FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226853. September 29, 2021.]
SENATOR CREWING [MANILA], INC., AQUANAUT SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., AND/OR MS. ROSEMARY AARON, petitioners, vs.PABLO L. VENTURA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 226853 (Senator Crewing [Manila], Inc., Aquanaut Shipmanagement Ltd., and/or Ms. Rosemary Aaron v. Pablo L. Ventura) — Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc. (Senator Crewing), a domestic corporation engaged in the manning business, hired Pablo Ventura (Pablo) as an able seaman under successive contracts beginning 1998 to 2011 for and on behalf of its foreign principal Aquanaut Shipmanagement Ltd. (Aquanaut). Pablo's duties as able seaman included operational tasks, such as loading and unloading activities, towing gears for tanker berthing, anchor handling, mooring, carrying store supplies and provisions, painting, chipping and such other tasks as may be assigned to him. Pablo underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) prior to his embarkation for each contract, and was declared fit for sea duty. 1 Sometime in December 2004, Pablo underwent PEME and was diagnosed with hypertension. Nevertheless, the company-accredited physician certified that Pablo was 'Fit for Deck Duty (Restricted)' and advised him to take Plendil ER 2.5 mg. Thus, Senator Crewing re-hired Pablo and reminded him to bring his medication onboard the vessel. This arrangement continued in Pablo's subsequent engagements from 2008 to 2010.
On September 21, 2011, Senator Crewing and Aquanaut rehired Pablo for a period of six (6) months on board the vessel Hatsu Coverage. Pablo underwent PEME and the company-accredited physician pronounced him 'Fit for Sea Duty with remarks: hypertension controlled with medication Felodipine 5mg.' On October 27, 2011, Pablo joined the vessel.
On May 13, 2012, Pablo was repatriated after the expiration of the term of his contract. Thereafter, on May 31, 2012, Pablo filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, damages and attorney's fees against Senator Crewing, Aquanaut and Senator Crewing's President Ms. Rosemary Aaron (Ms. Aaron).
In his complaint, Pablo claimed that he performed functions that required strenuous physical and mental effort. Moreover, Pablo was exposed to the perils of the sea and extreme climate changes in the daily performance of his job as well as to harmful fumes and chemicals from the cargo loaded onto their vessels. Pablo also alleged that during the term of his contract and while on board the vessel, he experienced chest pains and shortness of breath especially when climbing stairs and/or after heavy exertion. Pablo purportedly requested the master for a medical check-up but was advised that he can undergo examination after completing his contract. After repatriation, Pablo then reported to Senator Crewing's office to claim his final wage. Also, Pablo claimed that he informed the agency of his symptoms and requested for a post-employment medical examination. However, Captain Edgardo Tuazon (Captain Tuazon) told Pablo that his previous medical examination was still effective for four (4) months or until September 16, 2012. Capt. Tuazon allegedly assured Pablo that there would be no problem because all his documents were still valid as confirmed in the e-mail of Captain Schmeling, Master of Hatsu Courage. Pablo likewise averred that he returned to the office of Senator Crewing on May 22, 2012 and reiterated his request for a post-employment medical examination. Senator Crewing again refused to provide him with medical assistance. Pablo was then informed that his medical record contained a restriction due to chronic high blood or hypertension and his contract would no longer be renewed.
On May 28, 2012, Pablo consulted a private doctor Dr. Arbel U. Perete (Dr. Perete), a specialist in Internal Medicine and Cardiology. Dr. Perete initially diagnosed Pablo with Hypertension stage 1, t/c2CAD, CSA. The electrocardiogram of Pablo also showed that he was suffering from 'Sinus Tachycardia, left atrial abnormality and left ventricular hypertrophy with ST T wave changes, secondary to strain and/or ischemia.'
On July 7, 2012 or after filing of the complaint, Pablo consulted another specialist Dr. Domicias L. Albacite (Dr. Albacite), who diagnosed him with 'To Consider Coronary Artery Disease, Chronic Stable Angina Pectoris and Hypertension ST2 uncontrolled.' Dr. Albacite certified that Pablo can no longer be employed as a seaman until coronary artery disease is ruled out. Pablo spent the amount of P8,980.00 for all his medical check-ups. Pablo asked for reimbursement from Senator Crewing and Aquanaut but to no avail. TCAScE
In contrast, Senator Crewing, Aquanaut, and Ms. Aaron (Senator Crewing, et al.) argued that Pablo was not medically repatriated and that he finished his contract without issue. Pablo did not inform the master of the vessel that he needed medical attention during the term of his contract. Pablo also did not ask Senator Crewing for a referral to the company-designated physician for a post-employment medical examination within three (3) days from his repatriation. Pablo failed to show that he suffered a work-related illness during the term of his contract and that it resulted in disability. Pablo was simply not re-hired because there was no available position for him in their vessels. Lastly, Ms. Aaron should not be impleaded in her personal capacity because she did not act with malice or bad faith in the discharge of her functions.
On June 28, 2013, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Pablo's complaint for lack of merit. 3 The LA found that Pablo was repatriated for a finished contract and that he failed to establish that he suffered a work-related illness and disability during the term of his contract. Aggrieved, Pablo appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Pablo insisted that the LA erred in ruling that he did not suffer an illness during the term of his employment and that he failed to undergo post-employment medical examination. In its Comment/Opposition to the appeal, Senator Crewing, et al., pointed out that Pablo was hired as an able seaman by another agency thus disproving his claim that he suffered a disability.
On September 24, 2013, the NLRC granted Pablo's appeal and awarded his claim for disability benefits. The NLRC gave credence to Pablo's allegations that he informed the master of the vessel that he had been suffering symptoms of his illness and that he requested for medical assistance while on board the vessel and upon his repatriation. The NLRC found that given Pablo's 14 years of employment with Senator Crewing, et al., it is plausible that his ailment was caused by the stress and pressure of his work, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the complainant is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby reversed and the complainant is hereby declared to be totally and permanently incapacitated to go back to his previous and usual kind of employment as an Able Seaman. The respondents are hereby held liable to pay complainant the following:
a) Total and permanent disability of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment;
b) P8,980.00 as refund for the necessary medical expenses incurred by the complainant;
c) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000 as exemplary damages;
e) 10% of the total monetary awards as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, Senator Crewing, et al., elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133513. 4 On January 15, 2016, the CA affirmed the NLRC's findings that Pablo's ailments were work-related and were acquired during his exclusive employment with Senator Crewing, et al., under multiple contracts for fourteen (14) years. The absence of a post-employment medical examination cannot be used to defeat Pablo's claim since the same was due to the Senator Crewing, et al.'s inadvertence or refusal to refer him to the company-designated physician. However, the CA reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P30,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. 5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order is DISMISSED. The assailed September 24, 2013 Decision and November 25, 2013 Resolution both issued by the Public Respondent National Labor Relations Commission, Fourth Division in NLRC LAC No. 08-000752-13-OFW-M/NLRC NCR-M-O5-08432-12 are hereby AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is hereby decreased from P100,000.00 to P30,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages is likewise decreased from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00. The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Senator Crewing, et al., sought reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this recourse. Senator Crewing, et al., maintained that Pablo's continued employment as able seaman shows that he did not suffer from any illness while on board Hatsu Courage and that it resulted in his disability. 6 Pablo's claim that he complained that he was suffering symptoms of his illness and asked for medical assistance while aboard the vessel is a self-serving allegation. There is also no proof that Pablo requested for a post-employment medical examination within three (3) days from his repatriation and that Senator Crewing refused his request. 7 The medical reports of Pablo's private doctors are not worth credence as they contain irregularities. More importantly, Pablo failed to show how his work supposedly aggravated his condition. 8 On the other hand, Pablo insisted that he is entitled to disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees.
The petition is meritorious.
As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts. Yet, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are conflicting findings by the CA, the NLRC and the labor arbiter. 9 The Court may also review the evidence on record if the appealed decision is based on misapprehension of facts. Here, the rulings of the CA and the NLRC are contrary to the LA's findings. Thus, the Court is empowered to examine and evaluate the materiality and significance of the parties' evidence.
In resolving claims for disability benefits, it is imperative to integrate the POEA-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) with every agreement between a seafarer and his employer. 10 Pablo's latest employment contract with Senator Crewing, et al., was executed on September 21, 2011 and is covered by the 2010 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships. 11 In Ventis Maritime Corporation v. Salenga, 12 the Court clarified that a seafarer's complaints for disability benefits arise from (1) injury or illness that manifests or is discovered during the term of the seafarer's contract, which is usually while the seafarer is on board the vessel or (2) illness that manifests or is discovered after the contract, which is usually after the seafarer has disembarked from the vessel. It is only in the first scenario that the provisions on the three-day mandatory reportorial requirement under Section 20 (A) of the POEA-SEC applies, viz.: cTDaEH
Seafarer's complaints for disability benefits arise from (1) injury or illness that manifests or is discovered during the term of the seafarer's contract, which is usually while the seafarer is on board the vessel or (2) illness that manifests or is discovered after the contract, which is usually after the seafarer has disembarked from the vessel. As further explained below, it is only in the first scenario that Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC applies.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, it was an error for the CA to rely on Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC. Section 20(A) applies only if the seafarer suffers from an illness or injury during the term of his contract, i.e., while he is employed. Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC clearly states the parameters of its applicability:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: x x x
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Based on the foregoing, if the seafarer suffers from an illness or injury during the term of the contract, the process in Section 20(A) applies. The employer is obliged to continue to pay the seafarer's wages, cover the cost of treatment and medical repatriation, if needed. After medical repatriation, the seafarer has the duty to report to the company-designated physician within three days upon his return. The employer shall then pay sickness allowance while the seafarer is being treated. And thereafter the dispute resolution mechanism with regard to the medical assessments of the company-designated, seafarer-appointed, and independent and third doctor, shall apply. (Emphases Supplied)
In the present case, aside from Pablo's bare allegation, there is nothing on record that would prove the claim that his illness manifested during the term of his contract, i.e., that he experienced symptoms of his illness while at sea. There is also no proof that Pablo informed the master of his supposed symptoms and asked for medical attention. Pablo relied on the email 13 of Capt. Schmeling as proof that he asked for medical attention and was refused. Yet, a reading of the email shows that Capt. Schmeling was merely inquiring about the effect of the expiration of the medical examinations of Pablo and a certain Third Officer Espiritu on their contracts. Capt. Schmeling wanted confirmation that both men could serve until the end of their respective contracts without need for new medical examinations:
Hatsu Courage
Good morning,
There are 2 crew (3/O Espiritu and AB Ventura) with expired SBG-medical-examination in March/2012.
So far I know the regulation it will be still no problems occur when it goes expiry during servicetime on board but need to renew before next joining vessel.
Means that the men can serve until end of contract with this cert without additional med examination.
Can you confirm that?
Otherwise vessel calls HAM on weekend 13./14. Apr and there is no examination possible to my knowledge.
Your opinion is appreciated to this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Schmeling 14
Contrary to Pablo's allegation, there is nothing in the email supporting the claim that he informed the master that he was suffering symptoms of his illness and that he requested for medical attention but was refused. Similarly, there is no proof that Pablo requested Senator Crewing, et al., for a post-employment medical examination. Admittedly, Pablo went to the office of Senator Crewing the day after his repatriation but only to get his final wages. Absent evidence of medical repatriation and refusal to give treatment, it can be reasonably deduced that Pablo's illnesses manifested or were discovered only after the term of his contract. In Ventis, the Court explained that a seafarer may still claim disability benefits even if his illnesses manifested or were discovered after the term of the contract. In such circumstances, the illness may either be (1) an occupational illness listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, in which case, it is categorized as a work-related illness if it complies with the conditions stated in Section 32-A, or (2) an illness not listed as an occupational illness under Section 32-A but is reasonably linked to the work of the seafarer, thus: cSaATC
In instances where the illness manifests itself or is discovered after the term of the seafarer's contract, the illness may either be (1) an occupational illness listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, in which case, it is categorized as a work-related illness if it complies with the conditions stated in Section 32-A, or (2) an illness not listed as an occupational illness under Section 32-A but is reasonably linked to the work of the seafarer.
For the first type, the POEA-SEC has clearly defined a work-related illness as 'any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.' What this means is that to be entitled to disability benefits, a seafarer must show compliance with the conditions under Section 32-A, as follows:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described therein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
As to the second type of illness — one that is not listed as an occupational disease in Section 32-A — Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel, instructs that the seafarer may still claim provided that he suffered a disability occasioned by a disease contracted on account of or aggravated by working conditions. For this illness, '[i]t is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.' Operationalizing this, to prove this reasonable linkage, it is imperative that the seafarer must prove the requirements under Section 32-A: the risks involved in his work; his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks; the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and he was not notoriously negligent.
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More importantly, the rule applies that whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence which is more than a mere scintilla; it is real and substantial, and not merely apparent. Further, while in compensation proceedings in particular, the test of proof is merely probability and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusions of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inferences and speculations. (Emphases Supplied)
Notably, Coronary Artery Disease is not specifically mentioned in Section 32 (A) of the POEA-SEC while hypertension alone is not enumerated as an occupational disease in Section 32 (A). It is only end organ damage resulting from hypertension that is considered as an occupational disease. As such, Pablo is required to prove the reasonable link between his illnesses and nature of work. Pablo must establish the risks involved in his work, his illnesses were contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks, the diseases were contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract them, and he was not notoriously negligent. Yet, Pablo failed to pass the reasonable linkage test.
In his complaint, Pablo did not present evidence showing how his work as an able seaman involved exposure to the risks affecting his illnesses. Pablo likewise failed to prove that his work environment caused or aggravated his diseases. Also, there is no proof that Pablo was not notoriously negligent and that he complied with the prescribed maintenance medications and lifestyle changes recommended by the company-designated physician. While the Court in previous cases has taken judicial notice of the working environment that seafarers in general have to deal with, said notice is just a mere acknowledgment of the general perils encountered by seafarers on board vessels. It does not sufficiently prove work-relatedness of a particular illness or injury, much less, prove entitlement to compensation. Despite the acknowledgment of the general working environment of seafarers, the Court never dispensed with the required substantial evidence to prove entitlement to disability benefits under the law. 15
Moreover, the CA and the NLRC heavily relied on the medical certificates issued by Drs. Perete and Albacite in awarding Pablo permanent total disability benefits. Notably, when Pablo filed the complaint against Senator Crewing, et al., on May 31, 2012, he was only armed with the findings of Dr. Perete, who he consulted on May 28, 2021. Dr. Perete diagnosed Pablo to be suffering from Hypertension stage 1, t/cCAD, CSA. Coronary Artery Disease was being considered by Dr. Perete but it was not confirmed that Pablo was actually suffering from the disease. If at all, Dr. Perete only confirmed the hypertension diagnosis of Pablo. Yet, Dr. Perete did not pronounce that Pablo suffered a disability as a result of his hypertension, to wit:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that Mr. Pablo Ventura, 48 years old, male, was seen and examined with complaints of back pains and chest pains.
Assessment:
Disposition:
Similarly, Dr. Albacite's medical certificate should not be given weight and credence for purposes of assessing Pablo's entitlement to disability benefits considering that it was obtained more than a month after filing of the complaint. In addition, Dr. Albacite's impression was 'Consider Coronary Artery Disease, Chronic Stable Angina Pectoris and Hypertension ST2 uncontrolled.' Like Dr. Perete, Dr. Albacite did not pronounce that Pablo was suffering from Coronary Artery Disease. The medical certificate itself stated that Pablo needed to undergo further tests to rule out Coronary Artery Disease. There is no showing that Pablo complied with Dr. Albacite's recommendation and that he underwent the necessary tests to confirm that he was suffering from Coronary Artery Disease. At most, Dr. Albacite merely confirmed that Pablo was suffering from hypertension but did not pronounce that he can no longer work as a seafarer, thus: cHDAIS
My impression at this time is
It is my opinion that Mr. Ventura can no longer be employed as a seaman until we are sure coronary artery disease is ruled out. He needs to undergo further testing such as treadmill ECG stress test and possibly a coronary angiogram. 16
All told, Pablo is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits for failure to prove that a reasonable link exists between his illnesses and nature of work. Absent substantial evidence as reasonable basis, this Court is left with no choice but to deny Pablo's claim for disability benefits, lest an injustice be caused to his employer. The award of compensation and disability benefits cannot rest on speculations, presumptions and conjectures. 17
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated January 15, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 133513 is REVERSED. The Labor Arbiter's judgment dated June 28, 2013 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 13-16.
2. Note: "To consider."
3.Rollo, pp. 104-115; penned by Labor Arbiter Adela S. Damaso.
4.Id. at 16.
5.Id. at 12-24; penned by retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with the concurrence of Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
6.Id. at 43.
7.Id. at 50-52.
8.Id. at 32-57.
9.Plastimer Industrial Corporation, et al. v. Gopo, et al., 658 Phil. 627, 633 (2011).
10.C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Legal Heirs of the late Godofredo Repiso, 780 Phil. 645 (2016).
11. See POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010, dated October 26, 2010.
12. G.R. No. 238578, June 8, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66256>.
13.Rollo, p. 187.
14.Id.
15.Razonable, Jr. v. Torm Shipping Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 241620, July 7, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66454>.
16.Rollo, p. 145.
17.Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., et al., 698 Phil. 170 (2012). See also Loadstar International Shipping, Inc. v. Yamson, 830 Phil. 731 (2018).