FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 202476. June 10, 2019.]
LEILA L. PALAGANAS, petitioner, vs.DR. JENNIFER ROSLYN SISON-DE LEON, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 10, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 202476 (Leila L. Palaganas v. Dr. Jennifer Roslyn Sison-De Leon). — In this petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated September 28, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated June 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120054, we reaffirm the rule of faithful observance of the applicable rules of procedure, which in this case is the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (RRSP).
On July 8, 2008, respondent Dr. Jennifer Roslyn Sison-De Leon (Dr. Sison) performed Thermage procedure on the face of petitioner Leila L. Palaganas (Palaganas) at the Medical Plaza Makati City clinic of Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI). Claiming, among others, that her face became swollen with bruises and blisters after the procedure, that the condition of her face worsened even after complying with Dr. Sison's post procedural instructions, and that Dr. Victoria Belo (Dr. Belo) allowed Dr. Sison to perform the procedure even if the latter is not a certified Thermage practitioner, Palaganas filed a complaint-affidavit 4 against Dr. Sison and Dr. Belo with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. She also asked for payment of moral damages in the amount of P20,000,000.00.
Palaganas filed a supplemental complaint-affidavit 5 further alleging that the swelling and bruises on her face were contrary to BMGI's representation in its website that "Thermage is a procedure that delivers tighter skin, smoothing out wrinkles, and defining the faces natural contours after a single treatment" and it is "fast and easy, and requires no downtime from normal activities." 6 She invoked the principle of res ipsa loquitor. She likewise stated that BMGI offered her post Thermage services (e.g., Lymphatic drainage and light therapy on her face) to alleviate the swelling; for her, this is an admission on the part of BMGI that something was wrong in her Thermage procedure. Palaganas then presented a medical certificate issued by Dr. Alma G. Perez, a dermatologist and certified Thermage practitioner, stating that Palaganas has permanent scars mostly located at the right cheek which might have resulted from the last procedure done on her. 7
In her counter-affidavit, 8 Dr. Sison averred that: (i) she is a skilled and experienced Thermage practitioner as she trained under Dr. Belo and Dr. Johanna Cristina Muñoz, who are both certified Thermage practitioners; (ii) having signed an Informed Consent Form, Palaganas was aware of the risks associated with Thermage; 9 (iii) Palaganas omitted that she still has to undergo Fraxel treatment after the Thermage procedure to improve, if not remove, the effects of the risks and complications of Thermage; and (iv) the post Thermage services provided to Palaganas were included in the cost of the whole Thermage package and are part of the goodwill extended by BMGI. 10 CAIHTE
The OCP dismissed the charge against Dr. Belo, but found probable cause for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries against Dr. Sison. Thus, on July 6, 2009, an Information was filed in the Metropolitan Trial Courts 11 (MeTC) of Makati City. 12 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
On the 8th day of July 2008, in Makati, the Philippines, the accused did then and there, in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without taking the necessary precaution, perform Thermage Procedure on private complainant, Leila L. Palaganas, the accused knowing well that she is not a certified Thermage practitioner to perform such procedure, thereby inflicting upon private complainant conspicuous and permanent scars and marks that constitute physical ugliness and permanent deformity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 13
In an Order dated July 6, 2009, the MeTC declared that the case is governed by the RRSP and pursuant to it, Dr. Sison was directed to submit her counter affidavit and to appear on August 17, 2009 "for arraignment and/or preliminary hearing as the case may be." 14
Also on July 6, 2009, the MeTC issued a separate Order stating that Dr. Sison voluntarily surrendered to the court and posted a bail in the amount of P2,000.00. 15
On August 11, 2009, Dr. Sison filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for suspension of proceedings, 16 which was opposed by Palaganas. On September 18, 2009, Palaganas filed a motion to amend information and to admit attached amended information, 17 which the MeTC eventually admitted. The Amended Information stressed that Dr. Sison was employed by BMGI when she committed the reckless conduct complained of. Thereafter, the arraignment was reset to September 30, 2009. 18
Meanwhile, the MeTC, in an Order 19 dated September 22, 2009, resolved the motion for determination of probable cause in favor of Dr. Sison. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of probable cause, the information in this case against the accused Dr. Jennifer Roslyn Sison-De Leon is dismissed. The cash bond posted by her for her provisional liberty is cancelled and ordered refunded to her upon proper identification. The tentative setting for the arraignment of the accused on September 30, 2009, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning is cancelled for being functus officio.
SO ORDERED. 20
The MeTC held, among others, that: (i) Palaganas failed to establish probable cause to hold Dr. Sison for trial, specifically, she failed to submit an expert's affidavit to establish the standard of care to be implemented in treating a patient with a similar condition as hers and that Dr. Sison did not exercise such standard; (ii) Palaganas failed to point out any specific rules or law which requires a licensed physician to undergo training or secure a separate certificate before performing Thermage procedure; (iii) she also did not allege much less present sufficient proof to support a finding of probable cause that her injury would not have occurred but for Dr. Sison's supposed negligent conduct; (iv) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is inapplicable in the case because the scars, blisters, and burns were foreseen consequences of the Thermage procedure, as clearly indicated in the consent form that she signed; and (v) Palaganas' signing of the Consent Form is a voluntary assumption of risk on her part of the complications involved. 21
With the conformity of Second Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang, Palaganas filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for inhibition, 22 which Dr. Sison opposed. The Presiding Judge of Branch 62, MeTC of Makati City inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled to Branch 67, which denied the motion for reconsideration in its Order dated December 22, 2009. 23
Instead of appealing the Order dated December 22, 2009, Palaganas filed a petition for certiorari 24 with the RTC.
In a Decision 25 dated July 6, 2010, the RTC affirmed the MeTC. It ruled that Palaganas availed of the wrong remedy. Under Section 21 of the RRSP, the judgment or final order of the MeTC is appealable to the appropriate RTC. In this case, Palaganas deliberately filed a petition under Rule 65 instead of an ordinary appeal. The RTC declared that the petition was dismissible on the ground of impropriety of remedy. 26 DETACa
Nevertheless, on the assumption that there is an exceptional circumstance showing that appeal is an inadequate remedy, the RTC held that the MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. It declared that the motion for judicial determination of probable cause filed by Dr. Sison is not a prohibited pleading. Section 13 of the RRSP authorizes the MeTC, upon consideration of the Information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, to dismiss the case outright even before the arraignment and trial of the case if it finds no ground to hold the accused on trial. If the court may motu proprio dismiss the case then it could also do so when a motion for determination of probable cause is filed. 27
The RTC further explained that Dr. Sison's posting of a bail bond, although unnecessary, was intended to avert her incarceration and should not be deemed a waiver of her right to assail the finding of probable cause. 28
Palaganas appealed to the CA. 29
In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC. First, it agreed that the MeTC is not precluded from dismissing a criminal case under the RRSP before arraignment and sans trial. 30 Second, it stated that while it may appear that the MeTC gave much credence to the allegations of Dr. Sison in her motion for judicial determination of probable cause, the same does not equate ipso facto to an abuse of discretion. The MeTC appears to have complied with the requirement under the rules of personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. 31 Third, the CA opined that Dr. Sison's posting of a bail bond cannot be deemed a waiver of her right to question the finding of probable cause. 32
Palaganas moved for reconsideration, which was likewise denied in a Resolution 33 dated June 25, 2012; hence, this petition.
Palaganas argues that:
(a) The MeTC has no power to review, reassess, and reverse the resolution of the OCP as to the finding of probable cause; 34
(b) Assuming the MeTC has the power to review and reassess the OCP's resolution, it precipitately dismissed the Information based on unproven and highly disputed matters, which could be established only during trial on the merits; 35 and
(c) The MeTC dismissed the Information despite the issue of probable cause becoming moot and academic. Dr. Sison was effectively barred from raising the issue on probable cause after the MeTC had accepted, approved and confirmed the bail bond she posted. 36
For her part, Dr. Sison counters that:
(a) Palaganas' petition failed to show that special and important reasons exist to invoke our power of review since she merely reiterated and rehashed all previous arguments in the courts a quo. 37
(b) The CA correctly denied Palaganas' appeal for being fatally defective. First, she is not the proper party to institute the action but the People of the Philippines, through the Public Prosecutor. 38Second, she filed a motion for reconsideration of the final Order of MeTC, which is a prohibited pleading under the RRSP. Thus, its filing did not toll the running of the prescriptive period of appeal, rendering the Order final and executory. Third, even assuming that the motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited pleading, still Palaganas should have filed an ordinary appeal to the RTC and not a petition for certiorari. 39
(c) The MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. 40 aDSIHc
The material issue is whether the MeTC Order is already final and executory.
Dr. Sison harps on the two procedural lapses allegedly committed by Palaganas, either of which will result in the finality of the MeTC Order dated September 22, 2009. First, Palaganas filed a motion for reconsideration of the MeTC Order which is prohibited under the RRSP. Second, even assuming that a motion for reconsideration is not prohibited, Palaganas availed of the wrong remedy to assail the MeTC Order when she filed a petition for certiorari, instead of an ordinary appeal with the RTC.
We find for Palaganas as to the first issue but we agree with Dr. Sison as to the second.
The proceedings for the charge of reckless imprudence, having a prescribed penalty of not more than six months imprisonment, is governed by the RRSP. 41 Section 19 of the RRSP provides:
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
xxx xxx xxx (Underscoring supplied.)
As a rule, motions for reconsideration are prohibited under the RRSP. However, in Lucas v. Fabros, 42 we ruled that the proscription applies only when the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits, to wit:
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19(c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint. 43 (Underscoring supplied; citation omitted.)
Here, the MeTC Order is not a judgment rendered after trial on the merits. The MeTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause upon consideration only of the Information and affidavits submitted by the parties. The case did not reach arraignment and trial stage. Clearly, there is no trial on the merits to speak of. Therefore, Palaganas is not prohibited from filing a motion for reconsideration of the MeTC Order.
Be that as it may, we still find Palaganas to have committed a procedural blunder which resulted in the finality of the MeTC Order. Section 21 of the RRSP provides:
Sec. 21. Appeal. — The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. (Underscoring supplied.)
A final order is one which disposes of the subject matter of the case in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined. 44 In this case, the MeTC Order dismissing the Information against Dr. Sison is a final order. It leaves nothing to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case. Hence, to assail it, Palaganas should file an appeal before the RTC.
An appeal maybe taken to the RTC within 15 days after notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. 45 Palaganas received the notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration of the MeTC Order on February 2, 2010. Thus, she had until February 17, 2010 to file an appeal. However, instead of an appeal, she filed a petition for certiorari on April 5, 2010 46 alleging that she had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The RTC was not convinced.
We agree with the RTC. ETHIDa
Section 21 of the RRSP is clear. The final order of the MeTC may be assailed only through an appeal before the RTC. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 47 In Caliwan v. Ocampo, 48 we underscored compliance with the provisions of the RRSP, viz.:
The 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. It was conceptualized to facilitate the immediate resolution of cases. Respect for the Rule on Summary Procedure as a practicable norm for the expeditious resolution of cases like the one at bar could have avoided lengthy litigation that has unduly imposed on the time of the Court. 49 (Citations omitted)
To justify her chosen mode of remedy, Palaganas cites People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Cerbo50 where a petition for certiorari was availed of and was acted upon after a criminal case was dismissed before arraignment and trial on the merits.
Cerbo finds no application here. In Cerbo, the accused was charged with murder before the RTC. Evidently, the RRSP does not apply in Cerbo. On the other hand, the case before us is governed by the provisions of the RRSP.
Considering that Palaganas failed to avail of the proper remedy, the MeTC Order lapsed into finality.
We need not discuss the issue on whether the MeTC erred in dismissing the case because to do so would effectively give due course to Palaganas' petition for certiorari. Suffice it to state that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court. 51 In the present case, the MeTC exercised its discretion in accordance with Section 13 52 of the RRSP when it opted to dismiss the case upon a consideration of the information and the submitted affidavits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2011 Decision and June 25, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120054 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." Carandang, J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 8-33.
2.Id. at 36-57; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with concurrence of Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Michael P. Elbinias.
3.Id. at 59-63.
4.Id. at 65-67.
5.Id. at 68-73.
6.Id. at 69.
7.Id. at 68-73.
8.Id. at 74-85.
9. x x x I understand that practice of medicine and surgery is not an exact science, and, therefore, reputable practitioners cannot guarantee results. The clinical results may vary in different skin types.
Although complications following Thermage radiofrequency skin tightening are infrequent, there are some risks associated with the use of radiofrequency devices. These include:
• Blistering, swelling, superficial burns and infection
• May interfere with cardiac pacemakers and defibrillators
• Temporary lumpiness, tenderness and altered sensation
• H. Simplex virus (cold sores) may be reactivated
• Scarring and skin indention which may require additional treatment
I understand that healing time varies with each individual and the intensity of treatment. Immediately following the treatment, the treated area may appear as a red discoloration, edematous which may last up to two hours or longer or may feel tight and tender to the touch. Following treatment, you may continue your normal skin care regimen. Make-up can be worn over the treated area as long as there are no blisters. Please call the clinic or Dr. Sison if you develop a blister.
Improper care of the treated area may increase the chance of scarring or skin textual changes.
I hereby give my consent to Dr. Sison.
I certify that I have been fully informed of the nature and purposes of the procedure, expected outcomes and possible complications, and I understand that no guarantees can be given as to the final result obtained. I am fully aware that my condition is of cosmetic concern and that the decision to proceed is based solely on my expressed desire to do so.
xxx xxx xxx
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE OPP[O]RTUNITY TO ASK QUESTIONS AND THAT I HAVE READ AND FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CONTENTS OF THIS CONSENT FORM AND AGREE TO THE RISKS INVOLVED. Id. at 78-79. Emphasis and italics omitted.
10.Rollo, pp. 74-85.
11. Branch 62.
12.Rollo, p. 37.
13.Id. at 94.
14.Id. at 95.
15.Id. at 96.
16.Id. at 117-133.
17.Id. at 135-136.
18.Id. at 38.
19.Id. at 156-163.
20.Id. at 163.
21.Id. at 158-163.
22.Id. at 164-185.
23.Id. at 13.
24.Id. at 225-249.
25.Id. 301-314.
26.Id. at 308.
27.Id. at 311-312.
28.Id. at 313.
29.Id. at 317.
30.Id. at 52.
31.Id. at 53-54.
32.Id. at 55.
33.Supra note 3.
34.Rollo, p. 14.
35.Id. at 20.
36.Id. at 30.
37.Id. at 438.
38.Id. at 41.
39.Id. at 445.
40.Id. at 450.
41.Sec. 1. Scope. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx xxx
5. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
xxx xxx xxx
Reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries is punishable by the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period or 1 month to 4 months imprisonment. [See Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 9 and 263 (4) of the same Code]
42.A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-315-MTJ], January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 1.
43.Id. at 6.
44.Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 566, citing Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 170740, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 203, 210-211.
45.Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court as applied in a suppletory capacity in accordance with Section 22 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
46.Supra note 24.
47.Tolentino-Prieto v. Elvas, G.R. No. 192369, November 9, 2016, 808 SCRA 108, 120, citing Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal, Jr., G.R. No. 181182, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 468, 470, citing Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 113, 117.
48.G.R. No. 183270, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 500.
49.Id. at 507-508.
50.G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 475.
51.Caliwan v. Ocampo, supra note 48 at 508.
52.Sec. 13. Arraignment and trial. — Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
xxx xxx xxx