SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 208443. August 4, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ROLANDO ASOY y CAUBALIJO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated04 August 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 208443 (People of the Philippines v. Rolando Asoy y Caubalijo). — The Court NOTES the Letter dated October 8, 2020 of CSInsp. Jeremy L. Argonza, OIC-Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, in compliance with the Resolution dated June 10, 2020, confirming the confinement of accused-appellant Rolando Asoy y Caubalijo (accused-appellant) in the said institution since August 13, 2011.
Before this Court is an Appeal filed by accused-appellant from the Decision 1 dated February 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34379. The assailed Decision dismissed the appeal and affirmed, albeit with modifications as to penalty and amount of damages, the Decision 2 dated May 10, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 257, which found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The antecedent facts follow.
By virtue of an Information 3 dated October 14, 2008, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of October 2008, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with bladed weapon, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one MICHAEL JOHN SEBULLEN y ACUISA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
When arraigned, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty." After pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded. 5
The evidence for the prosecution established that at around 5:00 p.m. of October 12, 2008, Michael John Sebullen (victim), along with his family and friends, were on board a vehicle travelling along Sampaloc Avenue, Sampaloc Site II, Barangay BF Homes, Parañaque City, when they saw the accused-appellant walking mindlessly in the middle of the road. The driver blew the horn but the accused-appellant did not move; the victim then uttered: "Pre tumabi ka naman, hindi kami makadaan." In response, the accused-appellant stared at the victim and remarked: "Putang ina mo, yabang mo, babalikan kita." The accused-appellant then hit the rear portion of the vehicle with his fist while the victim's group went on their way. 6
When the victim's group reached the end of the street, they stopped; and the victim alighted from the vehicle in order to buy cigarettes. As the victim was walking towards the store, the accused-appellant armed with a long knife suddenly appeared, approached the victim, and stabbed him in his back. As the victim tried to escape, he stumbled to the ground; it was then that the accused-appellant caught up with him and stabbed the victim in his chest. Thereafter, the accused-appellant tried to flee but he was chased and mauled by bystanders who witnessed the incident. 7
The victim's sister, Ma. Criselda Sebullen, alighted from the vehicle and came to the aid of his brother. With the help of people in the area, they brought the victim to the Parañaque Medical Center, but he died while undergoing medical treatment due to the severity of his injuries. 8
SPO2 Archie Cristobal and PO1 Alberto A. Antonio responded at the scene at around 5:00 p.m. of the same day. When they arrived, only the accused-appellant was at the scene. They first had him treated for his injuries and thereafter brought him to the police station for investigation. During trial, the police officers affirmed the contents of the affidavit of arrest and of having executed the same. 9
In an autopsy report executed by Dr. Voltaire P. Nulud, Police Chief Inspector and Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, based on the examination conducted on the body of the victim, it was found that he sustained three injuries: an abrasion at the left forearm, a stab wound at the front of the body below the right chest, and another stab wound at the left portion of the back of his body. In the same report, it was concluded that the wound at the victim's back caused his death as it penetrated his right lung causing internal hemorrhage. 10
The prosecution also presented official receipts to prove that the victim's family incurred P4,877.19 as medical expenses, and funeral and burial expenses in the total amount of P26,500.00. 11
The accused-appellant, for his part, admitted to having inflicted injuries upon the victim but averred that he merely acted in self-defense. The accused-appellant testified that on the date of the incident, he was walking along Sampaloc Street when a vehicle ran past close to him, hitting his left hand with its side mirror. When the accused-appellant asked the driver to slow down; the vehicle stopped and the victim went out and approached him. The accused-appellant then said to the victim — "Pre dahan dahan naman kayo," to which the latter angrily said in response: "Tatanga tanga ka kasi eh hindi mo ba alam na nagmamadali kami, matapang ka pa?" At that point, the victim punched the accused-appellant in the face, which resulted in a fistfight between the two. While engaged in the brawl, the victim pulled out a knife. The accused-appellant held the victim's hand and tried to gain possession of the knife. Thereafter, two of the victim's companions alighted from the vehicle and mauled the accused-appellant. In the course of the fight, the accused-appellant gained possession of the knife and thrust it wildly against the group; it was then that the victim got hit and fell on the ground. With this, the accused-appellant ran towards Sucat Road, but felt dizzy and tumbled down. Then, two police officers arrived, boarded him in the patrol car, and brought him to the precinct where he was detained. The accused-appellant also presented in evidence a Medical Certificate to prove the injuries he sustained during the fight. 12
On May 10, 2011, the RTC rendered its Decision, 13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Rolando Asoy y Caubalijo is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 20 years of reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as maximum. He is ordered to pay Elizabeth Sebullen, mother of the victim, P50,000.00 for actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 14
The accused-appellant appealed to the CA, which dismissed the same in its Decision 15 dated February 25, 2013, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 10 May 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Paranaque City, Branch 257, in Criminal Case No. 08-1311, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Rolando Asoy y Caubalijo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Michael John Sebullen the following amounts: 1) P75,000.00 civil indemnity; 2) P75,000.00 moral damages; 3) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and 4) P32,154.38 actual damages.
SO ORDERED. 16
Thus, this appeal.
The parties manifested that they would no longer file their respective supplemental briefs as they had already exhaustively discussed the issues in their briefs before the CA. 17
The accused-appellant, in his Brief, 18 argued his innocence. He averred that despite his invocation of self-defense, the burden of proof still lies with the prosecution to establish the elements of the offense, its attendant circumstances, and prove that he is the perpetrator thereof. He also faulted the RTC in relying upon the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, claiming that their relationship with the victim make them biased, and that their testimonies are riddled with "incredulous" details and loopholes which render them not worthy of belief and credence. 19
The accused-appellant submitted that he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He insisted that it was the victim who started the fight and that his unlawful aggression which consisted in boxing him on the face and pulling a knife prompted the accused-appellant to make a move in order to defend himself. Arguing further, the accused-appellant submitted that even assuming that the means he employed were not reasonable under the circumstances, he is still entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and should be imposed upon a penalty that is one or two degrees lower than that prescribed by law. 20
Finally, the accused-appellant also submitted that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving that the killing was attended by evident premeditation as none of its requisites are attendant in the case. Likewise, the accused-appellant argued that treachery cannot be merely inferred from the suddenness of the attack; it must also be proven that the means was consciously adopted by the accused-appellant to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself and in order to deprive the victim of any means to defend himself. 20
In response, the plaintiff-appellee in its Brief 21 countered that with the accused-appellant's admission, it is undeniable that it was he who killed the victim. The accused-appellant cannot excuse himself from liability as his version of self-defense is "incredible being contrary to human experience and the natural order of things" particularly, that the victim, who was then accompanied by his sister and mother would go as far as confront and hitting the accused-appellant for a trivial remark made by the latter. Moreover, had the accused-appellant's theory that he was mauled by the victim and his companions be true, he would have easily been overpowered and neutralized. In contrast, the plaintiff-appellee posited that the version of the prosecution is more credible and natural. The minor inconsistencies and flaws cited by the accused-appellant do not weaken but rather bolster the credibility of witnesses as they show that the testimonies are not rehearsed; neither does it affect the finding of guilt as they are immaterial to the elements of the crime charged. 22
The appeal is not meritorious.
The crime of murder, as defined by Article 248 of the RPC, demands the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing does not constitute the crime of parricide or infanticide. 23
The same article of the Code enumerates the circumstances that qualify homicide into murder, 24 pertinent to this case, these include evident premeditation and treachery which are alleged in the instant information to have attended the crime.
The Court finds the existence of the foregoing elements of murder; the killing, qualified by treachery. Thus, the Court sees no reason to reverse the judgment of conviction.
Herein, the accused-appellant admitted to the killing of the victim but claimed that the same was done in self-defense.
The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. In this scenario, the burden is shifted upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 25
Jurisprudence has repeatedly emphasized that of the elements of self-defense, the most important is unlawful aggression. Absent which, the accused cannot claim self-defense whether complete or incomplete; and the two other essential elements would have no factual and legal bases. 26
In this case, the fact of unlawful aggression has not been proven; thus, the accused-appellant's claim for complete or incomplete self-defense has no leg to stand on.
Unlawful aggression requires the presence of these elements: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imaginary threat. 27
Notably, and as observed by the trial court, the accused-appellant's version of events is uncorroborated, a marked difference from that of the prosecution which is substantiated in its material points. Other than his testimony, the accused-appellant failed to support his version of events. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the eyewitness accounts of the two principal witnesses of the prosecution, particularly as no false or improper motive may be imputed upon them. The accused-appellant's imputation of bias upon these witnesses fails to impress the Court. It is settled that mere relationship with the victim does not give rise to any presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish their testimonies. If at all, relationship would even make them more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to charge and prosecute another person other than the real culprit. 29 As such, the RTC and the CA cannot be faulted in giving the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses full faith and credit.
Moreover, it is settled in this jurisdiction that the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great respect if not finality by the Court, since it is in a unique position to properly evaluate the evidence and observe the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying. This rule is even more observed, when as in this case, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. 30
As observed by both the RTC and the CA, the victim was on his way to the store when the accused-appellant suddenly stabbed him in the back. Clearly, in this scenario, there is no unlawful aggression as the victim was not even facing the accused-appellant. The injuries sustained by the victim substantiated this narration of events and belies the accused-appellant's defense that there was an altercation. As stated in the autopsy report, the victim sustained three injuries: an abrasion at the left forearm and two stab wounds — one located at the front of the body below the right chest, and another at the left portion of the back of his body. 31 If the Court were to believe the accused-appellant's story that after getting possession of the knife, he merely thrust the same aimlessly against the group, then why is it that only the victim sustained injuries among his companions? As well, the fatal wound that the victim sustained belies the nature of an aimless attack. More specifically, the autopsy report characterizes the same as "fatal wound that penetrated and lacerated the upper lobe of the right lung causing internal hemorrhage which led to the death of the victim." 32 The other injury sustained by the victim was in the chest. The location and seriousness of the wounds negate that the same resulted in an aimless attack, which in turn, discredits the accused-appellant's plea of self-defense. 33
In view of the same circumstances, the position and manner of the attack on the victim indicate the presence of treachery which qualifies the offense to murder. The accused-appellant stabbed the victim, without warning and from behind. As the victim tried to escape, he fell down and that is when the accused-appellant again stabbed him for the second time on the chest. Clearly, the manner of attack by the accused-appellant, that is, sudden, from behind, and while the victim was on the ground, insured the execution of the crime without any risk of defense or retaliation that the victim might make. Otherwise, the accused-appellant employed means to insure or afford impunity. 34
However, the attack cannot be said to have been attended by evident premeditation. The attendant facts reveal that there was no sufficient time that elapsed for the accused-appellant to decide to commit the crime and reflect on its consequences. "The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment." 35 In this case, the encounter between the parties immediately preceded the fatal attack upon the victim.
Anent the penalty, there being no other aggravating circumstance aside from treachery which already qualified the offense, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua must be affirmed in accordance with Articles 63 and 248 and of the RPC. 36 However, the amount of damages must be modified in light of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta. 37 The accused-appellant should be made to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, pegged at P75,000.00 each. With respect to the amount of actual damages, the settled rule is that when the amount proven by receipts during the trial is less than the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual damages which is of a lesser amount. 38 Since prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages in murder cases, the Court finds it proper to award temperate damages to victim's heirs, in lieu of P32,154.38 actual damages that was proven. 39 The accused-appellant shall also pay interest upon these damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum until fully paid. 40
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34379 convicting the accused-appellant Rolando Asoy y Caubalijo of the crime of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Rolando Asoy y Caubalijo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, and in accordance with the recent jurisprudence, he is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Michael John Sebullen, the amounts of P50,000.00 as temperate damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All of which shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED." (Rosario, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2835 dated July 15, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-15; penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with Associate Justices Angelita A. Gacutan and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring.
2. CA rollo, pp. 15-21.
3.Rollo, p. 3.
4.Id.
5.Id. See also CA rollo, p. 15.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 3-4. See also CA rollo, pp. 15-17.
8.Id.
9. CA rollo, pp. 18-19.
10.Id. at 18.
11.Id.
12.Rollo, p. 4. See also CA rollo, p. 20.
13. CA rollo, pp. 15-23; rendered by Presiding Judge Rolando G. How.
14.Id. at 23.
15.Rollo, pp. 2-15.
16.Id. at 14.
17.Id. at 22-23, 25-26.
18. CA rollo, pp. 36-51.
19.Id. at 44-47.
20.Id. at 48-49.
20.Id. at 47-48.
21.Id. at 72-92.
22.Id. at 80-86.
23.People v. Gaborne, 791 Phil. 581, 592 (2016).
24. Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
25.People v. Dulin, 762 Phil. 24, 37 (2015).
26.Id. at 39.
27.People v. Fontanilla, 680 Phil. 155, 165-166 (2012).
28. Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document. Missing Footnote Reference and Footnote Text.
29.People v. Dayaday, 803 Phil. 363, 371-372 (2017).
30.People v. Damitan, 423 Phil. 113, 121-122 (2001).
31. CA rollo, p. 18.
32.Id.
33.People v. Damitan, supra at 123.
34.Id. at 126.
35.People v. Isla, 699 Phil. 256, 270 (2012).
36.Id. at 272.
37. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
38.People v. Racal, 817 Phil. 665, 685-686. (2017).
39.Id., People v. Jugueta, supra.
40.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).