FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252160. December 2, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.RITA FRANCISCO y BARCENILLA ALIAS "PUKA", appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 2, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 252160 — People of the Philippines v. Rita Francisco y Barcenilla alias "Puka"
Appellant Rita Francisco y Barcenilla (appellant) prays for a reversal of the verdict of conviction against her for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165). 1 She invokes two (2) grounds in support of this appeal: first, her warrantless arrest was illegal, hence, the incidental seizure of the alleged drugs from her person was also illegal; and second, there was a breach of the chain of custody rule.
Appellant waived her
On appellant's warrantless arrest, suffice it to state that any objection involving arrest or the procedure for acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before arraignment; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 2 The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, and any defect in the arrest may be deemed cured when he or she voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 3 The accused's voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during the trial cured any defect or irregularity that may have attended his or her arrest. 4
Here, appellant did not raise any objection to her warrantless arrest before she got arraigned. She, in fact, voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty, and thereafter, actively participated in the trial. As it was, her present challenge against her warrantless arrest came too late in the day as she raised it only for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. This belated stance certainly cannot undo her waiver and the consequent proceedings that took place below as well as the appellate proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
The failure of the accused though to timely object to the illegality of his or her arrest does not preclude him or her from questioning the admissibility of the evidence seized as an incident of the warrantless arrest. 5 Its inadmissibility is not affected when the accused fails to timely question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest. 6 cHECAS
The chain of custody
In drug related cases, the State bears the burden not only of proving the elements of the offense but also the corpus delicti itself. 7 The dangerous drug seized from an accused constitutes such corpus delicti. It is thus imperative for the prosecution to establish that the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug were duly preserved in order to sustain a verdict of conviction. 8 It must prove that the dangerous drug seized from the accused is indeed the substance offered in court with the same unshakeable accuracy as that required to sustain a finding of guilt.
On June 2, 2011, appellant was arrested for violation of both Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. The governing law, therefore, is the original version of RA 9165 and its implementing rules, prior to the effectivity of the amendatory Republic Act No. 10640 (RA 10640) 9 on August 7, 2014.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 further mandates:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 21. (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements underjustifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphases and underscoring supplied) AHDacC
xxx xxx xxx
Generally, there are four (4) links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drug: (i) its seizure and marking, if practicable, from the accused, by the apprehending officer; (ii) its turnover by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (iii) its turnover by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for examination; and, (iv) its turnover by the forensic chemist to the court. 10
The first link refers to the seizure and marking which must be done immediately at the place of the arrest. Too, it includes the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized items which should be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely, "a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official." 11
Here, the first link of the chain of custody had already been breached early on.
At the outset, the apprehending officers did immediately mark the seized plastic sachets of shabu at the place of arrest. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. 12
To recall, after Police Officer 3 Jojo Leonor (PO3 Leonor) and Senior Police Officer 1 Joanna Canja (SPO1 Canja) apprehended appellant at her very own house, SPO1 Canja took a pouch from appellant's armpit. After SPO1 Canja handed him the pouch, PO3 Leonor spread its contents — sachet of suspected shabu, scissor, disposable lighter, cellphone, and money — on a table. PO3 Leonor conducted an inventory in the presence of a certain Barangay Chairman Buendia, who arrived right after the pouch was opened. PO3 Leonor marked all the items (the two (2) sachets he purchased were marked "JTL-6" and "JTL-7," while the sachet recovered from the pouch was marked "JTL-1"). 13
Yet, the precaution of marking was put to naught for the apprehending officers concurrently committed a breach: the inventory was done only in the presence of appellant and Barangay Chairman Buendia. There were no representatives from the DOJ and media. True, a certain Prosecutor Sustento again inspected the seized items at the police station but this supposed "second inventory" in no way cured the fatal defect.
To repeat, the insulating witnesses must be an elected public official, a representative of the DOJ, and a representative from the media in People v. Vistro, 14 the Court acquitted Jonathan Vistro because only one insulating witness, a barangay official, was present during the inventory, thus:
In this case, while a barangay official signed as a witness in the Certificate of Inventory, there was no mention that the inventory and photograph of the seized shabu was done in the presence of representatives from the media and the DOJ. The arresting officer merely testified that the buy-bust team marked the seized shabu in the police station since the barangay captain and other officials of the place where the crime was committed were relatives of the appellant. He failed to provide a justifiable ground for the absence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ during the inventory and photograph of the seized shabu at the police station. The failure of the prosecution to secure the attendance of these witnesses, without providing any reasonable justification therefor, creates doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu. Thus, there is no recourse for this Court other than to reverse the conviction of appellant. (Emphasis supplied) IDSEAH
The Court has repeatedly stressed that the presence of the required insulating witnesses at the time of the inventory is mandatory. Under the law, the presence of the insulating witnesses is a high prerogative requirement, the non-fulfillment of which casts serious doubts upon the integrity of the corpus delicti itself — the very prohibited substance itself — and for that reason imperils the prosecution's case. 15 Here, the Court takes note of the prosecution's failure to explain as to why no representatives from DOJ and media were present when the inventory was conducted in appellant's house. In other words, there was no earnest effort to speak of in securing the presence of the representatives from DOJ and the media during the inventory.
Indeed, the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law, especially in this case where a surveillance was conducted on appellant before she got entrapped in a buy-bust operation. Police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his or her arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state the reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 16
True, the saving clause under Section 21 (a), Article II, RA 9165 IRR ordains that non-compliance with the prescribed requirement shall not invalidate the seizure and custody of the items provided such non-compliance is justified and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. 17
As shown, the saving clause here is not triggered for the prosecution failed to prove that the police officers' non-compliance with the prescribed procedure was justified and it is very clear that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have already been tainted.
Verily, we find that the prosecution utterly failed to 1) prove the corpus delicti of the crime especially since the amount involved in this case is minuscule, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives; 18 (2) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any explanation why the Chain of Custody Rule was not complied with. Accordingly, the Court is constrained to acquit appellant based on reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02898 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant RITA FRANCISCO y BARCENILLA is ACQUITTED of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in Criminal Case No. 11-70118 and violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in Criminal Case No. 11-70119. aCIHcD
The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to: a) immediately release appellant RITA FRANCISCO y BARCENILLA alias "Puka" from custody unless she is being held for some other lawful cause or causes; and b) submit a report on the action taken within five (5) days from notice.
Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended.
2.Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019.
3.People v. Alunday, 586 Phil. 120, 133 (2008).
4.People v. Bacla-An, 445 Phil. 729, 748 (2003).
5.Homar v. People, 768 Phil. 195, 208 (2015).
6.Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642, 654 (2017).
7.People v. Calates, 829 Phil. 262, 269 (2018).
8.Calahi v. People, 820 Phil. 886, 894 (2017), citing People v. Casacop, 778 Phil. 369, 376 (2016) and Zafra v. People, 686 Phil. 1095, 1108 (2012).
9. AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002."
10.People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 227867, June 26, 2019.
11.People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 239000, November 05, 2018, 884 SCRA 318, 327.
12.People v. Coreche, 612 Phil. 1238, 1245 (2009).
13. CA rollo, pp. 15-16.
14. G.R. No. 225744, March 6, 2019.
15.People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229509, July 03, 2019.
16.People v. Ramos, 826 Phil. 981, 997 (2018).
17.People v. Frias, G.R. No. 234686, June 10, 2019.
18.People v. Pagsigan, G.R. No. 232487, September 03, 2018, 878 SCRA 545, 562.