Pichay, Jr. v. Tutol

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211515. November 11, 2021.]

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., petitioner,vs. RUSTICO B. TUTOL, LUIS DG ESTRADA and CARMEN F. AMORES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 236288. November 11, 2021.]

PROSPERO A. PICHAY JR., petitioner,vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES as represented by THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 11, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 211515 (Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. v. Rustico B. Tutol, Luis DG Estrada and Carmen F. Amores); and G.R. No. 236288 (Prospero A. Pichay Jr. v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and People of the Philippines as represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor). — Before this Court are consolidated petitions 1 assailing the October 23, 2013 Decision 2 and the February 24, 2014 Resolution 3 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127341, subject of the petition in G.R. No. 211515, as well as the Resolutions dated October 18, 2016 4 and November 17, 2017 5 rendered by the Sandiganbayan in SB-16-CRM-0425, SB-16-CRM-0426, SB-16-CRM-0427, and SB-16-CRM-0432, that is the subject of the petition in G.R. No. 236288. The CA Decision and Resolution affirmed the Decision 6 dated July 4, 2011 and the Joint Order 7 dated August 1, 2011 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay), among others, liable for grave misconduct, and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from service. On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan Resolutions affirmed with modifications, the Joint Resolution 8 dated March 16, 2015 and Joint Order 9 dated April 4, 2016 of the Office of the Ombudsman, thereby upholding the finding of probable cause to charge Pichay, among others, for three counts of violation of Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and for violation of Section X126.2 (c) (1) (2) of the Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB) in relation to Sections 36 and 237 of R.A. No. 7653.

The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is a government owned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198 and primarily serves as a specialized lending institution for the promotion, development and financing of local water utilities. 10 It exercises its corporate powers and performs its functions through a Board of Trustees, which is composed of one Chairman and four Trustees. 11 For the years 2008 to 2011, the Board of Trustees of LWUA was comprised of Prospero Pichay, as its Chairman, with Eduardo Bangayan (Bangayan), Aurelio Puentevella (Puentevella), Enrique Senen Montilla (Montilla), and Daniel Landingin (Landingin), who was also the LWUA Acting Administrator, and ex-officio member of the Board, as the members. Wilfredo Feleo (Feleo) was the LWUA Acting Deputy Administrator of Investments and Financial Services, and Atty. Arnaldo M. Espinas (Espinas) was the Corporate Legal Officer/Board Secretary. 12

On September 23, 2008, the LWUA Board of Trustees approved Resolution No. 145, Series of 2008, which sought to establish a water development bank that will be a wholly-owned subsidiary of LWUA. 13 In line therewith, Pichay wrote a letter dated October 13, 2008, informing the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) of such action taken by the Board of LWUA. He then requested the OGCC's legal advice on the feasibility of structuring the proposed financial institution as a wholly-owned subsidiary of LWUA. 14

In reply, the OGCC, through then Corporate Counsel Alberto C. Agra, issued OGCC Opinion No. 242 15 dated October 16, 2008, informing Pichay that his proposal to create a water development bank is subject to: (a) review of the Department of Finance (DOF); and (b) approval of the President of the Philippines, as well as applicable banking laws, rules and regulations. The OGCC opined that there was a need for LWUA to comply with applicable banking laws, rules and regulations because the proposed subsidiary would be performing banking and/or quasi-banking functions. CAIHTE

Thereafter, Pichay wrote a letter 16 dated October 20, 2008 to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo requesting for approval of his plan to establish the said financial institution. The Office of the President (OP) subsequently referred Pichay's letter-request to the DOF and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for comments and recommendations. 17

In a letter dated November 28, 2008, the DOF informed LWUA that its proposal was under evaluation, and requested the submission of supporting documents. 18 Meanwhile, the BSP wrote a letter 19 dated January 22, 2009 to the OP stating that as part of BSP's efforts to rationalize and consolidate the banking system, it was enforcing a moratorium on the establishment of new banks. In the same letter, LWUA was also advised to consider the possibility of acquiring an existing financial company for the purpose of addressing LWUA's requirements and may thereafter apply for a quasi-banking authority with the BSP. Subsequently, Pichay informed the BSP of LWUA's intention to acquire an existing bank in lieu of creating a new one. 20

On March 24, 2009, the LWUA Board of Trustees passed Resolution No. 56, Series of 2009 approving the acquisition of a savings or thrift bank. 21 Then in a letter 22 dated April 17, 2009, the BSP informed Pichay that LWUA may own up to 60% of the voting stock of a domestic bank. Nevertheless, prior approval of the Monetary Board (MB) shall be required on:

a. Any sale or transfer or series of sales or transfers which will result in ownership or control of more than twenty percent (20%) of the voting stock of a bank by any person, whether natural or juridical, or which will enable such person to elect, or be elected as a director of such bank; and

b. Any sale or transfer or series of transfers which will effect a change in the majority ownership or control of the voting stock of the bank from one group of persons to another group. 23

Apparently, several stockholders of Express Savings Bank, Inc. (ESBI) expressed interest in disposing of their aggregate stake of 445,377 outstanding common shares, or approximately 60% of ESBI's total equity, for the amount of P100,000,000.00. 24

ESBI is a thrift bank, with Elvira Ting (Ting) as its Chairman, Ferlan Balbido (Balbido) as its President, Arthur Ponsaran (Ponsaran) as its Corporate Secretary, Kenneth Gatchalian (Kenneth) as its Treasurer, and Dee Hua Gatchalian (Dee Hua), Lamberto Mercado, Jr. (Mercado), Yolanda De la Cruz (De la Cruz), Rogelio Garcia (Garcia) and Gladys Galang-Nocom (Galang-Nocom) as Directors. Most of the shares of ESBI were owned by Ting, Garcia, Dee Hua, Kenneth and Sherwin Gatchalian (Sherwin), as well as the Forum Pacific, Inc. (FPI) and Wellex Group, Inc. (WGI). 25

FPI is a financial holding company with the following as members of its Board of Directors: Geronimo Velasco, Jr. (Velasco), Peter Salud (Salud), Ting, Kenneth, Federico Puno (Puno), Mercado, Evelyn Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa), Ponsaran, Joaquin Obieta (Obieta) and Garcia. 26 Similarly, WGI is a financial holding company with the following as members of its Board of Director: William, Dee Hua, Kenneth, Ponsaran, and De la Cruz. Sherwin was then WGI's Executive Vice President. 27

Notwithstanding the status of ESBI as a thrift bank under a BSP administered rehabilitation, 28 the LWUA Board passed Resolution No. 120, Series of 2009, that authorized LWUA's acquisition of 60% of the outstanding shares of ESBI. It also authorized Management through the Acting Administrator and Acting Deputy Administrator for Investment and Financial Services to negotiate the offered price of P100 Million to the range of P70 Million to P85 Million, as well as negotiate the other terms and conditions of the sale. 29

After negotiations, LWUA, represented by Landingin and Feleo, executed the Terms of Reference (TOR) dated May 22, 2009 with WGI and FPI, both represented by Garcia. The TOR prescribed the terms of LWUA's acquisition of the 445,377 ESBI shares as follows:

a. LWUA shall pay the sellers the sum of PHP80,000,000.00, payable in two (2) month tranches: [i] 50% of the amount, or PHP40,000,000.00 upon the execution of the deed of sale; and [ii] 50% of the amount of PHP40,000,000.00 upon LWUA's take-over of the bank, which should not be "later than one (1) week after the signing of the Absolute Deed of Sale."

b. LWUA shall absorb or "write-off" the sellers' debts incurred to the bank in their capacities as directors, officers, stockholders and/or related interests (DOSRI loans), which amounted to PHP20,842,000.34. 30

On May 26, 2009, the LWUA Board passed Resolution No. 129-A, Series of 2009 approving the acquisition of 445,337 shares of stock of ESBI, based on the TOR. 31 Then on June 3, 2009, LWUA, represented by Landingin, executed the Deed of Absolute Sale for the purchase of the ESBI shares from its shareholders, specifically (a) WGI, represented by Dee Hua; (b) FPI, represented by Salud; with (c) Sherwin; (d) Kenneth; (e) Ting; and (f) Dee Hua, as individual shareholders. The sellers' respective shares of the 445,377 ESBI shares sold to LWUA were as follows:

 

SELLER	NO. OF SHARES
The Wellex Group, Inc.	310,086
Forum Pacific, Inc.	127,415
Elvira A. Ting	1,232
Dee Hua T. Gatchalian	6,629
Sherwin T. Gatchalian	14
Kenneth T. Gatchalian	1
TOTAL	445,337 32

 

By reason of the sale, Pichay, Feleo, Montilla and Espinas became ESBI's Chairman, Treasurer, Vice-Chairman and Assistant Corporate Secretary, respectively. 33 DETACa

On August 4, 2009, the LWUA Board passed Resolution No. 303, Series of 2009 unanimously approving the designation of ESBI as LWUA's depository bank. A savings account was thereafter opened under the name of LWUA and in which funds drawn from LWUA's coffers will be deposited. 34 Thereafter, upon instructions of Landingin and Feleo, an amount of P300 Million drawn from the Landbank account of LWUA was transferred to the ESBI account of LWUA. 35

Afterwards, ESBI's shareholders and directors approved an amendment to ESBI's Articles of Incorporation (AOI), increasing the bank's authorized capital stock from P500 Million to P2 Billion. 36

On August 17, 2009, before either the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the BSP could take action on ESBI's amended AOI, the LWUA Board passed Resolution No. 336, Series of 2009, approving the payment of P400 Million to ESBI, representing LWUA's subscription in the event that ESBI's proposed increase in capitalization is approved by regulators. 37 A check was then drawn from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) account of LWUA and deposited in its ESBI current account. 38 However, due to lack of approval from the BSP, the amount of P400 Million was booked by ESBI as a liability under the Accrued Expenses and Other Liabilities account in its balance sheet for the end-year 2009. 39

After LWUA's takeover of ESBI, Pichay, Feleo, Montilla and Espinas, who were simultaneously officers of LWUA and ESBI, approved the loan applications of and released the corresponding proceeds to ESBI employees, water districts, as well as private individuals for the years 2009 to 2011. 40

It appears that almost three months after the purchase by LWUA of ESBI's shares in June 2009, the OGCC, in its letter dated September 14, 2009 to Pichay, reiterated that while the creation of a bank was well within LWUA's corporate powers, said proposal remained subject to review by the DOF and approval by the President of the Philippines, pursuant to applicable banking laws, rules, and regulations. 41 Then in a letter dated December 4, 2009, addressed to BSP Deputy Governor Espenilla, DOF Undersecretary Jeremias Paul formally objected to LWUA's proposed acquisition of a controlling interest in ESBI. 42

Likewise, the BSP's Integrated Supervision Department (ISD) II conducted an examination of ESBI after Ting informed the BSP of LWUA's acquisition of ESBI shares in June 2009. The BSP ISD II also noted Pichay's repeated requests to the BSP that ESBI be allowed to act as a depository bank of government funds, which shall come primarily from local water utilities. After examining ESBI's records, the BSP ISD II submitted a Memorandum dated April 23, 2010 to the MB, recommending that: (a) LWUA's request for approval of its acquisition of 445,337 shares in ESBI be denied; and (b) a cease and desist order be issued, as well as other sanctions be imposed on ESBI for accepting government deposits without prior authorization by the MB. 43

On April 29, 2010, the MB approved BSP ISD II's recommendations, in its Resolution No. 605. Specifically, the MB: (a) issued a Cease and Desist Order against ESBI, barring it from further accepting government deposits without authorization from the MB; and (b) required ESBI to immediately dispose/return the deposits generated from various government entities until the required authorization is secured, and submit a corresponding report within 30 days from notice thereof. 44

On June 6, 2011, the new LWUA Board issued Resolution No. 74, Series of 2011, directing LWUA's Acting Deputy Administrator for Investment and Financial Services to initiate the immediate transfer of all LWUA deposits/investments with all non-government banks, including ESBI, to all authorized government depository banks. 45 ESBI was thereafter requested to return the aggregate deposit in the sum of P700 Million, which merited a response that the same was subject to the deliberation of the new Board of ESBI. 46

Thereafter, by virtue of Resolution No. 987-B dated July 7, 2011, the MB placed ESBI under receivership because of: (a) inability to pay its liabilities as these became due in the ordinary course of business; (b) its inability to continue operating without involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors; and (c) the failure of its Board and management to restore the bank's financial health and viability despite being given considerable time within which to address its financial problems. 47 Later, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was designated as ESBI's liquidator as the bank was already placed under liquidation. 48

With the losses suffered by LWUA because of its investments in ESBI, Rustico Tutol, Luis Dg. Estrada, and Carmen Amores (Tutol, et al.), as employees of LWUA, filed a consolidated criminal and administrative complaint-affidavit 49 dated September 9, 2010, accusing Pichay, Landingin, Feleo and Espinas, of grave misconduct, violation of R.A. No. 6713, malversation, misappropriation of public funds in conjunction with R.A. No. 7080, and violation of R.A. No. 3019. aDSIHc

According to them, the act of LWUA in subscribing to P80 million worth of ESBI shares and payment of P400 million as subscription to the increase in its authorized capital stock were in defiance of, and contrary to the general provision of the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which states:

Sec. 15. Restrictions on the use of government funds. — No government funds shall be utilized for the following purpose x x x. (f) To be invested in non-government securities, money market placements and similar investments or deposit in private banking institutions. The provisions of this section shall also apply to Government Owned and Controlled Corporations. 50

Complainants alleged that the aforesaid purchase/investments in the total amount of P480 Million were completely unprotected by any government securities, including the non-issuance of certificate of stocks/shareholdings by ESBI/BSP. 51 Further, the officers of LWUA allegedly defied BSP Circular No. 309 dated November 16, 2001, by not securing the prior approval of BSP's MB on the sale or transfer of shares before disbursing the total amount of P480 Million, which resulted in LWUA having more than 20% ownership or control of the voting stock of ESBI. 52

Furthermore, as ESBI was under BSP rehabilitation, such investments are considered disadvantageous on the part of LWUA. For the six-month period from June to December 2009, no income was earned by LWUA from such investments/advances. The amount used to acquire ESBI could have been invested in high yielding government securities, government bonds and/or time deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Treasury Bills with BSP or other government depository banks. It could have been also used as loans to water service provider or eligible water districts. 53

Tutol, et al., also asseverated that Pichay and the other officers of LWUA should be guilty of grave misconduct and other administrative infractions, because through their consistent and persistent actions in illicitly performing their respective positions with clear conflict of interest, they manifested their clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule. 54 They claimed that Pichay, Feleo and Espinas have direct financial or material interest in the ESBI transaction requiring the approval of LWUA. Pichay, as LWUA Chairman, Feleo, as Acting Deputy Administrator for Finance including investments, and Espinas as Corporate Legal Counsel and Corporate Board Secretary, all have a direct hand in the recommendation, review and approval of the LWUA investments in ESBI, where they are also Chairman, Acting President and Board Secretary, respectively, and receiving financial benefits therefrom. 55

Further, an amount of P300 Million was deposited by LWUA in its ESBI account in the early part of 2010, increasing the total investment of LWUA in ESBI to P780 Million, which is the subject of demand by the LWUA Employees' Association for Progress (LEAP), the accredited union of LWUA rank and file employees. 56

Pichay and the members of the Board of Trustees and officers of LWUA filed their respective Counter-Affidavits, and after due proceedings, a Decision 57 dated July 4, 2011 was rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman finding Pichay, Feleo, and Landingin guilty of grave misconduct and imposing upon them the penalty of dismissal from service. 58 In so ruling, the Office of the Ombudsman held:

LWUA as a government corporation with special charter, may, according the legal opinion of the OGCC, have power to create subsidiary corporations such as specialized banking institution. Nevertheless, such power is still subject to the review and approval of the President of the Philippines.

Under Administrative Order No. 59 rationalizing the government corporate sector, it is mandatory that all proposals to establish subsidiary corporations shall be submitted to the President for approval.

Notwithstanding such mandatory legal requirement and the OGCC opinion, LWUA's board of trustees proceeded to establish a LWUA bank as a subsidiary pursuant to the aforecited LWUA Board Resolutions and to thereafter acquire pursuant to Resolution No. 129-A, Series of 2009 the ESBI and 445,337 of its shares of stock in the amount of Eighty Million Pesos (Php80,000,000.00) which constitute approximately sixty percent (60%) of its outstanding capital, thereby resulting in a change in the majority ownership of the bank which is also without prior approval by the Monetary Board pursuant to the BSP Manual of Regulations for Banks.

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the investments made by LWUA to ESBI, according to the finding by the Commission on Audit per its Audit Observation Memorandum are contrary to Section 15 of the General Provisions of the GAA for FY 2009 restricting the use of government funds as investments or deposits in private banking institutions.

xxx xxx xxx

The LWUA Board of Trustees' persistence to make investments and establish a subsidiary notwithstanding to a point of violating the provisions of Administrative Order No. 59, the BSP Manual of Regulations for Banks, including the general provisions of the GAA for FY 2009, is considered to constitute the kind of gross and flaunting misconduct.

The several Resolutions are manifestations of the Board's clear intent to violate the law or its flagrant disregard to established rules. The resolution which the Board of Trustees had issued pertaining to the establishment of LWUA' subsidiary through the acquisition of ESBI even without the mandatory approval of the President and Monetary Board establish the element of malice which adequately sustains the strength of evidence of culpability on the part of respondent Prospero Pichay as Chairman of the LWUA Board of Trustees for Grave Misconduct. 59

Pichay, Feleo, and Landingin filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied in a Joint Order 60 dated August 1, 2011. ETHIDa

This led Pichay to file a petition for review 61 under Rule 43 before the CA on November 13, 2012. Therein, Pichay claimed that his right to due process was violated as he was not apprised of the charge, specifically for violation of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 59 and the MORB, which served as the basis for his dismissal from service. 62 He nonetheless claimed that A.O. No. 59, requiring the approval of the President, applies only in cases where a government corporation is proposed to be acquired, created, or dissolved. As ESBI was not such a government corporation at the time when LWUA made its investment, it being a private bank, A.O. No. 59 is inapplicable, and the prior approval of the President is unnecessary. 63

In its Decision 64 dated October 23, 2013, the CA denied the petition of Pichay, thereby affirming the Ombudsman's finding of grave misconduct, and his dismissal from service. The CA agreed with the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, and likewise held that no violation of due process occurred as Pichay was given the opportunity to answer and argue against the accusations raised against him. 65

Pichay filed a motion for reconsideration, 66 which was denied in a Resolution 67 dated February 24, 2014.

Undeterred, Pichay filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 211515.

Meanwhile, the Field Investigation Office of the Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman filed a complaint for: (i) violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019; (ii) Malversation, as defined under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code; and (iii) violation of Section XI126.2 (c) (1), (2), and (3) of the MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. No. 7653, against Pichay and the other members of the Board of Trustees of LWUA, the officers and members of the Board of WGI, and the officers and members of the Board of FPI because of the interlocking directors among ESBI, FPI and WGI 68 and having acted in conspiracy in relation to the LWUA's purchase of 445,377 shares in ESBI in 2009. 69 These personalities are the following:

a. Prospero Pichay, Jr., former Chairman of the LWUA Board of Trustees

b. Eduardo Bangayan, former member of the LWUA Board

c. Aurelio O. Puentevella, former member of the LWUA Board

d. Enrique Senen G. Montilla III, former Member of the LWUA Board

e. Wilfredo M. Feleo, former LWUA Acting Deputy Administrator of Investments and Financial Services

f. Daniel Landingin, former LWUA Acting Administrator

g. Dee Hua T. Gatchalian, in her personal capacity and Executive Vice President for Finance and Administration, Director and Treasurer of WGI

h. Peter S. Salud, as President of FPI

i. Elvira A. Ting, in her personal capacity and as Executive Vice President for Operations for WGI

j. Sherwin T. Gatchalian, in his capacity as the Executive Vice President of WGI and while he was the incumbent Mayor of Valenzuela City

k. Kenneth Gatchalian, in his personal capacity and as the Director of WGI

l. William T. Gatchalian, in his capacity as Chairman and Director of WGI

m. Yolanda T. De la Cruz, in her capacity as Director of WGI

n. Geronimo Velasco, Jr. as Chairman and Director of FPI

o. Rogelio D. Garcia, in his capacity as Director of FPI

p. Federico Puno, in his capacity as Director of FPI

q. Lamberto B. Mercado, Jr., in his capacity as Director of FPI

r. Evelyn De La Rosa, as Director of FPI

s. Arthur Ponsaran, in his capacity as Director of both WGI and FPI

t. Joaquin P. Obieta, in his capacity as Director of FPI 70

Likewise filed were criminal complaints for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Malversation against Pichay, Landingin, Bangayan, Puentevella, Montilla and Feleo, in relation to LWUA's two separate deposits of P400 Million and P300 Million with ESBI in 2009, acting in conspiracy with the following: cSEDTC

a. George S. Chua (Chua), former LWUA nominee to ESBI's Board of Directors

b. George T. Ipong (Ipong), former LWUA nominee to ESBI's Board of Directors

c. Generoso D. C. Tulangan (Tulangan), former LWUA nominee to ESBI's Board of Directors

d. Wilfred L. Billena (Billena), former LWUA nominee to ESBI's Board of Directors

e. Edith S. Bueno (Bueno), former LWUA nominee to ESBI's Board of Directors 71

As part thereof, another criminal complaint was filed against Pichay, Montilla, Feleo and Espinas for violation of Sections 19 and 66 of R.A. No. 8791 in relation to Section 36 of R.A. No. 7653. 72

Lastly, the complaint included an administrative charge for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, all under P.D. No. 807 and the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service against Espinas, Chua, Ipong, Tulangan, Billena and Bueno. 73

After the parties filed their respective pleadings and the conduct of due proceedings, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause against respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, 74 malversation, 75 and violation of Section X126.2 of the MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. No. 7653 76 and violation of Sections 19 and 66 of R.A. No. 8791 in relation to Section 36 of R.A. No. 7653. 77

As found by the Office of the Ombudsman, LWUA's acquisition of ESBI shares was illegal and improper because it did not bear the approval of the BSP, MB or DOF. Both BSP and DOF refused to give their imprimatur to the transaction because ESBI was shown to be unstable and suffering from liquidity issues. 78

They were well aware of the bank's precarious situation, considering that even LWUA's due diligence examination conducted by an auditor that they commissioned, confirmed that ESBI was suffering liquidity problems and was a credit-risk. Despite this knowledge, Pichay, Bangayan, Feleo, Montilla, Landingin and Puentevella still pushed through with the questionable purchase. 79 Their bad faith is manifested by their acts of inexplicably brushing aside legal requirements and by continuously refusing to heed the repeated cautions and admonitions of the OGCC, DOF, OP and BSP in relation to the purchase of the ESBI shares. 80 They also failed to refute the bad faith attendant to LWUA's purchase of ESBI shares because it was made in a manner that highlighted the large and obviously disproportionate amount between the par value of the ESBI shares at PHP100.00/per share and price which LWUA paid for them. 81

As such, the injury suffered by the government due to their actions is undeniable, as it deprived the government of the opportunity to use the illegally expended funds to instead fund the agency's lawful projects, not to mention that the shares purchased by LWUA from FPI and WGI are now worthless, ESBI having been shuttered due to severe financial distress. 82

The Office of the Ombudsman thereby disposed of the case in a Joint Resolution 83 dated March 16, 2015 as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Office, through the undersigned:

(a) FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE to indict for:

[VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019]

i. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, EDUARDO A. BANGAYAN, AURELIO O. PUENTEVELLA, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, JR., DANIEL A. LANDINGIN, WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, YOLANDA T. DE LA CRUZ, DEE HUA T. GACHALIAN, ARTHUR R. PONSARAN, GERONIMO VELASCO, JR., PETER S. SALUD, ROGELIO D. GARCIA, LAMBERTO B. MERCADO, JR., EVELYN DE LA ROSA, JOAQUIN P. OBIETA, ELVIRA A. TING, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN and SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, acting in conspiracy, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. No. 3019 in relation to LWUA's purchase of 445,377 shares in Express Savings Bank, Inc. (ESBI) and in which the Government suffered damage in the amount of at least PHP80,003,070.51;

ii. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., DANIEL A. LANDINGIN, EDUARDO A. BANGAYAN, AURELIO O. PUENTEVELLA, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, GEORGE S. CHUA, GREGORIO T. IPONG, WILFRED L. BILLENA, EDITA S. BUENO and GENEROSO D.C. TULAGAN acting in conspiracy, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. No. 3019 in relation to LWUA's deposit and/or capital infusion of PHP400,000,000.00 with ESBI and in which the Government suffered damage in the amount of at least PHP400,000,000.00; and

iii. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., DANIEL LANDINGIN, EDUARDO A. BANGAYAN, AURELIO O. PUENTEVELLA, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, GEORGE S. CHUA, GREGORIO T. IPONG, WILFRED L. BILLENA, EDITA S. BUENO and GENEROSO D.C. TULAGAN acting in conspiracy, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. No. 3019 in relation to LWUA's deposit of PHP300,000,000.00 with ESBI and in which the Government suffered damage in the amount of at least PHP300,000,000.00

[MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS]

i. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, EDUARDO A. BAN GAYAN, AURELIO O. PUENTEVELLA, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, JR., DANIEL A. LANDINGIN, WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, YOLANDA T. DE LA CRUZ, DEE HUA T. GACHALIAN, ARTHUR R. PONSARAN, GERONIMO VELASCO, JR., PETER S. SALUD, ROGELIO D. GARCIA, LAMBERTO B. MERCADO, JR., EVELYN DE LA ROSA, JOAQUIN P. OBIETA, ELVIRA A. TING, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN and SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, acting in conspiracy, for MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS in relation to LWUA fund releases amounting to at least PHP80,003,070.51 in connection with LWUA's purchase of 445,377 shares in ESBI;

ii. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., DANIEL A. LANDINGIN, EDUARDO A. BANGAYAN, AURELIO O. PUENTEVELLA, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, GEORGE S. CHUA, GREGORIO T. IPONG, WILFRED L. BILLENA, EDITA S. BUENO and GENEROSO D.C. TULAGAN acting in conspiracy, for MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS in relation to LWUA fund releases amounting to at least PHP400,000,000.00 in connection with LWUA's deposit and/or capital infusion with ESBI of PHP400,000,000.00; and

iii. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., DANIEL LANDINGIN, EDUARDO A. BANGAYAN, AURELIO O. PUENTEVELLA, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, GEORGE S. CHUA, GREGORIO T. IPONG, WILFRED L. BILLENA, EDITA S. BUENO and GENEROSO D.C. TULAGAN acting in conspiracy, for MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS in relation to LWUA fund releases amounting to at least PHP300,000,000.00 in connection with LWUA's deposit with ESBI of PHP300,000,000.00.

[VIOLATION OF SECTION X126.2 (C) (1) (2) OF THE MANUAL OF REGULATION FOR BANKS IN RELATION TO SECTIONS 36 AND 37 OF R.A. NO. 7653]

i. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, EDUARDO A. BANGAYAN, AURELIO O. PUENTEVELLA, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, JR., DANIEL A. LANDINGIN, WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, YOLANDA T. DE LA CRUZ, DEE HUA T. GACHALIAN, ARTHUR R. PONSARAN, GERONIMO VELASCO, JR., PETER S. SALUD, ROGELIO D. GARCIA, LAMBERTO B. MERCADO, JR., EVELYN DE LA ROSA, JOAQUIN P. OBIETA, ELVIRA A. TING, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN and SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, acting in conspiracy, for VIOLATION OF SECTION X126.2 (C) (1) (2) OF THE MANUAL OF REGULATION FOR BANKS IN RELATION TO SECTIONS 36 AND 37 OF R.A. NO. 7653 in relation to LWUA's purchase of 445,377 shares in ESBI.

[VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 19 AND 66 OF R.A. NO. 8791 IN RELATION TO SECTION 36 OF R.A. NO. 8791]

i. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, and ARNALDO M. ESPINAS for VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 19 AND 66 OF R.A. NO. 8791 IN RELATION TO SECTION 36 OF R.A. NO. 8791.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the corresponding Informations be immediately filed against them with the Sandiganbayan;

(b) DISMISSES the criminal charges against respondents RENATO S. VELASCO, SUSANA DUMLAO-VARGAS AND BONIFACIO MARIO M. PEÑA, SR. in OMB-C-C-12-0031-A for lack of merit;

(c) DISMISSES the charges for Plunder and Violation of Section 3 (a), (d), (g), (h) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019 against ALL RESPONDENTS for insufficiency of evidence;

(d) DISMISSES all the criminal charges against respondent FEDERICO PUNO by reason of his death;

(e) AFFIRMS the Department of Justice Prosecutors' Resolution dated 10 January 2012 in OMB-C-12-0031-A; and

(f) FINDS respondents ARNALDO M. ESPINAS, GEORGE S. CHUA, GREGORIO T. IPONG, WILFRED L. BILLENA, EDITA S. BUENO and GENEROSO D. C. TULAGAN ADMINISTRATIVELY GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and metes upon them the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, including all its accessory penalties of (a) cancellation of eligibility, (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits, (c) perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service and (d) perpetual bar from taking Civil Service examinations.

SO ORDERED. 84

The respondents filed their respective Motion for Reconsideration, which were denied in a Joint Order 85 dated April 4, 2016. The said Joint Order likewise corrected a clerical error as follows: SDAaTC

[VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 19 AND 66 OF R.A. NO. 8791 IN RELATION TO SECTION 36 OF R.A. NO. 7653]

i. [1 COUNT] Respondents PROSPERO A. PICHAY, ENRIQUE SENEN G. MONTILLA III, WILFREDO M. FELEO, and ARNALDO M. ESPINAS for VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 19 AND 66 OF R.A. NO. 8791 IN RELATION TO SECTION 36 OF R.A. NO. 7653.

The corresponding Informations as decreed by the Office of the Ombudsman were thereafter filed 86 with the Sandiganbayan. These were docketed as (a) SB-16-CRM-0425 87 for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to the amount of P80,003,070.51 to purchase 445,377 shares of stocks of ESBI; (b) SB-16-CRM 0426 88 for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to the amount of P300 million deposit in the savings account of ESBI; (c) SB-16-CRM-0427 89 for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to the amount of P400 million advance payment for stock subscription to ESBI; (d) SB-16-CRM-0428 90 for malversation of public funds in relation to the amount of P80,003,070.51 to purchase 445,377 shares of stocks of ESBI; (e) SB-16-CRM 0429 91 for malversation of public funds in relation to the amount of P300 million deposit in the savings account of ESBI; (f) SB-16-CRM 0430 92 for malversation of public funds in relation to the amount of P400 million advance payment for stock subscription to ESBI; (g) SB-16-CRM 0431 93 for violation of Sections 19 and 66 of Republic Act No. 8791 in relation to Section 36 of RA No. 7653; and (h) SB-16-CRM-0432 94 for violation of Section X126.2 (c) (1) (2) of the MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 237 of R.A. No. 7653.

Pichay thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and/or to Dismiss the Case 95 on July 15, 2016. The other accused also filed similar motions.

After due proceedings, the motions were resolved by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 96 dated October 18, 2016 finding the absence of probable cause against the accused in SB-16-CRM-0428, SB-16-CRM-0429 and SB-16-CRM-0430 for Malversation, and in SB-16-CRM-0431 for Violation of Sections 19 and 66 of R.A. No. 8791 in relation to Section 36 of R.A. No. 7653, thereby dismissing the same. 97

Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause against Pichay, Feleo, Jr. and Montilla III for violation of Section X126.2 (c) (2) of the MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. No. 7653. It also found probable cause against Pichay, Feleo, Jr. and Montilla III, Weslie Gatchalian, William Gatchalian, Yolanda dela Cruz, Dee Hua Gatchalian, Arthur Ponsaran, Geronimo Velasco, Jr., Peter Salud, Rogelio Garcia, Lamberto Mercado, Jr., Evelyn dela Rosa, Joaquin Obieta, Elvira Ting, Kenneth Gatchalian for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to the amount of P80,003,070.51 to purchase 445,377 shares of stocks of ESBI. Likewise, it found probable cause against Pichay, Feleo, Jr., and Montilla III, George Sia Chua, and Generoso Ipong, Wilfred D. Billena, Edita Bueno, and Generoso D. Tulagan, for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to the amount of P300 Million deposit in the savings account of ESBI. Lastly, it found probable cause against Pichay, Feleo, Jr. and Montilla III, George Sia Chua, Gregorio Ipong, Wilfred D. Billena, Edita Bueno, and Generoso D. Tulagan, for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to the amount of P400 Million advance payment for stock subscription to ESBI. 98

The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan resolved in its Resolution 99 dated November 17, 2017 as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court issued on October 18, 2016 filed by the prosecution is DENIED. Likewise, the Motions for Partial Reconsideration filed by accused Prospero A. Pichay, Wilfredo M. Feleo, Jr., and Enrique G. Montilla III, are DENIED. However, the cases against accused Enrique G. Montilla are dismissed on account of his death, per Resolution of this Court dated June 27, 2017.

On the other hand, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by accused George S. Chua, Gregorio T. Ipong, Edita S. Bueno and Generoso D. Tulagan, Dee Hua T. Gatchalian, William T. Gatchalian, Kenneth T. Gatchalian and Elvira Ting are GRANTED. Likewise, the Motions for Partial Reconsideration filed by accused Arthur R. Ponsaran and Joaquin P. Obieta, Geronimo F. Velasco, Jr., Peter S. Salud, Weslie T. Gatchalian, Rogelio D. Garcia, Lamberto B. Mercado, Jr. and Evelyn Dela Rosa, and Yolanda T. Dela Cruz, are GRANTED. The cases against them are DISMISSED for lack of probable cause.

The Resolution dated 18 October 2016 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

a. In SB-16-CRM-0425, SB-16-CRM-0426, SB-16-CRM-0427, SB-16-CRM-0432, the Court finds PROBABLE CAUSE for the issuance of warrants of arrest against accused Prospero A. Pichay and Wilfredo M. Feleo, Jr. and DISMISSES the case against all the other accused;

b. In SB-16-CRM-0428, SB-16-CRM-0429, SB-16-CRM-0430, SB-16-CRM-0431, the Court finds NO PROBABLE CAUSE for the issuance of warrants of arrest against ALL the accused, and as a corollary, the cases against them are DISMISSED;

c. In SB-16-CRM-0425, SB-16-CRM-0426, SB-16-CRM-0427, SB-16-CRM-0432, as against accused Enrique Senen G. Montilla III and Daniel A. Landingin are DISMISSED by reason of death.

The surety bonds filed by accused Aurelio O. Puentevella and Enrique Senen G. Montilla III are hereby cancelled. The cash bonds posted by accused Eduardo A. Bangayan, Weslie, William, De Hua, Kenneth, Sherwin, all surnamed Gatchalian, Yolanda T. Dela Cruz, Arthur R. Ponsaran, Geronimo Velasco, Jr., Peter S. Salud, Roelio D. Garcia, Lamberto B. Mercado, Jr., Evelyn Dela Rosa, Joaquin P. Obieta, Elvira A. Ting, George S. Chua, Gregorio T. Ipong, Wilfred D.L. Billena, Edita S. Bueno, Generoso D. Tulagan, and Arnaldo M. Espinas for their provisional liberty are hereby released subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. The Hold Departure Orders issued against the accused except for accused Pichay and Feleo, Jr. are hereby lifted and recalled.

SO ORDERED. 100

Aggrieved, Pichay now comes before this Court via a petition for certiorari to assail the findings of the Sandiganbayan, which case was docketed as G.R. No. 236288. acEHCD

With the same parties and issues involved in both G.R. No. 211515 and 236288, these were consolidated in a Resolution 101 dated April 2, 2018.

Essentially, the issue for consideration in the instant cases is whether Pichay should be held administratively liable, as well as be criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan on account of LWUA's purchase of 445,377 ESBI shares, its deposit of P300 Million, and advance payment for subscription in the anticipated increase in capital stock of ESBI in the amount of P400 Million.

Our Ruling

The administrative

At the outset, it must be stated that the Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers of calibrating the evidence of the parties. This Court is not a trier of facts; the Ombudsman is. 102

As the findings of fact of the Ombudsman and the CA reveal, as supported by the documents made available before this Court, Pichay and the members of the Board of Trustees of LWUA acquired a majority stake in ESBI despite the absence of the necessary prior approval as required by laws and regulations.

Pichay nevertheless comes before this Court, claiming violation of his right to due process. He argues that the complaint filed by Tutol, et al., did not raise allegations pertaining to the requirement of presidential approval under A.O. No. 59 and the approval of the Monetary Board under the BSP MORB, hence, he could not be held administratively guilty for these acts. 103

We disagree.

In the case of Vivo v. Pagcor, 104 this Court elucidated on the concept of administrative due process in this wise:

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. 105

As such, due process simply means the opportunity to be heard. Poring over the documents made available before this Court, it cannot be said that Pichay was deprived of an opportunity to raise his defenses on the charges laid down against him. Contrary to the claims of Pichay, he was apprised of, and was given the opportunity to controvert, the allegation pertaining to the absence of prior approval of the President under A.O. No. 59 and the Monetary Board under the MORB.

Notably, during the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman, Tutol, et al., attached in their Position Paper 106 dated May 9, 2011, as Annex B, and thus made an integral part thereof, Opinion No. 242, Series of 2008 of the OGCC, which mentioned the need for a presidential approval when LWUA sought its advice on the acquisition of a thrift bank, thus:

Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 59, specifically provides that all proposals to establish subsidiary corporations shall be subject to the review of the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee (GCMCC), now the Department of Finance, and the approval of the President of the Philippines. x x x 107

An examination of Opinion No. 242 issued by the OGCC would also show that the addressee of the said Opinion was Pichay. He was thus made fully aware of the requisite approvals that the LWUA Board must obtain in the intended subscription to the majority shares of ESBI. SDHTEC

With regard to the requirement of MB approval, the position paper of Tutol, et al., explicitly stated the absence of MB approval in the acquisition of ESBI, thus:

The foregoing shows that all the documents referred to above, particularly those from BSOP and OGCC, even the Memorandum issued by former Executive Secretary Ermita, confirm that LWUA's multi-million transfer of money to ESBI is subject to compliance with various legal requirements, foremost of which is the prior approval by the Monetary Board. x x x 108

Pichay cannot conveniently close his eyes on these allegations and nitpick which among the allegations he would choose to answer and thereafter cry violation of due process. He was given a copy of the position paper 109 and had the time to browse all of its contents before submitting his own position paper. As such, he had the opportunity to controvert all of the allegations therein, and was given the opportunity to be heard.

While the complaint-affidavit filed by Tutol, et al., related the absence of the necessary approvals in their discussion under the criminal charge they filed, the same does not operate as a delimitation on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman to make a piecemeal appreciation of the arguments raised therein based on the divisions made by the complainants in their complaint-affidavit. It is the entirety of the allegations of the complaint and all relevant papers submitted, that must be considered by the Office of the Ombudsman and not just on what specific charge the complainants ought to charge respondents. To do so would limit the authority of the investigator and entertain the complainant's caprice in deciding on what charge should be equated with the facts being raised.

A complaint having been filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts as narrated therein must be examined as a whole and could serve as a basis either for a finding of an administrative liability or of a criminal charge, or both. A wrongdoing committed by an individual does not only give rise to a criminal liability; the same wrongdoing may also serve as a basis for an administrative liability.

A reading of the complaint-affidavit of Tutol, et al., would show that they were able to narrate the facts leading to the findings of liability on the part of Pichay. For after all, the charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he/she is apprised of the substance of the charge against him/her; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. 110

The allegations in the complaint-affidavit of Tutol was further elaborated in their position paper. Under Rule III, Section 5 (b) (1) of A.O. No. 07, 111 the officer investigating a case filed with the Ombudsman, may ask for submission of position papers, which shall be considered in resolving a case, thus:

1. To direct the parties to file, within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order, their respective verified position papers. The position papers shall contain only those charges, defenses and other claims contained in the affidavits and pleadings filed by the parties. Any additional relevant affidavits and/or documentary evidence may be attached by the parties to their position papers. On the basis of the position papers, affidavits and other pleadings filed, the Hearing Officer may consider the case submitted for resolution.

The complaint centered around the irregularities committed in the acquisition of ESBI by LWUA. Necessarily, the corresponding requirements, such as the approval of the President and the MB are considered relevant information in deciding on the complaint of Tutol, et al., which encompasses not just the criminal aspect, but also the administrative aspect. Moreover, a reading of the key issue raised by Tutol, et al., in their position paper would reveal that the arguments they raised, including the requisite presidential and MB approval, were intended to prove the administrative charge, as they raised the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence in support of the administrative charges against respondents. 112 Thus, the grounds they raised in their complaint and position paper could very well be evaluated for a finding of administrative liability.

It must be clarified that the phrase "The position papers shall contain only those charges, defenses and other claims contained in the affidavits and pleadings filed by the parties" under A.O. No. 07 does not mean that the position paper shall be limited only to the structure by which the complaint-affidavit was presented when it was filed. Rather, this must be interpreted to mean that supporting evidence to support the charges under the complaint-affidavit may be submitted provided that these pieces of evidence would revolve around the acts complained of, and fall within claims of the parties as real parties in interest. Corollary, excluded from these are allegations of acts that will fall outside the extent of the parties' legal interest. As the requirements of presidential and MB approval serve as an anchor to the question of whether irregularities existed in the acquisition of ESBI by LWUA, the issues raised by Tutol, et al., cannot be said to have deprived Pichay of his right to be informed and participate in the proceedings.

As evaluated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the acts complained of by Tutol, et al., amounted to grave misconduct.

As defined, misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." 113 In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest and established by substantial evidence. 114

As discussed in Sabio v. Ombudsman, 115 grave misconduct grounded on flagrant disregard of established rules may be committed as follows:

While misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose, a public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct only when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest, as in this case. Flagrant disregard of rules has been jurisprudentially demonstrated, among others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of a customary rule; in the repeated voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies; in the practice of illegally collecting fees more than what is prescribed for delayed registration of marriages; when several violations or disregard of regulations governing the collection of government funds were committed; and when the employee arrogated unto herself responsibilities that were clearly beyond her given duties. The common denominator in these cases was the employee's propensity to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.116

In the instant case, several correspondences were addressed to Pichay regarding the requirements for acquiring ESBI, yet, there is no showing that he raised this concern to the LWUA Board before the transaction materialized. AScHCD

In a letter 117 dated October 16, 2008, the OGCC already advised Pichay that while government corporations with special charters are granted general corporate powers, the implied power to create subsidiary corporations is governed and regulated by special law and presidential issuances. It then mentioned provisions of the law and issuances requiring the prior approval of the President of the Philippines and the Monetary Board.

Thereafter, in a letter 118 dated April 17, 2009, Pichay was again informed that the acquisition of a bank requires the review of the DOF and approval of the President of the Philippines. The letter also mentioned the requisite prior approval of the MB.

Then in a letter 119 dated July 10, 2009, Pichay was informed of the documents needed to be submitted for the evaluation of his request for approval by the MB, for the acquisition of LWUA of 60% of the voting stock of ESBI.

Another letter 120 dated July 30, 2009 was sent to Pichay, reiterating that any change in the majority ownership of a bank would require prior MB approval. Subsequently, in a letter 121 dated August 27, 2009, the MB reiterated the submission of certain documents that were needed in order to aid it in evaluating the proposed acquisition by LWUA of the majority of the voting stock of ESBI.

The aforementioned communications received by Pichay indicate several reminders about the need to secure the President and the MB's approval. While it would appear that the Memorandum 122 dated October 14, 2009 carried the approval of the President, the same still carried a caveat that the same is subject to pertinent banking laws, rules and regulations, to wit:

3. Subject to the provisions of RA 8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000 and pertinent laws, rules and regulations, the Office of the President interposes no objections and grants authority to LWUA to acquire equity investment in Express Savings Bank, Inc. 123

Notably, nowhere from the communications from the MB could it be inferred that it gave its imprimatur in LWUA's acquisition of a majority stake in ESBI. On the contrary, the repeated request of the MB for the submission of documents entail that it was in the process of evaluating the proposed action of LWUA. As LWUA would acquire a majority share in ESBI, it would have a controlling stake in the business of the bank. It would engage in banking activities that fall within the supervision of the MB. It was thus important to secure the approval of the MB for it to be allowed to engage in banking activities.

Despite the repeated reminders to Pichay, the LWUA Board still proceeded with its plan to acquire ESBI, which started with the approval of Resolution No. 56 124 on March 24, 2009 for the acquisition of a savings or thrift bank. The acquired bank was later identified as ESBI, and with the passage of Resolution No. 120 125 on May 19, 2009, it approved the acquisition of 60% of the outstanding shares of the ESBI. Then in Resolution No. 129-A 126 passed on May 26, 2009, the Board approved the amount of P80 Million as consideration for the acquisition of 60% outstanding shares in ESBI.

The flagrant disregard of the rules committed by Pichay, despite being knowledgeable of the requirements for obtaining ESBI, as evinced by the letters that were sent to him, is evident. The absence of a definitive approval as required by the banking laws and regulations should have prompted Pichay to raise concerns with the LWUA Board before proceeding with the acquisition of ESBI. However, instead of raising such concerns, he allowed the LWUA Board, under his leadership, to continue with the negotiations and eventual acquisition of ESBI. This repeated disregard of the rules equates to a grave misconduct.

Ultimately, the absence of the requisite MB approval resulted in losses on the part of the government in the total amount of P780 Million. This amount could have been used for other endeavors to help local water utilities. Despite the absence of the necessary approvals, the LWUA Board proceeded with its acquisition of ESBI in the amount of P80 Million, deposited P300 Million and even made an advance payment in the amount of P400 Million to subscribe to the increase in ESBI's authorized capital stock. Continuously transferring funds to an entity, for which approval of the appropriate regulatory body was not yet acquired, exposed these funds to visibly potential risks. As it later turned out, the risks led to losses, as ESBI was eventually closed, and there was no showing that LWUA was able to recover the full amount it spent in relation to the acquisition of ESBI. AcICHD

It bears stressing that while the OGCC gave an opinion that LWUA was authorized to acquire another bank, it also mentioned the necessary approvals from the appropriate body, which must be secured by LWUA before proceeding with its acquisition of a bank. LWUA, especially Pichay, to whom the letters and correspondences were addressed, was thus clearly informed of the requisites before proceeding with its acquisition of a bank. This assumes greater significance when viewed in light of the amount involved in this case. As it appears, LWUA was not just spending government money to subscribe to shares of stocks of a bank. It decided to take a huge part in the management of the bank by subscribing to 60% of the shares of stocks of ESBI, perform banking functions, and maintain its control thereof, as it advanced its payment to the subscription of ESBI's increase in its authorized capital stock. In spending the amount of P780 Million, LWUA should have been more prudent in making decisions, especially since there was no showing of an immediate necessity to obtain ESBI for LWUA to perform its functions. With the failure of Pichay to take into consideration or raise the letters and correspondences addressed to him for the acquisition of ESBI, which eventually led to government losses, his actions cannot just simply be considered as a bad business judgment, but a clear disregard of the rules that is equivalent to grave misconduct.

Finally, Pichay impresses upon this Court that the term "perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision" as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service under A.O. No. 07, means that the disqualification extends only to government positions that involve employment, hence the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it imposed disqualification to hold any public office, 127 which is an accessory penalty under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS).

Pichay is mistaken.

There is nothing from the provisions of A.O. Order No. 07 that would prevent the application of the RRACCS. On the contrary, A.O. No. 7 allows the application of the rules on civil service, which serves to implement the provisions of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987. Rule III, Section 1 of A.O. No. 07 explicitly provides the grounds for administrative complaint as follows:

Section 1. Grounds for administrative complaint. — An administrative complaint may be filed for acts or omissions which are:

a) contrary to law or regulations;

b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

c) inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions though in accordance with law;

d) based on a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

e) in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose;

f) otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification;

g) due to any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the Ombudsman or any of his deputies against the officer or employee to whom it was addressed; and

h) such other grounds provided for under E.O. 292 and other applicable laws. 128 (Emphasis supplied)

Further Section 10 thereof provides:

Section 10. Penalties. — (a) In administrative charges under Executive Order No. 292 or such other executive orders, laws or rules under which the respondent is charged, the penalties provided thereat shall be imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman (b) in administrative proceedings conducted under these Rules, the Office of the Ombudsman may impose the penalty of reprimand, suspension without pay for a minimum period of one (1) month up to a maximum period of one (1) year; demotion, dismissal from the service, or a fine equivalent to his salary for one (1) month up to one (1) year, or from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken, or lost, or both, at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charge.

The penalty of dismissal from the service shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

This is without prejudice to the exercise of authority of the Ombudsman to exercise his authority under Section 15, paragraph (3) of RA 6770. 129 (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, Sections 1 and 10, Rule III of A.O. No. 07 clearly provides that when the administrative charge adjudged by the Office of the Ombudsman is one that is classified within E.O. No. 292, it is the penalty provided thereat that should be applied. Under Sec. 46, Chapter 7 Book V of E.O. No. 292, the offense of misconduct is considered as a ground for disciplinary action. Pursuant to its power to prescribe and amend rules and provisions for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law, it promulgated the RRACS, which imposed the corresponding penalty for the administrative offenses enumerated under E.O. No. 292. As such, the RRACS serves as the implementing authority of the administrative offenses enumerated under EO 292. Under the RRACS, the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations. 130

Hence, considering that the administrative offense charged against Pichay was committed under E.O. No. 292, it is the penalty imposable, with its inherent administrative disabilities, as provided under the RRACS, that should prevail.

The criminal charge in

In these consolidated petitions, Pichay likewise assails the findings of probable cause against him by the Sandiganbayan. TAIaHE

Probable cause is defined as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." Thus, an allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated before this Court can exercise its power of judicial review. 131

As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause. However, this non-interference does not apply when there is grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. 132 There is "grave abuse of discretion" where "a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law." 133

In Pestilos v. Generoso, 134 probable cause as a requirement in the different stages in a criminal proceeding, was discussed as follows:

The purpose of a preliminary investigationis to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial. In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. 135

When the Sandiganbayan found probable cause to charge Pichay with violation of R.A. No. 3019 and the MORB, it found sufficient proof that he was probably guilty of the offenses under which he was charged. It did not proceed to evaluate the evidence presented in a manner that would convict or exculpate him from the charges. As held in Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan, 136 probable cause simply implies probability of guilt. It is based merely on opinion and reasonable belief. The preliminary investigation is not the proper venue to rule on petitioner's guilt or innocence.

The requirement of approval by the MB and the obligation to register the transfer of ownership emanates from the requirements of the MORB, which is now reproduced under Section 122 of the 2018 MORB, thus:

122 SHARES OF STOCKS OF BANKS

xxx xxx xxx

b. Transactions requiring prior Monetary Board approval

(1) Prior approval of the Monetary Board shall be required on transaction involving voting shares of stock of a bank, if such transaction, in itself or in relation with other/previous transactions will:

(a) Result in ownership or control of more than twenty percent (20%) of voting shares of stock of a bank by any person whether natural or juridical or which will enable such person to elect, or be elected as, a director of such bank; or

(b) Effect a change in the majority ownership or control of the voting shares of stock of the bank from one (1) group of persons to another group: Provided, That in no case shall such transaction be approved unless the bank concerned shall immediately comply with the prescribed minimum capital requirement for new banks, notwithstanding any approved capital build-up program.

(2) The request for prior Monetary Board approval shall be submitted jointly by the transferor-stockholder (or the bank in the case of additional subscription or conversion of preferred shares or debt instruments) and the transferee-stockholder thru the bank to appropriate supervising department of the Bangko Sentral. The request shall be accompanied by, in the case of transferee-stockholder, the same papers/documents required of incorporators/stockholders of newly established banks as provided in Appendix 33. The corporate secretary shall hold in abeyance the registration of the transaction until the required prior Bangko Sentral approval is submitted as provided hereof.

(3) In the case of additional subscription, the bank shall not recognize the fund infused by the subscriber in its book as asset and liability or equity unless prior Monetary Board approval is obtained. Pending approval by the Monetary Board, the fund infused by the subscriber shall be placed in an independent bank, such as, in the form of an escrow deposit or deposit with hold-out agreement showing availability/hold-out of funds for the said purpose.

(4) Sanctions. Any willful delay in the submission by the transferor and transferee of the request for prior Monetary Board approval, together with the required supporting papers/documents, within sixty (60) calendar days from date of transaction or thirty (30) calendar days from receipt by corporate secretary of request for registration of the transaction, whichever is earlier, shall subject the transferor, the transferee, or both to the sanctions prescribed under Section 35 of R.A. No. 7653, without prejudice to the appropriate legal actions for the rescission and invalidation of the transaction.

Irrefutably, the transaction entered into by LWUA resulted into its ownership of ESBI, having more than 20% of its shares. Necessarily, this equates to having the power to control the management of ESBI, which, being a bank, falls within the supervision of the BSP. Consequently, the transaction entered into by Pichay, as Chairman of the LWUA Board, required the prior approval of the MB. The absence of prior MB approval was explicitly alleged in the Information covered by SB-16-Crim. Case No. 0432. 137 Regardless of whether there was a tacit approval that was given by the MB or whether there was substantial compliance, if the same is allowed, or whether there are exceptions thereto, are questions left to the court during the course of the trial. What is apparent in this case, is the failure of Pichay to obtain the requisite approval of the MB, which already satisfies the requirement of probable cause.

Moreover, while the Sandiganbayan added a supporting finding in its Resolution regarding the failure of Pichay to request for the registration of the ESBI acquisition, nowhere did it indicate an abandonment of its earlier finding that there was no MB approval that accompanied the acquisition of ESBI. If at all, this only adds to the findings of the Sandiganbayan on the violations committed by Pichay. Whether the obligation is actually imposed on the corporate secretary or Pichay, is a matter to be threshed out during the trial. Moreover, even if it was not his obligation to do so, it cannot be denied that Pichay proceeded with the transaction despite the absence of the MB approval. Furthermore, it deposited the amount of P300 Million and even made an advance payment of P400 Million as additional subscription to ESBI for the increase in its authorized capital stock. These were done regardless of the absence of MB approval, which eventually caused undue injury to the government. cDHAES

Pichay likewise raises the violation of his right to speedy disposition of the case.

We do not agree.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 138 it was held that the right to speedy disposition of cases is subjective, thus:

Thus, the concept of speedy disposition is relative. There is no hard-and-fast mathematical rule on the reckoning of time involved and facts peculiar to each case must be taken into account.

Nevertheless, this Court carved a standard test in resolving these cases. Martin v. Ver adopted the "balancing test" which provides four (4) factors as its guide in determining the existence of inordinate delay, namely: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his or her right; and (4) prejudice caused to the defendant as a result of the delay. However, these factors must be taken into account together with the other circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the totality of the facts must be weighed and evaluated. 139

In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 140 the invocation of the said right was explained in this wise:

When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend these investigations, this period cannot be counted since these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused.

This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its investigation takes too long, it can result in the extinction of criminal liability through the prescription of the offense.

Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against the accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated. Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned.

With respect to fact-finding at the level of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman must provide for reasonable periods based upon its experience with specific types of cases, compounded with the number of accused and the complexity of the evidence required. He or she must likewise make clear when cases are deemed submitted for decision. The Ombudsman has the power to provide for these rules and it is recommended that he or she amend these rules at the soonest possible time.

These time limits must be strictly complied with. If it has been alleged that there was delay within the stated time periods, the burden of proof is on the defense to show that there has been a violation of their right to speedy trial or their right to speedy disposition of cases. The defense must be able to prove first, that the case took much longer than was reasonably necessary to resolve, and second, that efforts were exerted to protect their constitutional rights.

What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by "mere mathematical reckoning." It requires consideration of a number of factors, including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the information, to conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the submission of the case for decision. Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into account.

The complexity of the issues presented by the case must be considered in determining whether the period necessary for its resolution is reasonable. In Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan this Court found that "the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the records." In Binay v. Sandiganbayan, this Court considered "the complexity of the cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties' lawyers" to determine whether the delay is justifiable. When the case is simple and the evidence is straightforward, it is possible that delay may occur even within the given periods. Defense, however, still has the burden to prove that the case could have been resolved even before the lapse of the period before the delay could be considered inordinate. 141

In the present case, Tutol, et al., filed their consolidated administrative and criminal complaint-affidavit in 2010. Following Cagang, this stage cannot yet be considered as an adversarial proceeding insofar as the criminal aspect is concerned. This is because the fact-finding investigation of the FIO has yet to start. Under Section 2, Rule II of A.O. No. 07, a criminal complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman may lead to different outcomes, thus:

Section 2. Evaluation — Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;

c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;

d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;

e) referred for administrative adjudication; or

f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.

As it turned out, the criminal aspect was referred to the FIO for a fact-finding investigation, and it was only after the FIO filed a formal complaint in 2013, when it could be said that the determination of whether there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of the case, could start. While it took three years for the Ombudsman to resolve the issues presented before it, the complexity of the case and the submission of the various pleadings by the parties must also be taken into consideration.

Further, as the burden of proof falls on the part of Pichay to prove violation of his right to speedy disposition of the case, he was duty bound to show the circumstances surrounding the cause of the delay he is raising. A determination of whether there was a delay in the disposition of a case, seen from the prism of mathematical computation alone, will not suffice. During the course of the proceedings, pleadings will have to be filed, the pieces of evidence carefully scrutinized, and the arguments raised by the adverse parties diligently examined before coming up with a decision. Considering the nature of the transaction involved, which also included different personalities who owned the ESBI shares that were bought by LWUA, the time taken by the Ombudsman in deciding the case cannot be said to be unreasonable. In all, Pichay failed to show any other causes that contributed to the delay in the disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated October 23, 2013 and the Resolution dated February 24, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127341, subject of the petition in G.R. No. 211515, and the Resolutions dated October 18, 2016 and November 17, 2017 rendered by the Sandiganbayan in SB-16-CRM-0425, SB-16-CRM-0426, SB-16-CRM-0427, and SB-16-CRM-0432, subject of the petition in G.R. No. 236288 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." ASEcHI

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 582.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Rodil V. Zalameda (now a member of this Court) concurring; rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 360-374.

3.Id. at 397-398.

4. Resolution issued by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, with Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez, as Chairperson, and Associate Justices Alex L. Quiroz and Geraldine Faith A. Econg as members; rollo G.R. No. 236288, pp. 54-106.

5. Penned by Associate Justice Geraldine Faith A. Econg, with Associate Justices Reynaldo P. Cruz and Edgardo M. Caldona concurring, and Associate Justices Alex L. Quiroz and Sarah Jane T. Fernandez dissenting; id. at 107-135.

6.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 135-153.

7.Id. at 84-93.

8.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, pp. 307-438.

9.Id. at 441-470.

10.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 172.

11.Id.

12.Id. at 172-173; 311.

13.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, p. 179.

14.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 315.

15.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 180-186.

16.Id. at 187.

17.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 316.

18.Id.

19.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 188-189.

20.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 315.

21.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 190-191.

22.Id. at 192-193.

23.Id. at 193.

24.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 318.

25.Id. at 313.

26.Id. at 313-314.

27.Id. at 314.

28.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, p. 277.

29.Id. at 194-195.

30.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 320.

31.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, p. 197.

32.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 321.

33.Id. at 325.

34.Id. at 326.

35.Id. at 326-327.

36.Id. at 327.

37.Id.

38.Id. at 328.

39.Id. at 329.

40.Id.

41.Id. at 329-330.

42.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 214-215.

43.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, p. 333.

44.Id.

45.Id. at 335.

46.Id. at 335-336.

47.Id. at 336.

48.Id.

49.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 276-284.

50.Id. at 277.

51.Id.

52.Id.

53.Id. at 278.

54.Id. at 279.

55.Id. at 280.

56.Id. at 282.

57Id. at 135-153.

58.Id. at 152.

59.Id. at 147-151.

60.Id. at 84-93.

61.Id. at 50-82.

62.Id. at 60.

63.Id. at 64.

64.Id. at 360-374.

65.Id. at 368.

66.Id. at 375-397.

67.Id. at 397-398.

68.Rollo, G.R. No. 236288, Vol. I., p. 175.

69.Id. at 168.

70.Id. at 168-171.

71.Id. at 171-172.

72.Id. at 172.

73.Id.

74. Id. at 387.

75.Id. at 418.

76.Id. at 422-423.

77.Id. at 426.

78.Id. at 390.

79.Id. at 391.

80.Id.

81.Id.

82.Id. at 396.

83.Id. at 307-438.

84.Id. at 434 437.

85.Id. at 443 469.

86.Id. at 473-511.

87.Id. at 506-511.

88.Id. at 502-505.

89.Id. at 497-501.

90.Id. at 491-496

91.Id. at 486-490.

92.Id. at 481-485.

93.Id. at 478-480.

94.Id. at 473-477.

95.Id. at 512-522.

96.Id. at 54-106.

97.Id. at 105.

98.Id. at 106.

99.Id. at 107-135.

100.Id. at 134-135.

101.Id. at 582.

102.Kara-an v. Office of the Ombudsman, 476 Phil. 536, 550 (2004).

103.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, p. 19.

104. 721 Phil. 34 (2013).

105.Id. at 39.

106.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 155-177.

107.Id. at 184.

108.Id. at 162-163.

109.Id. at 178.

110.Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, 295 Phil. 825, 832 (1993).

111. Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, April 10, 1990.

112.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, p. 163.

113.Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Organo, 468 Phil. 111, 118 (2004). (Citations omitted).

114.Domingo v. CSC, G.R. No. 236050, June 17, 2020.

115. 825 Phil. 848 (2018).

116.Id. at 862. (Emphasis in the original).

117.Rollo, G.R. No. 211515, pp. 180-186.

118.Id. at 192-193.

119.Id. at 200-201.

120.Id. at 202-203.

121.Id. at 204-205.

122.Id. at 213.

123.Id.

124.Id. at 190.

125.Id. at 194.

126.Id. at 197.

127.Id. at 38.

128. Rule III, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 07.

129. See Section 10.

130. See Section 52.

131.Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman, 816 Phil. 288, 319-320 (2017).

132.Dr. Baylon v. Ombudsman, 423 Phil. 705, 719-720 (2001).

133.Id. at 720.

134. 746 Phil. 301 (2014).

135.Id. at 324-325.

136. G.R. No. 210488, January 27, 2020.

137.Id. at 473-477.

138. G.R. No. 231144, February 19, 2020.

139.Id. (Citations omitted)

140. G.R. No. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018, 874 SCRA 374.

141.Id. at 435-437.