FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 245948. November 11, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PHILIP AVIÑO y TOLENTINO A.K.A. MICHAEL GERONIMO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 11, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 245948 — People of the Philippines v. Philip Aviño y Tolentino a.k.a. Michael Geronimo
Appellant Philip Aviño, also known as Michael Geronimo, asks the Court to reverse the verdict of conviction for five (5) counts of murder rendered against him by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 4, Baguio City 1 as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 He attacks anew the circumstantial evidence that the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied upon in finding him liable for the death of Jacquelyn Kale Marquez Nociete (Jacquelyn) (19 years old), Joey Marquez Nociete, Jr. (Joey) (8 years old), Dave Jhon Bufete De Guzman (Dave Jhon) (7 years old), Raymond Adrian Agustin Delmendo (Raymond Adrian) (9 years old), and Jonalyn Cabais Lozano (Jonalyn) (32 years old).
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz.:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxx xxx xxx
Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 3
There is no question as to the presence of the first and fourth elements. All the victims here died as evidenced by the Certificates of Death 4 presented in court. Appellant was also not related to any of the victims. Thus, we focus on the second and third elements, the presence of which appellant vigorously disclaims.
Second ElementAppellant killed the victims
In the main, appellant asserts there was no direct evidence to prove that he stabbed to death any or all of the victims, hence, he should have been acquitted.
The argument does not persuade.
It is a basic rule that absence of direct evidence will not bar conviction of the accused when pieces of circumstantial evidence satisfactorily prove the crime charged. Circumstantial evidence are sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 5
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the crime. 6 In People v. Casitas, Jr., 7 the Court explained that establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence is akin to weaving a "tapestry of events that culminate in a vivid depiction of the crime of which the accused is the author."
Here, as correctly found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the following circumstances make up the chain of events which point to appellant as the one who stabbed to death Jacquelyn, Jonalyn, Joey, Dave Jhon, and Raymond Adrian:
One. Appellant was the last person seen knocking at the door of the apartment where the victims were found dead. The owner of the apartment building Barangay Kagawad Jose Manangan (Kagawad Jose) and his house helper Amelita Fernandez (Amelita) positively identified appellant as the man they saw knocking on the door of the apartment at the time of the incident. They both testified that the man they saw was wearing a green sweatshirt, a pair of black shorts, and slippers. During the investigation, both of them identified appellant from among a series of photographs shown to them, as the one they saw knocking at the situs criminis on April 6, 2014. Kagawad Jose also recognized appellant when the latter was turned over to the Baguio City Police Office. Amelita, on the other hand, also identified appellant in open court, as the person whom she saw knocking on the door of the apartment where the crimes took place. 8
Notably, appellant did not deny that he indeed knocked on the door of the apartment in question on April 6, 2014. All he claimed was that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was the last person there before the victims were found dead.
We emphasize though that aside from appellant, no other person was said to have been seen standing or loitering at or near the victims' apartment.
Two. Appellant's DNA matched with several blood samples which the Regional Crime Laboratory Office DNA Analyst Police Senior Inspector Angeline B. Amangan (PSI Amangan) took from the apartment. DNA Laboratory Report Case No. DNA CORBC-011-15 9 reads in part:
RESULT/CONCLUSION:
• DNA profile obtained on the following specimen is consistent with that of Philip Tolentino Aviño (011-14-B074):
o Blood swabbed from the comfort room (011-14-B060);
o Blood swabbed from the pink plastic cabinet inside the 1st room (011-14-B066);
o Cut cloth with blood taken at the pocket of one (1) cream shoulder bag inside the 1st room (011-14-B067);
o Cut cloth from the inner lining of the zipper of one (1) black short pants labeled "Sean Jeans" (011-14-B06 A1);
o Cut cloth from the upper right front portion of one (1) black short pants labeled "Sean Jeans" (011-14-B0684A2);
o Swabbing (from) the inner waist lining of one (1) black short pants labeled "Sean Jeans" (0110140B068A5);
o Blood from the right front pocket of one (1) short pants labeled "Sean Jeans" (011-14-14-B068A6);
o Blood from the left front hand pocket [of] one (1) black short pants labeled "Sean Jeans" (011-14-B068);
o Blood swabbed from the back portion of one (1) green with white stripe belt (011-14-B068B1)
With the exception of identical twin, it is concluded to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the DNA profile obtained from the above-mentioned specimen came from Philip Tolentino Aviño.
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• A mixture was observed from the blood swabbed on the right front portion of one (1) black short pants labeled "Sean Jeans" (0110140B068A3) that is originating from more than one individual. Philip Tolentino Aviño (011-14-B074) cannot be excluded as a possible donor to the DNA profile obtained. The Combined Probability of Inclusion (CPI), or the expected frequency of individuals who could contribute to a portion of the mixture is appropriately 1 in 1,300,000 for Filipino individuals.
• The DNA profile extracted from the front and buckle portion of one (1) green and white stripe belt (011-14-B068B2) indicates a mixture from more than one individual. This mixture is consistent with the mixture of DNA from Jacquelyn Kale Marquez Nociete (011-14-B072) and Philip Tolentino Aviño (011-14-B074). 99.99% of unrelated Filipinos would be expected to be excluded as contributors to be (sic) observed DNA mixture.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant, nonetheless, questions the integrity of the blood samples and the results thereon. He claims that the prosecution was not able to establish that the samples were properly preserved. It bears stress, however, that appellant never questioned the integrity and evidentiary value of the blood sample and DNA analysis during trial. He only raised the same during the appeal. But an accused is precluded from changing his theory on appeal, much less, from pleading an entirely new theory for the first time on appeal. For this is repugnant to the basic principle of due process. More important, the proper time to object to the admissibility of the evidence in question was during the offer of evidence before the trial court. As it was, however, appellant failed to do so. Hence, he is now barred from belatedly interposing it on appeal.
In any case, the prosecution was able to show how the blood samples were taken and preserved prior to its examination. Primarily, photographs were taken of the over-all crime scene and an initial walk through was conducted. Only PSI Amangan and a certain Police Officer 2 Dolteo (under PSI Amangan's supervision) collected the blood samples. After the samples were collected, they were secured inside an envelope and sealed. They remained in the custody of PSI Amangan until they got transported to Camp Crame for examination. Following the examination, they were secured back inside the envelope and sealed again. Hence, PSI Amangan was shown to have complied with the required procedure to avoid contamination of the blood samples. Suffice it to state that her qualifications as an expert had also been amply established. 10
Three. Maribel Coronel (Maribel), appellant's former live-in partner, positively identified the bloodied pair of black shorts and belt taken from the apartment. She recognized the shorts because she bought it with appellant and was the one who used to wash it. The belt belonged to her but as she had already outgrown it, appellant was the one using it. 11
Appellant, nevertheless, faults Maribel as an unreliable witness since she initially denied knowing who owned the pair of black shorts and belt which were recovered from the situs criminis.
The argument fails.
It is well settled that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal considering that the trial court is in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Its findings on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the consequent findings of fact must be given great weight and respect, especially so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 12
In any case, Maribel did not deny that she knew who the owner of the pair of black shorts and belt was. She simply refused to answer when asked for the first time when these items were presented to her. Maribel also explained why she hesitated — she was afraid that she would be implicated in the case if she admitted that the belt was hers. 13
More, there were other persons who identified the pair of black shorts as the one appellant was wearing on the date of the incident. Kagawad Jose and Amelita both identified the same pair of black shorts they saw being worn by the man knocking on the apartment. 14 Esteban Amurao, appellant's friend with whom he stayed from April 3, 2014 to April 5, 2014 also identified the pair of black shorts. He knew very well the pair of black shorts because appellant wore the same pair the whole time that he was staying with him. 15 Manuel Garino, appellant's friend and co-worker, was also familiar with the pair of black shorts. It was the same pair appellant wore the last time he saw him on April 4, 2014. 16 In any event, appellant did not deny that the pair of black short pants and striped belt belonged to him.
Four. There were text messages sent from Jacquelyn's number insisting that "ate Sam" or Maribel bring the food to them even though Vilma Nociete (Vilma) already told them that Jonalyn was already on the way. 17 The only significant person who wanted to see Maribel during those days was appellant. Notably, he stood by and stayed in Vilma's eatery for hours just to wait for Maribel. He even banged on Vilma's apartment just to persuade Maribel, then staying in the apartment, to go back home with him. 18
True, the burden of evidence in criminal cases lies with the prosecution, but, when the prosecution offers a strong case against the accused, the burden of proof shifts to the accused, who then bears the burden to refute it. As it was, appellant offered nothing to discharge this burden. He did not even take the witness stand to offer his version of the story. 19
These circumstances lead to no other conclusion but that appellant was the author of the five (5) killings in question.
Third ElementTreachery and/or abuse of superior strength
In Criminal Case No. 35695-R (Dave Jhon; 7 years old), Criminal Case No. 35696-R (Raymond Adrian; 9 years old), and Criminal Case No. 35698-R (Joey; 8 years old), treachery attended the killings. It is well-settled that when an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists. This is because minor children, by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. 20
As for Criminal Case No. 35694-R (Jacquelyn; 19 years old) and Criminal Case No. 35697-R (Jonalyn; 32 years old), the trial court and Court of Appeals both held that treachery attended their killings, too, because of the nature and number of wounds they respectively sustained — Jacquelyn sustained seventeen (17) stab wounds while Jonalyn sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds. 21
We cannot agree.
People v. Kalipayan22 reiterated that that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. A swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim that insures its execution without risk to the assailant arising from the defense of his victim is an indication that treachery is present. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate. In that sense, even attacks that occur from the front may be considered treacherous if the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for self-defense. It is a circumstance that must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself and constitutes two (2) elements: (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) that said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
The Court has consistently held that treachery cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved the events after the attack happened, but not the manner by which the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's death unfolded. In treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery. 23
Here, the fact alone that Jacquelyn and Jonalyn both sustained several stab wounds in their back is not sufficient to support a finding of treachery. Notably, no one saw the actual stabbing incident aside from the victims themselves. Thus, there was no clear evidence as to how the aggression began and how it developed. It bears stress too, that Dr. Jaime Rodrigo Leal noted some defense wounds in both Jacquelyn and Jonalyn's arms, indicating that both of them were able to put up some defense, no matter how futile, against appellant. 24
More, even assuming that the attacks on Jacquelyn and Jonalyn were sudden and unexpected, the prosecution failed to establish that appellant deliberately or consciously adopted the manner by which he attacked them to insure the execution of his goal, without posing any danger to himself. People v. Albino25 reiterated that it must be clearly shown that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the assailants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer.
In fine, treachery cannot be appreciated in the killings of Jacquelyn and Jonalyn.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals further held that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the killings of Jacquelyn and Jonalyn, considering the fact that appellant used to work as a porter or kargador in the public market. Hence, the disparity of physical strength between him and the two (2) unarmed ladies was allegedly established.
Again, we do not agree.
In People v. Cortez, 26 the Court explained that although there have been cases where abuse of superior strength was appreciated where a male equipped with a deadly weapon attacked an unarmed and defenseless woman, jurisprudence nonetheless provides that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, "the evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked."
Here, like in treachery, there was no iota of proof that appellant purposely sought the advantage or had the deliberate intent to use this advantage when he attacked Jacquelyn and Jonalyn. Consequently, the Court cannot appreciate abuse of superior strength to qualify the killings of Jacquelyn and Jonalyn.
Since no qualifying circumstance attended the killings of Jacquelyn and Jonalyn, appellant is guilty of Homicide under Article 249 27 of the RPC.
Penalty
Murder under Article 248 28 of the RPC is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. On the other hand, Homicide under Article 249 is punishable by reclusion temporal. In each of the three (3) counts of murder and the two (2) counts of homicide though, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated.
"Dwelling" aggravates the felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the offended party and the latter did not give any provocation. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy accorded to the human abode. Repeated across many cases are these lines: "one's dwelling is a sanctuary worthy of respect thus one who slanders another in the latter's house is more severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere. According to Cuello Calon, the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows worse perversity and produces graver harm." He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 29 Although Dave Jhon and Raymond Adrian were only guests in the home of the Nocietes, dwelling is still appreciated in their favor because one does not lose his right of privacy where he is offended in the house of another because as his/her invited guest, he/she, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by the same intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his/her house, but it is, even for a brief moment, "home" to him/her. He/She is entitled to respect even for that short moment. 30
Verily, in Criminal Case Nos. 35695-R (Dave Jhon), 35696-R (Raymond Adrian), and 35698-R (Joey), although death is the imposable penalty, the Court cannot impose it in view of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346). But Administrative Matter No. 15-08-02-SC, 31 provides that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be qualified by the phrase "without eligibility for parole" when the proper penalty would have been death were it not for the enactment of RA 9346.
In Criminal Case Nos. 35694-R (Jacquelyn) and 35697-R (Jonalyn), the prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal. Considering though that an aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the range of the maximum period of reclusion temporal (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) with the minimum penalty selected from the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). 32
As for damages, in accordance with People v. Jugueta, 33 we also affirm the awards of: a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case Nos. 35695-R (Dave Jhon), 35696-R (Raymond Adrian), and 35698-R (Joey). On the other hand, in each of Criminal Case No. 35694-R (Jacquelyn) and 35697-R (Jonalyn), the awards are reduced to: a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and because of the presence of an aggravating circumstance; c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
As for the actual damages, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded P170,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 35694-R (Jacquelyn) and 35698-R (Joey). This is the amount supported by receipts representing the expenses which Vilma and Joey Nociete Sr. spent for the hospitalization, wake, and burial of Jacquelyn and Joey. It was not specified though how much was spent specifically for each of these victims.
In Criminal Case Nos. 35695-R (Dave Jhon), 35696-R (Raymond Adrian), and 35697-R (Jonalyn), the Court of Appeals correctly awarded them P50,000.00 temperate damages for lack of receipt as to their expenses, in accordance with Jugueta. 34
These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid pursuant to Jugueta.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 19, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08146 is AFFIRMED with modification.
1. In Criminal Case No. 35694-R, Philip Tolentino Aviño also known as Michael Geronimo is found GUILTY of Homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of Jacquelyn Kale Marquez Nociete the following amounts:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 35698-R, Philip Tolentino Aviño also known as Michael Geronimo is found GUILTY of Murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of Joey Marquez Nociete, Jr. the following amounts:
(a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case Nos. 35694-R and 35698-R, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Jacquelyn Kale Marquez Nociete and Joey Marquez Nociete, Jr. P170,000.00 as actual damages for the expenses spent for their hospitalization, wake, and burial.
3. In Criminal Case No. 35695-R, Philip Tolentino Aviño also known as Michael Geronimo is found GUILTY of Murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of Dave Jhon Bufete De Guzman the following amounts:
(a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
4. In Criminal Case No. 35696-R, Philip Tolentino Aviño also known as Michael Geronimo is found GUILTY of Murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of Raymond Adrian Agustin Delmendo the following amounts:
(a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
5. In Criminal Case No. 35697-R, Philip Tolentino Aviño also known as Michael Geronimo is found GUILTY of Homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of Jonalyn Cabais Lozano the following amounts:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
All monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. See the trial court's Consolidated Judgment penned by Presiding Judge Mia Joy Oallares-Cawed; CA rollo, pp. 52-112.
2. See the Court of Appeals assailed Decision dated October 19, 2018, penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and concurred in by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Associate Justice Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin; rollo, pp. 3-33.
3.People vs. Gaborne, 791 Phil. 581, 592 (2016); citing People vs. Dela Cruz, 626 Phil. 631, 639 (2010).
4. Exhibit "D" for Joey Jr.; Exhibit "G" for Jacquelyn; Exhibit "E" for Dave Jhon; Exhibit "F" for Raymond Adrian; and Exhibit "H" for Jonalyn; rollo, p. 18 and CA rollo, p. 142.
5.People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 233104, September 02, 2020; also see People v. Adalia, G.R. No. 235990, January 22, 2020.
6.People v. Dongail, et al., G.R. No. 217972, February 17, 2020.
7. 445 Phil. 407, 419 (2003), as cited in People v. Pentecostes, 820 Phil. 823, 841 (2017).
8. CA rollo, pp. 67-71.
9. Exhibit "MM"; Id. at 62-63.
10. CA rollo, pp. 157-161.
11.Id. at 66.
12. See People v. XYZ, G.R. No. 244255, August 26, 2020.
13. CA rollo, p. 66.
14.Id. at 67 and 71.
15.Id. at 72.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 78-80.
18.Id. at 64 and 75.
19.People v. Adalia, G.R. No. 235990, January 22, 2020.
20. See People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 819; see also People v. Marisol, G.R. No. 239333, June 8, 2020 (Resolution).
21. CA rollo, pp. 21 and 105.
22. 824 Phil. 173, 186 (2018).
23.People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019.
24. CA rollo, p. 59.
25. See G.R. No. 229928, July 22, 2019.
26. G.R. No. 239137, December 5, 2018.
27. Article 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
28. Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
29.Supra note 22 at 191-192.
30. See People v. Balansi, 265 Phil. 614, 622-623 (1990).
31. Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "without eligibility for parole" in Indivisible Penalties, August 4, 2015; see also People v. Ursua, 819 Phil. 467, 476 (2017).
32.Reyes, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 250407, July 7, 2021 (Notice).
33. 783 Phil. 806, 847 (2016).
34. 783 Phil. 806, 846 (2016).
The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to P50,000.00.