FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 229753. July 28, 2021.]
SPS. ROGELIO (TOTO) MELISTO AND MARISSA S. MELISTON, AND ROBERTO (DOROY) SALINO, petitioners, vs.ATTY. ABUNDIO L. OKIT AND JULIUS OKIT, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 28, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 229753 (Sps. Rogelio (Toto) Melisto and Marissa S. Meliston, and Roberto (Doroy) Salino v. Atty. Abundio L. Okit and Julius Okit). — For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the August 12, 2016 Decision 2 and the January 5, 2017 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 07096-MIN, which reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10 (RTC), in Special Civil Action No. 627-15, and of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), to dismiss the complaint of Atty. Abundio L. Okit (Abundio) and Julius Okit (Julius) for forcible entry; and ordered Spouses Rogelio (Toto) Meliston (Rogelio) and Marissa S. Meliston (Marissa), and Roberto (Doroy) Salino (Roberto), to vacate the subject property.
ANTECEDENTS
At the center of controversy is a portion of 5.2365-hectare (52,365-square meter) lot located at Barangay 10, Impalambong, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. On the one hand, Abundio claimed that he acquired the 5.2365-hectare property from the heirs of Lucio Saligumba sometime in 2001. He took possession and occupied the property, and hired his nephew, Julius, as farm laborer, caretaker, and administrator of about three hectares, while the rest of the property was occupied by squatters. On January 17, 2014, Abundio's peaceful possession was interrupted when Marissa, Rogelio, and Roberto, (collectively, petitioners), by intimidation and threats, entered the property, claimed ownership of the lot, and prevented Julius from cutting grass in preparation for plowing the land. The parties met before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 10, Impalambong, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, however, no settlement was reached. On the other hand, petitioners asserted ownership of the lot as the heirs of the late Apolinario Salino, their father, who acquired the land from the heirs of Santiago M. Gandilan (Santiago). Petitioners claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since time immemorial — Santiago declared the property for taxation purposes, and was the claimant of the land based on sketch maps from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 4
Consequently, on December 23, 2014, Abundio and Julius (collectively, respondents) filed a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners. 5 On May 29, 2015, MTCC dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of petitioners. 6 The MTCC held that respondents failed to prove prior physical possession when they admitted that petitioners occupied the property. On appeal, the RTC in a Resolution 7 dated October 9, 2015, in Spl. Civil Action Case No. 627-15, affirmed the MTCC Decision. The RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Decision dated May 29, 2015 is affirmed in toto.
Cost against plaintiffs-appellants
SO ORDERED. 8
Respondents then sought review 9 before the CA, alleging that the trial courts: (1) misapprehended the scope of the forcible entry case; (2) erred in holding that respondents failed to establish prior physical possession of the lot as against petitioners; and (3) erred in deciding the ejectment case based on ownership and not on the basis of material and physical possession of the property. 10
In a Decision dated August 12, 2016, 11 the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. Respondent's petition for review was granted and petitioners were ordered to vacate the property, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Verified Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Resolution dated October 9, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon in Spl. Civil Action No. 627-15 is REVERSED. Respondents are ordered to vacate the subject property x x x.
SO ORDERED. 12
The CA clarified that respondents' action for forcible entry is limited to the portion of the lot with an area of about three hectares taken over by the petitioners. With respect to this portion of the land, respondents were able to prove physical possession since 2001, which was even confirmed by the statements of the petitioners. Finally, the CA declared that RTC and the MTCC erred in deciding the case not on the basis of possession de facto, and stressed that the only question that court must resolve in ejectment proceedings is — who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises. 13 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but was denied. 14
Hence, this petition. 15 Petitioners maintain that they are entitled to the possession of the property since they have been in continuous possession even before the alleged acquisition of the property in 2001 by the respondents. Contrary to the pronouncement of the CA, respondents' action for forcible entry covers the entire 5-hectare property. 16 Meanwhile, respondents, in a Comment, 17 point out that the petition raises questions of fact and not pure questions of law. Petitioners' insistence on their ownership of the property is misplaced and useless in an action for forcible entry. More importantly, the lot claimed by the petitioners is separate and distinct from the land subject of the present controversy.
RULING
Petitioners pray for this Court to determine the subject property involved in the forcible entry action, and whether respondents were in prior physical possession of the property to support their ejectment. Essentially, the issues in this petition are questions of fact, which call for a review of the evidence presented to verify the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 18 While this Court may only resolve questions of law in a petition for review on certiorari, an exception may be made when there are conflicting findings of fact made by the lower courts, 19 as in this case. Notably, the MTCC and the RTC dismissed respondents' complaint for forcible entry on the ground that they were not able to prove prior physical possession of the property. Both the MTCC and the RTC held that the subject of controversy involves the entire 5-hectare lot located at Barangay 10, Impalambong, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. In contrast, the CA declared that respondents' action was limited to a 3-hectare portion of the lot that they occupied, possessed and cultivated since 2001.
We find no reversible error in the CA's conclusion that the action does not cover the entirety of the 5-hectare property. The following allegations in respondents' Complaint 20 clearly show that they sought to oust petitioners from the 3-hectare portion of the lot only, viz.:
3. Plaintiff [Abundio] is the lawful owner and together with [Julius] are prior possessors of x x x a parcel of land situated at Barangay 10, Impalambong, Malaybalay City, x x x:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Out of the five (5) hectares, x x x, only about three (3) hectares thereof has been utilized, occupied and physically possessed by the plaintiffs which is more identifiable as portion A and portion B, the other portions x x x, are being occupied by squatters defendants herein, among others, while for purposes of identification is designated as portion C;
xxx xxx xxx
7. Plaintiff [Abundio], with the aid of [Julius] whom he hired as farm laborer, caretaker and overseer has been cultivating the aforesaid portions of three (3) hectares, more or less, twice a year for corn with the use of a hired tractor since 2001, continuously, publicly, peacefully, adversely, in good faith and in concept of owner, up to the present, except as alleged in the succeeding paragraphs hereof;
8. For thirteen (13) long years since 2001 up to the present plaintiffs were not disturbed on their specific portions identified as portion A and B, except as alleged in the succeeding paragraph hereof;
9. Surprisingly, on January 17, 2014, at around 8:00 x x x in the morning, without justifiable reason or without a court order, while [Julius] x x x was cutting grasses in preparation [for] plowing by a tractor, Marissa S. Meliston [and Roberto Doroy Salino] entered by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth and once inside stopped and prevented Julius from working on the portion subject hereof claiming that the land [belong] to them x x x; 21 (Underscoring supplied.)
Considering the identification of the property covered by the forcible entry action, we now resolve who has a better right to possess. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the person lawfully entitled to the possession of the property must allege and prove that he was deprived of possession by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Possession, in this case, refers to prior physical or material possession, or possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de jure, legal possession. 22 Prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement. Physical possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring the right to possess. 23
In this case, the following were sufficiently alleged in respondents' complaint for forcible entry: (1) after acquiring the property in 2001, Abundio hired Julius to take care and cultivate the land; (2) on January 17, 2014, petitioners intimidated and threatened Julius and prevented Julius from preparing the land for plowing; and (3) the action was filed within one year from deprivation of physical possession of the property. 24 To support these allegations, Julius attested that he was in charge of plowing, planting and harvesting corn in the land, but in the morning of January 17, 2014, he was threatened and precluded by petitioners from working on the land. 25 Petitioners failed to rebut respondents' prior physical possession. More, petitioners affirmed respondents' possession in their Judicial Affidavits, 26 as well as their Position Paper 27 filed with the MTCC, Comment 28 filed with the CA, and their Petition 29 before this Court. They stated:
9.Q: When did [respondents] disturb your property?
A: [Respondents] invaded our property in 2001 claiming that they are the real owners of it.
10.Q: What did you do when [respondents] disturbed your possession?
A: We vehemently protested the disturbance. However, although we manifested our oral protest, we do not know what to do. x x x. The only thing that we thought [of to] protect us from the intrusion is [sic] to not leave the [uncontested portion of the] property. We stayed there up until the present. We never give up our possession.
11.Q: Are the [respondents] still disturbing your possession of the subject property up to the present?
A: In 2014, indications arose that [respondents] were x x x also seeking that we be ousted from our respective houses. Thus, in fear of losing our homes as well, we had no option but to prevent [respondents] from further disturbing the land we have own [sic] and possess [sic] for a very long time.30 (Emphases supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondents were in physical possession, tending to, and cultivating the land at the time of the filing of the complaint for forcible entry. It is well-settled that the sole issue for resolution in ejectment cases relates to the physical or material possession of the property involved. 31 It is sufficient for a claimant to prove prior physical possession even from the owner of the property to recover his possession. 32 Regardless of the character of the possession, a person who has in his favor prior possession in time, has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. 33 The CA aptly held:
The MTCC and RTC therefore committed a reversible error in ruling that [petitioners] were in prior possession of the subject property x x x, when they in fact admitted [respondents'] prior physical possession thereof and their act of dispossessing [respondents] in 2014.
Even granting for the sake of argument that [petitioners] possessed the subject property before [respondents'] entry thereof in 2001, still, [petitioners] bear the loss of tolerating [respondents'] possession of the subject property for 13 years. [Petitioners] have no one to blame but themselves in refusing to take lawful steps to oust [respondents] from their alleged inherited property. Ejectment proceedings, like the present forcible entry case, are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances. A party deprived of possession, like [petitioners] in this case, must not take the law into [their] own hands and forcibly enter a property without resorting to lawful means. Indeed, ejectment cases only resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions, that is, to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the MTCC and the RTC, in disregarding [respondents'] prior possession from 2001 to 2014 x x x of [the portion] of the subject property in favor of [petitioners'] alleged earlier possession under claim of ownership, decided the forcible entry case below not on the basis of possession de factor but possession de jure. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, if [petitioners] believe that they are the ones wronged by [respondents] in taking the subject property that is not theirs, [petitioners] are not precluded to file the necessary action to recover ownership of the subject property. Lest the Court be misunderstood, the adjudication on this case is only with respect to the issue of possession de facto over [the contested] portions of the subject property and not ownership thereof. x x x: 34 (Citations omitted.)
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-11.
2.Id. at 25-41. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas.
3.Id. at 12-15.
4.Rollo, pp. 26-28.
5.Id. at 31. Docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2252 before the MTCC, Malaybalay City.
6.Id. at 16-20. Penned by Presiding Judge Edmundo V. Raagas. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant case.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 20.)
7. CA rollo, pp. 30-32. Penned by Assisting Judge Hon. Emmauel P. Pasal.
8.Id. at 32.
9.Id. at 3-27.
10.Id. at 10.
11.Rollo, pp. 25-41.
12.Id. at 40.
13.Id. at 30-40.
14.Id. at 12-15.
15.Id. at 3-11.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 59-63.
18. See Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Sps. Cristobal, 723 Phil. 379, 386 (2013); Republic v. Medida, 692 Phil. 454, 461 (2012); Republic v. Malabanan, 646 Phil. 631, 637 (2010), citing Leoncio v. Vera, 569 Phil. 512, 516 (2008); and China Road v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 590, 601 (2000).
19.Esperal v. Trompeta-Esperal, G.R. No. 229076, September 16, 2020.
20. CA rollo, pp. 38-43.
21.Id. at 38-40.
22.Madayag v. Madayag, G.R. No. 217576, January 20, 2020.
23.Garcia v. Spouses Esguerra, G.R. No. 237122 (Notice), October 7, 2020.
24. CA rollo, pp. 39-40.
25.Id. at 49.
26.Id. at 59-62; 63-66; 67-70; 71-74; and 75-78.
27.Id. at 51-58.
28.Id. at 114-120.
29.Rollo, pp. 3-11.
30. CA rollo, pp. 60-61.
31.Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 570 Phil. 130, 139 (2008), citing Heirs of Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, 449 Phil. 181, 186 (2003).
32.Sps. Ocampo v. Heirs of Bernardo U. Dionisio, 744 Phil. 716, 727-728 (2014).
33.Spouses Antazo v. Doblada, 625 Phil. 423, 429 (2010).
34.Rollo, pp. 37-40.