SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 202681. June 4, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NANCY PANES, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated04 June 2014which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 202681 — People of the Philippines v. Nancy Panes.
We decide appellant Nancy Panes' appeal from the February 28, 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04095. The appealed decision affirmed the June 16, 2009 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 129, Caloocan City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In its June 16, 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted the appellant of robbery with homicide based on her extrajudicial confession. According to the RTC, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant was detailed, spontaneous, and coherent, and was thus voluntary. On the other hand, the appellant's denial was weak at its core. First, it was unsubstantiated, and second, it could not stand up against the positive identification the prosecution witness made. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered her to indemnify the victim's heirs fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
On appeal, the CA maintained the appellant's conviction, but on a different legal basis. The CA said that, while the appellant's extrajudicial confession was not admissible for being legally deficient, the guilt of the appellant was sufficiently established by the proven surrounding circumstances of the case. Specifically, it was the appellant (then known by the victim and her family as "Ella P. Singson") who let the witnesses (daughter and grandson of the victim) in the unit, minutes before the body of the victim was discovered in the other room, strangled; when asked about the victim's whereabouts, the appellant claimed that the deceased was bathing; the appellant immediately asked for permission to go to the other unit to get some clothes, before the discovery of the body of the victim; upon the discovery of the victim, the appellant could no longer be located; in the room of the victim, where she was discovered, the drawers were forcibly opened and undetermined amount of cash and pieces of jewelry belonging to the deceased were missing; a missing jewelry was pawned by a certain Carla Curtiz, who would later be identified by the attending pawnshop employee to be the appellant; in the course of the investigation, a bio-data of one "Ella P. Singson" was found inside the appellant's bag, where it was discovered that a certain Arnel Lataya (her former common-law husband) was to be contacted in case of emergency — it was through Arnel Lataya that the whereabouts of the appellant was discovered, leading to her arrest. STaAcC
The CA likewise agreed with the RTC that the appellant's defenses of denial and alibi are ineffective excuses and may not be invoked where the identity of the perpetrator has been established by witnesses. In addition to the civil indemnity, the CA awarded the heirs of the deceased fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
In her brief 3 and reply, 4 the appellant argued that her extrajudicial admission was inadmissible as she did not have a competent and independent counsel as required by the Constitution. According to her, the counsel that supposedly assisted her did not fully explain to her the legal implications of her confession. The competence and independence of the assigned counsel were so questionable that the prosecution did not present the counsel to testify — either on direct examination or rebuttal. Finally, without the extrajudicial confession of the appellant — the sole basis of the appellant's conviction — the circumstantial evidence adduced were not sufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
We agree with the CA that the extrajudicial admission of the appellant was inadmissible in evidence. The records show that the manner with which the appellant was informed of her constitutional rights during the custodial investigation was abrupt and perfunctory; clearly, there was no visible effort to explain to the appellant her rights as an accused under the Constitution. As held in People v. Rapeza: 5 "In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation." 6
Likewise, Atty. Cruz-Angeles, the appellant's counsel at the time of the custodial investigation, fell short of being the competent and independent counsel required by the law. The records do not reflect that Atty. Cruz-Angeles explained fully to the appellant the legal consequences of her admission; the language used in apprising the appellant of her custodial rights was Tagalog, while her mother tongue is Hiligaynon, being born and raised in Silay, Negros Occidental.
For these reasons, we reiterate the ruling in Lumanog, et al. v. People: 7 An effective and vigilant counsel requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist the accused from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer must ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. 8CcAESI
Nonetheless, we affirm the appellant's conviction, but modify the amount of the awarded civil indemnities.
Robbery with homicide is committed when death occurs either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. 9
Through circumstantial evidence, the prosecution proved that the appellant committed robbery with homicide against the deceased. It has been held that circumstantial evidence can convict in the presence of the following: (a) there are two (2) or more circumstances; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must form a continuous chain that leads to one fair conclusion: the accused committed the crime and no one else. 10
The test to determine whether the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with the accused's innocence. 11
What are those circumstances that lead to inexorable conclusion that the appellant committed homicide by reason, or on occasion of the robbery? We enumerate.
First. The deceased's grandson, Nilo Natividad, testified that when he and her mother came to the unit of the deceased (where the appellant had been working for two (2) days as a housemaid), it was the appellant who opened the door for them. He identified the appellant in open court to be the same person that opened the door for them. This testimony was corroborated by his mother, Helen Natividad (deceased's daughter).
Second. When Helen Natividad asked the appellant where her mother was, the appellant told her that her mother was in her room taking a bath. It was in her room that the body of the accused was discovered.
Third. Immediately after opening the door for Helen Natividad and Nilo Natividad, the appellant immediately asked for permission to go to the other room to get clothes. She did not come back even after the discovery of the deceased's body. As correctly analyzed by the CA, flight by the accused reflects "consciousness of guilt and a silent admission of culpability. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion." 12
Fourth. After taking too long for the deceased's supposed bath, the mother and son decided to force open the deceased's room. It was then that the body of the deceased was discovered — lying face down, hands tied at her back, feet tied with a cloth, and strangled to death.
Fifth. The room where the deceased was discovered was in a state of disarray — drawers were forced open, undetermined amount of money and jewelries of the deceased were missing.
Sixth. Among the missing jewelries of the deceased, one golden bangle was subsequently redeemed by Nilo Natividad at Glorious Pawnshop, where it was pawned by a certain Carla Curtiz.
Seventh. Leonora Alejandro, the clerk of the pawnshop that attended to Carla Curtiz's pawning of the bracelet, positively identified the accused to be the Carla Curtiz who pawned to her the jewelry.
Eighth. After the appellant fled the scene of the crime, she left behind a bag that contained a bio-data of one "Ells P. Singson" where it was discovered that a certain Arnel Lataya was to be contacted in case of emergency. Through Arnel Lataya, the appellant's former live-in partner, the investigators discovered the whereabouts of the appellant, leading to her arrest.
Based on enumerations seventh and eighth, as aptly observed by the CA, the appellant was in the habit of utilizing different names to conceal her identity. Like the CA, this Court concludes that the purpose of the appellant in concealing her identity is to evade any liability whenever she commits illegality.
The appellant denies to have committed the imputed acts against her, claiming she had left the deceased's unit a day before her death. We do not believe her. Aside from failing to substantiate her denial, alibi may not be invoked where the accused's identity has been positively established. 13 Such is the case at bar — she was positively identified by the witnesses.
We increase the amount of civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the deceased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. The increase in the amount of civil indemnity is called for as the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, like murder, involves a greater degree of criminal propensity than homicide alone where the civil indemnity awarded is P50,000.00. 14
We maintain the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Jurisprudence sets the amount of moral damages at P50,000.00 if the special complex crime of robbery with homicide was not qualified by any circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty. 15
In addition, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid in conformity with current policy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the CA decision dated February 28, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04095 with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the awarded civil indemnity is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; and (2) all the monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. TIDaCE
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 2-23; penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla.
2. CA rollo, pp. 41-59; penned by Presiding Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre.
3. Id. at 69-82.
4. Id. at 127-131.
5. G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 596, 619.
6. Id.
7. G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010, 630 SCRA 42, 115.
8. Id.
9. People v. Uy, G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 236, 249.
10. See People v. Deocampo, G.R. No. 185212, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 288, 293.
11. People v. P/Supt. Artemio E. Lamsen, G.R. No. 198338, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 500, 507.
12. Rollo, p. 16, CA Decision, citing People v. Manulit, G.R. No. 192581, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 426.
13. See People v. Villamor, G.R. No. 187497, October 12, 2011, 659 SCRA 44.
14. People v. Aleman, G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 118, 135.
15. See People v. Uy, G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 236, 260; People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 178, 202.