SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 215789. April 10, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.XYZ, 1accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 April 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 215789 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versus XYZ, accused-appellant.
After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the parties, the Court finds no error committed in the Decision 2 dated April 25, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05535. The facts, as borne out by the records, sufficiently support the conclusion that accused-appellant is indeed guilty of the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape charged against him. The issues and matters raised before the Court, the same ones as those raised in the CA, there being no supplemental briefs filed, were sufficiently addressed and correctly ruled upon by the CA.
It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court. 3 Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of the victim, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during trial. 4 Here, after examining the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the appreciation of the evidence by the RTC, 5 which the CA affirmed in toto.
In the same vein, accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot outweigh the candid and straightforward testimony of private complainant AAA 6 (AAA) that he indeed had sexual intercourse with her. The Court has oft pronounced that denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between categorical testimonies of AAA and her other sisters, on one hand, which have the ring of truth on the one hand, and a mere denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 7
Moreover, the courts have long held that when a woman, especially a minor, alleges rape, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped. 8 When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. 9 Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction. 10
In the present case, AAA — who was only four years old at the time the rape incident happened, and five years old when she testified in court — clearly and positively narrated that accused-appellant raped her. As the CA noted:
AAA and BBB both positively identified their father, accused-appellant, as the one who inserted his penis in AAA's vagina and anus. As found by the trial court, AAA, who was five (5) years old when she testified, was categorical in testifying that accused-appellant inserted his penis in her vagina and anus. A young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. We see no plausible reason why AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen. 11
Furthermore, the CA was likewise correct in ruling against accused-appellant's contention that it was impossible for him to have raped AAA in the presence of his other children. As the Court held in People v. Agudo, 12 "[r]apists are not deterred from committing the odious act of sexual abuse by the mere presence of people nearby or even family members; rape is committed not exclusively in seclusion. Several cases instruct us that lust is no respecter of time or place and rape defies constraint of time and space." 13
However, the Court finds it proper to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC, as modified by the CA. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, 14 the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should be increased to P100,000.00 each, with six percent (6%) per annum legal interest from the finality of this Resolution until full satisfaction. 15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision dated April 25, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05535. The Decision finding accused-appellant XYZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape, defined and punished under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. He is ordered to pay the private complainant ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as civil indemnity, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. (PERLAS-BERNABE, J., on leave)"
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. The identity of the victims or any information which could establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano. Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 [2014], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013]. See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017; and People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018.)
2.Rollo, pp. 2-19. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela concurring.
3.People v. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 469, 478.
4.People v. Aguilar, 565 Phil. 233, 247 (2007).
5. See Judgment dated April 18, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 4345, penned by Presiding Judge Lelu P. Contreras; CA rollo, pp. 52-65.
6. See note 1.
7.People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527 (2013).
8.People v. Tuballas, 811 Phil. 201, 216 (2017).
9.Id. at 216-217.
10.Id. at 217.
11.Rollo, p. 16.
12. 810 Phil. 918 (2017).
13.Id. at 929.
14.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 848 (2016).
15. See id. at 854.