Court ofAppeals and Republic v. Court of Appealsand Molina per Rule 2, Section 3 (i) of Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo (G.R. No. 209180), Vol. II, pp. 738-782.

2.Rollo (G.R. No. 209180), Vol. I, pp. 250-251.

3.Id. at 135-152.

4.Republic v. Romero II, 781 Phil. 737 (2016).

5.Id. at 740-745.

6.Id. at 749-750.

7. 310 Phil. 21 (1995).

8. See Republic v. Romero II, supra note 4, at 746-747.

9.Id. at 747.

10.Id. at 748.

11.Rollo (G.R. No. 209180), Vol. I, p. 136.

12.Id. at 139.

13.Id. at 151.

14.Id. at 165-193.

15.Id. at 166.

16.Id. at 187, 376 and 388.

17.Id. at 250-251.

18.Id. at 250.

19.Rollo (G.R. No. 209180), Vol. II, pp. 726-737.

20.Id. at 738-782.

21.Id. at 858-870.

22. See id. at 774-775, 880.

23.Id. at 754-774.

24.Id. at 774-780.

25.Id. at 1036-1042.

26.Id. at 1043.

27.Id. at 1036-1037.

28.Id. at 872-890.

29. See Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 352 (2006), citing Salita v. Magtolis, 303 Phil. 106, 114 (1994). See also Republic v. CA and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997).

30. Minutes of the 148th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees dated July 26, 1986, p. 8.

31.Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7, at 38-39.

32.Supra note 28.

33.Id. at 678-679.

34. See Manifestation, p. 23; rollo (G.R. No. 209180), Vol. I, p. 187. Note that the Conclusion of the Metropolitan Tribunal submitted to the Court states, in part:

   All other issues of purely civil nature are remitted to the competent civil authority pursuant to Canon 1059. Furthermore, no part of the Acts of this case nor of this Sentence shall be made available to any civil court for any purpose whatsoever. Id. at 376.

35. See Second MR, rollo (G.R. No. 209180), Vol. II, pp. 774-775, 858-870.

36. The Court adopted the same course of action in the case of Republic v. Banal na Pag-aaral, Inc., G.R. No. 193305, February 5, 2018.

37. 595 Phil. 87 (2008).

38. Id. at 148-149, citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 565 Phil. 59, 98-100 (2007). See also IVQ Landholdings, Inc. v. Barbosa, 803 Phil. 419, 440 (2017).

LEONEN, J., concurring:

1. 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

2. 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

3.Republic v. Romero II, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].

4.Rollo (G.R. No. 209180), pp. 135-152 and rollo (G.R. No. 209253), pp. 178-195.

5.Id. at 165-193 and rollo (G.R. No. 209523), pp. 207-235.

6.Id. at 376-388 and rollo (G.R. No. 209523), pp. 416-428.

7.Id. at 250-251 and rollo (G.R. No. 209523), pp. 289-290.

8.Id. at 257-268 and rollo (G.R. No. 209523), pp. 291-307.

9.Id. at 269-301 and rollo (G.R. No. 209523), pp. 308-340.

10.Id. at 376 and rollo (G.R. No. 209523), p. 416.

11. Ponencia, p. 10.

12.Id. at 8.

13. 310 Phil. 21, 43 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

14.Id.

15.Id. at 30.

16.Id. at 44.

17.Id.

18.Id. at 37.

19. 335 Phil. 664, 679 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

20.Id.

21.Id. at 678.

22.Id. at 679.

23. 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

24.Id. at 678-679.

25. 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].

26.Id. at 346.

27.Id. at 346-347.

28.Id. at 347.

29.Id. at 359.

30.Id. at 354.

31.Id. at 353-354.

32.Id. at 354.

33.Id.

34.Id. at 365.

35.Id. at 366.

36.Id. at 366-367.

37.Id. at 367.

38. 754 Phil. 158 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

39.Id. at 170.

40.Id.

41.Id.

42.Id. at 178.

43.Id. at 178-184.

44.Id. at 184.

45.Id. at 185-203.

46. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 679 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

47. Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158, 184 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

48. Republic v. Spouses Romero, 781 Phil. 737, 743-744 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].

49. Rollo (G.R. No. 209180), p. 384 and rollo (G.R. No. 209253), p. 416.

50. Id. at 386 and rollo (G.R. No. 209253), p. 418.

51. Id. and rollo (G.R. No. 209253), p. 418.

52. Id. and rollo (G.R. No. 209253), p. 418.

53. Id. at 384-387 and rollo (G.R. No. 209253), pp. 416-428.

54. Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 36 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

55. Id. citing Salita v. Magtolis, 303 Phil. 106 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]. See also Republicv. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 677 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

56. Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

57. Id.

58. Id. at 39.

59. 335 Phil. 664, 675-676 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

60. Id. at 676-679. The eighth guideline on the certification from the Solicitor General briefly stating his or her reasons for agreeing or opposing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity has been dispensed with under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Re: Proposed Ruleon Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages). See Padilla Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1078 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826, 839 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725, 735 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 358 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; and Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396, 410 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

61. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 674 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

62. Id.

63. Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 545 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 472 Phil. 807 (2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; and Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

64. 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

65. Id. at 669.

66. Id.

67. Id. at 696.

68. Id. at 695-696.

69. 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].

70. 673 Phil. 460 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

71. 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].

72. Id. at 499-500.

73. 606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].

74. 607 Phil. 1 (2009) [Per J. Corona, Special First Division].

75. 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].

76. 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

77. G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64164> [Per J. Reyes, Jr. Second Division].

78. G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64585> [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].

79. 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].

80. Republic v. Deang, G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65071> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64764> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republicv. Mola Cruz, G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64585> [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division]; Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64164> [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division]; Espina-Dan v. Dan, G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64126> [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division]; Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63795> [Per J. Tijam, First Division]; Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 201988, October 11, 2017, 842 SCRA 401 [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division]; BakunawaIIIv. Bakunawa, G.R. No. 217993, August 9, 2017, 837 SCRA 1 [Per J. Reyes, J., Third Division]; Garlet v. Garlet, G.R. No. 193544, August 2, 2017, 834 SCRA 120 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, 805 Phil. 978 (2017) (Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Castillo v. Republic, 805 Phil. 209 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division]; Matudan v. Republic, 799 Phil. 449 (2016) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]; Republic v. Pangasinan, 792 Phil. 808 (2016) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]; Republic v. Spouses Romero, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Kalaw v. Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division]; Republic v. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Encelan, 701 Phil. 192 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Mendoza v. Republic and Mendoza, 698 Phil. 241 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Republic v. The Honorable Court of Appeals (Ninth Division) and De Quintos, Jr., 698 Phil. 247 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Republic v. Galang, 665 Phil. 658 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Ochosa v. Alano and Republic, 655 Phil. 512 (2011) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division]; Yambao v. Republic and Yambao, 655 Phil. 346 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]; Marable v. Marable, 654 Phil. 528 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division]; Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, 652 Phil. 49 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Baccay v. Baccay and Republic, 651 Phil. 68 (2010) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division]; Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]; Toring v. Toring and Republic, 640 Phil. 434 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, 632 Phil. 326 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]; Suazo v. Suazo, 629 Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Paz v. Paz, 627 Phil. 1 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, 625 Phil. 407 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Aspillaga v. Aspillaga, 619 Phil. 434 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Najera v. Najera, 609 Phil. 316 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; Halili v. Santos-Halili, 607 Phil. 1 (2009) [Per J. Corona, Special First Division]; So v. Valera, 606 Phil. 309 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Azcueta v. Republic, 606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Ngo-Te v. Yu Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 545 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 472 Phil. 807 (2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]; Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division]; and Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

81. See, for instance, Republic v. Deang, G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65071> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64764> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63795> [Per J. Tijam, First Division]; Republic v. Spouses Romero, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Republic v. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Pangasinan, 792 Phil. 808 (2016) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 472 Phil. 807 (2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

82. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 676 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

83. CONST., art. XV, sec. 1 provides:

   SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

84. CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides:

   SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

85. See S. R. Wiley, S.J., The History of Marriage Legislation, 20 ATENEO L.J. 23 (1976), available at <http://www.ateneolawjournal.com/Media/uploads/a76460afefc05afa45d3eda837db83af.pdf> (last visited on April 10, 2019).

86. CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 4.

87. 519 Phil. 337, 355 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].

88. Id.

89. Id.

90. Id.

91. Id.

92. 598 Phil. 666, 698-699 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

93. 750 Phil. 482, 501 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].

94. CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides:

   SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

95. FAMILY CODE, art. 1 provides:

   ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

96. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158, 203 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

97. See S. R. Wiley, S.J., The History of Marriage Legislation, 20 ATENEO L.J. 23, 25 (1976).

98. Id. at 39.

99. See Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64093> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

100. S. R. Wiley, S.J., The History of Marriage Legislation, 20 ATENEO L.J. 23, 40 (1976).

101. See Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64093> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

102. Carlos H. Conde, Philippines Stands All but Alone in Banning Divorce, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 17, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/asia/18iht-philippines18.html?_r=0> (last visited on April 10, 2019). The only instance that divorce is allowed is in the case of Filipino Muslims under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

103. See Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64093> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

104. S. R. Wiley, S.J., The History of Marriage Legislation, 20 ATENEO L.J. 23 (1976).

105.Id. at 43-44.

106. 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

107.Id. at 43-44.

108. See Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64093> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]; J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Castillo v. Republic, 805 Phil. 209, 228-243 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division]; J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Matudan v. Republic, 799 Phil. 449, 472-484 (2016) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]; and J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158, 204 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

109. CONST., art. II, sec. 6 provides:

   SECTION 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

110. G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64093> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

111.Id.

112. CONST., art. II, sec. 12.

113. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Mallilinv.Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158, 203-204 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

114. 377 Phil. 919 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

115.Id. at 931-932.

116.Ngo Te v. Yu Te, 598 Phil. 666, 696 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

117.Salita v. Magtolis, 303 Phil. 106, 114 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].

118. 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

119.Id. at 38-39.

120.Id. at 40-41.

121.Id. at 46.

122.Id. at 49.

123.Id. at 50.

124.Id. at 49-50.

125. Ponencia, p. 2.

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "times day" in the original document.