EN BANC
[G.R. No. 258393. January 4, 2022.]
PROSPERO ARREZA PICHAY, JR., petitioner, vs.THE LAW DEPARTMENT, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR IV, MARIA NORINA TANGARO-CASINGAL, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedJANUARY 4, 2022, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 258393 (Prospero Arreza Pichay, Jr. v. The Law Department, Commission on Elections, represented by Director IV, Maria Norina Tangaro-Casingal). — After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to DISMISS the petition 1 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
In this regard, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. 2 Cogent with the foregoing is the rule that, in order for the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) to prosper, there must be a showing that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 3
In this case, petitioner essentially seeks the cancellation of Romeo S. Momo's (Momo) certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of member of the House of Representatives for the first legislative district of the province of Surigao del Sur on account of patent defects therein. As such, petitioner should have first resorted to his remedies under the Omnibus Election Code for the denial of due course or cancellation of the same in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. Considering that petitioner's invocation of the Court's jurisdiction is premature, the petition must necessarily be dismissed on account of non-compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as the procedural requirements of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, while there are, admittedly, recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion, 4 none may be appreciated in this case. CAIHTE
At any rate, there exists no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in including Momo in the official list of candidates of the first legislative district of the province of Surigao del Sur as there appears to be no valid ground to deny due course or cancel his COC. Case law provides that in order to justify the cancellation of a COC, there must be a material misrepresentation pertaining to one's qualifications for elective office. 5 Here, no material misrepresentation may be gathered from Momo's indication in his COC that he was running as a candidate in the 'First District, City of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur,' as the same does not pertain to his qualifications for elective office. In any case, the foregoing phrase may easily be construed as referring to the first legislative district of the province of Surigao del Sur." (119)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MARIFE M. LOMIBAO-CUEVASClerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-15.
2.Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corp., 778 Phil. 451, 456-457 (2016).
3.Señeres v. Commission on Elections, 603 Phil. 552, 562 (2009); Chairman, Palawan Council for Sustainable Development v. Lim, 793 Phil. 690, 700-701 (2016).
4.Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corp., supra note at 458.
5. See Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, 660 Phil. 225, 244-245 (2011).