FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 218657. September 9, 2015.]
RYAN T. MASCARDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 9, 2015, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 218657 — RYAN T. MASCARDO, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
For review is the conviction for the crime of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code of petitioner Ryan T. Mascardo (Mascardo) by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision 1 dated November 12, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32999. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated October 27, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 199 of Las Piñas City, in Criminal Case No. 05-0433.
Mascardo was charged before the RTC through the Information dated January 12, 2005, docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-0433, which reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of November 2003, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ryan T. Mascardo, a sixteen (16)-year-old minor with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his hand and/or finger, an object into the genital of one AAA, seven (7) years of age, through force, threat, or intimidation and against her will and consent, and subjected her to sexual abuse, the act complained of is prejudicial to the physical and psychological development of AAA. 3
When arraigned, Mascardo pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charge. A Court Social Worker was directed to conduct a Special Case Study on complainant AAA 4 and the accused Mascardo, who were both minors, including their families, environment, and such other matters relevant to the proper disposition of the case. After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
AAA and Mascardo are second cousins. On November 23, 2003, AAA, then 7 years old, was outside the house of Mascardo, then 16 years old. Mascardo called AAA to their store. Once inside the store, Mascardo forced AAA to sit on his lap and tied her right leg to a nearby cabinet with a plastic string. Mascardo pulled down AAA's short pants and inserted his right forefinger twice into AAA's vagina. AAA tried to throw stones at Mascardo to stop him. After assaulting AAA, Mascardo removed the string tied to AAA's leg and warned AAA not to tell her parents or there would be a family feud. AAA ran away. At the time of the incident, BBB, AAA's mother, was away at the house of Lolo Enteng, AAA's grandfather, who was sick. When BBB was back, she noticed the inflammation of AAA's private part but when BBB asked AAA about it, AAA refused to answer, and BBB did not press the matter. CCC, AAA's father, first learned of the incident on February 14, 2004 when AAA told him that, "kinalikot ni Ryan ang pepe ko." BBB only became aware that her nephew Mascardo assaulted AAA when CCC told her about it. On that same day, February 14, 2004, CCC and AAA went to the Children's and Women's Desk of the Las Piñas Police Station where AAA executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "A"). They were also referred to the NBI for medico-legal examination. Doctor Joseph Palermo (Dr. Palermo), who conducted the physical and genital examination of AAA, found that there was a healed hymenal laceration at 6:00 o'clock position (Exhibit "C-1"), that AAA was in a non-virginal state physically, and that there was no external sign of trauma noted on AAA's body at the time of the examination.
Mascardo denied the charges against him and the defense presented evidence recounting a different version of events. At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning on November 23, 2003, Mascardo was awakened by his mother Lilibeth and was told that his Lolo Enteng was sick and vomiting blood. Lilibeth left to bring Lolo Enteng to the hospital. Lilibeth instructed Mascardo to stay at his aunt's house, where his Lolo Enteng also lived. Mascardo followed Lilibeth's instruction and stayed at his aunt's house and played the play station with his cousins up to 12:00 midnight. AAA was with BBB also at Lolo Enteng's house on November 23, 2003, leaving only around lunch time but returning at around 2:30 in the afternoon. The charges against Mascardo could be attributed to the ill will and grudge harbored by AAA's family against Mascardo's family. AAA's family was envious of Mascardo's family; plus the two families also had issues regarding the payment of the electric bill as they shared a single electric meter. The defense also claimed that the store where the alleged sexual assault took place was already closed on November 23, 2003.
On October 27, 2009, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding Mascardo guilty and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Ryan T. Mascardo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Art. 266-A (par. 2) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes the Indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, as minimum, to THREE (3) YEARS, as maximum of PRISION CORRECCIONAL, with the accessory penalty of the law. Accused is likewise directed to indemnify the victim AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and another amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages. HSAcaE
However, the sentence imposed upon him is in the meantime suspended. Suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the child is already eighteen years of age at the time of his conviction. This rule is in line with the rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law and the Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness.
The Court Social Worker assigned is hereby directed to submit her recommendation as to the DISPOSITION MEASURES to be imposed in a hearing to be called by the court.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the parties and their counsels and the Court Social Worker for their information and guidance. 5
Mascardo appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32999. In its Decision dated November 12, 2014, the appellate court affirmed Mascardo's conviction but with the modification sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months, as maximum, of prision correccional. The appellate court further ordered Mascardo to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the Decision. The appellate court lastly ordered the remand of the case to the court of origin to effect Mascardo's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility based on the following reasons:
Suspension of sentence is proper under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 which provides that:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application; Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
However, the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-seven (27) years old. Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. The case should be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility. So said the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Hermie M. Jacinto. 6
Aggrieved, Mascardo filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Mascardo contests the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC and the Court of Appeals calling attention to the inconsistencies and loopholes on material points in the testimonies of AAA and CCC that tainted the veracity of the charge against him. Mascardo also avers that the testimony of Dr. Palermo, the medico-legal officer, essentially consists of mere conjectures, suppositions, and probabilities. Additionally, Mascardo faults the trial and appellate courts for disregarding the weight and truthfulness of the evidence for the defense, including the testimonies of the defense witnesses which were candid, straightforward, and corroborated.
Mascardo's arguments boil down to the sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution to sustain his conviction, particularly, the weight and credibility accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The Court declared in People v. Barcela7 that:
Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts. The trial judge has the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court is convinced that there is no reason to disturb the assessment of AAA's credibility by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The RTC observed that AAA's testimony was given in a straightforward and candid manner, and could have been made only by someone subjected to a sexual abuse. Below is an excerpt from AAA's testimony:
ATTY. PAGGAO
Q Do you know why you are sitting there now before this Honorable Court? For what purpose you were there?
WITNESS
A To tell what Ryan did to me, sir.
ATTY. PAGGAO
Q When you mentioned "what Ryan did to you," do you remember what date was that or when was that when he did what you said, "Ryan did to you?"
WITNESS
A November 23, 2003, sir.
ATTY. PAGGAO
A Being 8 years old and in Grade III, can you tell us if you can distinguish between what is right and what is wrong?
WITNESS
A No, sir.
ATTY. PAGGAO
Q You said that Ryan did something to you, what was it that he did to you? HESIcT
WITNESS
A "Kinalikot po nya ang pepe ko."
ATTY. PAGGAO
Q When you mentioned the word "pepe," what part of your body you are referring to?
COURT INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to her vagina.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
Q When you said that the accused "kinalikot ang pepe mo," that means, did he insert something on your vagina is that what you meant?
WITNESS
A His finger, Your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. PAGGAO
Q You said Ryan inserted his right forefinger into your vagina, when he did so, what did you do anything?
WITNESS
A None, sir. I did not do anything.
Q Up to what part of his finger was he able to insert into your private part?
COURT INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to about half of inch portion of her forefinger.
ATTY. PAGGAO
Q How long did this finger stay on your private part when he inserted it?
WITNESS
A Only for a little while, Your Honor.
ATTY. PAGGAO
Q How many times did he insert his finger into your private part?
WITNESS
A Two (2) times, sir.
Q Did you do anything when he inserted twice his forefinger into your private part?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir. I threw stones at him. 8
The aforequoted testimony of AAA that she was sexually assaulted is supported by the medical certificate issued by Dr. Palermo who physically examined AAA. Dr. Palermo's examination revealed that AAA had a deep healed hymenal laceration at 6:00 o'clock position which could have been inflicted more than one week to one year from examination, and could have been caused by a blunt object, such as a finger inserted in the vagina.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimony of AAA as to whether or not she protested when Mascardo inserted his forefinger into her vagina; and in the testimonies of both AAA and CCC, AAA's father, as to when and how AAA related to CCC the sexual abuse committed by Mascardo, are trivial matters that do not diminish or alter the fact that Mascardo twice inserted his forefinger into AAA's vagina. The inconsistencies Mascardo refers to are trivial and only pertain to inconsequential matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of the rape (by sexual assault). What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape has been sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the element of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. 9
Likewise, AAA's credibility cannot be tainted by Mascardo's imputation of ill motive or revenge. It is highly unthinkable for a minor to falsely accuse her own cousin solely by reason of a family feud between her family and that of Mascardo over electric bills. Motive such as resentment, hatred, or revenge has never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. 10 The Court pronounced in People v. Garcia11 that:
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.
Mascardo's only defense was to deny that he had sexually abused AAA. To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and without merit. 12 Thus, in the face of AAA's categorical testimony that Mascardo sexually assaulted her, Mascardo's defense of denial must fail absent any evidence of his non-culpability.
There being no reason to overturn the conviction of Mascardo for rape by sexual assault, the Court now proceeds to discuss the appropriate penalties imposable on Mascardo.
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, there are two ways by which the crime of rape may be committed: by sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. 13
Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code describes how rape by sexual assault is committed: caITAC
ART. 266-A. Rape, when and how committed. — Rape is committed —
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B prescribes the penalties for rape by sexual assault, viz.:
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed by any of the ten aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.
Here, Mascardo is convicted for rape by sexual assault, without any qualifying circumstances, punishable with prision mayor under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. However, since Mascardo was 16 years old, a minor, at the time of the commission of the crime, the Court applies the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, thus, lowering his penalty by one degree. The imposable penalty on Mascardo, there being no mitigating and aggravating circumstance, should be prision correccional in its medium period which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. The Court applies further the Indeterminate Sentence Law, taking the maximum penalty from prision correccional in its medium period and the minimum penalty from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Hence, the Court sentences Mascardo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of prision mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.
The Court likewise deems it proper to modify the amount of damages awarded to AAA to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. 14 The Court reduces the award of civil indemnity to P30,000.00, moral damages to P30,000.00, and exemplary damages to P30,000.00, with legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly took into account Mascardo's minority at the time of the commission of the crime. Although Mascardo has to serve his sentence, he may serve it at an agricultural camp and other training facilities established, maintained, supervised, and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with Mascardo's best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution. 15 TAIaHE
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Petition for Review on Certiorari and AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated November 12, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32999. The Court FINDS Ryan T. Mascado GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape by sexual assault punishable under Section 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and SENTENCES him to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum. The Court also ORDERS Ryan T. Mascardo to pay AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. Finally, DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facilities under its control, supervision and management, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 62-78; penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Pedro B. Corales, concurring.
2. Id. at 103-115; penned by Judge Joselito dj. Vibandor.
3. Id. at 103.
4. The real name of the victim is withheld to protect her identity and privacy pursuant to Section 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262, and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. See our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006).
5. Rollo, pp. 114-115.
6. Id. at 74-75.
7. G.R. No. 208760, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 647, 660-661.
8. Rollo, pp. 108-110.
9. Id. at 663.
10. People v. Boromeo, 474 Phil. 605, 626 (2004).
11. G.R. No. 200529, September 19, 2012, 681 SCRA 465, 477-478, citing People v. Dalipe, 633 Phil. 428, 448 (2010).
12. Velasco v. People, 518 Phil. 780, 794 (2006).
13. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 266-A.
14. Raga v. People, G.R. No. 200597, February 19, 2014, 717 SCRA 193, 203.
15. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.