Gonzales v. Senator Crewing [Manila], Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 207891. June 14, 2021.]

RENATO L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs.SENATOR CREWING [MANILA], INC., respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 14, 2021, which reads as follows: DETACa

"G.R. No. 207891 (RENATO L. GONZALES, petitioner, v. SENATOR CREWING [MANILA], INC., respondent.) — A pre-existing illness does not automatically foreclose compensability. In the absence of contrary proof, the presumption of work-relatedness of a non-occupational disease stands.

For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Renato L. Gonzales (Gonzales). He assails the Court of Appeals' Decision 2 and Resolution, 3 which affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission's 4 reversal of permanent disability benefits in his favor.

Aquanaut Ship Management Limited (Aquanaut), through Senator Crewing Manila, Inc. (Senator Crewing), hired Gonzales as a Chief Cook on board M/V Hanjin Amsterdam for a period of seven (7) months. 5 He was found to be "fit for sea duty" during the Pre-Employment Medical Examination. 6

On June 29, 2008, Gonzales boarded M/V Hanjin Amsterdam, and left the Philippines. 7

On September 2008, as Gonzales was performing his duties, he felt severe dizziness and muscle cramps in his legs and feet. 8 A doctor in Italy examined Gonzales and diagnosed him with diabetes mellitus. The doctor prescribed him medications and recommended his repatriation. Gonzales' physical condition further deteriorated. He was declared not fit to work, and was repatriated to Manila on October 23, 2008. 9

Upon arrival, Senator Crewing referred him to Dr. Wilanie Romero-Dacanay who likewise diagnosed him with Diabetes Mellitus on October 28, 2008. 10 On March 11, 2009, the company-designated physician issued a medical report stating that during his re-evaluation on March 9, 2009, Gonzales claimed that his condition has improved. 11 He advised Gonzales to continue his medication, and attached in his report the findings of internist Dr. Grace Ko-De Los Santos who assessed Gonzales' disability at Grade 7 — moderate residuals or disorder. 12

Gonzales sought the medical opinion of another doctor, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo). Dr. Vicaldo also found Gonzales to be suffering from Diabetes Mellitus, but is Insulin Requiring, and that he is no longer fit to resume work as a seafarer. 13

Gonzales requested for the payment of disability benefit from Senator Crewing, but this remained unheeded prompting him to file a Complaint for permanent disability compensation against Senator Crewing. 14

Labor Arbiter Gaudencio P. Demaisip, Jr. (Arbiter Demaisip) rendered his August 13, 2010 Decision, 15 ruling in favor of Gonzales. Arbiter Demaisip found that the disability is permanent and total because Gonzales was advised to continuously take insulin, and his resumption of duties on board a vessel may aggravate his illness. 16 Accordingly, he directed Senator Crewing to pay Gonzales disability benefits amounting to US$60,000.00. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respondent Agency is directed to pay the complainant a disability benefits of US$60,000.00.

The rest of the claims and motion are dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 17

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered its February 11, 2011 Decision 18 reversing the Labor Arbiter's ruling.

The National Labor Relations Commission found that diabetes mellitus is not among those listed as occupational diseases in POEA-SEC. It noted that Gonzales' sole evidence to substantiate his claim was Dr. Vicaldo's medical report, which was presented a month after re-filing his complaint. 19 It declared that Dr. Vicaldo's report declaring the illness work-related is "a bare statement . . . without any semblance of explanation as to why this is so." 20 It ruled that the disability was preexisting, and hence, not compensable. 21

The dispositive portion of the National Labor Relations Commission Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one entered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original)

On April 19, 2011, the National Labor Relations Commission issued its Resolution 23 denying Gonzales' Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Gonzales filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that he was not entitled to permanent disability benefits. 24

The Court of Appeals denied the Petition in its February 6, 2013 Decision. 25 It affirmed the finding that Gonzales had been suffering from diabetes mellitus even prior to his accident. Citing Wikipedia and the MayoClinic websites, it found that type 2 diabetes is primarily due to lifestyle choices and a person's genetics. It then concluded that diabetes cannot be work-related nor work-aggravated as there was no causal connection between the illness and the work he performed. 26

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision dated February 11, 2011 and the resolution dated April 19, 2011 of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 27 (Emphasis in the original)

Gonzales' Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals' July 3, 2013 Resolution. 28

Hence, petitioner Gonzales filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari. 29

In its November 13, 2013 Resolution, 30 this Court required respondent Senator Crew to file a Comment 31 which it complied with. 32 Petitioner then filed his Reply, 33 which this Court noted in a December 10, 2014 Resolution. 34

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to the findings of the company-designated physician, 35 despite respondent's failure to overthrow the presumption that petitioner's diabetes mellitus was work-related. 36 He avers that since diabetes mellitus is not among the compensable occupational diseases, it is disputably presumed to be work-related, and the burden to prove otherwise rests on the employer. 37 He claims that the work does not have to be the direct cause of the illness, as long as there is proof that the nature of the job developed or aggravated the disease. 38 He asserts that this Court had previously acknowledged the working conditions on a ship which tend to aggravate a seafarer's ailment. 39

Petitioner also alleges that since January 4, 2006, he had been employed by respondent under five successive contracts, and it was only in the last contract executed on January 11, 2008, where his Pre-Employment Medical Examination reported that he suffered from diabetes mellitus. According to petitioner, this clearly showed that he contracted the illness during his contracts' duration. 40

Respondent counters that petitioner's diabetes mellitus was a preexisting medical condition, and thus, it was not acquired during his employment. In his pre-employment medical examination, petitioner allegedly stated that he was suffering from the disease. 41 Further, the company doctor reported that diabetes mellitus is hereditary and cannot be work-related. 42 Invoking Bandila Maritime Services v. Dubduban, 43 respondent contends that petitioner's prayer for permanent total disability benefits must be denied. 44

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the National Labor Relations Commission's Decision which reversed the Labor Arbiter's award of permanent disability benefits in favor of seafarer petitioner Renato L. Gonzales. Subsumed in this is whether or not petitioner-seafarer's preexisting diabetes is compensable.

The Petition is granted.

I

Generally, a petition for review on certiorari must only raise questions of law and not require a reassessment of the evidence on record. 45 This Court admits exceptions, one of which is a scenario where the findings of the lower tribunals are contradictory. 46

In labor cases, a petition for review on certiorari "can prosper only if the Court of Appeals . . . fails to correctly determine whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion." 47Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon so Pilipinas v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc.48 instructs:

A court or tribunal is said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously acts or whimsically exercises judgment to be "equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Furthermore, the abuse of discretion must be so flagrant to amount to a refusal to perform a duty or to act as provided by law.

Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, citing Montoya v. Transmed, provides the parameters of judicial review for a labor case under Rule 45:

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. In one case, we discussed the particular parameters of a Rule 45 appeal from the CA's Rule 65 decision on a labor case, as follows:

In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.

Justice Arturo D. Brion's dissent in Abbot Laboratories, Philippines v. Alcaraz thereafter laid down the guidelines to be followed in reviewing a petition for review under Rule 45:

If the NLRC ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition. If grave abuse of discretion exists, then the CA must grant the petition and nullify the NLRC ruling, entering at the same time the ruling that is justified under the evidence and the governing law, rules and jurisprudence. In our Rule 45 review, this Court must deny the petition if it finds that the CA correctly acted. 49 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

At this juncture, the inquiry is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the National Labor Relations Commission committed no grave abuse of discretion.

II

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner's preexisting, non-occupational disease forecloses compensability. It failed to rule based on law when it reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and denied petitioner's disability benefit claims.

The Constitution mandates the State to "afford full protection to labor." 50 Law, the employment contract, and medical findings determine whether a seafarer is entitled to disability benefits. 51

Deemed incorporated in seafarers' employment contracts, 52 the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEA Standard Employment Contract) sets guidelines on claims of occupational hazards. 53

The POEA Standard Employment Contract defines a work-related illness as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." 54 In turn, Section 32-A provides:

SECTION 32-A. Occupational Diseases. — For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;

3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and

4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

To entitle a seafarer to disability benefit, it is not necessary to present direct causal relation, "reasonable proof of work-connection" suffices. 55 "Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings." 56

The National Labor Relations Commission correctly found that diabetes mellitus is not among the occupational diseases listed under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. However, it completely disregarded Section 20 (B) (4), 57 which states that the illness is disputably presumed as work-related. Romana v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp.58 explained the import of this presumption:

The legal presumption of work-relatedness was borne out from the fact that the said list cannot account for all known and unknown illnesses/diseases that may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions, and that the presumption is made in the law to signify that the non-inclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits. Given the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer, he may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. "The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail."59 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Absent contrary evidence from the shipping company, the presumption of work-relatedness of a non-occupational disease stands. The seafarer may rely on this presumption that establishes the work-relatedness of an illness, if the company fails to rebut it.

Further, the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion when it held that since petitioner's disability is preexisting, it cannot be compensated. The Court of Appeals also erred in affirming this finding.

Granted, petitioner assails the preexistence of his diabetes and claims that he was employed by the company under five successive contracts, but it was only in the last one where his Pre-Employment Medical Examination reported that he suffered from diabetes mellitus. He said that this demonstrated that he contracted the illness during his contracts' duration.

In any case, a pre-existing illness does not automatically foreclose compensability. It "may be regarded as work-related if it was aggravated by the seafarer's working conditions." 60 As Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel61 discussed:

Settled is the rule that for illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had. 62 (Citation omitted)

Manansala v. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. 63 described the complex nature of diabetes mellitus:

Diabetes is not among Section 32-A's listed occupational diseases. As with hypertension, it is a complex medical condition typified by gradations. Blood sugar levels classify as normal, pre-diabetes, or diabetes depending on the glucose level of a patient.

 

	Normal	Pre-diabetes	Diabetes Mellitus
FPG	<5.6	5.6-6.9	37.0 mmol/L
2-h PG	<7.8	7.8-11.0	311.1 mmol/L
HbA1C	<5.6%	5.7-6.4%	36.5%

 

Diabetes "is a clinical syndrome characterised by hyperclycaemia due to absolute or relative deficiency of insulin." It can cause several symptoms depending on its type, Type 1 or Type 2. Patients with Type 1 diabetes show more prominent symptoms, while patients with Type 2 diabetes are mostly asymptomatic. However, the symptoms between these two types may overlap. Other symptoms may even be inexplicit such as fatigue. Diabetes can lead to several complications, among which is suffering a stroke.

Hypertension and diabetes are hardly elementary conditions that afflicted laypersons could handily grasp. Even the POEA-SEC's appreciation of essential hypertension proceeds from an understanding that hypertension per se does not equate to disability warranting cessation of work and entailing compensation. Rather, it concedes that hypertension is identified by degrees of severity.

Hypertension and diabetes can be difficult to recognize because of gradations whose demarcations are not readily perceptible and because they can be asymptomatic. This is especially true in their mild stages. Even in relatively advanced stages, their symptoms may be generic that they are as easily mistaken to be indicating other conditions. 64 (Citations omitted)

Considering the complexity of diabetes, which is typified by gradations and does not automatically permit compensability requiring cessation from work, the labor tribunals must examine the severity of the seafarer's illness. The Court of Appeals was mistaken when it concluded that diabetes per se could be neither work-related nor work-aggravated since it is incumbent on lifestyle choices and genetics.

In the recent case of Salas v. Transmed Manila Corp., 65 a similar conjecture which merely described the generic nature of diabetes was rejected. There, this Court held that the company-designated physician's assessment that "diabetes mellitus is usually familial/hereditary" is a generic description which does not dispute the presumption that diabetes is work-related. Accordingly, it reversed the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission's rulings, and awarded the seafarer total and permanent disability benefits. There is no reason to depart from this jurisprudence.

This Court reached the same conclusion in another recent case, Zonio, Jr. v. 88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc., 66 where this Court underscored the lack of proof from the shipping company that the seafarer's diabetes mellitus was not caused or aggravated by the working conditions on the vessel. Its discussion on the illness and related jurisprudence is enlightening:

It is medically accepted that stress has major effects on a person's metabolic activity. The effects of stress on glucose metabolism are mediated by a variety of counter-regulatory hormones that are released in response to stress and that result in elevated blood glucose levels and decreased insulin action. In diabetes, because of a relative or absolute lack of insulin, the increase in blood glucose on account of stress cannot be adequately metabolized. Thus, stress is a potential contributor to chronic hyperglycemia in diabetes.

At this juncture, the case of Millora v. ECC is instructive. The petitioner therein was the widow of Prisco Millora. The latter was a public school teacher and was diabetic during the last 11 years of his life. Upon his discharge from the hospital for treatment of his illness, he forthwith filed a claim for benefits due to diabetes mellitus, but it was denied. At the age of 40, Prisco died. Petitioner requested the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to reconsider its denial of the deceased's claim, but to no avail. This compelled petitioner to elevate the case to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) for review, but the commission affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground that the cause of the deceased's ailment was not work-connected. The ECC relied on the evaluation made by the GSIS that diabetes mellitus is hereditary in nature and could not have been caused by his employment conditions. To assail the ECC's findings and prove that the nature of her late husband's work as a teacher increased the risk of contracting diabetes mellitus, petitioner quoted the medical opinion of Dr. Augusto Litonjua, president of the Philippine Diabetic Association, published in the November 1, 1985 issue of Bulletin Today, to wit:

"Dr. Augusto Litonjua, president of the Philippine Diabetic Association, also said that other causes of diabetes are overweight, accidents, operations, pregnancy and certain drugs.

"Speaking before the weekly 'Agham Ugnayan,' Litonjua said diseases caused either by a virus or bacteria were found to have damaged the pancreas and caused diabetes in persons 'with a predisposition.'

"Litonjua explained that a person under stressful physical or emotional situations secrete hormones that are 'contra-insulin' or hormones which outweigh the effects of insulin. Insulin, a hormone that is produced by the pancreas lowered blood sugar. aDSIHc

"He noted that there are more diabetes cases in urban than in a rural setting. This discrepancy is believed to be attributed to the more 'Westernized' environment in urban areas which have more problems and tensions x x x."

The wife of the deceased argued that since the parents of her late husband were not diabetic and that the deceased was not predisposed to the ailment by reason of obesity or old age, it would be more fair [sic] to conclude that his contracting diabetes mellitus was increased by the nature of his work. This Court found merit in her contention and held that:

Prisco Millora began work as a public school teacher when he was twenty-one (21) years old. Although not predisposed to diabetes mellitus by reason of old age, obesity or heredity, he became diabetic after eight (8) years in said employment. As a classroom teacher, his work was not confined to the regular eight-to-five schedule, but stretched into the long hours of the night preparing lesson plans and instructional materials. Aside from this, he was actively involved in the school's developmental projects. To our mind, such work situation could reasonably be described as physically and emotionally stressful, a situation cited by Dr. Litonjua as producing hormones which are 'contra-insulin' in their effects and which satisfies the evaluation made by respondent Commission of the endocrinal etiology of diabetes mellitus.

In this case, to prove that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, Apolinario showed that part of his duties as an Ordinary Seaman in MV Algosaibi 42 involved strenuous workload such as assist in the handling and operation of all deck gear such as topping, cradling and housing of booms; aid the carpenter in the repair work when requested; scale and chip paint, handle lines in the mooring of the ship, assist in the actual tying up and letting go of the vessel and stand as a lookout in the vessel. Apolinario further stated that while inside the vessel for several months, he was exposed to physical and psychological stress due to rush jobs, lack of sleep, heat stress, emergency works and homesickness for being away from his family. From the above enumeration of Apolinario's duties on board the vessel, he was certainly exposed to various strain and stress — physical, mental and emotional.

In the case of Sevilla v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, the First Division of this Court ruled in favor of the compensability of diabetes mellitus quoting the case of Abana, et al. v. Quisumbing. This Court held:

While there is that possibility that factors other than the employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation of his illness, this is not a drawback to its compensability. For, under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease.

As earlier stated, respondents herein failed to adduce any contrary medical findings from the company-designated physician to show that Apolinario's illness was not caused or aggravated by his working conditions on board the vessel. There was also no showing that Apolinario is predisposed to the illness by reason of genetics, obesity or old age. Such being the case, this Court considers that the stress and strains he was exposed to on board contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of his disease. Inasmuch as compensability is the entitlement to receive disability compensation upon a showing that a seafarer's work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, We find Apolinario's disease as compensable at bar. 67 (Citations omitted)

Here, this Court accordingly rejects respondent's argument that since the company doctor reported that the pre-existing diabetes is hereditary, it cannot be work-related. 68 We reinstate Arbiter Demaisip's ruling which carefully examined the conflicting medical findings. We affirm his finding that petitioner must be awarded permanent and total disability since he must continuously take insulin, and his resumption of duties on board a vessel may aggravate his illness. 69 Despite prior medications, his physical condition deteriorated that necessitated his repatriation. 70

Moreover, considering that respondent did not controvert that petitioner's diabetes mellitus was not aggravated by the working conditions on board the vessel, the presumption that it is work-related stands. It did not adduce any iota of proof to show the conditions on board.

Petitioner cited Aniban v. National Labor Relations Commission71 where this Court favored the contentions of the heirs of the ship radio operator who boarded the vessel healthy, but died on board three months into his contract. This Court explained that while physical exertion may be minimal, an on-call seafarer is subjected to undeniable pressure and strain which result in the "wear and tear of the human body." 72 He also invoked this pronouncement which this Court reiterates:

It must be stressed that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation considering that probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.

It is a matter of judicial notice that an overseas worker, having to ward off homesickness by reason of being physically separated from his family for the entire duration of his contract, bears a great degree of emotional strain while making an effort to perform his work well. The strain is even greater in the case of a seaman who is constantly subjected to the perils of the sea while at work abroad and away from his family. 73 (Citation omitted)

On the other hand, respondent's reliance on Bandila Maritime Services v. Dubduban74 is misplaced. There, the seafarer's prayer for disability benefits was denied for several causes which are not present here. While the seafarer was diagnosed of diabetes four years prior to his contract with the shipping company, he did not complain of any complications during his contract's term. He also did not submit himself to the company-designated doctor for examination upon the expiration of his contract and his return to the Philippines. 75 That case does not apply here.

To recall, respondent does not dispute that petitioner is entitled to disability benefits, only that its assessment of Grade 7 must be paid. The bone of contention was whether a pre-existing non-occupational disease which has in the seafarer's favor a presumption that it was work-related was rebutted by respondent-shipping company. This, however, it failed to do. Thus, this Court is compelled to reinstate the Labor Arbiter's ruling granting petitioner permanent total disability compensation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' February 6, 2013 Decision and July 3, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 120044 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Labor Arbiter's August 13, 2010 Decision in NLRC-Case No. OFW(M)NCR-08-11442-09 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc. is directed to pay petitioner Renato L. Gonzales disability benefits of US$60,000.00, subject to legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Resolution until full payment.

SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., on wellness leave)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III

Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 11-28.

2.Id. at 29-30. The February 6, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 120044 was penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3.Id. at 31-36. The July 3, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 120044 was penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4.Id. at 170-181. The February 11, 2011 Decision in NLRC NCR Case No. OFW(M)08-11442-09 and NLRC LAC No. OFW(M)11-000972-10 was penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles, and concurred in by Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L. Go of the First Division, National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.

5.Id. at 171.

6.Id. at 29.

7.Id. at 171.

8.Id. at 34 and 171.

9.Id. at 171.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 172.

12.Id. at 32.

13.Id. at 172-173.

14.Id. at 32.

15.Id. at 243-248. The Decision was penned by Labor Arbiter Gaudencio P. Demaisip, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.

16.Id. at 247.

17.Id. at 248.

18.Id. at 170-181.

19.Id. at 176.

20.Id. at 177.

21.Id.

22.Id. at 180.

23.Id. at 182-183. The Resolution was not attached to the petition.

24.Id. at 33.

25.Id. at 31-36.

26.Id. at 33-35.

27.Id. at 35-36.

28.Id. at 29-30.

29.Id. at 11-28.

30.Id. at 387-388.

31.Id. at 393-407.

32.Id. at 408.

33.Id. at 414-422.

34.Id. at 423.

35.Id. at 17.

36.Id. at 20.

37.Id. at 415.

38.Id. at 20.

39.Id. at 416, citing Heirs of Aniban v. National Labor Relations Commission, 347 Phil. 46 (1997) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].

40.Rollo, p. 414.

41.Id. at 394.

42.Id. at 397.

43. 617 Phil. 67 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

44.Rollo, pp. 394-395.

45.See RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1. See also Goduco v. Court of Appeals, 119 Phil. 531 (1964) [Per J. Paredes, En Banc].

46. See Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].

47.Philippine Airlines v. Dawal, 781 Phil. 474, 500 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

48. 809 Phil. 106 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

49.Id. at 120.

50. CONST., art XII, sec. 3.

51.Cutanda v. Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc., 817 Phil. 1106 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

52.Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, 743 Phil. 371, 385 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

53. POEA Dep. O. No. 4, Series of 2000 or the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (May 31, 2000) applies since the antecedents transpired prior to the amendment.

54.Id. Definition of Terms.

55.Magsaysay Mol Marine, Inc. v. Atraje, 836 Phil. 1061, 1076 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

56.Id. Citing Magat v. Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., 829 Phil. 570, 581 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division]; Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Obrero, 794 Phil. 481 (2016) [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division]; Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater, 628 Phil. 81 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

57. Section 20 (B) (4) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

xxx xxx xxx

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.

58. 816 Phil. 194 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].

59.Id. at 203-204.

60.Castillon v. Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc., G.R. No. 234711, March 2, 2020 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66406> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing Manansala v. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., 817 Phil. 84, 96 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

61. 707 Phil. 210 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

62.Id. at 225.

63. 817 Phil. 84 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

64.Id. at 107-109.

65. G.R. No. 247221, June 15, 2020 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66379> [Per J. Bernabe, Second Division].

66. G.R. No. 239052, October 16, 2019 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65782> [Per J. Inting, Third Division].

67.Id.

68.Rollo, p. 397.

69.Id. at 247.

70.Id. at 171.

71. 347 Phil. 46 (1997) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].

72.Id. at 55.

73.Id.

74. 617 Phil. 67 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

75.Rollo, pp. 394-395.