Lim y Chua v. People

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 240321. November 22, 2021.]

ROMEO EPHRAIM LIM y CHUA, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated22 November 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 240321 (Romeo Ephraim Lim y Chua v. People of the Philippines). — Impugned in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision2 dated 26 March 2018 and the Resolution3 dated 22 June 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 09283, which affirmed the Decision4 dated 12 January 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-272741, finding petitioner Romeo Ephraim Lim y Chua (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659. 5

This case has its precursor in an Information6 indicting petitioner for Murder, the inculpatory averments of which read:

That on or about December 18, 2009, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said (petitioner), conspiring and confederating with another person whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one CROMWELL DUKA, JR. y JANE by then and there repeatedly stabbing the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting him stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

Upon arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty 8 to the crime charged. After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution 9 endeavored to establish the following factual milieu:

Around 11:30 in the morning of 18 December 2009, Marion Joseph Hipolito (Marion) and Cromwell Duka, Jr. (Cromwell) were at the San Sebastian College Recoletos canteen, lining up to buy food from Twinbee when petitioner bumped into Cromwell. They had an exchange of words after which petitioner kicked Cromwell and attacked him with a bladed weapon. Forthwith, the school's security guard arrived.

Cromwell was immediately rushed to the Mary Chiles General Hospital where he eventually succumbed to death due to the stab wounds he had sustained in his thorax and abdomen.

On the other hand, petitioner was brought to the Barbosa Police Block, and was subsequently turned over for hooking to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Unit of the Manila Police District.

As expected, petitioner 10 proffered a divergent version of the facts.

He asseverated that he was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi, the rival fraternity of Alpha Phi Omega of which Cromwell was a member. Cromwell had bullied him. On 18 December 2009, Cromwell's fraternity brother, Marion, threatened to kill petitioner. While at the counter of the school's canteen transacting with an attendant, Cromwell suddenly gave petitioner a spinning kick and then attacked him with a knife, which he was able to parry. Having training in taekwondo, he managed to grab the knife from Cromwell.

Ploughing through the contrasting evidence of the defense and the prosecution, the RTC rendered the 12 January 2017 Decision11 finding petitioner guilty as charged, thusly —

WHEREFORE, (petitioner) ROMEO EFHRAIM/EPHRAIM LIM Y CHUA is hereby (declared) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 and there being no mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offense(,) accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole and to pay the heirs of deceased victim Cromwell Duka, Jr. with the following amount:

1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2) P4,502,400.00 for loss of earnings of the victim;

3) P75,000.00 as moral damages;

4) P25,000.00 as temperate damages;

5) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

6) all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 12

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision to the CA postulating, in the main, that the RTC erred in declaring the element of treachery as attendant in the killing of Cromwell, the victim.

In the assailed Decision, 13 the CA affirmed the disposition of the RTC, ordaining that the RTC erred not in convicting petitioner of murder since treachery was present in the killing of Cromwell. Likewise, the CA pronounced that the seemingly inconsistencies in the testimony of Marion, the prosecution witness, were trivial which blow no holes in his credibility.

Petitioner's bid for a reconsideration 14 of the challenged Decision fell on deaf ears as the CA denied the same in the impugned Resolution. 15

Via the present Petition, petitioner intransigently postulates that: one, there is no treachery under the facts obtaining in this case; and two, there exist mitigating circumstances which should be appreciated in his favor.

Petitioner theorizes that no treachery can be imputed against him as Cromwell was not only aware of the hostility and the impending retaliation but was also the one who instigated the fight. Augustus Caesar Cosio (Cosio), one of the prosecution's very own witnesses, professed in his sworn statement that it was Cromwell who initially boxed petitioner.

Moreover, petitioner insists that he was definitely the victim given that Cromwell and his fraternity brothers bullied him. In actual fact, prior to the incident, Cromwell's group provoked him by taking the change due him when he had purchased cellphone load. Inevitably, Cromwell's acts of kicking and punching him triggered the altercation. Thence, the mitigating circumstances of incomplete justifying circumstance and provocation, as well as the analogous circumstance of bullying should be appreciated. 16

The Court is not persuaded.

First off, it bears emphasis that factual matters are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari, as it is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh the evidence which has been considered in the proceedings a quo. Certainly, issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses and the re-evaluation of the evidence involve factual questions. 17 Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that this rule is not absolute and a review of the factual findings is justified under the following circumstances:

(i) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (ii) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (iii) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (iv) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (v) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (vi) when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (vii) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (viii) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (ix) when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent; (x) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [or] (xi) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 18

Plain as day, none of the above exceptions obtain here. This being so, the Court cannot calibrate anew the evidence already assessed and evaluated by the trial court. Accordingly, the Court accords the highest respect to the factual findings of the RTC, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from its factual findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, judicial experience has shown that the trial courts are in the best position to decide issues of credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the witnesses and observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying under exacting examination. 19

Contrariwise, the prosecution demonstrably proved beyond reasonable doubt that Cromwell was treacherously killed, in light of the presence of the two (2) requirements for treachery: (1) the victim was in no position to defend himself or herself when attacked; and, (2) the assailant consciously and deliberately adopted the methods, means, or form of one's attack against the victim. 20

On this point, the squabble between petitioner and the victim resulting in the commission of the crime, did not negate the presence of treachery. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow. 21

It cannot be stressed enough that the stabbing incident happened inside the school premises. As such, Cromwell patently did not have any inkling that petitioner had in his possession a bladed weapon which was used to attack him. As it happened, Cromwell was rendered defenseless when petitioner stabbed him successively.

Quite palpably, petitioner deliberately and consciously adopted stabbing as his mode of attack. As heretofore adumbrated, petitioner and Cromwell, possessing a bladed weapon, were in school. This cold hard fact manifestly evinces his intention to use such bladed weapon (four-finger metal knuckle with a protruding blade) 22 to ensure that his adversary would not be able to retaliate. Along this vein, the Court reverberates the ratiocination of the CA, viz.:

The fact that (petitioner) was facing the victim when he stabbed the latter or the fact that they were engaging in a fist fight is of no consequence. Even a frontal attack could still be treacherous when unexpected, and on unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it.

In this case, the (petitioner) was well aware that the bringing of a bladed weapon within the school's premises is prohibited. Yet when (petitioner) engaged the victim to a fist fight, the former made use of a bladed weapon to stab the latter. Hence, by bringing a bladed weapon inside the school's premises, engaging in a fist fight, and thereafter making use of the said bladed weapon to stab the victim despite being unarmed, (petitioner's) clear intention was to have the upper hand against an unsuspecting victim. 23

In synthesis, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the verdict of conviction for murder against petitioner. We find and so hold that the factual backdrop of the case belies petitioner's plea for the appreciation of the purported mitigating circumstances.

A final word. Given that the proper penalty herein is simply reclusion perpetua, there is a need to delete the phrase "without eligibility for parole" in petitioner's penalty, in accordance with A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC. 24 Moreover, in obeisance to prevailing jurisprudence, 25 the awards of exemplary damages and temperate damages should be increased to P75,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 26 March 2018 and the Resolution dated 22 June 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 09283 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:

1. Petitioner Romeo Efhraim/Ephraim Lim y Chua is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

2. The awards of exemplary and temperate damages are increased to P75,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively.

SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., on official leave.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 11-30.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles. Id. at 33-45.

3. Id. at 55-56.

4. Penned by Judge Alma Crispina B. Collado-Lacorte. Id. at 33.

5. An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, Approved on 13 December 1993.

6. Id. at 34.

7. Rollo, p. 34.

8. Id.

9. Id. at 35.

10. Id. at 37.

11. Penned by Judge Alma Crispina Callado-Lacorte.

12. Rollo, pp. 33-34.

13. Id. at 44.

14. Id. at 46-51.

15. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles. Id. at 56.

16. Id. at 24-26.

17. Quijano v. People, G.R. No. 202151, 10 February 2021.

18. Id.

19. Cruz v. People, 745 Phil. 54, 66 (2014).

20. People v. Abina, et al., 830 Phil. 352, 361 (2018).

21. People v. Archivido, G.R. No. 233085, 21 September 2020.

22. Rollo, p. 69.

23. Id. at 42.

24. GUIDELINES FOR THE PROPER USE OF THE PHRASE "WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE" IN INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES (4 August 2015).

25. People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 848 and 853 (2016).