FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252670. November 23, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. TEODORICO DAQUIZ y DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 23, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 252670 (People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee v. Teodorico Daquiz y Del Rosario, accused-appellant).
This is an Appeal 1 from the January 28, 2020 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 11918. The CA affirmed in toto the July 9, 2018 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34 (RTC), which found Teodorico Daquiz y Del Rosario (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Antecedents
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 14554-10 and 14555-10 in two separate Informations, both dated November 11, 2010. The accusatory portions of said informations read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14554-10
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Undersigned Inquest Prosecutor [accuses] TEODORICO DAQUIZ Y DEL ROSARIO, @ "Rick" of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of November 2010 at Barangay Sto. Tomas, in the Municipality of PENARANDA, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused, with intent to kill, while armed with a stainless kitchen knife, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Edgardo F. Villanueva with the said knife inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's family and heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14555-10
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Undersigned Inquest Prosecutor [accuses] TEODORICO DAQUIZ Y DEL ROSARIO, @ "Rick" of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of November 2010 at Barangay Sto. Tomas, in the Municipality of PENARANDA, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused, with intent to kill, while armed with a stainless kitchen knife, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Rolando D. Medina, Jr. with the said knife inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's family and heirs. 4
During arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), entered a plea of not guilty to the charges against him. The PAO intimated that it would raise the defense of insanity but accused-appellant did not opt for a reverse trial. 5 Thereafter, trial ensued. CAIHTE
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Jocelyn Villanueva (Jocelyn), Elvira Feliciano (Feliciano), PO2 Alvin De Guzman (PO2 De Guzman), Eleonor Medina, SPO1 Rene Ramos, who was then PO3 Ramos, and Gerardo I. Padolina (Padolina). 6 Their testimonies tended to establish the following:
At around 10:00 a.m. of November 10, 2010, in Barangay Sto. Tomas, Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, Rolando D. Medina, Jr. (Medina) and Edgardo Villanueva (Villanueva) attended the wake of Padolina's daughter at the latter's house. Suddenly, a commotion erupted wherein Padolina saw accused-appellant stabbing Villanueva with a kitchen knife. The already injured Villanueva was able to run away from accused-appellant, but only for a short distance, as he eventually fell to the ground. While Villanueva was escaping, accused-appellant then turned to his other victim, Medina, and uttered, "Isa ka pa, putang ina mo," and suddenly stabbed the latter several times with the same knife he used on Villanueva. Both Villanueva and Medina died from the stab wounds inflicted by accused-appellant. 7
Responding police officers PO2 De Guzman, PO3 Ramos, PO3 Juanito M. Reyes, Jr. (PO3 Reyes) and SPO1 Manuel S. Inductivo (SPO1 Inductivo) then arrived at the scene of the incident. PO3 Reyes found the lifeless body of Villanueva. At about five (5) meters from the same, SPO1 Inductivo recovered a seven (7)-inch knife. Medina, on the other hand, was rushed to the Good Samaritan Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival. 8
After conducting a preliminary investigation, the police officers found that it was accused-appellant who allegedly stabbed the victims. They then proceeded to the house of accused-appellant. The police officers found accused-appellant, who was then shouting, with his hands and clothing soaked in blood. Accused-appellant's brother-in-law directed the police officers to arrest accused-appellant. The police officers handcuffed accused-appellant and brought him to the station.
Meanwhile, Jocelyn, Villanueva's wife, and Feliciano, Medina's aunt, learned about the incident a few minutes after. 9
SPO1 Inductivo requested Dr. Jun B. Concepcion (Dr. Concepcion), Medical Examiner, to conduct an autopsy on Villanueva and Medina. Dr. Concepcion found that the cause of death for both victims was "hemorrhagic shock secondary to penetrating stab wound on the chest." 10
In his Spot Report dated November 10, 2010, Police Senior Inspector Angelito D. Ramos (PSI Ramos), indorsed the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Nueva Ecija, City of Cabanatuan, together with the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jocelyn, Salaysay of Feliciano, Salaysay of Padolina, Salaysay of SPO1 Inductivo, PO3 Ramos, PO3 Reyes and PO2 De Guzman, as well as the autopsy reports and certificate of death of Medina. 11
Version of the defense
There was no contest over the fact that accused-appellant had indeed stabbed the victims, but he interposed the defense of insanity. Accused-appellant testified that his urge for killing the victims was due to paranoia — that someone was going to kill him, and that he was hearing a voice in his head compelling him to kill. 12
With the agreement of the parties, accused-appellant was referred to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), in Mandaluyong City, for a mental examination. Accused-appellant was not admitted for confinement, since he was found mentally capable of understanding the situation he was in or what was happening around him. In 2012, accused-appellant had gone to the NCMH for several consultations wherein he was given medication. 13
Accused-appellant presented Dr. Zarah C. Espinoza (Dr. Espinoza), Medical Specialist III of the NCMH, as his witness, to prove that he was suffering from a mental condition called schizophrenia at the time of the incident. 14
Dr. Espinoza admitted that she was in no position to declare accused-appellant of unsound mind at the time he committed the crime, since she was only able to examine him after the incident. She averred that she was one of the specialists who examined accused-appellant at the NCMH. Further, she stated that accused-appellant was suffering from schizophrenia, a form of mental retardation resulting in disorganized behavior and thinking. Schizophrenic attacks are triggered by alcohol intake or traumatic incidents, like death. She opined that the schizophrenic attack might have been triggered by the death of his neighbor, which caused him stress. 15
Further, Dr. Espinoza testified that during her interview with accused-appellant, the latter disclosed that he had been hearing voices. She opined that there was a probability that accused-appellant stabbed the victims at the height of a schizophrenic attack due to lack of sleep or alcohol intake. 16
Nonetheless, Dr. Espinoza recommended that the trial proceed since accused-appellant need not be committed at the NCMH and because, at that time, he was mentally capable of understanding the situation. She explained that during their consultations and/or examinations, accused-appellant did not exhibit any violent behavior. Conversely, accused-appellant was able to control his emotions and restrain himself despite having schizophrenic attacks. 17
The RTC Decision
In its July 9, 2018 Decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of murder. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision provides:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, for the failure of the defense to substantiate its claim that the accused was insane when he killed the victims Edgardo F. Villanueva and Rolando D. Medina, Jr., the court finds accused Teodorico Daquiz y Del Rosario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder. DETACa
In Criminal Case No. 14554-10, accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The same penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is hereby imposed upon him in Criminal Case No. 14555-10.
Accused is hereby ORDERED to pay the following amounts of money to the heirs of victim Edgardo F. Villanueva: P75,000.00 as moral damages; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex-delicto; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. He is likewise ORDERED to pay the same amounts to the heirs of victim Rolando D. Medina, Jr.
Accused shall be committed immediately to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila for the service of his sentences.
SO ORDERED. 18
The RTC ruled that accused-appellant's defense of insanity was not sufficiently proven as to exculpate him of the offenses charged. Likewise, it noted that, as an exempting circumstance, insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. 19
The RTC stated that accused-appellant must establish that he was deprived of reason or that he acted without the least discernment because of a complete absence of the power to discern, or of a total deprivation of will. An accused who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving the same with clear and convincing evidence. The RTC likewise held that opinion testimony may be given by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that accused-appellant was insane based on the witness' own perception of accused-appellant, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 20 However, the RTC found that accused-appellant failed to present such credible opinion testimony. He failed to discharge the burden of proving insanity at the time he killed the victims. Thus, the trial court found him guilty of committing the two (2) counts of murder.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA.
The CA Decision
In its January 28, 2020 Decision, 21 the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 9 July 2018, rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija in Criminal Case Nos. 14554-10 and 14555-10 is hereby AFFIRMEDin TOTO.
SO ORDERED. 22
The CA noted that all the elements of the crime of murder had been sufficiently established by the evidence on record. Also, it held that the defense of insanity was not sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence. The CA noted that accused-appellant was very much conscious of what transpired before, during, and after the stabbing incident. 23 These were apparent from the evaluation made by the medical officers and specialists who assessed the mental status of accused-appellant. He clearly remembered the manner by which he stabbed the victims. The CA underscored that accused-appellant remembers repeatedly stabbing Villanueva until the latter fell to the ground. He then turned to the other victim and stabbed him too. Accused-appellant's vivid recollection of the incident belies his claim of insanity. 24
The CA concluded that accused-appellant's awareness negates the presence of complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment. His manifest consciousness is not in consonance with the defense of insanity. 25
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY. 26
On September 14, 2020, the Court issued a Resolution, 27 which notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In its December 28, 2020 Manifestation and Motion (Re: Supplemental Brief), 28 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief there being no transactions, occurrences or events that happened since it filed its appellee's brief before the CA. In its May 28, 2021 Manifestation (In Lieu of a Supplemental Brief), 29 accused-appellant averred that he would no longer file a supplemental brief since he had sufficiently refuted all the arguments raised in his appellant's brief. aDSIHc
In the said Appellant's Brief 30 filed before the CA, accused-appellant argues that his defense of insanity was supported by the testimony of Dr. Espinoza, who issued a medical report on his mental condition. Moreover, in her testimony, Dr. Espinoza did not discount the possibility that accused-appellant was suffering from a remission of his schizophrenic disorder at the time of the stabbing incident, considering that he was found to have discontinued his regular consultations and use of his medications. 31
Accused-appellant avers that, assuming arguendo, that he is criminally liable, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is not applicable. Treachery cannot be appreciated when there is no evidence presented to show that accused-appellant consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage. 32 Based on medico-legal findings, Medina sustained several defense wounds on both arms indicative that there was no opportunity for the latter to act in defense thereof and possibly retaliate. The prosecution failed to present clear and convincing evidence that accused-appellant deliberately adopted the manner of stabbing both victims. 33
On the other hand, the OSG urges the Court to affirm accused-appellant's conviction for two (2) counts of murder since the prosecution duly established the elements of the offenses as charged. 34 It emphasized that accused-appellant admitted stabbing the victims to death but raised insanity as a defense. 35 Nonetheless, the OSG argues that accused-appellant failed to prove insanity at the time of the commission of the crime. 36 Finally, the OSG underscored that the prosecution was able to establish that accused-appellant was well aware of what transpired before, during, and after the incident, which disproved his defense of insanity. 37
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms, with modification, the ruling of the lower courts.
The Court finds that accused-appellant failed to prove the defense of insanity. Nonetheless, accused-appellant should only be found guilty of the lesser offense of two (2) counts of homicide since the prosecution failed to prove that treachery attended the commission of the offense.
Accused-appellant is charged with two (2) counts of the crime of murder under Art. 248 of the RPC, which states:
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
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5. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
The elements of murder are as follows: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 38
There is no need to dwell on the first, second and fourth elements. Accused-appellant admitted repeatedly stabbing the two (2) victims, which resulted in their deaths. The last element is likewise present since accused-appellant is a stranger to the two victims with no relationship that could be classified as falling within the definition of parricide or infanticide.
The issues in this case are the existence of a circumstance that would qualify the killing to the crime of murder, and accused-appellant's defense of insanity to exculpate him from criminal liability.
Accused-appellant's defense
Accused-appellant claims exemption from criminal liability. He maintains that he should be acquitted due to his alleged insanity immediately prior to, during, and immediately after stabbing the victims. According to him, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. To prove his alleged insanity, accused-appellant insists on the findings and testimony given by Dr. Espinoza as his witness. Dr. Espinoza purportedly diagnosed him to be suffering from schizophrenia.
The Court is not convinced by accused-appellant's defense of insanity.
In People v. Dela Cruz, 39 the Court explained how insanity is successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal liability, to wit:
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivationof the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof: As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. 40 (italics in the original; emphases supplied)
For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. 41 Accordingly, accused-appellant has the burden to establish with certainty that he was indeed completely deprived of intelligence at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense because of his mental condition or illness.
Here, the Court finds that accused-appellant failed to prove that he was insane at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. ETHIDa
The assessment issued by Dr. Espinoza was dated August 1, 2011. Notably, said assessment was issued several months after the incident, which occurred on November 10, 2010. Notwithstanding the finding that accused-appellant might be suffering from schizophrenia at the time (August 1, 2011) of the issuance of Dr. Espinoza's assessment of accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive proof that accused-appellant was also suffering from said illness during the commission of the crime. Accused-appellant may have a history of schizophrenic disorder, or may have suffered symptoms of schizophrenia several months after the commission of the crime, but it was not established that he was indeed suffering from the said illness at the time or immediately before the stabbing incident. Moreover, it was not established that said illness completely deprived accused-appellant of reason and/or the intelligence to act.
Although accused-appellant was purportedly previously diagnosed with schizophrenia and, again, a few months after the stabbing incident, this evidence of insanity may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal psychological behavior immediately before or simultaneous with the commission of the crime. The evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or during the very moment of execution. Accused-appellant failed utterly to establish this.
Time and again, the Court has stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused-appellant should relate to the period before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the inquiry; and that his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. 42
Further, the Court agrees with the CA that accused-appellant's vivid recollection of the incident belies his claim of insanity, viz.:
Q And when was that?
A On that day of November 10, 2010.
Q The same date you said you killed your kumpadre?
A I killed them one after another.
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Q What exactly did you hear?
A At that time I was thinking that somebody would kill me and I was hearing voices telling me to kill.
Q And what is that voice a man or a woman?
A A male voice, sir.
Q How loud was the voice that you heard?
A Mahina lang po. 43
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COURT:
Q Do you understand what we're talking today?
WITNESS:
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q You understand that you are here to testify in this case?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q You understand that you are an accused in this case?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Are you still hearing any voice that whispers to you at this time?
A No, your Honor.
Q You only hear the voice of Atty. Dalangin and my voice?
A Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. DALANGIN:
Q And what happened when you went out of your house?
WITNESS:
A I stabbed the person, sir. 44
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Q What happened after you stabbed Edgardo?
A He fell on the ground after I stabbed him, sir.
Q Do you remember how many times you stabbed him?
A Many times, sir.
Q After that, Mr. [W]itness, what happened next?
A I stabbed another person, sir, Rolando Medina.
Q Do you remember how many times you stabbed Medina?
A Only once, sir.
Q And after stabbing Rolando Medina what happened next?
A Nothing, sir because everybody was gone.
COURT:
Q Why were there no other persons left?
WITNESS:
A Because they scampered away, your Honor.
Q So, you saw them ran away?
A Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. DALANGIN:
Q Mr. [W]itness, at the time that you stabbed these two persons, do you know their identity?
A The other one was known to me, the other one was not, sir.
Q Who is that person that you know?
A Rolando Medina, sir. cSEDTC
Q How were you able to know his name?
A Because we were classmates in the elementary grade, sir.
Q Do you have any misunderstanding with Rolando Medina prior to the stabbing incident?
A No, sir it just happened that he was there, sir.
ATTY. DALANGIN:
Q After people scampered away, what happened next?
WITNESS:
A I went inside my house and sat there, sir.
Q And for how long did you stay inside your house?
A About thirty minutes, sir when the policemen came.
Q What happened after the policemen came?
A They handcuffed me and they brought me to the police station, sir.
Q Do you know the reason why you were brought to the police station?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q So you were aware that you will be brought to the police station because you killed a person?
A Yes, your Honor. 45
Indubitably, the circumstances surrounding the incident negate a complete absence of intelligence on the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the victims. He vividly and distinctly narrated the incident, which negates his claim of being completely deprived of reason at the time of the commission of the crime. Before the incident, accused-appellant claims hearing a voice in his head but he did not prove that such voice was the compulsory and irresistible force which led him to commit the crimes. Further, at the time of the killing, accused-appellant did not claim that he could not control his actions or that he could not distinguish right from wrong. Conversely, accused-appellant admitted that he intentionally stabbed the victims and committed the killing. He even knew that, after the incident, the people around him scampered away. Accused-appellant's acts immediately before, during, and immediately after committing the offense indicate that he was conscious of his actions, that he intentionally committed the act of stabbing, knowing the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that such act of stabbing is morally and reprehensibly wrong. He even voluntarily went with the policemen to the station when he was arrested knowing fully well the crime he had committed.
The Court cannot second-guess whether accused-appellant was insane at the time the crime was committed. Indeed, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to prove that accused-appellant was insane immediately before and during the commission of the crime.
The prosecution failed to
Both the CA and the RTC appreciated treachery in convicting accused-appellant of murder.
Although the guilt of accused-appellant for the death of the two victims is unquestioned, the Court finds that accused-appellant may only be convicted of homicide, not murder. The prosecution failed to prove that the crime was committed with treachery or with any other qualifying circumstance.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualities the killing and raises it to the category of murder. 46
For the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following elements must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. 47
Relative to the first element, jurisprudence consistently provides that the essence of treachery is when the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow. 48
Here, prosecution eyewitness Padolina's account of the incident failed to establish the circumstance that would prove the suddenness of the attack and how it started. Padolina recounted that there was already a commotion when he saw accused-appellant stabbing Villanueva. Notably, Padolina only witnessed the scene when accused-appellant was already stabbing Villanueva. He did not witness how the incident started and he had no idea what moved accused-appellant to stab the two victims to death. All that can be gleaned from Padolina's account was that accused-appellant stabbed Villanueva first until the latter fell down to the ground; and afterwards accused-appellant turned to Medina, likewise repeatedly stabbing him. In this regard, it has been held that even where all indicia tend to support the conclusion that the attack was sudden and unexpected, yet no precise data on this point exists, treachery cannot be taken into account. 49 SDAaTC
As to the second element, jurisprudence requires that there must be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of execution to ensure its success since unexpectedness of the attack does not always equate to treachery. The means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime. 50
The prosecution failed to provide evidence to support the allegation that accused-appellant deliberately adopted the means or method to ensure the commission of the offense. To reiterate, since the witness did not see how the attack was carried out and could not testify on how it began, the trial court cannot presume from the circumstances of the case that there was treachery. Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence. Mere probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish each element necessary to convict. 51
Verily, there is no basis in the lower courts' conclusion that treachery attended the commission of the crime. In fact, the RTC merely concluded that the crime committed was murder without a single mention of any aggravating circumstance that supposedly qualified the crime. Similarly, the CA simply concurred with the RTC and ruled that the offense committed was murder, without any discussion on the presence of any aggravating circumstance. The CA's discussion focused mainly on accused-appellant's defense of insanity only.
Therefore, in the absence of treachery, accused-appellant should only be found guilty of two (2) counts of the lesser offense of homicide, defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the RPC.
Penalty and Damages
The penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. 52 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor with a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Consequently, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty within the range of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of homicide. 53
Meanwhile, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 each in accordance with People v. Jugueta. 54 The Court also awards temperate damages of P50,000.00 pursuant to People v. Racal. 55
As for the award of exemplary damages, the same should be deleted, there being no aggravating circumstance attendant to the killing. 56 Finally, legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on these amounts from finality of this resolution until fully paid. 57
WHEREFORE, the January 28, 2020 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 11918 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that in Criminal Case Nos. 14554-10 and 14555-10, accused-appellant Teodorico Daquiz y Del Rosario is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of HOMICIDE defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each of the two counts of homicide.
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Edgardo F. Villanueva and Rolando D. Medina, Jr. the following amounts for each of the two victims: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages. These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. acEHCD
SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 18-19.
2.Id. at 3-17; penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, with Associate Justices Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin and Walter S. Ong, concurring.
3. CA rollo, pp. 64-74; rendered by Judge Celso O. Baguio.
4.Rollo, pp. 5-6.
5. CA rollo, p. 65.
6.Rollo, p. 6.
7.Id. at 3-4.
8.Id. at 4.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 4-5.
12. CA rollo, p. 68.
13.Id. at 68-69.
14.Id. at 69.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 69-70.
18.Id. at 73.
19.Id. at 72.
20.Id. at 72-73.
21.Rollo, pp. 3-17.
22.Id. at 17.
23.Id. at 12.
24.Id. at 13.
25.Id. at 16.
26. CA rollo, p. 47.
27.Rollo, pp. 23-24.
28.Id. at 28-30.
29.Id. at 37-39.
30. CA rollo, pp. 45-62.
31.Id. at 54-55.
32.Id. at 58.
33.Id. at 59.
34.Id. at 95.
35.Id. at 90-91.
36.Id. at 93-95.
37.Id. at 95.
38.People v. Kalipayan, 824 Phil. 173, 183 (2018).
39. G.R. No. 227997, October 16, 2019.
40.Id., citing People v. Madarang, 387 Phil. 846, 859 (2000).
41.People v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, 883 SCRA 155, 164-165.
42.Id. at 167.
43. TSN, February 21, 2017, pp. 7-8.
44. TSN, March 28, 2017, pp. 5-6.
45.Id. at 7-9.
46.People v. Manzano, 827 Phil. 113, 140 (2018).
47.Id. at 141.
48.Id.
49.People v. Panerio, 823 Phil. 738, 750 (2018).
50.People v. Manzano, supra note 46, at 141.
51.People v. Panerio, supra note 49, at 750.
52.People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019.
53.Id.; People v. Toro, G.R. No. 245922, January 25, 2021.
54. 783 Phil. 806, 852 (2016).
55. 817 Phil. 665, 686 (2017); see also People v. Toro, supra note 53 and People v. Galam, G.R. No. 224222, October 9, 2019.
56.People v. Galam, id.
57.Id.; People v. Toro, supra note 53.