FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 253365. October 6, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.REY JACER ABELLA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 6, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 253365 (People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, v. Rey Jacer Abella, accused-appellant).
This is an ordinary appeal seeking to vacate and reverse the September 9, 2019 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09818. The CA affirmed the August 22, 2017 Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4 (RTC), which found Rey Jacer Abella (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
Antecedents
Accused-appellant was charged under the following Information: 3
That on January 8, 2017[,] in the City of Baguio[,] Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and detain "NSS" 4 a minor six (6) years of age, by asking her to buy ["moma"] 5 and then called her to accompany him in looking for his cousin and that when the minor asked to be brought home, he refused and instead spanked and pinched her and deprived [her of] personal liberty, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.
During his arraignment on January 19, 2017, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. 6
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as witnesses: (a) the victim, NSS; (b) her mother, AAA; and (c) BBB, NSS's neighbor and playmate.
On January 8, 2017, NSS was playing with her friends at the school playground near her home when a man (later identified as accused-appellant) suddenly approached her and asked her to buy "moma" or betel nut. After buying "moma," accused-appellant asked NSS to pull out the white hair from his scalp and, thereafter, asked her to accompany him in looking for his cousin. At the time of the incident, NSS was only six (6) years of age. 7 HESIcT
In order to find his cousin, accused-appellant told NSS that they had to take a jeepney. NSS recalls already being far from the school playground before they took the jeepney. They then disembarked from the jeepney and walked where accused-appellant wanted to go. 8 When NSS got tired from walking, accused-appellant proceeded to carry her over his shoulders as they passed Burnham Park. NSS testified that she wanted to go home as it was already nighttime, but accused-appellant simply told her "[W]ait lang."9 According to NSS, it was already dark when several police officers and her uncle saw her and accused-appellant near the police station; and that accused-appellant only put her down when the police asked him to. 10 NSS also recalled accused-appellant telling her "Ag-iyot kami kano ta amin nga tao ket agkaskasjay ken nu dumakkel ak ket kasjay ak metlang" (We will just have sex because everyone is doing it and when I grow up, I would do it just the same). 11
AAA testified that at about 5:00 p.m., she started to look for her daughter, NSS. She called the mother of NSS's playmate who informed her that NSS was taken by a man later identified as accused-appellant. 12 Thereafter, she went to the house of BBB, NSS's playmate, and asked him to accompany her to the place where the incident occurred. With the assistance of her family members, AAA was informed that another boy saw the incident and likewise knew accused-appellant. The boy accompanied her to accused-appellant's residence, but did not find him there. Accused-appellant's mother merely told AAA that her son was alone when she last saw him. 13 AAA's sister then reported the incident to the police. As AAA was searching for NSS all over Quirino Hill to Cogcoga, they were informed that the police chanced upon accused-appellant and NSS along Lower Magsaysay in Baguio City. 14
BBB testified that they were playing at the school grounds when the incident happened. 15 He saw accused-appellant carrying NSS over his shoulders when the two left the area. BBB claimed that he tried following them to see where accused-appellant would take NSS, but they were suddenly gone. He likewise testified that he told his mother what he witnessed, who, in turn, informed AAA of the situation. 16
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant presented himself as lone defense witness. He denied having any malevolent intention toward NSS and that he merely wanted to help her get home. 17
Accused-appellant narrated that on January 8, 2017, at around 5:00 p.m., he chanced upon NSS crying on the street at Barangay Dizon on his way home from Lower Quirino Hill. Accused-appellant asked NSS why she was crying and she told him that her companions had left her. He then told her to go home as it was already getting dark, but NSS replied that she did not know how to get home. Accused-appellant claims that NSS told him that she lived "sa taas," which he interpreted as Barangay Pinget, so they started walking towards the said barangay's direction. 18 Upon their arrival at Barangay Pinget, he asked the bystanders if they knew NSS and where she lived, but they replied that they were not familiar with her. Thereafter, he and NSS proceeded to the barangay hall but since there was no one around, he decided to proceed to the police station. Upon arriving at the station, the police officers asked where he had brought NSS, and ordered him to put NSS down. He was handcuffed thereafter. 19
Ruling of the RTC
In its August 22, 2017 Judgment, 20 the RTC ruled that accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt and he was found liable for the crime of kidnapping and illegal detention under Art. 267 of the RPC. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this Family Court finds accused REY JACER ABELLA GUILTY of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention as defined under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
Considering that the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the conditions provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC ruled that NSS was clearly deprived of her liberty, as she was taken away by accused-appellant from the surroundings familiar to her, and was refused to be immediately taken home when she asked him to. The lower court similarly found accused-appellant's defense of alibi and denial weak considering that the prosecution sufficiently and positively identified him. 22
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed Decision 23 rendered on September 9, 2019, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, and held that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the crime charged. 24 As to the alleged inconsistencies between NSS's testimony in open court and in her sworn statement, the CA ruled the same as insufficient to destroy her credibility. The CA gave credence to the trial court's observations on NSS's demeanor — that NSS, being a minor, was naturally anxious, scared, and embarrassed at the initial stage of the proceedings and slowly warmed up and gained composure towards the latter stage. 25
Issues
Accused-appellant submits the following errors for the Court's consideration:
1. Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements thereof;
2. Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the patently inconsistent and incredible testimony of NSS;
3. Whether the CA gravely erred in not considering the defense of accused-appellant that he merely helped NSS find her house.
The Court's Ruling
There being no reversible error found in the assailed decision of the CA, the Court resolves to dismiss the appeal. caITAC
The elements of kidnapping and
In order to obtain a conviction for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the RPC, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained, is a minor, a female or a public officer. 26
Contrary to accused-appellant's position, the RTC and the CA correctly held that the prosecution had sufficiently proved the existence of the elements of the crime imputed upon him beyond reasonable doubt.
First, it remains undisputed by both parties that accused-appellant is a private individual, and at the time of the incident, NSS was a minor, merely six (6) years of age. Undoubtedly, the first and fourth elements are present in the case at bar.
In his appeal, accused-appellant primarily questions the existence of the second and third elements based on his argument that he did not illegally deprive NSS of her liberty. He contends that there was no categorical, definite or express statement from NSS that he (a) kidnapped, detained or in any way deprived NSS of her liberty, or (b) restricted her movements or prevented her from communicating with other people. He reasons that he merely helped NSS find her way home, without any intention on his part to deprive her of liberty. He likewise argues that NSS herself did not show any form of opposition, resistance or struggle against him and to what they were doing. 27
We disagree.
In People v. Baluya, 28 the Court ruled that the deprivation of liberty required under Art. 267 of the RPC not only pertains to the imprisonment or physical confinement of a person, but also the deprivation of one's liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. In the case of a minor, it also includes the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of their child. 29 The same was apparent when accused-appellant took NSS to a place unfamiliar to her without the permission or knowledge of her parents. 30 It remains undisputed that accused-appellant has no familial or social relations whatsoever with NSS or her family that would remotely justify his actions. It is likewise evident from the fact that NSS's family reported her abduction to the police.
As regards the deprivation of her liberty, it was evident that NSS was under the control of accused-appellant as she was taken to places that were strange and unfamiliar to her. In fact, NSS claimed that she was not familiar with the places they went to, except for Burnham Park. 31 Considering NSS's tender age, taking her to places from where she could not find her way home, notwithstanding the lack of force or restriction on accused-appellant's part, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. 32 Under such situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. 33 Furthermore, the intention to deprive NSS of her liberty became even more apparent when NSS signified her desire to go home but accused-appellant refused, and instead told her to wait. For a finding of kidnapping in this case, it is enough that NSS was restrained from going home. 34
Contrary to accused-appellant's position, his observations that NSS did not show signs of struggle against him and just followed him 35 did not help his case. It even underscored the fact that NSS completely relied on accused-appellant's instructions and misrepresentations. The fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused does not remove the element of deprivation of liberty because the victim went with the accused by reason of false inducement, without which the victim would not have gone with him. 36 In the present case, accused-appellant induced NSS to buy "moma" for him and asked her to pull out his white hair. After establishing rapport and gaining her trust, accused-appellant was eventually able to convince her to accompany him in searching for his cousin. Taking advantage of her tender age, accused-appellant called over NSS — a child with whom he had no personal relations, and thus deprived NSS of her liberty.
Furthermore, it is settled that lack of consent is presumed in cases of kidnapping where the victim is a minor. 37 As a minor, NSS was not in the position to give consent to accused-appellant, and was incompetent to assent to or even comprehend the nature of her seizure and consequent deprivation of liberty. Lack of resistance and alleged voluntariness on the part of NSS place accused-appellant in no better position than if he had taken NSS against her will. 38 Hence, accused-appellant's defense that NSS made no categorical statement that she was deprived of her liberty is of no matter.
The testimony of NSS is reliable
In order to discredit the testimony of NSS against him, accused-appellant pointed out the alleged material inconsistencies between her sworn statement and her testimony in open court. He also argued that NSS's testimony was doubtful due to her failure to recall material information regarding the incident. ICHDca
However, accused-appellant's allegations are not enough to destroy the credibility of NSS. Minor discrepancies are more consistent with human nature and experience, and serve to strengthen rather than destroy a victim's credibility. 39 The Court has likewise repeatedly held that the testimony of a minor of tender age and of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of an older person; so that once it is established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full credence and probative weight. 40 In fact, youth and immaturity are badges of truth. 41 In here, the records do not show that NSS had ill motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. From this alone, NSS's testimony must be given weight.
Furthermore, this Court reiterates the time-honored maxim that findings and conclusions of the trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. 42 The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is conclusive and binding to this Court, unless it is shown to be tainted with arbitrariness, or that some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered through oversight. Absent such however, the trial court's findings on the credibility of the witnesses before it, deserve high respect from the appellate courts. 43 The Court finds no reason to depart from this rule.
The RTC found the testimony of NSS as credible and consistent. It aptly observed that NSS, a minor, was anxious, frightful, and embarrassed during the initial stage of the trial, but later on gained confidence and became more straightforward and candid in answering the questions propounded upon her, 44viz.:
The court observed a mixture of anxiety, fright and embarrassment in NSS during the initial stage of the trial. x x x The court notes that as NSS got used to the courtroom set-up, she was straightforward and candid in answering questions, most especially when the continuation of the taking of her testimony was done in chambers. She appeared innocent and a little too shy for her age, if not, even embarrassed by the questions. These behaviors are but consistent with the age of NSS who was nonetheless able to answer the questions directed at her by the prosecution and the defense counsel. NSS's actuations and demeanor is ingenuous and sincere, characteristic of an innocent child. Undoubtedly, the court finds the testimony of NSS bereft of any prevarication and guile as to the content of her statements and her testimony.
The records show that the trial court did not err in appreciating the testimony of NSS. It took into consideration the age and demeanor of NSS, and allowed her to testify on three (3) different dates owing to mood swings common to children of NSS's age. 45 Undoubtedly, the RTC was able to arrive at realistic conclusions on the credibility of NSS's testimony as it had the opportunity to observe NSS at least three (3) times. Hence, both the RTC and the CA were correct in according credence to the testimony of NSS.
Accused-appellant's self-serving
In defense, accused-appellant denied that he had any intention to deprive NSS of her liberty, and further claimed that he merely wanted to help NSS find her way home. He argued that the RTC failed to consider that when NSS was found in his custody, she was physically and sexually unharmed, well-fed and carried on his shoulders.
The Court remains unconvinced. Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 46 Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence, undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution as they are easily fabricated and concocted. 47
Apart from his lone testimony, accused-appellant failed to provide evidence that would support his claim that he had no intention to deprive NSS of her liberty. Had there been an indicia of truth that he was merely helping NSS find her way home, the defense could have presented the testimony of the bystanders whom accused-appellant allegedly asked about NSS's residence.
On the other hand, NSS's testimony and positive identification of accused-appellant cast serious doubts on the latter's motives, especially when the same were corroborated by the testimony of BBB who witnessed accused-appellant carry NSS away from where she was playing. BBB was likewise able to positively identify accused-appellant in court. 48 Hence, the trial court and the CA were correct in ruling that the prosecution was able to discharge its duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Defenses of denial and alibi cannot be sustained in the face of the positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator. Surely, a categorical testimony must prevail over mere denial and alibi. TCAScE
Finally, to support his claim of innocence, accused-appellant argued that upon being accosted by the police officers, he did not run or try to flee. He stated that if he was indeed committing a crime, he would not have stayed or gone near any police station. 49 While flight is indicative of guilt, its converse is not necessarily true. 50 Jurisprudence dictates that non-flight is not proof of innocence. 51 Thus, the fact that accused-appellant did not flee may be considered a badge of innocence, but without supporting evidence, it remains insufficient to exculpate him from his proven criminal liability. 52
In fine, the elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention have been sufficiently established. Hence, there is no reason for the Court to reverse the decision of the CA. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Art. 267 of the RPC. However, in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, 53 the Court also finds it necessary to award the victim, through her mother AAA, the following amounts: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. All these amounts shall be subject to interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this resolution until fully paid. 54
WHEREFORE, the September 9, 2019 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09818 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds accused-appellant Rey Jacer Abella GUILTY of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to PAY the following amounts in favor of NSS:
(1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
(3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages;
all subject to an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-19; penned by Associate Justice Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Danton Q. Bueser, concurring.
2. CA rollo, pp. 51-63; penned by Presiding Judge Mia Joy C. Oallares-Cawed.
3.Id. at 51.
4. The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children, effective November 15, 2004. People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 (2011).
5. "Momma" in some parts of the rollo.
6. CA rollo, p. 51.
7.Id. at 74.
8.Rollo, p. 5.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 6.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 6-7.
15.Id. at 7.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 8.
18.Id. at 7-8.
19.Id. at 8.
20. CA rollo, pp. 51-63.
21.Id. at 63.
22.Id. at 58-62.
23.Rollo, pp. 3-19.
24.Id. at 11-15.
25.Id. at 16.
26.People v. Carreon, G.R. No. 229086, January 15, 2020, citing People v. Siongco, 637 Phil. 488, 498-499 (2010); People v. Bringas, 633 Phil. 486, 514-515 (2010).
27. CA rollo, pp. 41-42.
28. 664 Phil. 140, 150 (2011), citing Marzan v. People, G.R. No. 248905, February 10, 2021; People v. Siongco, supra note 26, at 499.
29.People v. Siapno, 817 Phil. 182, 190-191 (2017); People v. Baluya, supra note 28, at 150; People v. Acbangin, 392 Phil. 232, 240 (2000).
30.People v. Baluya, id. at 150-151.
31. CA rollo, p. 59.
32.People v. Ulangkaya, G.R. No. 244837, December 5, 2019, citing People v. Baluya, supra note 28, at 151.
33.People v. Fabro, 813 Phil. 831, 841 (2017).
34.People v. Acbangin, supra note 29.
35. CA rollo, p. 42.
36.People v. Fabro, supra note 33, at 847; People v. Siongco, supra note 26, at 500; People v. Jatulan, 550 Phil. 342, 355 (2007).
37.People v. Fabro, id. at 846; People v. Baluya, supra note 28, at 152; People v. Siongco, id. at 501.
38.People v. Fabro, id.; People v. Siongco, id.
39.People v. Deocares, G.R. No. 246585, June 17, 2020, citing People v. Lagramada, 436 Phil. 758, 771 (2002).
40.People v. Baldogo, 444 Phil. 35, 57 (2003).
41.People v. Hanggan, G.R. No. 213830, November 25, 2015, citing People v. Opong, 577 Phil. 571, 590 (2008).
42. See People v. Ulangkaya, supra note 32, citing People v. Del Rosario, 657 Phil. 635, 642-643 (2011); People v. Roxas, 642 Phil. 522, 537 (2010).
43.People v. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37, 71 (2000).
44. CA rollo, p. 59.
45.Id. at 52.
46.People v. Bulasag, 582 Phil. 243, 251 (2008).
47.People v. Anticamara, 666 Phil. 484, 507 (2011).
48. CA rollo, p. 61.
49.Id. at 115.
50.People v. Dadao, 725 Phil. 298, 313 (2014).
51.People v. Mores, 712 Phil. 480, 495 (2013), citing People v. Asilan, 685 Phil. 633, 647 (2012); People v. Del Castillo, 584 Phil. 721, 730 (2008).
52.People v. SPO1 Alawig, 718 Phil. 104, 130 (2013).
53.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016), provides that when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present; see also: Marzan v. People, supra note 28; People v. Chan, G.R. No. 226836, December 5, 2018, 888 SCRA 485, 495; People v. Fabro, supra note 33, at 849.
54.People v. Chan, id.; People v. Fabro, id.; People v. Maglente, 722 Phil. 388, 405-406 (2013).