SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 251148. November 10, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RONALD SECRETARIO y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 November 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 251148 (People of the Philippines v. Ronald Secretario y Mendoza). — This is an Appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated May 6, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10719 which affirmed the Decision 3 dated November 29, 2017 of Branch 73, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City. The RTC found Ronald Secretario y Mendoza (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Carnapping, defined and penalized under Republic Act No. (RA) 6539, 4 as amended by RA 10883. 5
The Antecedents
The instant case stemmed from an Information dated February 24, 2006 charging accused-appellant with the offense of Carnapping. The accusatory portion of the Information 6 states:
That on or about the 15th day of January 2006, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one @ "Larry" whose name and present whereabouts is still unknown and both of them mutually helping and aiding with one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, carnap and drive away one (1) Honda Wave Alfa 100 with plate no. PI-1660 valued at Php39,800.00 being driven at the time by Anthony Monteron y Geronimo and owned by Albert Jeffrey Monteron, to the damage of the latter in the aforementioned amount. CAIHTE
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. 8
Trial ensued. 9
The prosecution established that on January 15, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., Anthony Monteron (Anthony), the lone witness for the prosecution, was driving the Honda Wave Alfa 100 (subject motorcycle) with Plate No. PI-1660 towards the direction of his family's store along Sumulong Exit, Brgy. San Roque, Antipolo City. The subject motorcycle is owned by Anthony's brother, Albert Jeffrey Monteron (Albert). 10 While traversing Sumulong Extension, Anthony's path was blocked by accused-appellant and his companion, a certain alias "Larry." Accused-appellant asked if Anthony could bring him and Larry to Brgy. Dela Paz, Antipolo City. Anthony agreed considering that accused-appellant was a childhood friend. 11 When they arrived at Brgy. Dela Paz, accused-appellant, with a knife pointed at Anthony's neck, declared a hold-up. The threat prompted Anthony to stop the motorcycle. Larry likewise pointed a knife at Anthony. Accused-appellant and Larry tied Anthony's hands and thereafter sped off with the subject motorcycle. 12
In defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations hurled against him. He insisted that on January 15, 2006, he was already asleep at around 1:00 a.m., and that he woke up only at 5:00 a.m., to go to work. Later, he received a call from his mother informing him that Anthony had accused him of Carnapping. Out of fear, accused-appellant fled to the province. He was apprehended in 2007. 13
The RTC Ruling
In the Decision 14 dated November 29, 2017, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of Carnapping. The dispositive portion of the Decision 15 reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ronald M. Secretario is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum to twenty-five (25) years, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 16
The RTC found that (1) the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of Carnapping; (2) accused-appellant's act of driving the vehicle without the consent of Anthony already constituted the offense of Carnapping; 17 (3) Anthony positively identified accused-appellant as the one who pointed a knife at him and sped away with the subject motorcycle; and (4) there was no evidence that Anthony had any ill motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. 18
The CA Ruling
In the assailed Decision, 19 the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated 29 November 2017 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Antipolo City in Criminal Case No. 06-31506 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 20
The CA sustained the RTC's finding that the prosecution proved all the elements of the offense of Carnapping. 21 It likewise gave weight to the RTC's finding that Anthony is a credible witness. 22 Further, the CA highlighted the fact that accused-appellant fled to the province until he was arrested in 2007, stressing that flight is indicative of guilt. 23
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed to the Court.
In a Manifestation 24 dated September 24, 2020, accused-appellant stated that he will no longer file a supplemental brief and that he is adopting all the defenses and arguments outlined in his Appellant's Brief 25 filed before the CA. 26 Likewise, in a Manifestation 27 dated October 12, 2020, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief because it had already thoroughly discussed its arguments in its brief filed before the CA. 28
In his Appellant's Brief 29 filed before the CA, accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt; 30 that Anthony's testimony as to the taking of the subject motorcycle is doubtful; that Anthony's action immediately after the incident is contrary to human nature because he reported the incident only at 11:50 in the evening when the taking of the subject motorcycle allegedly happened at around 1:00 in the morning; 31 and that Anthony's testimony was not corroborated by any other witness. 32
On the other hand, the OSG, in its Brief 33 argues: (1) that accused-appellant was correctly found guilty of Carnapping; (2) that all the elements of the offense of Carnapping were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; 34 and (3) that Anthony was able to identify accused-appellant as the person who pointed a knife at him and took the subject motorcycle. 35
Issues
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant's conviction for Carnapping. HEITAD
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court holds that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Carnapping.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Court gives high respect to the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it has the best opportunity to observe his or her demeanor to determine if there is indeed truth to his or her testimony in the witness stand. 36 Since the trial judge is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses, the judge's evaluation of the witnesses' testimonies is given the highest respect. 37
Anthony's testimony is sufficient to establish accused-appellant's identity as one of the assailants who forcibly took the subject vehicle. It must be noted that Anthony saw how accused-appellant and a certain alias "Larry" pointed knives at him on his neck and took the subject motorcycle. In the absence of any evidence that Anthony was actuated by improper motive in testifying against accused-appellant, it is presumed that he was not so actuated and thus, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 38 When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the witness to testify falsely against the accused or pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists and that the former's testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 39
The elements of Carnapping as defined and penalized under RA 6539, as amended, are the following: (1) that there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) that the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; (3) that the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and (4) that the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 40
Undisputedly, the subject motorcycle is owned by Albert and not by accused-appellant as evidenced by a Honda Installment Policy which is under the name of Albert. 41
The element of unlawful taking was also proven by the prosecution. Unlawful taking or apoderamiento is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 42 Anthony identified accused-appellant and Larry, who pointed knives at him, as the ones who forcibly took the subject motorcycle. Thus, there was actual taking of the subject motorcycle through violence against and intimidation of a person.
The element of intent to gain is also present. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. 43 The mere use of the thing taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain. 44 In the case, accused-appellant's intent to gain is presumed from his declaration of a hold-up and the subsequent taking of the motorcycle from Anthony's possession. Hence, there is no doubt that all the elements of Carnapping through violence against or intimidation of persons were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Additionally, it is well to stress that accused-appellant fled to the province until his arrest in 2007. He admitted that he fled to the province out of fear that he will be incarcerated for an offense he did not commit. 45 His assertion holds no water.
It is well settled that the flight of an accused may be taken as evidence to establish his guilt. 46 Indeed, the wicked fleeth when no men pursueth, but the innocent is as bold as a lion. 47
As to the penalty imposed, the RTC, as sustained by the CA, correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to twenty five (25) years, as maximum, considering that the offense was committed through violence against and intimidation of a person. ATICcS
Section 14 of RA 6539, as amended, provides:
SECTION 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case, the penalty to be imposed is imprisonment for not less than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months and not more than thirty (30) years because the offense was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and whose minimum term not be less than the minimum prescribed. 48 Thus, the penalty imposed by the RTC which is the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to twenty five (25) years, as maximum, is in order.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 6, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10719 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Ronald Secretario y Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Carnapping defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 6539. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to twenty five (25) years, as maximum.
The Court NOTES the letter dated July 4, 2021 of Corrections Technical Senior Superintendent Ricardo S. Zulueta of the New Bilibid Prison-MaxSeCom, Muntinlupa City, confirming the confinement of Ronald Secretario y Mendoza in their institution on July 2, 2021. ETHIDa
SO ORDERED." (LOPEZ, J. J., designated as additional member vice DIMAAMPAO, J., per Raffle dated October 27, 2021).
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 12.
2.Id. at 3-11; penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao (now a Member of the Court) and Maria Filomena D. Singh, concurring.
3. CA rollo, pp. 31-35; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Leili C. Suarez.
4. Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, approved on August 26, 1972.
5. New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016, approved on July 17, 2016.
6. As culled from the CA Decision, rollo, p. 4.
7. As culled from the CA Decision; id.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 5.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14. CA rollo, pp. 31-35.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 35.
17.Id. at 33.
18.Id. at 34.
19.Rollo, pp. 3-11.
20.Id. at 10.
21.Id. at 6-9.
22.Id. at 5, 9.
23.Id.
24.Id. at 18-20.
25. CA rollo, pp. 21-29.
26.Rollo, p. 18.
27.Id. at 24-26.
28.Id. at 24.
29. CA rollo, pp. 21-29.
30.Id. at 24-27.
31.Id. at 25-26.
32.Id. at 26.
33.Id. at 44-52.
34.Id. at 46.
35.Id. at 50-51.
36.People v. Catig, G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020.
37.People v. Nocido, G.R. No. 240229, June 17, 2020.
38. See People v. Albaran, G.R. No. 233194, September 14, 2020.
39.People v. Advincula, 829 Phil. 516, 525 (2018).
40.People v. Donio, 806 Phil. 578, 590 (2017).
41.Rollo, pp. 6-7.
42.People v. Donio, supra note 40 at 592.
43.Id. at 593.
44.People v. Arcenal, 808 Phil. 50, 65 (2017).
45.Rollo, p. 5.
46.People v. Dumdum, G.R. No. 221436, June 26, 2019, citing People v. Mores, 712 Phil. 480, 495 (2013).
47.Id.
48.People v. Fieldad, 744 Phil. 790, 814 (2014).