FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 214761. November 3, 2020.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DONALD JAREÑO y CHUA, *accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 3, 2020 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 214761 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versus DONALD JAREÑO y CHUA, accused-appellant.
After a careful review of the records of the instant case, the Court reverses and sets aside the Decision 1 dated February 17, 2014 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City (CA) in C.A-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01047, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated May 6, 2009 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, Branch 62 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2060, finding accused-appellant Donald Jareño y Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended. The Court acquits accused-appellant for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the prosecution has the burden to prove compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, to wit: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 3
Strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is necessary in protecting the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, without which the crime of the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 4 Further, it is only by such strict compliance that the grave mischiefs of planting, switching and contamination of evidence may be eradicated and the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation may be proved. In other words, noncompliance with Section 21 is tantamount to a failure to establish an essential element of the crime; and will therefore engender the acquittal of an accused. 5
Thus, in the cases of People v. Garcia, 6People v. Royol, 7People v. Gabriel, 8People v. Del Rosario, 9People v. Ordiz, 10People v. Zapanta, 11 and People v. Saragena, 12 the Court acquitted the accused, on reasonable doubt, because the police officers failed to comply with all of the foregoing requirements of Section 21. In these cases, no inventory and photographing of the seized items were conducted at the place of apprehension or at the nearest police station. Moreover, none of the required witnesses was present at or near the place of apprehension nor at the police station. This wholesale violation of Section 21 casts reasonable doubt on the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the prosecution's evidence and thus, on the accusation that accused-appellant violated RA 9165. aScITE
Following the foregoing cases, accused-appellant should perforce be acquitted because the police officers in this case failed to comply with literally ALL the mandatory requirements of Section 21.
To start, no inventory and photographing of the evidence were conducted either at the scene of the purported buy-bust operation or even when accused-appellant was brought to the police station for investigation. To make matters worse, none of the three (3) required witnesses was present at the place of apprehension or at the police station. In a long line of cases, that includes People v. Mendoza, 13People v. Reyes, 14People v. Sagana, 15People v. Calibod, 16People v. Tomawis, 17Hedreyda v. People, 18People v. Sta. Cruz, 19Tañamor v. People, 20People v. Arellaga, 21 and People v. Casilang, 22 this Court has consistently emphasized that the presence of all the required witnesses at the time of the inventory and photography is mandatory and the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves to protect against the possibility of planting, switching, contamination or loss of the seized drug. The presence of these disinterested witnesses would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug.
While jurisprudence provides that strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 is not always possible given the wide range of varying field conditions, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 nonetheless state that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." Thus, for this saving clause to apply, the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 23
In the present case, the prosecution failed to establish any justifiable ground for the police officers' failure to comply with the requirements of Section 21. There is even no showing from the records of the case that the police officers exerted earnest efforts to comply with the requirements of the law. Considering that buy-bust is a planned operation, police officers are given sufficient time to prepare and consequently, make arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21. 24 They are therefore compelled "not only to state reasons for their noncompliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstance, their actions were reasonable." 25 Thus, the failure of the prosecution to justify or explain the police officers' noncompliance in this case further underscores the doubt and suspicion about the truthfulness or legitimacy of the buy-bust operation supposedly conducted against accused-appellant and the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti allegedly confiscated from him.
Moreover, contrary to the findings of the RTC and CA, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drug. To establish an unbroken chain of custody, "[i]t is necessary that every person who touched the seized item describe how and from whom he or she received it; where and what happened to it while in the witness' possession; its condition when received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in the chain." 26 This requirement was, however, not complied in this case.
First, there was no evidence whether markings were made on the seized drug and if it was marked, who made such markings, when and where the seized drug was marked and whether the markings were made in the presence of accused-appellant. In a plethora of cases which includes People v. Dahil, 27People v. Bartolini, 28People v. Villarta, 29People v. Marcelo, 30Largo v. People, 31People v. Castillo, 32 the Court has consistently ruled that marking, as the starting point in the custodial link, must be made immediately upon confiscation because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. Immediate marking is indispensable as it ensures that the illegal drug confiscated from the accused is the same as the one subjected to inventory and photographing and later on presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Hence, while marking is not found in RA 9165, this Court has ruled, long before the passage of RA 9165, that "failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti." 33
Second, records clearly show that the prosecution failed to prove that the identity and integrity of the seized items were preserved. The Court notes that the prosecution never presented as its witness, SPO1 Nelson Grijaldo, the actual poseur-buyer who allegedly bought the items from accused-appellant, kept and transported the confiscated items from the place of arrest to the police station, and subsequently brought them to the crime laboratory for examination. 34 The Court is thus absolutely appalled by the RTC and CA's assessment that the chain of custody of the drug allegedly seized from the accused-appellant was sufficiently established, when at the point of seizure and confiscation irregularities were already attendant and there is dearth of evidence on how the drug allegedly seized from the accused was handled, managed or preserved from the time of confiscation until the same was turned over to the forensic chemist.
Finally, the Court finds that both the RTC and CA turned a blind eye to the police officers' complete and utter derogation of Section 21 and instead erroneously relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law is fundamentally unsound because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity. 35 More importantly, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, a mere rule of evidence, cannot overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused guaranteed by no less than our Constitution. 36 In this case, the presumption of regularity does not even arise because of the police officers' gross and deliberate disregard of the established procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165. HEITAD
All told, the blatant and unjustified breaches of procedure committed by the police officers in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug create more than reasonable doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. This leaves the Court without any guarantee as to the integrity of the corpus delicti other than the self-serving assurances of the police officers. This is precisely the situation that RA 9165 seeks to prevent. 37 Thus, absent any proof beyond reasonable doubt of the corpus delicti of the crime charged, the presumption of accused-appellant's innocence must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal 38 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 17, 2014 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01047 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Donald Jareño y Chua is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELYRELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Superintendent of New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The said Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Revision: Gatia changed to Chua per footnote of Court of Appeals Resolution dated September 24, 2014 and Order of Commitment & Decision dated February 24, 2010 & May 6, 2009, respectively, both issued by Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City.
1. Rollo, pp. 4-17. Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan with Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.
2. CA rollo, pp. 43-65. Penned by Presiding Judge Frances V. Guanzon.
3. People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 234151, December 5, 2018 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division], 888 SCRA 604, 618-619.
4. See People v. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], 853 SCRA 487.
5. People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 205821, October 1, 2014 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], 737 SCRA 486, 496.
6. G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009 [Per J. Brion, Second Division], 580 SCRA 259.
7. G.R. No. 224297, February 13, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], 893 SCRA 54.
8. G.R. No. 228002, June 10, 2019 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65279>.
9. G.R. No. 235658, June 22, 2020 [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66342>.
10. G.R. No. 206767, September 11, 2019 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65741>.
11. G.R. No. 230227, November 6, 2019 [Per J. Zalameda, Third Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66244>.
12. G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], 837 SCRA 529.
13. G.R. No. 192432, June 23, 2014 [Per C.J. Bersamin, First Division], 727 SCRA 113.
14. G.R. No. 199271, October 19, 2016 [Per C.J. Bersamin, First Division], 806 SCRA 513.
15. G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], 834 SCRA 225.
16. G.R. No. 230230, November 20, 2017 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division], 845 SCRA 370.
17. G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division], 862 SCRA 131.
18. G.R. No. 243313, November 27, 2019 [Per J. A.B. Reyes, Jr., Second Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66031>.
19. G.R. No. 244256, November 25, 2019 [Per J. J.C. Reyes, Jr., First Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65946>.
20. G.R. No. 228132, March 11, 2020 [Per J. Caguioa, First Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66109>.
21. G.R. No. 231796, August 24, 2020 [Per J. Hernando, Second Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66340>.
22. G.R. No. 242159, February 5, 2020 [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66075>.
23. People v. Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division], 834 SCRA 613, 625.
24. People v. Mama, G.R. No. 237204, October 1, 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division], 881 SCRA 268, 282-283.
25. Id. at 283.
26. People v. Gajo, G.R. No. 217026, January 22, 2018 [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division], 852 SCRA 274, 287.
27. G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division], 745 SCRA 221, 240-241.
28. G.R. No. 215192, July 27, 2016 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], 798 SCRA 711, 720.
29. G.R. No. 217887, March 14, 2018 [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division], 859 SCRA 193, 214.
30. G.R. No. 228893, November 26, 2018 [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division], 887 SCRA 97.
31. G.R. No. 201293, June 19, 2019 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, Second Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65325>.
32. G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65610>.
33. People v. Dahil, supra note 27, at 241.
34. Rollo, pp. 14-16.
35. People v. Escaran, G.R. No. 212170, June 19, 2019 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division], accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65324>.
36. Id.
37. People v. Que, supra note 4, at 516.
38. Rollo, pp. 18-19.