THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 219853. June 28, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JOSEPH JUNIO y PANES, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 28, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 219853 (People of the Philippines v. Joseph Junio y Panes). — On appeal 1 is the November 21, 2014 Decision 2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06104, which affirmed the October 12, 2012 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 5248-08. The RTC found accused-appellant Joseph Junio y Panes (Junio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing murder.
The Antecedents:
Junio appeals his conviction for the murder of Emidio 4 Pacatang (Pacatang).
Version of the Prosecution:
At around 10:30 P.M. on July 24, 2008, Pacatang and Antonio Reston (Reston) were having their jeepneys washed along Paliparan Molino Road, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Reston observed that accused-appellant Junio, along with accused Ronaldo Macose (Macose) and Reynaldo Vinluan (Vinluan), stood near the car wash station beside JP Gasoline Station. Reston also noticed that Junio asked the person cleaning Pacatang's vehicle what time he would finish. 5
After their vehicles had been washed, Pacatang and Reston left the car wash station. On the road, Pacatang passed Reston's vehicle and told him that someone hurled stones at his (Pacatang's) jeepney. Pacatang then overtook Reston's vehicle. 6
Suddenly, Vinluan, while driving his jeepney with Junio and Macose as passengers, blocked Pacatang's vehicle. After the trio alighted from Vinluan's jeepney, Junio and Macose forced Pacatang to disembark from his (Pacatang's) vehicle then dragged him to a nearby grassy area on the side of the road. Shortly after, Junio (with a balisong) and Macose (with an ice pick) stabbed Pacatang. 7
Reston begged Junio and Macose to stop, reasoning that Pacatang has a family. However, Macose rushed to Reston and told him, "I will kill this because he challenged me to a killing this morning." Macose told Reston to leave otherwise he (Reston) would be involved. Vinluan subsequently approached Junio and Macose and pacified them. Before leaving, Reston noted the plate number of the jeepney used by the assailants then left to seek help from the barangay. On the way, he saw a barangay mobile and asked for assistance. 8 Reston and the barangay officials rushed to the scene but found Pacatang lying prostrate on the ground. They brought Pacatang to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 9
The same night, Police Officer 3 Edgar Belza (PO3 Belza) and PO3 Rez Alovera received a report from the barangay officials about the incident. They found that Pacatang was brought to the hospital by Reston and a barangay tanod. PO3 Belza later learned that Reston was an eyewitness. 10 During his investigation, PO3 Belza discovered that the vehicle used by the perpetrators was sold to Vinluan by the original owner. Thereafter, the police located Vinluan and obtained his statement. 11
Vinluan asserted that the incident stemmed from a traffic altercation. He claimed that Junio and Macose killed Pacatang. He confirmed that Junio and Macose were on board his jeepney prior to the stabbing incident. He tried to prevent Junio and Macose from hurting Pacatang but failed. Nonetheless, he managed to stop them from hurting Reston when he (Reston) tried to intervene. He left the crime scene to avoid being implicated but Junio and Macose still boarded his jeepney. He did not report the incident since he feared Junio and Macose. 12
Relevantly, Reston executed a couple of statements 13 relating to the incident. He recalled that Pacatang mentioned to him that he (Pacatang) had a disagreement with another jeepney driver earlier that day. 14 However, Reston indicated different plate numbers ("PVT 609," 15 "PVZ 609," 16 and "PVT 906") 17 to identify the vehicle used by the perpetrators. He explained that he could not accurately recall the exact details due to confusion. 18 In any event, Reston averred that while at the car wash station, he noticed Junio watching Pacatang. 19
The autopsy 20 on Pacatang's body showed that he received a fatal stab wound on his right anterior chest, which caused his death. He also sustained other non-fatal wounds. 21
Version of the Defense:
Junio denied his participation in the killing. He asserted that on July 24, 2008 at around 8 P.M., his cousin, Vinluan, went to his house and asked for his help regarding the registration of his vehicle with the Land Transportation Office (LTO). Junio referred Vinluan to a certain "Tibo," who works at the LTO. He could not accompany Vinluan as the former's wife just gave birth. Junio did not see Vinluan again until his arrest. Apparently, Vinluan implicated Junio and Macose as the killers. 22
On August 4, 2008, an Information 23 was filed charging Junio with murder. To include 24 Macose and Vinluan, who both remained at-large, 25 the Information was amended 26 on July 6, 2009, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 24th of July, 2008 in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one EMIDIO PACATANG y DANO, with the use of said bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the latter [a] fatal wound on his chest which caused the untimely death of said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Emidio Pacatang.
CONTRARY TO LAW.27
During his arraignment, Junio entered a "not guilty" plea. 28 Trial then ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
In its October 12, 2012 Decision, 29 the RTC ruled that based on the documentary and testimonial evidence, the elements of murder are present. 30 It likewise found the attendance of the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation, 31 treachery, and abuse of superior strength, although the last circumstance is absorbed by treachery. 32 Moreover, the trial court held that all of the accused conspired to commit the felony 33 and that Junio's denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the prosecution witnesses. 34 The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Joseph Junio y Panes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Emidio Pacatang y Dano the amount of P179,200.00 for funeral expenses, construction of niche and attorney's fees, P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P50,000.00 for moral damages and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 35
Aggrieved, Junio appealed 36 to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The CA, in its assailed November 21, 2014 Decision, 37 rejected Junio's defenses of denial and alibi in view of his positive identification by Reston as among the three persons on board a jeepney and who participated in the stabbing of Pacatang to death. 38 Additionally, it found that the minor inconsistency in Reston's recollections of the plate numbers was adequately explained by his confusion when he gave the statements. 39 It noted that Junio's alibi was uncorroborated. 40
Furthermore, the CA found Reston's reaction to be normal under the circumstances. Although Reston left, he immediately sought help from the barangay officials. In any case, his reaction should not be held against him as it was not at all contrary to human experience given that people react differently when confronted with a frightful occurrence. 41 Also, the appellate court found that for defining clauses that there was treachery since the attack was executed in a manner that rendered the victim defenseless. 42 It also held that evident premeditation also attended the commission of the felony as Junio and his co-accused did not abandon their plan and waited for the victim to finish with the car wash and followed him on his way home. This was in addition to the finding that Macose said that he would kill Pacatang because he challenged him to a fight earlier that day. 43
Appreciating the attendant qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, 44 the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling but modified the monetary awards, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, convicting JOSEPH JUNIO y PANES of Murder, in Criminal Case No. 5248-08 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of Seventy-five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; Seventy-five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages; and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, in addition to the actual damages of P179,200.00 and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.45
Junio then appealed 46 before the Court.
Issue
Whether Junio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Our Ruling
There is no merit in the appeal.
This Court finds no reason to reverse the CA's ruling. Based on Our assessment, the prosecution proved accused-appellant's culpability beyond reasonable doubt. 47 Withal, "[i]t is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered might affect the result of the case." 48
The trial court and the appellate court's evaluation of the reliability of Reston's testimony should prevail over that of Junio's mere denial. Reston testified that he knew the perpetrators by face as they were jeepney drivers like him. 49 Thus, his positive identification of the assailants is sufficient. Notably, Reston volunteered to testify and Pacatang's family did not ask him to be a witness during the trial. 50 This only shows that Reston, as the sole eyewitness to the incident, was motivated by a sincere desire to seek justice for Pacatang's death.
Concerning Reston's reaction during the incident, "[i]t is settled that there could be no hard and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or behavior when confronted with a startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence, as in this case. Witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently to shocking stimulus — some may shout, some may faint, and others may be plunged into insensibility." 51 Hence, Reston cannot be blamed for avoiding risking his own life at the time. The mere fact that he tried to pacify the assailants is proof enough that he wanted to prevent the crime from happening notwithstanding the imminent danger to himself.
As to Junio's liability, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, 52 states that:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 [Parricide] shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
5. With evident premeditation.
xxx xxx xxx 53
In view of this, the following are the elements of murder, namely, "(i) that a person was killed; (ii) that the accused killed him or her; (iii) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (iv) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide." 54
There is no dispute that Pacatang perished and that the killing was not parricide or infanticide. Based on the testimony of Reston, Junio took part in the stabbing using a balisong. The autopsy report indicating the fatal stab wound on the chest corroborated Reston's account that the assailants stabbed Pacatang. To qualify the killing to murder, the circumstances provided in Article 248 of the RPC must be alleged in the Information 55 and clearly proven like the crime itself. 56 Here, the Information alleged that treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation attended the commission of the felony.
For the circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, two requisites should be present, namely, "(1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend [themselves] or to retaliate or escape; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by [them]." 57
In this case, the attack on the victim was sudden and unexpected. Pacatang was busy driving his jeepney when his vehicle was suddenly blocked by the vehicle being driven by Vinluan. Despite the prior stoning of his jeepney, Pacatang could not have known that he was going to be fatally assaulted shortly after. For all he knew, the stoning could have been random and not related at all to the subsequent attack against him. In other words, Pacatang had no inkling of what was about to happen to him, especially when he was focused on driving home at the time. Based on the eyewitness account, there was no sign that Pacatang was running away or evading any form of aggression, except for his (Pacatang's) awareness that someone hurled stones at his jeepney.
Jurisprudence states that "a prior altercation negates treachery only insofar as it forewarned the victim about the impending danger." 58 Here, Pacatang could not have realized that the earlier disagreement he had with Macose would later escalate into a vicious attempt on his (Pacatang's) life. Also, a sufficient amount of time had lapsed between their altercation and the attack on his life. Thus, the earlier traffic altercation could not have served as a warning to Pacatang that the assailants would follow through with the oral threats they previously hurled at the victim. 59
Moreover, Pacatang was unarmed and defenseless. After stopping his vehicle, Junio and Macose forcibly brought Pacatang to the grassy area near the road. It was two against one, and the perpetrators had a balisong and an ice pick, weapons that could inflict great damage. Junio and Macose had superior strength, making sure that Pacatang could not subdue or overpower them. Pacatang possessed no weapon to protect himself and the attack was sudden. Junio and Macose evidently overpowered Pacatang. Also, Junio did not show that he sustained any injury during the incident, further proving that the attackers deliberately employed means to ensure that no harm would befall upon them.
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, is absorbed by treachery. 60 All the same, the existence of treachery effectively qualifies the killing to murder, as proven by the prosecution during trial. This is notwithstanding any claim that the Information did not sufficiently allege or particularly describe the acts done by the perpetrators demonstrating the treachery. Junio is deemed to have waived the supposed defect since he did not file a motion to quash the Information or a bill of particulars before his arraignment. In fact, he voluntarily entered his "not guilty" plea during his arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus, Junio understood the implication of the acts being charged against him as indicated in the Information. 61
Also, the prosecution alleged the existence of evident premeditation, which could only be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. This is because the Information did not specifically allege the facts constituting this circumstance. 62 Regardless, the killing was already qualified to murder by the attendance of treachery. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Junio waived the purported defects in the Information for his failure to timely question its contents or lack of specificity before his arraignment. Thus, evident premeditation can still be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance, which would have an effect on the imposable penalty.
Withal, the elements of evident premeditation are as follows, namely, "(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to [their] determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow [them] to reflect upon the consequences of [their] act." 63 Based on Reston's testimony, Junio, on board a motorcycle, monitored Pacatang's whereabouts at the car wash station, and he (Junio) even asked when Pacatang's jeepney would be finished. It appeared that Junio and Macose planned the killing as they conspired with each other and armed themselves with a balisong and an ice pick when they followed Pacatang's jeepney onboard Vinluan's vehicle. Reston also testified on Macose's intent and declaration to kill Pacatang due to a prior disagreement. These acts point to the resolve and plan of the accused to commit the crime specifically against Pacatang.
Indeed, "[t]he essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment." 64 Sufficient amount of time elapsed between the alleged traffic altercation in the morning and the stabbing, which occurred later that night. This demonstrates that all the accused clung to their murderous intent and were undeterred by the passage of time, even with the knowledge that what they sought to do was illegal and cruel.
On a related note, the Court noticed that during his testimony, Junio inadvertently admitted that Vinluan asked for his assistance to confront the person who Macose had a traffic dispute with although he (Junio) later denied it. 65 In any case, Junio confirmed that on that fateful night, Vinluan, who became drunk after a drinking spree with Macose, visited him to inquire about the registration of his jeepney with the LTO. 66 This validated that Junio, at some point, was with Vinluan that night. Although Junio denied accompanying Macose and Vinluan to drink or exact revenge against Pacatang, 67 the positive and categorical testimony of Reston belies such allegation. In like manner, the statement that Vinluan gave to the police clearly specified that Junio and Macose attacked Pacatang, which is another proof bolstering Junio's liability.
Junio's denial deserves no consideration. Case law teaches that "[p]ositive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial, which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law." 68 Junio, aside from his failure to submit other proof, did not present any witness to support his claim that he remained at home during that time. He could have presented his wife or other occupants of his house to prove his whereabouts, yet he did not do so. Indeed, this reinforced Vinluan's statement that Junio, along with Macose, ruthlessly murdered Pacatang.
Regarding the imposable penalty, the law states that murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the RPC provides that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is a generic aggravating circumstance, the higher penalty should be imposed. In this case, given that evident premeditation is considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance (after the killing was qualified to Murder by the existence of treachery), death, the higher penalty, should be imposed. However, since the penalty of death cannot be imposed in accordance with RA 9346, 69 the trial court and the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua. However, it must be stated that Junio is not eligible for parole. 70
Furthermore, in line with recent jurisprudence, 71 the monetary awards of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are increased to P100,000.00 n each. Additionally, all monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the judgment until full payment. 72
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed November 21, 2014 Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06104 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Joseph Junio y Panes is hereby found GUILTY of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay P179,200.00 as actual damages, civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages at P100,000.00 each. All the monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Resolution until full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. CA rollo, pp. 116-117.
2.Rollo, pp. 2-14. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ramon A. Cruz.
3. CA rollo, pp. 13-20. Penned by Executive Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.
4. Also referred to as Emedio in other parts of the rollo.
5. CA rollo, p. 71.
6.Id. at 71-72.
7.Id. at 72.
8.Id.
9.Id., TSN, April 29, 2009, pp. 3-16.
10. CA rollo, pp. 72-73.
11.Id. at 73; records, pp. 16-17.
12. Records, pp. 14-15.
13.Id. at 9-13, 25.
14.Id. at 25.
15.Id. at 9.
16.Id. at 10.
17.Id. at 11.
18.Id.
19.Id. at 13.
20.Id. at 22-23, 158-159.
21. CA rollo, p. 73.
22.Id. at 42; TSN, March 17, 2011, pp. 4-7.
23. Records, p. 26.
24.Id. at 85.
25. CA rollo, p. 13.
26. Records, pp. 1-22.
27.Id. at 1.
28.Id. at 60.
29. CA rollo, pp. 13-20.
30.Id. at 16-17.
31.Id. at 17-18.
32.Id. at 18.
33.Id. at 18-19.
34.Id. at 19.
35.Id. at 19-20.
36.Records, pp. 258-259, 272.
37.Rollo, pp. 2-14.
38.Id. at 7.
39.Id. at 8-9.
40.Id. at 8.
41.Id. at 9.
42.Id. at 10.
43.Id. at 10-11.
44.Id. at 11-12.
45.Id. at 13.
46.Id. at 15-16.
47. REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 133, § 2.
48.People v. Masilang, G.R. No. 246466, January 26, 2021, citing People v. Dinglasan, 334 Phil. 691, 704 (1997).
49. TSN, May 7, 2009, pp. 6-7.
50.Id. at 10.
51.People v. Guarin, G.R. No. 245306, December 2, 2020, citing People v. Ampo, G.R. No. 229938, February 27, 2019.
52. Republic Act No. 7659, An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, December 13, 1993.
53. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 248.
54.People v. Archivido, G.R. No. 233085, September 21, 2020, citing People v. Gaborne, 791 Phil. 581, 592 (2016).
55.Id., citing People v. Wilson Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 488 (2002).
56.Id., citing People v. Dadivo, 434 Phil. 684, 688-689 (2002).
57.People v. Guarin, G.R. No. 245306, supra note 51.
58.People v. Archivido, supra, citing People v. Vallespin, 439 Phil. 816, 827-828 (2002).
59.Id., citing People v. Coscos, 424 Phil. 886, 902-903 (2002).
60.People v. Natindim, G.R. No. 201867, November 4, 2020.
61.See: People v. Silvederio III, G.R. No. 239777, July 8, 2020, citing People v. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019.
62. RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, § 9.
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
63.People v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 241632, October 14, 2020, citing People v. Macaspac, 806 Phil. 285, 293 (2017).
64.Id., citing People v. Dagsil, 822 Phil. 808 (2017).
65. TSN, March 17, 2011, p. 15.
66. TSN, October 19, 2011, p. 4.
67.Id. at 5-6.
68.People v. Masilang, supra note 48, citing People v. De Guzman, 352 Phil. 304, 313 (1998).
69. Republic Act No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, June 24, 2006.
70.See: A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility for Parole" in Indivisible Penalties, August 4, 2015.
71.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 848-849 (2016).
72.Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe, 720 Phil. 828, 840 (2013), citing Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Barley, Jr., 716 Phil. 267, 281-283 (2013) citing BSP-MB Circular No. 799 dated May 16, 2013.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "P100,00.00" in the official document.