FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 244837. December 5, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. JOMAR M. ULANGKAYA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 5, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 244837 — (People of the Philippines v. Jomar M. Ulangkaya)
On appeal is the December 29, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07606 which affirmed with modification the May 18, 2015 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 69, Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 149339 finding accused-appellant Jomar M. Ulangkaya (accused-appellant) guilty of kidnapping under paragraph 4, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
In the Information dated December 17, 2010, accused-appellant was charged as follows:
That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 2010 to December 17, 2010 in the Municipality of Pigcawayan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused JOMAR M. ULANGKAYA, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with SAUDI H. KASAN, MOHAIMEN ABO @ Boy Bangsa Moro, Alias CMDR KING FALCON, and MOHAMMAD YUSOP PASIGAN who are still at[-]large, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap AAA, [9-year-old] minor, thus[,] depriving said AAA of her liberty for the said period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Only accused-appellant was arrested. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Version of the Prosecution
On December 16, 2010, AAA and her father, BBB, boarded their car which was parked just outside their gate. They were supposed to buy pancit for AAA's Christmas party to be held later that day. Just as when BBB was about to close the door on AAA's side, a man suddenly appeared and pointed a gun at them. BBB told AAA to turn around. AAA then heard a gunshot. Thereupon, four persons took AAA away and boarded her to another vehicle. 4
Along the way, the vehicle carrying AAA rammed into what seemed to be a fence. Accused-appellant then carried AAA away from the vehicle and went towards the direction of the mountains. 5
AAA narrated that she spent the whole day and night with accused-appellant. All throughout, accused-appellant visibly tucked his gun into his pants. AAA slept intermittently on the grass and she did not try to escape because she was afraid that accused-appellant might shoot her and that she might get lost in the mountains. 6
When the sun had risen again, the two moved. They were in the open field when they were seen by the police and military. An exchange of gunfire ensued. AAA said accused-appellant fired at the police while his other hand held her. 7
When the police caught up with them, accused-appellant pointed his gun at AAA's forehead. Nonetheless, the police and military were able to neutralize accused-appellant and take AAA away from him. 8
Three of the police officers who apprehended accused-appellant were Police Senior Inspector Baltazar B. Corpuz (PSI Corpuz), Senior Police Officer 3 Jose Elmer S. Cornelio (SPO3 Cornelio) and SPO2 Artemio Jubacon (SPO2 Jubacon). They testified as follows:
At around 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. on December 16, 2010, PSI Corpuz received a call from the Chief of Police of Pigcawayan, reporting that there was a shooting and kidnapping incident in the Municipality of Pigcawayan. 9
Thereafter, PSI Corpuz and his company commander, Police Superintendent Alexander Tagum, proceeded to Pigcawayan and reported to the Pigcawayan Chief of Police who briefed them about the kidnapping incident. Together with a unit from the army and the provincial headquarters, PSI Corpuz proceeded to Barangay Manuangan, Pigcawayan to conduct hot pursuit. 10
When the team reached Barangay Manuangan at around 9:00 a.m. on December 16, 2010, PSI Corpuz saw a car in the gutter of the national highway which matched the getaway vehicle of the suspects. The people also reported seeing one person carrying a child and running towards the mountains. 11
At around 5:00 a.m. on December 17, 2010, a woman approached the team and reported having seen a person with a child traversing Barangay Manuangan. With the woman leading the way, they saw accused-appellant and AAA about 30 meters away. A chase ensued after accused-appellant saw them. Accused-appellant was carrying AAA by her waist while his right hand held a gun. 12
Accused-appellant turned around when he saw military and police officers in front of him. PSI Corpuz then told accused-appellant to drop his gun, but the suspect did not comply. Instead, he aimed his gun at a member of the army and fired upon the latter. When it did not fire, a police officer grabbed the gun while another took AAA away from him. 13
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant proffered complete denial and alibi. He countered that he was home from December 16 to 17, 2010 and he was arrested in Pigcawayan on December 18, 2010. 14
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision dated May 18, 2015, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of kidnapping under paragraph 4, Article 267 of the RPC. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant kidnapped AAA who identified the former as her kidnapper. The trial court gave full weight to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who pursued accused-appellant and saw AAA with him. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Jomar M. Ulangkaya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Kidnapping under Par. 4, Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, this court sentences him to suffer the penalty of [Reclusion Perpetua]; and to indemnify AAA the sum of PhP50,000.00 as nominal damages, PhP50,000.00 as moral damages, and PhP20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 15
Aggrieved, accused-appellant elevated an appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated December 29, 2017, the CA affirmed with modification the conviction of accused-appellant. It held that the victim clearly testified that she was taken by accused-appellant against her consent and she was brought to the mountains. The appellate court disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant APPEAL is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 18, 2015 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by imposing interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED. 16
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
Whether the guilt of accused-appellant for kidnapping has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. 17
The essential elements for this crime are the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. 18 There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. 19
In this case, all the elements of kidnapping were proven beyond reasonable doubt. First, there is no question that accused-appellant is a private individual.
Accused-appellant, however, disputes the presence of the second element of the crime. He argues that since he was not one of the four persons who initially nabbed AAA, the prosecution failed to establish that he deprived AAA of her liberty. Accused-appellant's argument fails to persuade. In People v. Baluya, 20 the Court ruled:
As to the second element of the crime, the deprivation required by Article 267 of the RPC means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. If the victim is a child, it also includes the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. In other words, the essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In the present case, Glodil was in the control of appellant as he was kept in a place strange and unfamiliar to him. Because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back home, he was then and there deprived of his liberty. The intention to deprive Glodil's parents of his custody is also indicated by appellant's actual taking of the child without the permission or knowledge of his parents, of subsequently calling up the victim's mother to inform her that the child is in his custody and of threatening her that she will no longer see her son if she failed to show his wife to him. (Citations omitted and emphases supplied)
Here, even assuming that accused-appellant was not one of the four persons who grabbed AAA and forced her to board the getaway vehicle, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused appellant was the one who carried AAA away from the vehicle when it rammed into a fence. Accused-appellant kept AAA under his watch from December 16 until December 17, 2010. AAA did not attempt to escape because she was afraid that accused-appellant would shoot her. In addition, she was brought to the mountains where she could not flee out of fear of getting lost.
The intent of accused-appellant to detain AAA and deprive her of her liberty became even more apparent when, after accused-appellant saw that there were military and police officers chasing him, accused-appellant exchanged fire with them and ran away carrying AAA with him. Even after accused-appellant was cornered by military and police officers, he did not release the victim. Instead, he even pointed a gun at AAA's head. Accused-appellant only released AAA after the police ganged up on him and subdued him.
With respect to the third element of the offense charged, the prosecution proved that accused-appellant's act of detaining the victim was without lawful cause.
As to the last element of the crime, the victim's minority was alleged by the prosecution in the Information and was not disputed. Moreover, the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA shows that she was 9 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. 21
The task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it. 22 As a rule, findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 23 Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. 24 In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to depart from this rule. Accused-appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC and the CA overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
Accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA as the one who had taken, detained and deprived her of her liberty from December 16 to 17, 2010. Accused-appellant was also positively identified by PSI Corpuz, SPO3 Cornelio and SPO2 Jubacon as the one whom they arrested after a hot pursuit operation. Thus, the denial of accused-appellant cannot be given any weight. Against the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, accused-appellant can only offer the defense of denial. However, denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who, as in this case, were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against accused-appellant. 25
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The December 29, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07606 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." J. Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, additional Member per Special Order No. 2726.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-12.
2. Penned by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna; CA rollo, pp. 61-69.
3.Id. at 61.
4.Rollo, p. 4.
5.Id. at 5.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9. CA rollo, p. 63.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 63-64.
13.Id. at 64.
14.Rollo, p. 7.
15. CA rollo, p. 69.
16.Rollo, pp. 11-12.
17.People v. Pagalasan, 452 Phil. 341, 362 (2003).
18.People v. Mostrales, 667 Phil. 395, 409 (2011).
19.People v. Pagalasan, supra, at 362-363.
20. 664 Phil. 140, 150-151 (2011).
21. CA rollo, p. 67.
22.People v. Del Rosario, 657 Phil. 635, 642 (2011).
23.People v. Lacaden, 620 Phil. 807, 819 (2009).
24.See People v. Regaspi, 768 Phil. 593, 598 (2015).
25.People v. Madsali, 625 Phil. 431, 446 (2010).