SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 217406. December 13, 2017.]
RHODA DELGADO PRINCIPE, petitioner,vs. LEO JAY PRINCIPE, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated13 December 2017which reads as follows: cDHAES
"G.R. No. 217406 (Rhoda Delgado Principe v. Leo Jay Principe). — On May 2, 2012, respondent Leo Jay Principe filed a Petition for Deprivation of Parental Authority against petitioner Rhoda Delgado Principe over all their minor children, namely, Cesar, Romeo Benedict, and Noah Rosh, praying that: (1) Rhoda be deprived of her parental authority and instead, Leo be granted sole parental authority; (2) Cesar and Romeo continue their studies at Anima Christi Center for Learning and Development in Alabang, Muntinlupa City; (3) Noah continue his studies at Isabela City, Basilan, where he will be in Leo's company; (4) pending hearing and resolution of petition, to immediately award full custody and control over the children; (5) Rhoda to immediately deliver custody to Leo. 1 Leo alleged that Rhoda, in complete disregard of Cesar and Romeo's special needs as children suffering from autism as well as Noah's best interest, took them away from their respective schools so that they could live with her, enrolling them in day care centers and schools that were closer to her. Rhoda filed her Opposition alleging that it is in the best interest of the children to live with their mother. Thereafter, she filed an Omnibus Motion for Inhibition alleging that Leo's relationship with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge would undermine the integrity of the judicial process. 2 During the hearing, the RTC acknowledged the urgency of the issue on the children's school since classes were already ongoing and asked the parties to submit additional pleadings in relation thereto to enable it to decide said issue already. 3 In the same hearing, the RTC judge stated that after resolving the issue on the school, he will resolve the motion for inhibition. Counsel of both parties state "We submit" to the RTC's proposal. 4
In its Resolution 5 dated July 10, 2012, the RTC found that as opposed to the wide range of evidence submitted by Leo on the proposed schools, Rhoda merely submitted a weekly activity plan and two (2) pictures of the proposed school of the children. 6 Thus, the trial court held that Cesar and Romeo should study in Alabang and granted their temporary custody to Leo, subject to visitation rights of Rhoda. With respect to Noah, however, the court held that he shall remain with Rhoda, the child being under seven (7) years of age, subject to visitation rights of Leo. 7 Rhoda appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving the school and temporary custody issues despite a motion seeking his inhibition, in giving full faith and credence to Leo's allegations on the school of his choice, and in ruling that it is in Cesar and Romeo's best interest that they study in Alabang. 8
On May 24, 2013, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC resolution ruling that while the Rules of Court does not provide when a motion for inhibition must be resolved, the RTC judge had enough time to rule upon the same. 9 It also ruled that said RTC judge, in granting temporary custody to Leo, failed to consider the factors under the Rule on Provisional Orders such as the desire and ability of each parent to foster a loving relationship between the child and the other parent, the child's health, safety and welfare, the fitness and qualifications of the parent to be chosen, among others. The appellate court added that the alleged curricula and program of the schools were admitted as facts even if these private documents were not yet proven as their authenticity and due execution.
In its Amended Decision 10 dated August 13, 2014, however, the CA granted Leo's Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the RTC ruling finding merit in Leo's contentions that there is no rule mandating that a motion for inhibition must be resolved ahead of other pending incidents, that temporary custody of children may be granted in a petition for custody, and that the RTC judge properly considered the evidence on record as well as the best interests of the children in issuing their temporary custody. 11 According to the CA, moreover, it is clear that both parties expressly agreed that the motion for inhibition be ruled after the resolution on the issue of the school, submitting for resolution the issue on the school ahead of the motion for inhibition. 12 In addition, the Rules of Court clearly allows the RTC to issue a provisional order of custody after an Answer has been filed. Thus, an order for temporary custody can be issued without hearing and that the order may only be based on the pleadings submitted by the parties without necessarily being bound by the Rules of Evidence. The RTC ruling, therefore, was within the bounds of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. 13
On April 28, 2015, Rhoda filed the instant petition. According to Rhoda, since what was filed by Leo was a Petition for Deprivation of Parental Authority, the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus, which allows the court to grant temporary custody, is clearly inapplicable. Moreover, the grant of custody pendente lite in favor of Leo was also not sanctioned by the new rules governing provisional remedies, or the Rule on Provisional Orders due to the fact that said rules deliberately state that provisional orders for custody pendente lite may be issued upon verified petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage, or legal separation. Since Leo's action for deprivation of parental authority is not among the enumeration, the grant of custody pendente lite is, therefore, not allowed. In addition, Rhoda alleges that jurisprudence provides that it is better to make a personal and first-hand assessment in granting custody pendente lite than a mere reliance on the records of the case. 14 ASEcHI
The petition is devoid of merit.
Contrary to Rhoda's assertions, the trial court's resolution granting temporary custody to Leo was sanctioned by law, particularly the Rule on Custody of Minors. While respondent Leo's action was denominated as a Petition for Deprivation of Parental Authority, the allegations in his Amended Petition show that it is one for custody of minors due to the fact that it contains the following facts required under Section 4 of said Rule: (1) the personal circumstances of the petitioner and respondent; (2) the name, age, and present whereabouts of the minor and his or her relationship to the petitioner and respondent; (3) the material operative facts constituting deprivation of custody; and (4) such other matters relevant to the custody of the minor. 15 More importantly, a perusal of the reliefs prayed for by Leo reveals that his petition was not only one for deprivation of parental authority but also one for custody, to wit: (1) pending hearing and resolution of the herein petition, to immediately award full custody and control over the persons of Cesar D. Principe, Romeo D. Principe, and Noah D. Principe to Leo; and (2) for Rhoda to immediately deliver custody of said minors to Leo. 16
It is hornbook doctrine that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action. 17 Thus, the fact that Leo's petition was denominated as a "Petition for Deprivation of Parental Authority" does not automatically remove it from the ambit of the Rule on Custody of Minors. For as long as the key operative factors of a petition for custody was alleged in the petition, the provisions of the Rule on Custody of Minors can still govern the same, giving the trial court authority to grant temporary custody pending litigation. The Court, therefore, does not find that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting temporary custody of Cesar and Romeo to Leo for being within the realm of applicable rule.
Neither did the trial court act in a capricious manner when it granted said custody without the conduct of a hearing. As duly asserted by respondent Leo, the resolution of the RTC was merely a provisional order authorized by Section 13 of the Rule on Custody of Minors, which provides that "after an answer has been filed or after the expiration of the period to file it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor." 18 Hence, there is nothing in the rules which require that temporary custody may be granted only upon presentation of authenticated evidence. Meritorious is Leo's assertion that the mere fact that a provisional order awarding custody may be granted after an answer has been filed or after the expiration of the period to file it clearly indicates that properly authenticated documents need not be presented since authentication of documents occurs only during presentation of evidence. 19 Thus, in view of the fact that the RTC's grant of temporary custody was duly authorized by existing rules, the CA cannot be said to have erred in affirming the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of petitioner to show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision. (Reyes, Jr., J., on wellness leave)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 41-42.
2.Id. at 42.
3.Id. at 31.
4.Id. at 32.
5. Penned by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy; id. at 67-74.
6.Id. at 70.
7.Id. at 73-74.
8.Id. at 32.
9. Resolution penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Pablito A. Perez, concurring; id. at 36-39.
10. Penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Pablito A. Perez, concurring; id. at 29-34.
11.Rollo, p. 29.
12.Id. at 33.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 17-24.
15.Id. at 119.
16.Id. at 122-123.
17.Lee, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 577 Phil. 400, 407-408 (2008).
18.Rollo, pp. 124-125.
19.Id. at 125-126.