THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 229835. January 31, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ROGELIO ZAMORA y CADIENTE, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 31, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 229835 (People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Zamora y Cadiente). — This is an ordinary appeal seeking the reversal and setting aside of the August 17, 2016 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02025, entitled "People of the Philippines v. XXX." The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the Joint Decision dated March 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Bais City, in Criminal Case Nos. F-10-131-MJ and F-10-133-MJ, finding accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 2 (RA 7610).
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
In an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. F-10-131-MJ, accused-appellant was charged as follows:
That on the second week of December 2006, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning at [information deleted] Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the live-in partner of the mother of 13-year old victim AAA, who was then sleeping inside their home, with lewd designs, and through force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously hold the latter hard on the shoulders to prevent her from getting up, went on top of her with his underpants already removed, accused next removed the victim's underwear and undressed her using his right hand and then inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement, thus succeeding in having carnal knowledge with the said minor-victim, exploiting, and indecently abusing her in a way that degrades and demeans her intrinsic worth and dignity as a child and prejudicial to her development, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Section 5 of RA 7610.
The Information docketed as Crim. Case No. F-10-132-MJ also charged accused-appellant thusly:
That on or about the second week of January 2007 at [information deleted] Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the live-in partner of the mother of 13-year old victim AAA, with lewd designs, and through force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously insert his finger into the vagina of the said victim and threatening her with harm afterwards if she would reveal the incident to anybody, thus successfully molesting the said minor-victim, exploiting and indecently abusing her in a way that degrades and demeans her intrinsic worth and dignity as a child and prejudicial to her development, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Section 5 of RA 7610.
Lastly, the accusatory portion of the Information docketed as Crim. Case No. F-10-133-MJ reads:
That on the fourth week of January 2007 at [information deleted] Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the live-in partner of the mother of 13-year old victim AAA, with lewd designs, and through force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously insert his finger into the vagina of the said victim and threatening her with harm afterwards if she would reveal the incident to anybody, thus successfully molesting the said minor-victim, exploiting, and indecently abusing her in a way that degrades and demeans her intrinsic worth and dignity as a child and prejudicial to her development, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Section 5 of RA 7610.
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial was conducted.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the minor-victim, AAA, and expert witness Dr. Panalip Deme Andaya (Dr. Andaya). AAA narrated the following:
In November 2006, her mother went to Manila to work, leaving her and her two (2) half-brothers with accused-appellant, her mother's common-law partner. On the 11th of said month, at around one o'clock in the morning, she was awakened when she felt someone holding her foot, who turned out to be accused-appellant. She reacted by kicking accused-appellant and transferring to another room to sleep. 3
Sometime in the second week of December, at around one o'clock in the morning, while she was sleeping, she felt someone hold her shoulders. She then saw accused-appellant who was naked. Accused-appellant removed her underwear, placed himself on top of her, and then forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina, making push and pull movements thereafter. She felt pain and cried. 4
Then, in the fourth week of January 2007, around one o'clock in the morning, she was sleeping when accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, prompting her to shout. Accused-appellant then threatened that he would break her neck if she told anyone about the incident. 5 aScITE
The next morning, some of the neighbors asked her why she had shouted the previous night. She then revealed to them that accused-appellant had molested her. They immediately brought her to the residence of barangay tanod Rudy Palagtiw, where she was interviewed. Thereafter, she was brought to the police station. 6
Dr. Andaya conducted a medical examination on AAA. Her findings, as narrated in a Medical Certificate, showed that AAA's vagina easily admits two (2) fingers and there were lacerations on her hymen. 7
Version of the Defense
For his part, accused-appellant denied the charges against him, maintaining that he slept between his two (2) minor children, while AAA slept on the other end of the bed. 8
The RTC, in its Joint Resolution dated March 16, 2015, found accused-appellant guilty in Criminal Case Nos. F-10-131-MJ and F-10-133-MJ, while acquitting him in Criminal Case No. F-10-132-MJ. The fallo of the Joint Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby pronounces judgment on the accused as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. F-10-131-MJ
Accused x x x is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify AAA the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. F-10-133-MJ
Accused x x x is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify AAA the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00).
With respect to Criminal Case No. F-10-132-MJ[,] it is DISMISSED for failure of the prosecution to introduce evidence.
The period during which the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in his favor.
No pronouncement as to costs. 9
Aggrieved, accused-appellant elevated the case to the CA via an appeal. He insists that AAA's testimony was laced with inconsistencies and that AAA testified that the place where the incident happened was dark, suggesting that she could not have seen who the perpetrator was. Too, according to him, he could not do said acts to her because he considered her as his own daughter. 10
Finding no merit in the appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that accused-appellant is guilty but with modifications as to the crime for which he was convicted, the period of imprisonment meted upon him, and the damages imposed. The fallo11 of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Joint Decision dated March 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45 in Bais City, in Criminal Case Nos. F-10-131-MJ and F-10-133-MJ, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that:
1) In Criminal Case No. F-10-131-MJ, the Court finds XXX GUILTY of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused-appellant is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to pay AAA the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages;
2) In Criminal Case No. F-10-133-MJ, the Court finds XXX GUILTY of Rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused-appellant is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and HEITAD
3) All damages awarded shall earn an interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be computed from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Preliminarily, the appellate court discussed that based on the allegations in the Informations, accused-appellant may be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 12 The CA stated that although the caption of the Informations show that accused-appellant is charged with violations of RA 7610, the body of the Informations reveals that the crime committed was rape and rape by sexual assault, both punishable under the RPC. 13 Applying the doctrine that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble or form the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information, the CA proceeded to determine whether accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Rape by Sexual Assault. 14
Ruling in the affirmative, the CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the concurrence of the elements of the crimes. The appellate court noted that, as found by the trial court, AAA's testimony was forthright, indicative of an honest and realistic account of the incident. 15 The CA held that when the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. 16
Additionally, the CA emphasized, the medical examination upon AAA revealed that she had healed vaginal lacerations, thereby bolstering AAA's claims. 17
With respect to accused-appellant's defense that AAA could not have seen who the perpetrator was because it was dark, the CA ruled that it was established that the place was illuminated by the light of the electric post outside which penetrated the bamboo wall of the room. 18
As such, the RTC's finding of accused-appellant's guilt, but now for Rape and Rape by Sexual Assault, was upheld by the CA. Accordingly, the CA modified the penalties meted upon accused-appellant, while taking into consideration the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, as well as the damages imposed.
For Criminal Case No. F-10-131-MJ (Rape), the CA imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Accused-appellant was ordered to pay AAA the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. F-10-133-MJ, accused-appellant was meted the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He was likewise ordered to pay AAA the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Lastly, the CA ordered that all damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be computed from the finality of its Decision until fully paid. 19
Still insisting on his innocence, accused-appellant brings this case before this Court assailing the CA's Decision.
We find the reversal of the CA Decision and the reinstatement with modification of the RTC's judgment proper.
At the outset, We note that indeed the allegations in the Informations qualify under both Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as well as Rape and Rape by Sexual Assault under the RPC, as amended. And as noted by the CA, all the elements of both crimes are present in this case. In dealing with the same issue, the Court, in People v. Abay, 20 clarified that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal Code. 21 However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. 22 A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law. 23 ATICcS
Accordingly, on the basis of the Informations, accused-appellant can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. However, We find the reversal by the CA of the RTC's judgment as unnecessary. Although accused-appellant can be charged with Rape under the RPC, the RTC correctly tried and convicted him for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 24
Here, We note that the Informations allege that the act was done through force and intimidation which may seem to depart from the clear directive under Section 5 that the deed be through coercion or influence. Such is not the case, however, as this has already been clarified by the Court in Quimvel v. People, 25 where We, in great detail, explained thusly:
The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation" as used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress" while "[undue] influence" is defined as "persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will." On the other hand, "force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end" while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear." As can be gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different. And to dispel any remaining lingering doubt as to their interchangeability, the Court enunciated in Caballo v. People that:
x x x sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it." (Emphasis in original; Citations omitted) TIADCc
As for the absence of the specific allegation that the victim was exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, We emphasized in Quimvel26 that such is immaterial so long as the Information alleges that the offense was committed by means of force and intimidation. Thus:
The absence of the phrase "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse" or even the specific mention of "coercion" or "influence" was never a bar for the Court to uphold the finding of guilt against an accused for violation of RA 7610. Just as the Court held that it was enough for the Information in Olivarez to have alleged that the offense was committed by means of "force and intimidation," the Court must also rule that the Information in the case at bench does not suffer from the alleged infirmity.
So too did the Court find no impediment in People v. Abadies, Malta v. People, People v. Ching, People v. Bonaagua, and Caballo v. People to convict the accused therein for violation of Sec. 5, RA 7610 notwithstanding the non-mention in the Information of "coercion,""influence," or "exploited in prostitution or subject to other abuse."
The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as appearing in the Information. The designation of the offense is a critical element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in apprising the accused of the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him of the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. Its import is underscored in this case where the preamble states that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610." (Citations omitted)
Similarly, in the instant case, it is clear from the Information that accused-appellant is being charged with violation of Section 5 of RA 7610 since the accusatory portions specifically state that the act complained of is "[c]ontrary to Section 5 of RA 7610."
Lastly, RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy of affording "special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development" and in such regard, "provide sanctions for their commission." 27 As such, this Court is more inclined to consider the case at hand under RA 7610 rather than under the RPC.
With the above, We find and so hold that the proper action to be taken in the case at bar is to determine whether accused-appellant is guilty not of Rape under the RPC, but of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
We now proceed to determine whether the RTC and the CA correctly found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Well-settled is the rule that, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the trial court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. 28 This is so because the observance of the deportment and demeanor of witnesses are within the exclusive domain of the trial courts. Thus, considering their unique vantage point, trial courts are in the best position to assess and evaluate the credibility and truthfulness of witnesses and their testimonies. 29
Here, We agree with the RTC and the CA that accused-appellant is indeed the perpetrator of the crimes committed against AAA. Not only was AAA's testimony candid and straightforward, clearly detailing the harrowing incident, the findings in her medical examination showing that AAA had hymenal lacerations bolster the accusations. 30
Moreover, it was also established that the place where the incident happened was sufficiently illuminated so as to allow AAA to clearly identify who the perpetrator is. As a matter of fact, accused-appellant even admitted his presence at the locus criminis by stating in his defense that he was in the same room with AAA, only insisting that he was asleep at the time and his son was sleeping between him and AAA.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that accused-appellant's only defense was that he was asleep when the incident happened. This, to Our mind, is a feeble attempt at exoneration. Indeed, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 31 In the case at hand, We cannot find any proof or information that would sufficiently overcome the strong evidence of the prosecution pointing towards accused-appellant's guilt for two (2) counts of violation of Section 5 of RA 7610. As such, there is nothing to convince Us to render a judgment of acquittal. AIDSTE
As regards the penalty to be imposed, Sec. 5 Article III of RA 7610 provides that the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. Here, notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a special law, accused-appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 32 In applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of violation of the said provision of RA 7610. 33
With respect to the award of damages, for each count, accused-appellant shall pay the victim the following: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, and a fine of P15,000.00 pursuant to Section 31 (f), Article XII of RA 7610. 34 In addition, this Court also orders accused-appellant to pay AAA P15,000.00 by way of exemplary damages. 35
Lastly, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the assailed August 17, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02025 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Joint Decision dated March 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bais City, in Criminal Case Nos. F-10-131-MJ and F-10-133-MJ finding accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATIONS. The fallo of said Joint Decision, as modified, shall read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby pronounces judgment on the accused as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. F-10-131-MJ
Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused shall also pay the victim the following: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, and a fine of P15,000.00 pursuant to Section 31(f), Article XII of RA 7610. In addition, this Court also orders petitioner to pay "AAA" P15,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. F-10-133-MJ
Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused shall also pay the victim the following: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, and a fine of P15,000.00 pursuant to Section 31(f), Article XII of RA 7610. In addition, this Court also orders petitioner to pay "AAA" P15,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
With respect to Criminal Case No. F-10-132-MJ, it is DISMISSED for failure of the prosecution to introduce evidence.
The period during which the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in his favor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
(Martires, J., on official leave)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo Delos Santos and Edward B. Contreras.
2. Otherwise known as Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
3.Rollo, p. 7.
4.Id.
5.Id.
6.Id. at 8.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 9.
10.Id. at 10.
11.Id. at 23-24.
12.Id. at 10-11.
13.Id. at 11.
14.Id. at 12.
15.Id. at 15.
16.Id. at 15-16.
17.Id. at 16.
18.Id. at 18.
19.Id. at 23.
20. G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009, 580 SCRA 235.
21. G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009, 580 SCRA 235.
22.People v. Optana, 404 Phil. 316, 351 (2001), cited in People v. Dahilig, G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011.
23. G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009, 580 SCRA 235.
24.Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011, citing Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421 (2005).
25. G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017.
26.Id.
27.Caballo v. People, G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013.
28.Quimvel, supra note 25, citing Uyboco v. People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014, 744 SCRA 688.
29.Id.
30.Rollo, p. 8.
31.People v. Tamolon, G.R. No. 180169, February 27, 2009.
32.Pinlac v. People, G.R. No. 197458, November 11, 2015, citing People v. Leonardo, 638 Phil. 161, 198 (2010).
33.Id.
34.Id.
35.Id.