SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 244638. July 6, 2022.]
SPOUSES JESUSA CARCUEVA PENSILGA, A.K.A. TOTANG PENSILGA AND FLORENCIO PENSILGA, SPOUSES PATRICIA SANTIAGO-PEPITO AND MARIO BOYD PEPITO, SPOUSES RONALDO ABEQUEBEL*AND LUCRESIA SAGAYNO, JULIETA SALUNDAGA, THE HEIRS OF TITO BEQUILLA, NAMELY: JOSIE BEQUILLA, JOY BEQUILLA, ROY BEQUILLA, AND ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR BEHALF, petitioners,vs.GLYNNA M. MASCARDO, HELEN B. MASCARDO, AND IN BEHALF OF ADOLFO B. MASCARDO, BUENAFE M. ARBAS, CYNTHIA M. NEPOMUCENO, DELZA M. ANGCONG, EDWIN MASCARDO AND FLORDELIZ M. CABUNILLAS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 6, 2022 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 244638 (Spouses Jesusa Carcueva Pensilga, a.k.a. Totang Pensilga and Florencio Pensilga, Spouses Patricia Santiago-Pepito and Mario Boyd Pepito, Spouses Ronaldo Abequebel and Lucresia Sagayno, Julieta Salundaga, the Heirs of Tito Bequilla, namely: Josie Bequilla, Joy Bequilla, Roy Bequilla, and all persons acting in their behalf v. Glynna M. Mascardo, Helen B. Mascardo, and in behalf of Adolfo B. Mascardo, Buenafe M. Arbas, Cynthia M. Nepomuceno, Delza M. Angcong, Edwin Mascardo and Flordeliz M. Cabunillas). — This Court resolves the present Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioners Spouses Jesusa Carcueva Pensilga, a.k.a. Totang Pensilga and Florencio Pensilga, Spouses Patricia Santiago Pepito and Mario Boyd Pepito, Spouses Ronaldo Abequebel and Lucresia Sagayno, Julieta Salundaga, and the Heirs of Tito Bequilla, namely: Josie Bequilla, Joy Bequilla, Roy Bequilla, and all persons acting in their behalf (collectively referred to as "Pensilga, et al."), seeking to reverse and/or set aside the following rulings of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 10593:
1. Decision 2 dated July 18, 2018, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated August 25, 2016 and Order 4 dated December 28, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Oslob, Cebu in Civil Case No. OS-16-16A, adjudging the respondents to have a better right of possession over the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 06486 and ordering the petitioners to vacate the same; and
2. Resolution 5 dated January 10, 2019, which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present case stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession of real property 6 filed by Glynna M. Mascardo, Helen B. Mascardo, and in behalf of Adolfo B. Mascardo, Buenafe M. Arbas, Cynthia M. Nepomuceno, Delza M. Angcong, Edwin Mascardo, and Flordeliz M. Cabunillas (collectively referred to as the "Mascardo, et al.") against Pensilga, et al. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 90 and raffled to the 11th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Malabuyoc-Alegria-Ginatilan, Malabuyoc, Cebu. The complaint was amended twice by Mascardo, et al.7
According to Mascardo, et al., they are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Victor Mascardo and Aniana B. Mascardo (Spouses Mascardo), who died on January 22, 2005 and October 23, 1993, respectively. During the lifetime of Spouses Mascardo, they acquired a parcel of land with an area of approximately 981 square meters located in Sitio Baljaan, Barangay Looc, Ginatilan, Cebu (subject property). The same was purchased by Victor Mascardo from Marciana Linawagan (Linawagan) in May 1949 by virtue of a document denominated as "Kalegunan sa Pag Palit ug Yuta." The property is covered by Tax Declaration No. 06486 in the name of Victor Mascardo. 8
Upon the death of their parents, Mascardo, et al., became the owners of the subject property through succession, and they have been paying the real property taxes thereon. 9
Mascardo, et al., further averred that during the lifetime of Victor Mascardo, the latter allowed Pensilga, et al., to occupy the subject property by mere tolerance. When they decided to occupy the entire property, Mascardo, et al., sent verbal and written demands to Pensilga, et al., to vacate the portions occupied by them. However, despite the repeated demands to vacate, Pensilga, et al., refused to vacate. Left with no recourse, Mascardo, et al., filed the complaint for recovery of possession against them. 10
For their part, Pensilga, et al., countered that they have been in possession of the subject property as actual owners beyond the reach of memory. In particular, they claimed that petitioner Ronaldo Abequebel's wife, Lucresia Sagayno, is the daughter of Spouses Cipriano and Felicisima Sagayno (Spouses Sagayno), who were the previous occupants of a 70-square-meter portion of the property. In January 1967, Cipriano Sagayno applied for a foreshore lease over the portion of the subject property with the Bureau of Lands. As the portion of the property they are occupying is classified as a foreshore land, they asserted that the owner and rightful possessor thereof is the government, and not Mascardo, et al.11
As for petitioner Patricia Santiago-Pepito, she claimed that in 2005, she and her husband, Mario Boyd Pepito (Spouses Pepito) acquired a 54-square-meter portion of the subject property from a certain Elsie Relacion, who, in turn, purchased the same from Victor Mascardo. On September 6, 2007, they acquired another portion of the subject property from respondent Cynthia M. Nepomuceno. 12
On the other hand, petitioner Joey S. Bequilla alleged that he and his siblings inherited the land from their father, Tito Bequilla. The said portion of land is part of the foreshore area, which his father had an application for foreshore lease. He also claimed that the portion of property occupied by his father is not within the land claimed by Victor Mascardo. 13
After trial, the MCTC rendered a Decisions 14 dated April 22, 2016, which disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE premises considered, Decision is hereby issued DISMISSING the Second Amended Complaint for lack of preponderance of evidence.
The counterclaim incorporated in the Answer of the Defendants is also DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
In dismissing the second amended complaint, the MCTC held that the tax declarations of Mascardo, et al., dating back to 1950 up to 2012 are not conclusive proof of their ownership or their right to possess the subject property. Tax declarations, standing alone, are self-serving evidence. The MCTC also pointed out that Mascardo, et al., do not have personal knowledge when Victor Mascardo commenced to possess the subject property, the specific acts of ownership or show possession performed by him, if any, and the nature of Pensilga, et al.'s occupation. The MCTC likewise did not give weight and credit to the tax receipts of Mascardo, et al., to prove their prior possession as the payments were made after the occupation of Pensilga, et al.
In addition, the MCTC held that an ocular inspection of the subject property revealed that a substantial portion thereof is inundated by water. Thus, the property is classified as a foreshore land, which may be opened to disposition or concession, through lease, but not to be alienated or sold to private parties. According to the MCTC, there was no evidence that Mascardo, et al., applied a foreshore lease over the subject property. As such, the State retains title and ownership over it and Mascardo, et al., have no preferential possessory right over the same as against Pensilga, et al.
At odds with the ruling, Mascardo, et al., elevated the matter to the RTC. 16
In its Decision 17 dated August 25, 2016, the RTC granted Mascardo, et al.'s appeal and reversed the Decision of the MCTC, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo that dismissed the Second Amended Complaint and renders judgment of possession in favor of plaintiffs-appellants over the said parcel of land including its portion thereof as described in Tax Declaration No. [0]6486 and ORDERS defendants-appellees and all persons or agents including in their behalf to vacate it including its portion thereto.
SO ORDERED. 18
In arriving at such disposition, the RTC ratiocinated that Mascardo, et al., have a better right of possession over the subject property having shown their prior possession thereof, as evidenced by their tax declarations and tax receipts way back in 1950, as against Pensilga, et al., who have only shown a tax declaration for 1969 despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual and physical possession thereof since time immemorial. 19
Meanwhile, Spouses Pepito showed proof that they are now the owners of the portions being occupied by them, but the RTC rejected the documentary evidence presented by them. According to the RTC, the "Kasabutan" and "Kamatuoran" evidencing the sale, failed to indicate any description of the boundaries of the land subject thereof, thus, it is unclear if it is the same properties subject of the case. 20
Aggrieved by the reversal, Pensilga, et al., filed a motion for reconsideration, 21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order 22 dated December 28, 2016.
Seeking further recourse, Pensilga, et al., filed a petition for review before the CA.
On July 18, 2018, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, 23 affirming the findings of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision dated August 25, 2016 and Order dated December 28, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62 of Oslob, Cebu in Civil Case No. OS-16-61A are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 24
Foremost, the CA stressed that the public nature of the land does not preclude the regular courts from assuming jurisdiction over cases involving possessory actions. Since the case filed by Mascardo, et al., is accion publiciana, which only seeks to recover possession and not ownership, the outcome of the foreshore lease application of the parties is irrelevant in deciding the case. 25
Proceeding to the main issue, the CA adopted the findings of the RTC that Mascardo, et al., have a better right to possess the subject property being the rightful owners thereof through their predecessor-in-interest, Victor Mascardo. The CA was convinced that Victor Mascardo bought the subject property from Linawagan as evidenced by "Kalegunan sa Pag Palit up Yuta" in 1949. The CA likewise considered the tax declarations of Mascardo, et al., as proof of prior possession. 26
Finally, the CA opined that the evidence presented by Mascardo, et al., suggested that Pensilga, et al.'s occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance of Victor Mascardo. When Mascardo, et al., inherited the same, they demanded Pensilga, et al., to vacate, but to no avail. As the dispossession has lasted for more than one year, Mascardo, et al., correctly filed an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover possession. 27
Adamant, Pensilga, et al., moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its impugned Resolution 28 dated January 10, 2019.
Hence, this present recourse.
The threshold issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in affirming the findings that respondents have a better right to possess the subject property. 29
In the main, petitioners maintain that they have a better right to possess the subject property, having been in possession thereof in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. 30
More specifically, petitioners Spouses Pepito recapitulate that they are the owners of the portion being occupied by them having acquired the same from Elsie Relacion, who in turn, purchased the said portion from Victor Mascardo. As proof of the sale, they continue to rely on the document denominated as "Kasubutan." They insist that this document has described the property sold to them, which fits the description of the property being claimed by respondents in this case. Further, they propound that they acquired another portion of the subject property, which they bought from respondent Cynthia M. Nepomuceno, as evidenced by a document denominated as "Kamatuoran." 31
As for petitioners Spouses Ronaldo Abequebel and Lucresia Sagayno and the Heirs of Tito Bequilla, they continue to claim that they have been in possession of the subject property beyond the reach of memory, although they were only able to present documentary evidence showing their possession as early as 1967 and 1969, respectively. Nevertheless, they claim that their possession is undisputed, and their predecessors-in-interest even applied for foreshore leases over their lands though were not approved and declared the same for tax purposes. 32
Petitioners also collectively assail the ownership of respondents over the subject property, asserting that there was no proof that Victor Mascardo was the owner thereof or whether the land itself is alienable public land considering that the land is adjacent to the seashore and the lower portions thereof are reached by the tides. There was also no proof on how and when the tolerance began and how it was given. 33
For their part, respondents posit that they have a better right to possess the subject property having acquired thereof through their father, Victor Mascardo. They further claim that the tax declarations and tax payments were incontrovertible proof of their possession and ownership. 34
Lastly, respondents reiterate that petitioners' occupation over the subject property is by mere tolerance. Victor Mascardo merely allowed them to stay thereon with the condition that they would vacate the subject property upon demand. Petitioners are also estopped from denying their better right of possession as they usually sought permission from respondent Cynthia M. Nepomuceno whenever they wanted to introduce improvements on the subject property. 35
The petition is bereft of merit.
Prefatorily, this Court discusses the three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property, to wit:
1. Accion interdictal or a summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material possession (possession de facto) where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de jure), which should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending upon the value of the property) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year (or for less than a year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court); and
3. Accion reivindictoria or accion de reivindicacion or reivindicatory action, which is an action for recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending upon the value of the property). 36 (Citations omitted)
In this case, there is no dispute that respondents availed the second type of action to recover possession of real property, that is — accion publiciana.
Accion Publiciana:
In accion publiciana also known as accion pleneria de posesion, the objective of the plaintiff is to recover possession only, not ownership. 37 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty between or among the parties, independently of title. 38 When the parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who between them has the right to possess the property. 39 This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. 40 The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. In other words, the judgment on the issue of ownership is not conclusive. 41
Here, since both parties anchor their right of possession over the subject property based on ownership, it is imperative to provisionally pass upon the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the party with a better right of possession.
Respondents have shown better
Correlatively, as between the parties, this Court adopts the uniform findings of the RTC and CA that respondents have shown a better right of possession over the subject property. In particular, respondents have shown that they were the rightful owners of the subject property, through their predecessor-in-interest, Victor Mascardo, who acquired the same from Linawagan in 1949. As proof thereof, respondents have submitted in evidence a document denominated as "Kalegunan sa Pag Palit ug Yuta," 42 wherein Linawagan sold and conveyed the subject property to Victor Mascardo. Upon the death of Victor Mascardo, respondents became the rightful owners of the subject property being the children and compulsory heirs of Victor Mascardo.
Moreover, as noted by both the RTC and CA, respondents have presented in evidence tax declarations covering the subject property in the name of Victor Mascardo as early as 1950. 43 They have likewise adduced in evidence a tax receipts, evidencing payment of the corresponding real property taxes. 44 While it may be true that a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership, it may, nevertheless, prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. It can likewise serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. 45 As this Court enunciated in Republic of the Philippines v. Gielczyk. 46
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at the least constructive, possession. They constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests, not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but it also announces [their] adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, including [their] intention to contribute to the needed revenues of the Government. All told, such acts strengthen one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 47
On the other hand, petitioners have only presented the following tax declarations, all in the name of Cipriano Sagayno, the father-in-law of petitioner Ronaldo Abequebel, to prove their better right of possession:
1. Tax Declaration No. 19258 — for the year 1969;
2. Tax Declaration No. 05923 — for the year 1974;
3. Tax Declaration No. 15968 — for the year 1980;
4. Tax Declaration No. 06014 — for the year 1985; and
5. Tax Declaration No. 06725 — for the year 2013. 48
Obviously, the earliest tax declaration that petitioners have presented was for the year 1969 despite their claim that they have been in possession of the portion of the subject property beyond the reach of memory as lawful successors from their ancestors and predecessors-in-interest.
In any case, as between the tax declarations of both parties, respondents have shown prior possession as their tax declaration is dated back to 1950 while petitioners' earliest tax declaration was only in 1969. Settled is the rule that "anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession." 49 Respect for such prior possession will always be upheld by the courts. 50
The Deeds of Sale adduced by
Meanwhile, petitioner Spouses Pepito cannot successfully claim that they have a preferential right to possess the 54-square-meter portion of the subject property being occupied by them on the ground that they supposedly bought the same from Elsie Relacion, who in turn, purchased the said portion from Victor Mascardo. A careful scrutiny of the Deed of Sale denominated as "Kasabutan" 51 shows that it failed to specify the boundaries of the property subject of the sale. It is also vague as to whether the portion sold to them by Elsie Relacion was the same portion sold by Victor Mascardo to Elsie Relacion. Suffice it to state, it cannot be determined with certainty if the property involved in the "Kasabutan" is the same property being claimed by the respondents in this case.
The same is true with respect to their claim that they have acquired an additional portion of the subject property from respondent Cynthia M. Nepomuceno. The "Kamatuoran," 52 evidencing the supposed sale was similarly lacking in material details as to the boundaries of the property subject of the sale. Thus, it cannot also be ascertained if the said additional portion pertains to the property subject of this case.
The applications for foreshore
As for petitioners Spouses Ronaldo Abequebel and Lucresia Sagayno and the Heirs of Tito Bequilla, this Court is not impressed with their contention that they have a better right of possession based on their application for foreshore lease agreement over the subject property. As accurately opined by the RTC, there is no evidence to show that the said applications have already been approved. 53 Without such approval, their applications add nothing to their right to possess the subject property. Put differently, it cannot be a source of any superior right to possess the subject property being just what it is — a mere application.
The regular courts have
In relation to this, there is no merit in their contention that respondents cannot have a better right of possession because the subject property is a foreshore land. It must be emphasized that the character of the subject property (whether it is a private or public land) is immaterial and has no bearing to the issue of the possessory rights between the parties. This is the important dictum laid down in National Development Company v. Hervilla: 54
There is no question that the authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of the land notwithstanding and that the exercise by the courts of such jurisdiction is not an interference with the alienation, disposition and control of public lands.
It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts). 55 (Citations omitted)
The same principle was adopted in the case of The City of Baguio v. Niño56 where this Court further explained the reason why the regular courts are not precluded from resolving the issue of possession, notwithstanding the public character of the property involved:
[W]hile the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest. 57 (Emphases in the original, citation omitted)
Irrefragably, the authority vested to the Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau) to determine the disposition or alienation of public lands does not exclude the regular courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions. Thus, even assuming that the subject property is a foreshore land, the same is not an impediment for the regular courts to determine the party with a better right of possession. Apropos on this point are the following disquisitions of the CA, which this Court quotes with imprimatur:
We note that the case filed by respondents before the MCTC is an action for recovery of possession or accion publiciana. It only sought the recovery of the portion of the land occupied by petitioners. It must be emphasized that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. The classification of land disputed by the parties (whether it is public or private property) has no bearing insofar as the determination of the possessory rights relative to the subject property is concerned. Withal, the outcome of the foreshore lease application is irrelevant to this case. 58
Finally, this Court adopts the findings of the CA that the totality of the evidence presented suggests that the nature of petitioners' possession over the subject property was by mere tolerance or permission of Victor Mascardo, with the condition that they would vacate the same when the time comes that his children would use it. The RTC likewise stressed that petitioners only started building their houses inside the subject property in 1980, 59 which effectively denied their contention of actual possession beyond the reach of memory. This has never been refuted by petitioners even on appeal. Records further disclose that when respondents already needed the subject property, they sent petitioners a formal demand to vacate on February 4, 2008. 60 However, the same fell on deaf ears as petitioners refused to vacate. From that moment, the occupation of petitioners over the subject property had become illegal. It is settled that "a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy." 61 However, if the dispossession has lasted for more than one year, as in this case, the proper recourse is accion publiciana, which the respondents properly availed, and through their evidence, as herein discussed have successfully prosecuted against petitioners.
All told, no grave error can be imputed on the part of the CA in upholding the better right of possession of the respondents over the subject property. The totality of the evidence adduced preponderates in favor of the respondents showing that they were the rightful owners, and thus, entitled to possession.
This Court, however, reiterates that the adjudication of ownership in this case is only provisional and an incident to determine the party with a better right of possession. The ruling is not final and conclusive on the issue of ownership. The parties in this case or even third persons are not barred from filing an action for the determination of ownership in a proper forum.
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 18, 2018 and the Resolution dated January 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10593 are AFFIRMED. Respondents Glynna M. Mascardo, Helen B. Mascardo, and in behalf of Adolfo B. Mascardo, Buenafe M. Arbas, Cynthia M. Nepomuceno, Delza M. Angcong, Edwin Mascardo and Flordeliz M. Cabunillas are entitled to possession of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 06486.
Petitioners Spouses Jesusa Carcueva Pensilga, a.k.a. Totang Pensilga and Florencio Pensilga, Spouses Patricia Santiago-Pepito and Mario Boyd Pepito, Spouses Ronaldo Abequebel and Lucresia Sagayno, Julieta Salundaga, and the Heirs of Tito Bequilla, namely: Josie Bequilla, Joy Bequilla and Roy Bequilla, and all persons claiming title under their name are ORDERED to vacate the land covered by said tax declaration.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Also known as Ronaldo Abequibel.
1. Rollo, pp. 9-23.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap with Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Louis P. Acosta, concurring; id. at 41-52.
3. Penned by Presiding Judge James Stewart Ramon E. Himalaloan; id. at 305-311.
4. Id. at 323-325.
5. Id. at 28-29.
6. Id. at 133-138.
7. Id. at 42.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 43.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Penned by Presiding Judge Dennis C. Larrobis; id. at 269-286.
15. Id. at 286.
16. Id. at 288.
17. Id. at 305-311.
18. Id. at 311.
19. Id. at 310.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 312-319.
22. Id. at 323-325.
23. Id. at 41-51.
24. Id. at 51.
25. Id. at 47-48.
26. Id. at 50.
27. Id. at 51.
28. Id. at 28-29.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 19.
34. Id. at 343.
35. Id.
36. The Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019.
37. Gabriel, Jr. v. Crisologo, 735 Phil. 673, 683 (2014).
38. Heirs of Elliot v. Corcuera, G.R. No. 233767, August 27, 2020.
39. Supapo v. Sps. de Jesus, 758 Phil. 444, 456 (2015).
40. Catindig v. Vda de. Meneses, 656 Phil. 361, 372 (2011).
41. Vda de. Aguilar v. Spouses Alfaro, 637 Phil. 131, 142 (2010).
42. Rollo, p. 184.
43. Id. at 309; 169-176; 185.
44. Id. at 186-190.
45. Republic v. Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation, 690 Phil. 31, 35 (2012).
46. 720 Phil. 385 (2013).
47. Id. at 396-397.
48. Rollo, p. 310; 219-222.
49. Cequeña v. Bolante, 386 Phil. 419, 427-428 (2000).
50. Domalsin v. Sps. Valenciano, 515 Phil. 745, 763 (2006).
51. Rollo, p. 227.
52. Id. at 229.
53. Id. at 308.
54. 235 Phil. 527 (1987).
55. Id. at 533-534.
56. 521 Phil. 354 (2006).
57. Id. at 362.
58. Rollo, p. 48.
59. Id. at 67.
60. Id. at 100-101.
61. Quevada v. Court of Appeals, 533 Phil. 527, 539 (2006). (Citation omitted)