People v. Francisco y Radores

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 231835. September 19, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.NOEL FRANCISCO y RADORES, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 19, 2018 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 231835 (People of the Philippines v. Noel Francisco y Radores)

For automatic review before Us is the Decision 1 dated October 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05597, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision 2 dated February 21, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Nos. RTC 2003-0271 and RTC 2003-0272, finding Noel Francisco y Radores (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Complexed Parricide with Frustrated Parricide and Attempted Murder.

On July 10, 2017, We issued a Resolution 3 directing the parties to file their Supplemental Briefs. On September 29, 2017, accused-appellant filed a Manifestation 4 in lieu of Supplemental Brief manifesting his desire to forego with the filing of a supplemental brief considering that the Appellant's Brief he filed before the CA has exhaustively argued all the relevant issues of his case. On the other hand, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Manifestation 5 in lieu of a supplemental brief.

After a perusal of the records of the case, this Court resolves to DISMISS the appeal for failure of accused-appellant to show that the CA committed a reversible error in upholding his conviction. CAIHTE

Central in accused-appellant's arguments in reversing his conviction is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses in relating the crime. Accused-appellant claimed that while the witnesses allegedly heard a gunshot coming from his house, none of the prosecution witnesses actually witnessed him shooting his wife, Marites, and thereby wounding his daughter Michelle, as well.

Time and again, this Court has reiterated that the credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed by the trial court because of its opportunity to observe their demeanor while testifying on the stand, an opportunity denied to the appellate courts. 6

It must be stressed that a question that invites a review of the factual findings of the lower tribunals or bodies is beyond the scope of this Court's power of review and generally justifies the dismissal of the petition. 7 Since the CA and the RTC unanimously found that accused-appellant is guilty as charged, it consequently falls down on accused-appellant to come forward with a good reason or cause to have Us depart from the age-old rule of according conclusiveness to the findings of the trial courts especially when the same is affirmed by the CA. But that convincing demonstration was not done by accused-appellant. Thus, his guilt was sufficiently proven by the prosecution.

It is settled that the lack or absence of direct evidence of the acts committed by the accused does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the latter cannot be proved. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. 8

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states that:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, to anchor conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the guilty person and no one else. 9

We affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA that the following circumstances form an unbroken chain that point to no other conclusion that accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Marites and the fatal wounding of Michelle, to wit: DETACa

1. Accused Noel Francisco is the husband of Marites Dolosa Francisco and the father of Michelle Doloso Francisco;

2. Accused Noel Francisco was at the scene of the crime before, during and after the incident;

3. On March 21, 2003 at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, private complainant Jemil Dadea saw accused Noel Francisco came out of his house located at Isla Sison, Bgy. Peñafrancia, Naga City armed with a gun and approached him;

4. Accused Noel Francisco struck the left side of the head of Jemil Dadea twice with a gun he was carrying at that time;

5. Accused Noel Francisco after seeing Jemil Dadea alighted from the padjak, aimed his gun and fired a shot at him hitting the left portion of his upper thigh;

6. Jemil Dadea after being shot hid in (sic) a concrete wall to avoid the accused but the latter followed him and continuously squeezed the trigger of his gun towards him;

7. When the gun of Noel Francisco failed to fire[,] he left the scene of the crime and proceeded to his house;

8. After accused entered his house, Jemil Dadea heard another gunshot coming from the house of Noel Francisco;

9. That the bloodied body of Marites Doloso with a gunshot wound on her head was seen being carried out of accused's house by Rodel Radores to be brought to the hospital where she later died;

10. That Michelle Doloso Francisco[,] daughter of Noel Francisco and Marites Doloso Francisco was also brought to the Mother Seton Hospital due to a head injury caused by the bullet that exited from the head of Marites;

11. The autopsy findings indicate that Marites Francisco sustained two (2) gunshot wounds on her head;

12. Accused Noel Francisco ran away and went into hiding after the shooting incident. 10

The defense of accident invoked by the accused-appellant cannot absolve him from criminal liability. Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that "any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it" is exempt from criminal liability. aDSIHc

However, for the defense of accident to exempt herein accused-appellant from criminal liability, it is necessary that the following elements exist: (1) accused is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) causes injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. 11

In invoking the defense of accident, the accused bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence, the requisites of the exempting circumstance of accident. 12 To prove the circumstance he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. 13

In the present case, the act of possessing an unlicensed firearm cannot be said to be a lawful act. Hence, the accused by the mere fact of possessing the same is already performing an unlawful act.

Further, if it is indeed true that the shooting of Marites and Michelle was by mere accident, the actuation of the accused after the shooting betrays his true intent. Here, instead of making sure that his wife and daughter be brought to the hospital and be treated for their wounds, accused ran away and hid for seven (7) months until he was arrested by the police.

As held in the case of People v. Ramil Mores, 14 to wit:

Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. In one case, this Court had stated that it is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion. 15

As to the charge of attempted murder, We sustain the RTC and CA's findings that accused-appellant is likewise guilty of the said crime.

For the crime of attempted murder to prosper, the following elements must be present: 1) The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; 2) He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3) The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; 4) The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. 16

All the following elements were present in this case, to wit: 1) Accused-appellant hit the head of Jemil with a gun, twice and each time the gun fired. When Jemil alighted from his padyak and ran, accused-appellant, fired another shot hitting Jemil on his upper thigh. 2) Accused-appellant continued squeezing the trigger of the gun pointed at Jemil, however, the gun luckily did not fire. 3) Accused-appellant failed to kill Jemil due to other circumstance, other than his own desistance, which was the malfunction of the gun. ETHIDa

We disagree with the RTC and the CA that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the shooting of Jemil to murder. The same was not proven by the prosecution. In People v. Beduya, 17 it is held that:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. 18

Here, the mere fact that accused-appellant, armed with a gun, suddenly approached Jemil and hit the latter's head with the gun, does not necessarily mean that accused purposely used his strength to facilitate the crime. The prosecution failed to present evidence as to the disparity in age, size, strength or force between accused-appellant and Jemil. 19

Nevertheless, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation is manifestly present in this case. When accused-appellant approached Jemil and hit the latter's head with a gun several times, Jemil was able to ran away. However, accused-appellant still clung to his determination to kill Jemil because even Jemil was able to ran away, accused-appellant continued firing shots at him which would have killed Jemil had the gun worked properly.

As to the penalty of Parricide, Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposable to any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse. In this case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that would necessitate the imposition of death. As to the penalty of Frustrated Parricide, the penalty should be reclusion temporal since it is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law in a consummated parricide. cSEDTC

However, under Article 48 20 of the Revised Penal Code, states that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty of the most serious crime shall be imposed. As such, We affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as to the penalty of the complex crime of Parricide with Frustrated Parricide.

As to the penalty for attempted murder, We deem it proper to modify the penalty to four (4) years and eight (8) days of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, considering that there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance that was alleged in the Information and proven during trial, other than the circumstance that qualified the attempted killing to murder.

As to damages, We modify the damages awarded by the CA, consistent with People v. Jugueta. 21 In the crime of Parricide, if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should be pegged at P75,000.00 each. Also, in case of death, and the expenses incurred are not supported by receipts or if supported with receipts, but the amount adduced is less than P50,000.00, an award of P50,000.00 as temperate, in lieu of actual damages, should also be awarded.

As to the crime of Frustrated Parricide, the civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages should be P50,000.00 each.

And as to the crime of Attempted Murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages that should be awarded is P25,000.00 each.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05597 is hereby AFFIRMEDwith the following MODIFICATION:

In Criminal Case No. 2003-0271, Noel Francisco y Radores is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Marites Francisco y Doloso the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. With respect to the minor victim Michelle Francisco y Doloso, accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. 2003-0272, Noel Francisco y Radores is found GUILTY of ATTEMPTEDMURDER and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and eight (8) days of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay Jemil Dadea y Dianela the amount of P25,000.00 as civil indemnity; P25,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. SDAaTC

Other dispositions not otherwise modified, STANDS.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA

Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Socorro B. Inting; rollo, pp. 2-27.

2. Penned by Presiding Judge Erwin Virgilio P. Ferrer; CA rollo, pp. 50-62.

3.Rollo, p. 33.

4.Id. at 36-38.

5.Id. at 43.

6.People v. Salvador, 761 Phil. 496, 505 (2015).

7.Natividad v. Mariano, et al., 710 Phil. 57, 68 (2013).

8.Zabala v. People, 752 Phil. 59, 67 (2015).

9.People v. Umapas, 807 Phil. 975, 988 (2017).

10.Rollo, pp. 16-17.

11.People v. Delector, G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017.

12.People v. Latosa, 635 Phil. 555, 564 (2010).

13.Id.

14. 712 Phil. 480 (2013).

15.Id. at 495.

16.Fantastico, et al. v. Malicse, Sr., et al., 750 Phil. 120, 131 (2015).

17. 641 Phil. 399 (2010).

18.Id. at 410-411.

19.People v. Villanueva, et al., 807 Phil. 245, 255 (2017).

20. Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

21. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).