THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 237808. June 10, 2020.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FELIPE BAUTISTA y TOLENTINO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 10, 2020, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 237808 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee,v. Felipe Bautista y Tolentino, Accused-Appellant). — This appeal 1 seeks to reverse and set aside the 11 October 2017 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08329, which affirmed with modification the 01 April 2016 Decision 3 of Branch 276, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 02-869, finding accused-appellant Felipe Bautista y Tolentino (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Antecedents
On 09 September 2002, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which read —
That on or about the 29th day of May 2002, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon (balisong), with intent to kill, with treachery, with evident premeditation, and with the use of motor vehicle, did[,] then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one DIXIE RANDY MALASMAS [y] SALEMO inside the canteen, hitting said DIXIE MALASMAS [y] SALEMO at the thorax[,] thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On 21 November 2002, the case was archived pending accused-appellant's arrest. Sometime in 2015, however, he was apprehended in Cavite for a different murder charge. 5 Thereafter, he pleaded not guilty to the crime charged on his arraignment. 6 After pre-trial, 7 trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
Dixie Randy Malasmas y Salemo (Dixie) and accused-appellant were contractual workers detailed at Multiplex RNC Philippines, Inc., formerly Uratex Philippines, Inc. (Uratex). 8
In the evening of 29 May 2002, Dixie was conversing with someone near the exit of the canteen outside Uratex. At about the same time, Elmer B. Bellen (Elmer), a resident of a nearby subdivision, was in front of the same canteen to buy food. While there, Elmer saw a man with noticeably protruding cheekbones 9 alight from a motorcycle holding a balisong or a fan knife. The man, whom Elmer later identified to be accused-appellant, 10 approached Dixie. When Dixie slightly turned, accused-appellant suddenly stabbed him in the chest and hurriedly fled after. 11
Elmer was about four (4) arms length away 12 and was facing Dixie when accused-appellant attacked him. 13 The incident only lasted about two (2) to three (3) minutes from the time accused-appellant alighted from his motorcycle. 14
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that on 29 May 2012, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, he left Uratex and bought food at a nearby canteen. He immediately headed to his sister's house in Las Piñas City after he noticed a group of people having a drinking session with some of them already drunk. 15 The next day, accused-appellant no longer reported for work and went home to Batangas to attend a fiesta. Since then, he settled there to look after his aging parents. On 18 May 2015, he was arrested in Cavite for a different murder charge. 16
Ruling of the RTC
On 01 April 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision, 17 the dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, this Court finds accused FELIPE BAUTISTA [y] Tolentino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended[,] and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
In addition, accused is hereby directed to pay the heirs of Dixie Randy Malasmas y Salemo the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per [annum] from the finality of judgment until full payment.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the immediate transfer of accused Felipe Bautista [y] Tolentino to the National Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for the service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED. 18
The RTC found Elmer's account of the incident convincing, trustworthy, and given without any established ill motive. It further found the existence of treachery as the attack was so sudden and Dixie was caught off guard, leaving him no time to defend himself. 19
However, the RTC ruled that the prosecution failed to establish evident premeditation and that accused-appellant purposely used a motorcycle to facilitate his escape. 20
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed to the CA. 21
Ruling of the CA
On 11 October 2017, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, 22 affirming accused-appellant's conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 01 April 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 276[,] is hereby AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant Felipe Bautista y Tolentino is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code[,] as amended[,] and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of [reclusion perpetua]. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Dixie Randy Malasmas the following: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages[,] all with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.23
It rejected accused-appellant's arguments and affirmed the RTC's findings based on Elmer's positive identification of the accused-appellant as the person who stabbed Dixie to death. The CA agreed with the RTC that the killing of Dixie was qualified by treachery since accused-appellant's attack was executed in a manner that rendered Dixie defenseless and unable to retaliate. 24
The CA, however, modified the decision of the RTC by deleting the phrase "without eligibility for parole" and increasing the award of damages to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.
Hence, this appeal. 25
Issue
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed accused-appellant's conviction of the crime of Murder, attended with treachery.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
To prove the crime of murder, the prosecution must establish the following elements: 1) a person was killed; 2) the accused killed him or her; 3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the RPC; and 4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 26
In questioning his conviction, accused-appellant attacks the credibility of prosecution witness Elmer and alleges that his identification of accused-appellant was vague and highly dubious. He highlights, among others, Elmer's admission that he did not know the names of the victim and the alleged assailant at the time of the incident. According to him, it was only Ambrosia A. Parba (Ambrosia) who supplied the name Felipe Bautista during her out-of-court identification before the police investigator thirteen (13) years ago. Elmer's testimony, therefore, cannot be the basis of his conviction as it was derivative — Elmer merely embraced Ambrosia's out-of-court identification. 27
The arguments are specious.
That Elmer did not know the name of accused-appellant at the time of the stabbing incident is of no moment. Witnesses need not know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the latter's faces. What is imperative is that, on the basis of their personal knowledge, the witnesses are positive as to the physical identification of the perpetrators. 28
To recall, Elmer saw accused-appellant stab Dixie at close range. Accused-appellant was facing Elmer at the time of the stabbing and the latter had an unobstructed view of accused-appellant's face at such a short distance of four (4) arms length. 29 Elmer is certain of accused-appellant's identity as he categorically testified that he remembered his noticeably slightly protruding cheekbones. 30
Moreover, this Court is convinced that accused-appellant's identity as Dixie's assailant was established on the basis of Elmer's testimony in open court and not merely adopted on Ambrosia's out-of-court identification. Notably, Elmer identified accused-appellant anew during trial. 31 The reliability of his identification was based on him having witnessed the stabbing incident from a very short distance.
Besides, accused-appellant failed to impute any sinister motive on the part of Elmer to falsely testify against him on such a serious crime. Elmer was even initially reluctant to testify because he did not personally know the parties to the case and did not want to be disturbed as he was the only one who tended to his store. 32 However, in 2013, he changed his mind, executed his Salaysay, 33 and took the witness stand after he learned that prosecution witness Ambrosia already died, and Dixie was an only son and incoming 5th year engineering student at the time of his death. 34
Accused-appellant also points out inconsistencies between Ambrosia's Salaysay35 and that of Elmer's testimony in court. He contends that: (1) Ambrosia sweepingly claimed in her affidavit that she was certain as to the identity of assailant yet she failed to mention "protruding cheekbones," which Elmer was referring to and she did not mention seeing Elmer at that time, and vice versa; and (2) Ambrosia never identified the accused-appellant at all while Elmer identified accused-appellant only thirteen (13) years after the stabbing incident occurred.
Elmer's belated identification of accused-appellant as Dixie's assailant was justified because of his initial reluctance to testify. Anent the inconsistencies between Ambrosia's Salaysay and that of Elmer's testimony in court, suffice it to state they refer to minor details which do not touch upon the central fact of the crime and do not impair Elmer's credibility. Too, that certain details testified to by Elmer were not mentioned in Ambrosia's Salaysay do not impair the former's credibility. Instead, they serve as proof that Elmer's testimony was not coached or rehearsed. Altogether, We are convinced that Elmer's testimony given in categorical, straightforward, and candid manner was worthy of faith and belief.
Neither can accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi outweigh the positive and categorical testimony of eyewitness Elmer that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Dixie. The Court has often pronounced that denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 36
Further, the continuing case law is that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he/she was at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that he/she was so far away that it was not possible for him/her to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 37 In the present case, it was not impossible for accused-appellant to be at the place of the crime at the time the stabbing incident because he himself testified that he was there, only that he left when he saw a group of people having a drinking session.
Also, as aptly observed by the RTC, the fact that accused-appellant left the place of the incident and no longer reported for work after strongly indicate consciousness of guilt. Verily, it is highly unnatural for accused-appellant to suddenly leave his source of income for no valid and convincing reason. Furthermore, his act of staying in the province for almost thirteen (13) years after the stabbing incident until he was finally arrested for a different murder charge shows his intent to go into hiding. 38 We are convinced that accused-appellant's flight, under the circumstances, is evidence of his guilt. 39
Lastly, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly ruled that the killing of Dixie was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 40
While the mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily equate to treachery, 41 We find that treachery exists in this case. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the victim no chance to resist or escape. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or herself or retaliate, ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. 42 Dixie was completely unaware of accused-appellant's plan to attack him. He was merely conversing with another person when accused-appellant, without warning, stabbed him. The incident happened so fast that it only lasted about two (2) to three (3) minutes from the time accused-appellant alighted from his motorcycle to the stabbing incident and until he left. Given the foregoing, Dixie was evidently afforded no opportunity to defend himself, to retaliate or escape while accused-appellant was exposed to no risk at all.
Notably, the Information failed to allege the facts and circumstances constituting treachery. We are very much aware of Our pronouncement in People v. Valdez43 that the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery must sufficiently be alleged in the information for murder. In other words, the use of the term treachery, standing alone, is not sufficient; it is but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. Further, under Section 3 (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the failure to allege said particular acts and circumstances is a ground for a motion to quash.
However, Section 9 of the same rule provides that the accused-appellant's failure to raise his objection against such a defect before he enters his plea shall be deemed a waiver of his objection thereto. 44 A perusal of the records shows that accused-appellant never questioned the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information. Accused-appellant is, therefore, deemed to have waived his right to object to the defect. At any rate, he had been informed of the elements of the murder charge against him. Hence, none of his rights, particularly that of being informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, was violated.
We now come to the propriety of the penalties imposed.
In view of the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the case at bar, accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the crime of Murder, as defined under Art. 248 of the RPC, for the killing of Dixie. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua is correct.
We, however, deem it apt to modify the amount of damages awarded by the CA. When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts to be awarded should be Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php75,000.00 exemplary damages. 45 We uphold the award of temperate damages. Temperate damages in the amount of Php50,000.00 in homicide or murder cases is awarded when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. 46 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. 47
Finally, We sustain the CA's imposition of interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 48
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated 11 October 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08329 is AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATIONS as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 01 April 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 276, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant Felipe Bautista y Tolentino is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Dixie Randy Malasmas the following: (a) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) Php50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, all with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 14-16.
2.Id. at 2-13; penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of this Court) and Jhosep T. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) of the Tenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3. CA rollo, pp. 55-62; penned by RTC Presiding Judge Antonietta Pablo-Medina.
4. Records, p. 13.
5.Id. at 3.
6.Id. at 33-34.
7.Id. at 43-45.
8. TSN dated 07 December 2015, pp. 3-6.
9. TSN dated 19 October 2015, pp. 6-11.
10.Id. at 8.
11.Id. at 9-11.
12.Id. at 8.
13.Id. at 14-15.
14.Id. at 9-11.
15. TSN dated 09 December 2015, p. 3.
16.Id. at 4-6.
17. Records, pp. 120-128.
18.Id. at 128.
19. CA rollo, p. 59.
20.Id. at 60.
21.Id. at 121-123.
22.Rollo, pp. 2-13.
23.Id. at 12-13.
24.Id. at 11.
25.Id. at 14-16.
26.People v. Lababo, G.R. No. 234651, 06 June 2018, 865 SCRA 609, 623.
27. CA rollo, pp. 38-41.
28.People v. Watamama, 734 Phil. 673-685 (2014); G.R. No. 188710, 02 June 2014, 724 SCRA 331, 341.
29. TSN dated 19 October 2015, pp. 8-9.
30.Id. at 11.
31.Id. at 7-8.
32.Id. at 12-14.
33. Records, p. 69.
34. TSN dated 19 October 2015, pp. 14-15.
35. Records, p. 9.
36.People v. Lumahang, G.R. No. 218581, 27 March 2019.
37.People v. Vargas, G.R. No. 230356, 18 September 2019.
38. Records, p. 127.
39.People v. Menil, G.R. No. 233205, 26 June 2019.
40.People v. Albino, G.R. No. 229928, 22 July 2019.
41.Id.
42.People v. Saltarin, G.R. No. 223715, 03 June 2019.
43. 679 Phil. 279-296 (2012); G.R. No. 175602, 18 January 2012, 663 SCRA 272, 281.
44. SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any of the objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
45.People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, 05 April 2016, 788 SCRA 331, 373.
46.People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997, 16 October 2019.
47.People v. Gervero, et al., G.R. No. 206725, 11 July 2018.
48.People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997, 16 October 2019.