FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 197552. July 30, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JESSAN INVENTOR y RABO AND GERRY MANLAPAZ y BALIN, accused,
GERRY MANLAPAZ y BALIN, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 30, 2019 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 197552 (People of the Philippines v. Jessan Inventor y Rabo and Gerry Manlapaz y Balin, accused; Gerry Manlapaz y Balin, accused-appellant)
This appeal assails the Decision 1 dated March 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the conviction of Manlapaz and Inventor who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
FACTS OF THE CASE
On September 23, 2002, an Information for murder was filed against Jessan Inventor (Inventor) and Gerry Manlapaz (Manlapaz) for the killing of Jose Valenzuela, Jr. (Valenzuela). 2
The prosecution's version of the incident, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 24, 2002, at around 11:30 p.m., Cristina Race (Race) noticed some persons discussing at the yard of her house. She was about to go to bed at that time after preparing the ingredients of her halo-halo to be sold the next day. When she peeped through the small opening of their window, she saw Inventor and Manlapaz discussing while Valenzuela was seen sleeping in the bamboo bed in front of her house. Inventor handed a knife to Manlapaz, who refused to accept it. Inventor then stabbed Valenzuela twice, hitting the latter's chest. Manlapaz got the knife from Inventor, who hit the left side of Valenzuela's body. 3
Race swore that she saw the incident happen before her very eyes because the place was well-lit. She heard Valenzuela say, "ayaw, ayaw" until he eventually stopped moaning. 4
After the stabbing incident, Manlapaz left the place and went directly to his house. Inventor initially went to the house of his grandmother but went back to the crime scene and asked Valenzuela who stabbed him. When he heard no answer, he went to the house of his aunt at the opposite side of the road. Later, Inventor and his aunt went to the direction of the house of Valenzuela. 5 aScITE
According to Flor Valenzuela (Flor), she was awakened by Inventor and his aunt who told her that Valenzuela was stabbed. She reported the incident to the police, who spoke with the owners of the house, where the stabbing incident happened. Race and her husband talked to the police but Race did not say anything about what she witnessed. 6
On June 26, 2002, when Flor was on her way to the barangay hall, she was called by Race, who told her that she was going to confess something. Flor asked someone to witness what Race was about to tell her. Race then confessed that she knew who stabbed Valenzuela because she saw the incident happen. She told Flor that she was afraid to reveal what she knew when the police conducted an investigation after the incident. 7
The defense, on the other hand, presented Inventor, Manlapaz, and Liberato Rigo (Rigo) as their witnesses.
According to Manlapaz, he was not at the crime scene in the evening of June 24, 2002. Rigo corroborated Manlapaz' claim that he was asleep from 5:30 p.m. until 8:00 a.m. of June 25, 2002. Rigo's house was adjacent to that of Manlapaz. Manlapaz swore that he only knew of the stabbing incident the next day, when his brother told it to him. 8
Inventor, for his part, said that at the time of the stabbing, he was in his grandmother's house. He asserted that he heard Valenzuela shout, so he went out to investigate and saw him full of blood and was moaning. He asked Valenzuela who stabbed him but he did not answer. He went to his aunt's house to ask for help. They then proceeded to Valenzuela's house and informed Flor of what happened. 9
On February 6, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its Decision 10 finding Inventor and Manlapaz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. In view of the fact that Inventor was a minor at the time of the incident, he was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum and 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Both were ordered to pay the heirs of Valenzuela P50,000.00 as civil liability. 11
The RTC concluded that Inventor and Manlapaz's defense of alibi and denial should not be given weight in view of the positive identification of them by Race who saw the stabbing. 12 It was further resolved that both Inventor and Manlapaz were in the vicinity of the crime scene. For their alibi to prosper, it should have been impossible for them to be at the crime scene at that time. Considering that they only lived in the same barangay and are practically neighbors, it was not impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the time of the stabbing incident. 13
The RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery in convicting Inventor and Manlapaz of murder. 14
Aggrieved, Inventor and Manlapaz filed an appeal to the CA which, however, affirmed with modification their conviction through a Decision 15 dated March 17, 2011.
In the meantime, a Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated September 7, 2010 was filed by Inventor through the Public Attorney's Office. A Resolution dated February 24, 2011 deemed the appeal of Inventor withdrawn and the case, in so far as he is concerned, closed and terminated. Hence, only the appeal as regards Manlapaz remained pending. 16
According to the CA, the testimony of the eyewitness, Race, was consistent and categorical. She saw the whole incident transpire before her and she had no difficulty identifying the malefactors since they frequented her house. The fact that Race did not immediately tell the police investigators what she knew, and it took her three days to testify because she was afraid was a normal response of someone who saw a vivid incident such as stabbing. Such fact does not erode her credibility. 17
Further, Inventor and Manlapaz were not able to substantiate their defense of denial and alibi. They were not able to prove that it was impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the time the incident happened. 18 HEITAD
As to the propriety of the conviction to murder because of treachery, the CA figured that, while it was true that the RTC should not have appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance since it was not alleged in the information, however, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, which were both alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial, still qualified the killing to murder. 19
In this case, the CA settled that Inventor and Manlapaz determined to kill Valenzuela who was asleep at that time. Their resolution to kill him was shown by the fact that Inventor carried a knife to perpetuate the crime and there was sufficient time for them to reflect on the consequences of their act as they were first engaged in a discussion before the stabbing per se. Hence, evident premeditation was concluded to have accompanied the crime. 20
Moreover, it was held that Inventor and Manlapaz took advantage of their superior strength to ensure the execution and success of the crime, as indicated by their act of taking turns in stabbing Valenzuela using a knife while the latter was fast asleep and helpless. 21
Since Inventor has withdrawn his appeal, the CA said that the penalty imposed upon him by the RTC shall stand. As to Manlapaz, the correct penalty was determined to be reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole. 22
The CA also required Inventor and Manlapaz to pay the heirs of Valenzuela P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, as found by the RTC. Additionally, Manlapaz was ordered to pay P50,000.00 moral damages, P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 funeral expenses. 23
Discontented, Manlapaz filed this appeal.
THE COURT'S RULING
After a perusal of the records of the case, this Court resolves to deny the appeal.
As explained in a plethora of cases, the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position to observe elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying. Absent any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant fact or circumstance is shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, would have affected the outcome of the case. 24
In this case, the fact that Race did not immediately tell the police investigators what she saw would not affect her credibility. It is consistent with human experience that the eyewitness might feel afraid, especially since at the time the police ask Race and her husband about the stabbing that happened in front of their house, Inventor, was listening nearby.
Bothered by her conscience, she eventually confessed what she saw three days later, when she chanced upon Flor, Valenzuela's mother.
As to the defense of denial and alibi, it is an established jurisprudential rule that mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of the appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi may prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene. 25 ATICcS
It was undisputed in this case that, while Inventor and Manlapaz claimed that they were not in the crime scene when it happened, nevertheless, they were just in the same barangay and practically neighbors. Hence, it was not impossible for them to be at the crime scene when it happened.
The CA is correct in finding that the RTC erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in this case because it was not alleged in the Information. According to Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, otherwise, they may not be appreciated in the case. This is in line with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 26
The CA is also correct in taking into consideration the presence of evident premeditation in qualifying the killing to murder.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, it is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Premeditation must be based on external acts which must be notorious, manifest, and evident — not merely suspecting — indicating deliberate planning. 27
The prosecution should prove the concurrence of the following requisites to establish evident premeditation:
(1) The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2) An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and
(3) A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. 28
Evident premeditation is primarily a state of mind which may be shown through overt acts. In this case, the fact that Inventor and Manlapaz went to Valenzuela while he was sleeping and brought with them a knife would lead to no other conclusion, but the fact that the attack was planned by both of them.
Moreover, prior to the stabbing incident, Inventor and Manlapaz even had a discussion as to who between them shall stab first. This act obviously established that both of them determined to commit the crime and that they clung to such determination. It was a sign that they thought of their act over and over before actually committing it.
As to abuse of superior strength, the CA held that the same is also present in the case. However, for abuse of superior strength to qualify the killing to murder, it must be proven that there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. 29 Further, it must be shown that the aggressors combined forces in order to secure advantage of their superiority in strength. Differently stated, it must be proven that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. 30
It has been held that, when the victim was attacked by the assailants alternatively, the claim that the accused abused their superior strength could not be appreciated. 31 TIADCc
Applying the above pronouncements in this case, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against Inventor and Manlapaz because it was undisputed that Inventor stabbed Valenzuela first before handing over the knife to Manlapaz, who likewise stabbed him. Had the attack been simultaneous, abuse of superior strength should have been appreciated.
Notwithstanding the absence of abuse of superior strength, evident premeditation was duly established. Hence, the CA is correct in convicting Inventor and Manlapaz of the crime of murder.
In view of Inventor's withdrawal of his appeal, his case is already closed and terminated. Hence, only the appeal of Manlapaz is the subject of this case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. We ADOPT the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision dated March 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02134 finding Gerry Manlapaz y Balin GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ORDERED to pay the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; moral damages amounting to P100,000.00; and exemplary damages amounting to P100,000.00. Furthermore, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Cecilia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-27.
2. CA rollo, p. 12.
3.Id. at 13.
4.Id.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8. CA rollo, p. 14.
9.Id. at 14-15.
10.Id. at 12-16.
11.Id. at 16.
12.Id. at 15.
13.Id.
14. CA rollo, p. 16.
15.Supra note 1.
16.Rollo, pp. 3-4.
17.Id. at 16-18.
18.Id. at 20.
19.Id. at 21.
20.Id. at 22.
21.Id. at 23.
22.Id. at 24.
23.Id. at 25-26.
24.People v. Dominguez, 650 Phil. 492, 520 (2010).
25.People v. Nieto, 571 Phil. 220, 236-237 (2008).
26.People v. Lapore, 761 Phil. 196, 203 (2015).
27.People v. Montejo, 249 Phil. 460, 467 (1988).
28.People v. Dadivo, 434 Phil. 684, 688 (2002).
29.Espineli v. People, 735 Phil. 530, 544-545 (2014).
30.People v. Cañaveras, 722 Phil. 261, 271 (2013).
31.People v. Campit, G.R. No. 225794, December 6, 2017, 848 SCRA 253, 265.